Si autem aliquod commune in omni anima oportet dicere, erit utique actus primus corporis physici organici. If, then, one should speak about something common to every soul, the soul will in fact be the first act of an organized natural body. Unde non oportet quaerere si unum est anima et corpus, sicut neque ceram et figuram neque omnino uniuscuiusque materiam et id cuius est materia. Unum enim et esse cum multipliciter dicatur, quod proprie est, actus est. Hence, it is unnecessary to ask whether the soul and body are one, any more than whether the wax and the impression sealed on it are one, or in general, the matter of anything whatever and that of which it is the matter. For while “one” and “being” are predicated in many ways, that which is properly so is act. 211. Quae quidem a prioribus, etc. Postquam Aristoteles posuit opinionem aliorum de anima in primo libro, accedit ad determinandum de anima secundum propriam opinionem et veritatem. Et circa hoc duo facit: 211. Thus far, we have spoken (412a3). Having reviewed, in book 1, other men’s opinions on the soul, Aristotle now begins book 2 of his treatise, in which he sets out what he himself holds on the matter. primo dicit de quo est intentio, continuans se ad praecedentia; First, then, continuing what has gone before, he states his general aim; secundo prosequitur suam intentionem, ibi: dicimus itaque unum quoddam etc. and second, at now we say that one (412a6; [212]), he starts to carry it out. Dicit ergo primo quod in primo libro dicta sunt ea quae tradita sunt a prioribus de anima. Sed oportet iterum quasi redeundo a principio determinare veritatem; quod quidem propter suam difficultatem magis oportet temptare quam securitatem de veritate invenienda praesumere. He begins by saying that, despite all which has been handed down by our predecessors of the soul, it is necessary to go back to the beginning, as it were, to determine to the truth. The subject is so difficult that it is wiser to assume that the truth about it has not yet been discovered. Et cum supra in prooemio quaesitum fuerit utrum prius de ipsa anima determinandum sit aut de partibus eius, quasi hanc quaestionem determinans dicit quod a principio dicendum est quid est anima, in quo notificatur ipsa animae essentia, postea autem determinabitur de partibus sive potentiis ipsius. Et quasi huiusmodi rationem assignans, subiungit: et quae utique erit communissima ratio ipsius; cum enim ostenditur quid est anima, traditur id quod est commune, cum autem determinatur de unaquaque partium aut potentiarum ipsius, traditur id quod est speciale circa animam; hic est autem ordo doctrinae, ut a communibus ad minus communia procedatur, sicut ostendit philosophus in principio Physicorum. And in answer to the question raised in the introduction to book 1, whether one should first define the soul, and afterwards its parts, he decides now to say what the soul is, which will make the very essence of the soul known, before coming to conclusions about its parts or powers. As though explaining this decision, he adds that we shall thus have acquired the most comprehensive account of soul. For when one shows what the soul is, one treats what is common, whereas when one determines each of its parts or powers, he treats only some special aspect of soul. And as he explains at the beginning of the Physics, this is the order of teaching: to begin with common things and end with things less common. 212. Deinde cum dicit: dicimus itaque etc., prosequitur suam intentionem quam proposuerat. Et dividitur in partes duas: 212. Beginning, then, at now we say (412a6), his treatment divides into two parts. in prima ostendit quid est anima; In the first, he shows what soul in general is; in secunda determinat de partibus euis sive potentiis eius, ibi: potentiarum autem animae etc. and in the second, starting at of the soul’s powers (414a29; [279]), he shows what are its parts or powers. Prima dividitur in duas: The first part subdivides into two. in prima ponit definitionem animae quae est quasi demonstrationis conclusio; In the first, he gives the definition of the soul that is like the conclusion of a demonstration. in secunda ponit definitionem animae quae est quasi demonstrationis principium, ibi: quoniam autem ex incertis quidem etc. In the second, he gives the definition of the soul that is like the principle of a demonstration, at since it is from things uncertain (413a11; [245]). Sciendum est enim quod, sicut dicitur in I Posteriorum, omnis definitio aut est conclusio demonstrationis, sicut haec: tonitruum est continuus sonus in nubibus, aut est demonstrationis principium, sicut haec: tonitruum est extinctio ignis in nube, aut est demonstratio positione, id est ordine, differens, sicut haec: tonitruum est continuus sonus in nubibus propter extinctionem ignis in nube; in hac enim ponitur et demonstrationis conclusio et principium, sed non secundum ordinem syllogismi. Note in passing that any definition, as he says in Posterior Analytics 1, is either the conclusion of a demonstration (for example, “thunder is a continuous noise in the clouds”) or it is the demonstration’s principle (for example, “thunder is the extinction of fire in the clouds”) or it is the demonstration itself but in a different order (for example, “thunder is a continuous noise in the clouds caused by the extinction of fire in the clouds,” in which the demonstration’s conclusion and principle both appear, though not in syllogistic order). Prima autem pars dividitur in duas: The first part is divided into two. in prima ponit definitionem primam animae; In the first, he posits a first definition of the soul; in secunda manifestat eam, ibi: universaliter igitur dictum etc. in the second, at it has been stated then (412b9; [235]), he gives an explanation of the definition. Prima dividitur in duas: The first is divided into two. in prima praemittit quasdam divisiones ex quibus habetur via ad investigandum definitionem animae; In the first, to clear the grounds so as to seek the soul’s definition, he makes some preliminary distinctions. in secunda investigat animae definitionem, ibi: quare omne corpus etc. In the second, the defining proper begins, at therefore every natural body (412a15; [220]). 213. Sciendum est autem quod, sicut docet philosophus in VII Metaphysicae, haec est differentia inter definitionem substantiae et accidentis quod in definitione substantiae nihil ponitur quod sit extra substantiam definiti: definitur enim unaquaeque substantia per sua principia materialia vel formalia; in definitione autem accidentis ponitur aliquid quod est extra essentiam definiti, scilicet subiectum; oportet enim subiectum poni in definitione accidentis, sicut cum dicitur: simitas est curvitas nasi; et hoc ideo est quia definitio significat quod quid est res; substantia autem est quid completum in suo esse et in sua specie; accidens autem non habet esse completum, sed dependens a substantia. 213. It should be noted here that, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 7, there is this difference between defining substance and defining accidents: in the former case nothing extrinsic to the substance being defined is included, for every substance is defined through its own material and formal principles; but in defining an accident, something outside the essence of the thing defined is referred to, that is, its subject—for the subject must be placed in the definition of the accident, as when one says, “snubness” is curvature of a nose. The reason is that a definition must express what a thing is, and while substance is something complete in its being and its species, accidents do not have complete being, but rather being dependent on substance. Similiter etiam nulla forma est quid completum in specie, sed complementum speciei competit substantiae compositae; unde substantia composita sic definitur quod in eius definitione non ponitur aliquid quod sit extra essentiam eius, in omni autem definitione formae ponitur aliquid quod est extra essentiam formae, scilicet proprium subiectum eius sive materia. Unde, cum anima sit forma, oportet quod in definitione ipsius ponatur materia sive subiectum eius. In the same way, no form as such is a thing complete in species; rather, completion in species belongs to the composite substance; so the composite substance is so defined that nothing is placed within its definition that is outside its essence, while something is placed within the definition of a form that is outside the form’s essence, that is, its proper subject or matter. Hence, since the soul is a form, within its definition one must place its subject or matter. 214. Et ideo in prima parte ponit duas divisiones, quarum prima necessaria est ad investigandum id quod in definitione animae ponitur ad exprimendam essentiam eius; aliam quae est necessaria ad investigandum id quod ponitur in definitione animae ad exprimendum subiectum ipsius, ibi: substantiae autem maxime etc. 214. So, in the first part of this section, he makes certain distinctions necessary for investigating what is placed within the soul’s definition for the sake of expressing its essence, and then, at bodies especially seem to be substances (412a11; [217]), things necessary for investigating what is placed in the soul’s definition for the sake of expressing its subject. Circa primum innuit tres divisiones. As regards the former point, he alludes to three distinctions. Quarum prima est secundum quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta; et hanc innuit per hoc quod dicit quod substantia dicitur esse unum genus entium. The first of which is that of being divided into the ten categories; this he hints at when he says that substance is reckoned to be one of the kinds of things that are. 215. Secunda divisio est secundum quod substantia dividitur in materiam et formam et compositum: materia quidem est quae secundum se non est hoc aliquid, sed in potentia tantum ut sit hoc aliquid; forma autem est, secundum quam iam est hoc aliquid in actu; substantia vero composita est quae est hoc aliquid. Dicitur enim esse hoc aliquid aliquid demonstratum quod est completum in esse et specie, et hoc competit soli substantiae compositae in rebus materialibus; nam substantiae separatae, quamvis non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sunt tamen hoc aliquid, cum sint subsistens in actu et completae in natura sua; anima autem rationalis quantum ad aliquid potest dici hoc aliquid, secundum hoc quod potest esse per se subsistens, sed quia non habet speciem completam sed magis est pars speciei, non omnino competit ei quod sit hoc aliquid. Est ergo differentia inter materiam et formam quod materia est ens in potentia, forma autem est endelechia, id est actus, quo scilicet materia fit actu; unde ipsum compositum est ens actu. 215. The second distinction alluded to is that of substance into matter, form, and the composite of both. Matter is that which is as such not this particular thing (412a6) but is in mere potency to be this particular thing. Form, however, is that by which right away this particular thing is actual. And the composite substance is this particular thing; for that is said to be a particular thing which is something demonstrated, complete in existence and species; and among material realities, only the composite is such. For although separated substances are not composites of matter and form, they are still particular things, since they are actually subsisting and complete in their own nature. However, the rational soul in a certain respect can be called a particular thing—insofar as it can subsist through itself; but because it does not have a complete species, but is more part of a species, being a particular thing does not altogether belong to it. Matter, then, differs from form in this, that it is a being in potency, whereas form is the entelechy or act by which matter comes to be in act; whence the composite itself is the being in act. 216. Tertia divisio est quod actus dicitur dupliciter, uno modo sicut scientia est actus, alio modo sicut considerare est actus. Et differentia horum actuum ex potentiis perpendi potest: dicitur enim aliquis in potentia grammaticus antequam acquirat habitum grammaticae discendo vel inveniendo, quae quidem potentia in actum reducitur quando iam aliquis habet habitum scientiae; sed tunc iterum est in potentia ad usum habitus cum non considerat in actu, et de hac potentia in actum reducitur cum actu considerat; sic igitur et scientia est actus et consideratio est actus. 216. Third, he distinguishes two senses of “act”: in one sense, as knowledge is an act; in the other, as thinking is an act. And the difference can be understood by relating these acts to their potencies. Before one acquires the grammatical habit and becomes a grammarian, whether by learning or by discovery, one is only potentially so; and this potency is reduced to act when someone has the habit of knowledge. But then again he is further in potency to the use of the habit when he is not actually thinking; and as regards this potency, he is reduced to act when he actually thinks. In this sense, then, knowledge is one act and thinking another. 217. Deinde cum dicit: substantiae autem etc., ponit divisiones ex quibus investigatur id quod ponitur in definitione animae pertinens ad eius subiectum et innuit tres divisiones. 217. Then, at bodies especially (412a11), he alludes to three distinctions which are presupposed by his inquiry into the meaning of the definition of the soul, so far as the subject endowed with soul is concerned. Quarum prima est quod substantiarum quaedam sunt corpora et quaedam non sunt corpora, inter quas substantias maxime sunt manifestae corporales substantiae; nam substantiae incorporeae, quaecumque sint, immanifestae sunt eo quod sunt a sensibus remotae, sola ratione investigabiles. Hoc est ergo quod dicit, quod corpora maxime videntur esse substantiae. The first distinction is that, of substances, some are bodies and some are not bodies. Among these substances, bodily substances are the most manifest: for whatever the incorporeal substances are, they are not manifest, since they are remote from our senses and are only discoverable by an exercise of the reason. Hence, he says that bodies especially seem to be substances. 218. Secunda divisio est quod corporum quaedam sunt corpora physica, id est naturalia, quaedam non naturalia, sed artificialia. Homo enim et lignum et lapis sunt naturalia corpora, domus et securis sunt artificialia. Magis autem videntur substantiae corpora naturalia quam artificialia, quia corpora naturalia sunt principia artificialium: 218. The second distinction is between physical or natural bodies and certain non-natural bodies, artificial ones. For man and wood and stone are natural bodies, but a house or a saw is artificial. And of these, the natural bodies seem to be the more properly called substances, since natural bodies are the principles of artificial bodies. ars enim operatur ex materia quam natura ministrat, forma autem quae per artem inducitur est forma accidentalis, sicut figura vel aliquid huiusmodi; unde corpora artificialia non sunt in genere substantiae per suam formam, sed solum per suam materiam, quae est naturalis, habent ergo a corporibus naturalibus quod sint substantiae; unde corpora naturalia sunt magis substantiae quam corpora artificialia: sunt enim substantia non solum ex parte materiae, sed etiam ex parte formae. For art works upon materials furnished by nature, but the form that is brought about by the art is an accidental form, such as a new shape and so forth. Whence artificial bodies are not in the genus of substance through their form, but only through their matter, which is natural, so they have it that they are substances from the natural bodies. Natural bodies, therefore, are substances more than artificial bodies are, for they are substance not merely on the side of their matter, but also on the side of their form. 219. Tertia divisio est quod corporum naturalium quaedam habent vitam et quaedam non habent; illud autem dicitur habere vitam quod per se ipsum habet alimentum, augmentum et decrementum. 219. Third, he distinguishes between natural bodies that have life and ones that do not. For that is said to have life which can through itself have nourishment and grow and decrease. Sciendum autem est quod haec explanatio magis est per modum exempli quam per modum definitionis: non enim ex hoc solo quod aliquid habet augmentum et decrementum vivit, sed etiam ex hoc quod sentit et intelligit et alia opera vitae exercere potest; unde in substantiis separatis est vita ex hoc quod habent intellectum et voluntatem, ut patet in XI Metaphysicae, licet non sit in eis augmentum et alimentum; Note here that this explanation is said by way of example rather than definition. For besides growth and decrease, living things may exhibit sensation and intellectual knowledge and other vital activities. Whence in separated substances, as is proved in the Metaphysics 11, there is life because they have understanding and will, though they cannot grow and do not take nourishment. sed quia in istis generabilibus et corruptibilibus anima quae est in plantis, ad quam pertinent alimentum et augmentum ut in fine primi dictum est, est principium vitae, ideo hic quasi exemplariter exposuit habens vitam id quod habet alimentum et augmentum. Propria autem ratio vitae est ex hoc quod aliquid est natum movere se ipsum, large accipiendo motum, prout etiam intellectualis operatio motus quidam dicitur; ea enim sine vita esse dicimus quae ab exteriori tantum principio moveri possunt. But because among the things that are generated and corrupt, the soul that is in plants (to which pertains nutrition and growth, as was said at the end of book 1) is the principle of life, this is why he explains by example what has life as what has nourishment and growth. However, the proper account of life is that something is naturally apt to move its very self, taking “movement” in its wide sense so as to include intellectual activity, which is said to be a certain movement. For we say that those things are without life which are moved only from an exterior principle. 220. Deinde cum dicit: quare omne corpus etc., investigat animae definitionem, suppositis praemissis divisionibus. Et circa hoc tria facit: 220. After this, at therefore every natural body (412a15), he begins to define the soul, presupposing the distinctions already made. And his inquiry here has three parts. primo investigat partes definitionis; First, he inquires into the elements of the definition taken separately;