357. Tertio ibi: omnia autem patiuntur, ostendit secundum praedicta quomodo antiquorum positio possit esse vera, scilicet quod simile simili sentitur. Dicit ergo quod omnia quae sunt in potentia patiuntur et moventur ab activo et existente in actu, quod scilicet dum facit esse in actu ea quae patiuntur assimilat ea sibi; unde quodammodo patitur aliquis aliquid a simili et quodammodo a dissimili, ut dictum est, quia a principio, dum est in transmutari et pati, est dissimile, in fine autem, dum est in transmutatum esse et passum, est simile. Sic igitur et sensus, postquam factus est in actu a sensibili, est similis ei, sed ante non est similis, quod antiqui non distinguentes erraverunt. 357. Third, at all things are moved and acted upon (417a17), he shows how it follows from the above that the old position, that like senses like, cannot be true. All things that are in potency, he says, are acted upon and moved by an agent and something existing in act, namely, that which, when it makes actual things that are being acted upon, makes them like itself. In some sense, then, a thing is acted upon by both its like and its unlike (as we have already remarked). At first, and while it is being transformed and acted upon, there is dissimilarity; but at the end, when the thing has been transformed and acted upon, there is similarity. Therefore, so too, the sense, after it has been actually acted upon by the sensible object, is like it, but before, it is not like; the early philosophers went wrong because they missed this distinction. Lectio 11 Lecture 11 Distinguit quippiam esse in potentia bifariam; vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid; et ad intellectum applicans, ostendit quomodo ex potentia reducatur in actum, non quidem patiendo, sed potius seipsum perficiendo Potency and act in sensation continued Dividendum autem et de potentia et actu est. Nunc enim simpliciter dicimus quae habemus de ipsis. Distinctions, however, must be made concerning potency and act; for at present we are speaking of these in a simple way. Est quidem enim sic sciens aliquid, sicut si dicamus hominem, quoniam homo scientium et habentium scientiam; est autem sicut iam dicimus scientem habentem gramaticam. Uterque autem horum non eodem modo possibilis est, sed hic quidem quoniam genus huiusmodi et materia est, ille autem quia volens possibilis est considerare, nisi aliquid prohibeat exterius; iam autem considerans, actu ens et proprie sciens hanc litteram A. For there is such a thing as a “knower,” in one sense, as when we say that man is a knower because man is among things able to know and have knowledge. But we also say it in the way we speak of a man who already has knowledge of grammar. These two are not possible in the same way; but the former’s power is, as it were, generic and matter; whereas the latter has the power to consider at will, so long as no extraneous obstacle intervenes. Yet again, he who is actually attending to the letter A is properly speaking the one knowing. Ambo quidem igitur primi secundum potentiam scientes sunt, sed hic quidem per doctrinam alteratus est et multotiens ex contrario mutatus habitu, hic autem ex eo quod habet sensum aut gramaticam, non agere autem, in agere, alio modo. Therefore the first two are knowing in potency. But one has been altered through teaching and is often altered from the contrary state, whereas the other is moved to activity from having sense or grammar without acting, but in a different way. Non est autem simpliciter neque pati, sed aliud quidem corruptio quaedam a contrario, aliud autem salus magis eius quod potentia ab eo quod est actu et simili sic sicut potentia se habet ad actum. Nor is being acted upon simple. Rather, it is one thing to be somehow destroyed by a contrary, and something else when there is more the preservation of what is in potency by what is in act and like it, the way that potency stands relative to act. Speculans autem fit habens scientiam, quod vere aut non est alterari (in ipsum enim additio est et in actum), aut alterum genus alterationis est. Unde non bene habet dicere sapientem, cum sapiat, alterari, sicut neque aedificatorem cum aedificat. In actum quidem igitur ducens ex potentia ente secundum intelligere et sapere, non doctrinam, sed alteram habere denominationem iustum. For when a man possessed of knowledge thinks, there is certainly either no alteration—there being an advance into itself, and into actuality—or it is a different genus of alteration. Hence it is not well said to say that a wise man is “altered” when he thinks, as neither is it to say this of the builder when he builds. Therefore the progression from being in potency to being in act, as regards understanding and thinking, is not instruction, but rightly has some other name. Ex potentia autem ente addiscens et accipiens scientiam ab actu ente et didascalo aut neque pati dicendum, sicut dictum est, aut duos esse modos alterationis, et eam que in privativas dispositiones mutationem, et eam quae in habitus et naturam. But the change from being in potency, in one who learns and receives knowledge from another (who actually has it and teaches), either should not be called a “being acted upon” (as we have said), or there are two modes of alteration, one a change to a privative disposition, the other to a possession and nature. 358. Dividendum autem etc. Postquam philosophus ostendit sensum esse in potentia et in actu, et nunc intendit ostendere quomodo educatur de potentia in actum. Et dividitur in partes duas: 358. Distinctions, however, must be made (417a21). Having explained how the sensitive powers are both in act and in potency, the Philosopher now goes on to say how they are brought from potency into act. This he does in two parts. in prima distinguit potentiam et actum et ostendit quomodo diversimode aliquid educatur de potentia in actum, utens exemplo intellectu; In the first, he distinguishes between act and potency and between the diverse ways in which a thing is led from potency to act, taking his example from the intellect. in secunda parte ostendit propositum circa sensum, ibi: sensitivi autem etc. In the second, at the first change in the sensitive being (417b16; [373]), he applies all this to the case of sensation. Circa primum tria facit: As regards the first of these parts, he does three things: primo dicit de quo est intentio; first, he states his intention; secundo distinguit potentiam et actum circa intellectum, ibi: est quidem enim sic sciens etc.; second, he distinguishes, at for there is such a thing as (417a22; [359]), between act and potency in the intellect; tertio ostendit quomodo aliquid educatur de potentia in actum, ibi: ambo quidem igitur etc. third, he explains, at therefore the first two (417a30; [362]), how what is potential becomes actual. Dicit ergo primo quod dividendum est de potentia et actu, id est ostendendum quot modis dicitur aliquid in potentia et quot modis in actu. Quod necessarium fuit, quia in superioribus simpliciter, id est absque distinctione, usus est potentia et actu. First of all, then, he says that there is a division concerning potency and act to show the diverse ways in which things can be said to be actual or potential—because, so far, the two terms have been used in a simple way, that is, without distinctions. 359. Deinde cum dicit: est quidem enim etc., distinguit potentiam et actum circa intellectum. 359. Then, at for there is such a thing as (417a22), he distinguishes act and potency in the intellect. Et dicit quod uno modo dicitur aliquid, puta homo, sciens, quia habet naturalem potentiam ad sciendum, sicut homo dicitur esse de numero scientium et habentium scientiam, inquantum habet naturam ad sciendum et ad habendum habitum scientiae; And he says that we say that in one sense a thing, that is, a man, is a knower because he has a natural capacity for knowledge. This is the way we say that man is among the number of things able to know and have knowledge, inasmuch as he has a nature ordered to knowing and to having the habit of knowledge. secundo modo dicitur aliquid quod sciat, sicut dicimus habentem habitum alicuius scientiae, puta grammaticae, esse iam scientem. In another sense, however, we say one knows something in the way we speak of a man who has the habit of a certain knowledge—for example, grammar—that he already has knowledge. 360. Manifestum est autem quod uterque horum dicitur sciens ex eo quod aliquid potest, sed non eodem modo uterque est potens ad sciendum, 360. Now, obviously, these two capacities are implied by calling him a knower, but not in the same way in both cases. sed primus quidem dicitur potens quia est genus huiusmodi et materia, id est quia habet naturalem potentiam ad sciendum per quam collocatur in tali genere et quia est in potentia puta ad scientiam sicut materia ad formam; In the first case, man’s power is said to be generic and matter, that is, because he has a natural potency for knowing through his being placed in a certain sort of genus, and because he is in potency, for example, to knowledge as matter is to its form. secundus autem, scilicet qui habet habitum scientiae, dicitur potens quia cum vult potest considerare, nisi aliquid extrinsecum per accidens impediat, puta vel occupatio exterior vel aliqua indispositio ex parte corporis; But in the second case, one who has the habit of knowledge is called “able to know” because when he wishes, he can consider at will his knowledge—unless, of course, he is accidentally prevented, for example, by exterior preoccupations or by some bodily indisposition. 361. tertius autem, qui iam considerat, est in actu et iste est qui proprie et perfecte scit ea quae sunt alicuius artis, puta hanc literam A, quae pertinet ad grammaticam de qua supra fecit mentionem. 361. A third case would be that of a man who was actually thinking about something here and now. He it is who most properly and perfectly is a knower in any field, for example, knowing the letter A, which belongs to the above-mentioned science of grammar. Horum igitur trium, ultimus est in actu tantum, primus in potentia tantum, secundus autem in actu respectu primi et in potentia respectu tertii. Unde manifestum est quod esse in potentia dicitur dupliciter, scilicet de primo et secundo, et esse in actu dicitur dupliciter, scilicet de secundo et tertio. Of the three, then, the third is only in act; the first is only in potency; while the second is in act as compared with the first and in potency as compared with the third. Clearly, then, to be in potency is taken in two senses (the first and second); and to be in act is also taken in two senses (the second and third). 362. Deinde cum dicit: ambo quidem igitur etc., ostendit quomodo de utraque potentia aliquid reducitur in actum. Et circa hoc duo facit: 362. Then, where he says, therefore the first two (417a30), he explains how each of these potencies is brought to act. And concerning this, he does two things. primo ostendit quomodo de utraque potentia aliquid in actum reducitur; First, he shows how both these types of potency are actualized; secundo ostendit utrum talis reductio sit secundum aliquam passionem, ibi: non est autem simpliciter neque pati etc. second, at nor is being acted upon (417b2; [365]), he discusses whether this actualization is the result of a being acted upon. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum ambo primi sint scientes secundum potentiam et id quod est in potentia reducatur in actum, alio modo reducitur in actum aliquis de potentia prima et aliter de secunda; First, then, he remarks that while in the first two cases there is knowing in potency and that which is reduced to act, there is a difference, in respect of actualization, between a first and a second potency. nam qui est in potentia primo modo reducitur in actum quasi alteratus per doctrinam et motus ab aliquo alio existente in actu, sicut a magistro, et multoties talis mutatio est ex contrario habitu (quod ideo dicit quia, cum aliquis reducitur de potentia prima in actum, ex ignorante fit sciens; For one in potency in the first way is brought into act through being, as it were, altered through teaching, and being moved by someone else who is already in act (the teacher). And often, he says, this change is from the contrary state, alluding to those who come to actual knowledge from a state of ignorance. 363. ignorans autem dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum simplicem negationem, quando nec veritate cogitur nec contrario errore detinetur, et qui sic ignorans est fit actu sciens non quod mutatus de contrario habitu, sed solum sicut acquirens scientiam; 363. “Ignorance” is spoken of in two ways. In one way, it can be purely negative, when the ignorant person neither knows the truth nor is involved in the opposite error; and in this case he is simply brought into actual knowledge, not changed by being rid of a contrary habit. alio modo dicitur aliquis ignorans secundum pravam dispositionem, utpote quia detinetur errore contrario veritati, et hic in actum scientiae reducitur quasi de contrario habitu mutatus); On the other hand, one is called “ignorant” in a different way, according to a bad disposition, insofar as he is involved in error contrary to the truth; and in this way to acquire knowledge, then, is to be changed from a contrary habit. 364. qui vero est in potentia secundo modo, ut scilicet iam habens habitum, transit ex eo quod habet sensum aut scientiam et non agit secundum ea, in agere, quia scilicet fit agens secundum scientiam; sed alio modo iste fit actu, et alio modo primus. 364. But one in potency in the second sense—that is, as already possessing the habit—passes from having sense or knowledge but not exercising it, to activity, because he becomes active as regards the knowledge. And he becomes actual in a different way from the first. 365. Deinde cum dicit: non est autem simpliciter, manifestat utrum, secundum quod aliquid educitur de potentia in actum scientiae primo modo vel secundo, possit dici pati. Et circa hoc duo facit: 365. Then, at nor is being acted upon (417b2), he discusses the question whether both kinds of actualization can be called “being acted upon.” And about this, he does two things. primo ostendit quot modis dicitur pati; First, he explains the different ways in which something is said to be acted upon. secundo manifestat propositum, ibi: speculans autem fit habens scientiam etc. Second, at for when a man possessed of (417b5; [367]), he applies these distinctions to the present problem.