380. Sic igitur patet quod naturae communi non potest attribui intentio universalitatis nisi secundum esse quod habet in intellectu: sic enim solum est unum de multis, prout intelligitur praeter principia quibus unum in multa dividitur. Unde relinquitur quod universalia secundum quod sunt universalia non sunt nisi in anima, ipsae autem naturae quibus accidit intentio universalitatis sunt in rebus. Et propter hoc nomina communia significantia naturas ipsas praedicantur de individuis, non autem nomina significantia intentiones: Sortes enim est homo, sed non est species, quamvis homo sit species. 380. It is clear, then, that the intention of universality can be attributed to a common nature only according to the existence that it has in the intellect. For a unity to be predicable of many things, it must first be conceived apart from the principles by which it is divided into many things. Whence, one concludes that universals as universal exist only in the soul, but the natures themselves, to which accrue the intention of universality, exist in the realities. That is why the common names that signify these very natures are predicated of individuals but the names that signify the intentions do not. For Socrates is a man, but he is not a species—even though man is a species. 381. Deinde cum dicit: nunc autem tantum etc., recolligit quod dictum est de sensu. Et dicit quod nunc tantum sit definitum quod non simpliciter dicitur id quod est in potentia, sed multipliciter: uno enim modo dicimus puerum posse militare secundum potentiam remotam; alio modo dicimus posse militare quando iam est in aetate perfecta, et hoc secundum potentiam propinquam; et similiter se habet in sensitivo: dupliciter enim est aliquis in potentia in sentiendo, ut iam dictum est. Et licet non sint nomina propria posita quibus differentia harum potentiarum ostendatur, tamen determinatum est quod istae potentiae sunt alterae ab invicem et quomodo sint alterae 381. Finally, at for the present (417b29), he recapitulates his remarks on sensation and observes that for the present, it is sufficiently established that what we say is in potency is not spoken of in a simple way. It is in one sense that we say that a child is able to be a soldier, that is, by a remote potency. But in another sense, we say that an adult can be a soldier, that is, by a proximate potency. And the same distinction applies to sense-perception, as we have seen there are two ways of being in potency to sensing anything. Though we have found no proper names to express this distinction of these potencies, it is settled, nevertheless, that the two potencies differ, and in what way they differ. 382. et, licet alterari et pati non proprie dicatur aliquid secundum quod exit de potentia secunda in actum, puta prout habens sensum fit actu sentiens, tamen necesse est uti hoc ipso quod est pati et alterari ac si essent nomina propria et convenientia, quia sensitivum in potentia est quale est actu sensibile. Et propter hoc sequitur quod secundum quod patitur a principio non est simile sensus sensibili, sed secundum quod iam est passum, est iam assimilatum sensibili et est tale quale est illud. Quod quia distinguere nescierunt antiqui, posuerunt sensum esse compositum ex sensibilibus. 382. And in spite of the fact that something is not properly speaking said “to be altered” and “to be acted upon” inasmuch as it passes from the second potency into act, that is, insofar as what has the sense comes to be actually sensing, yet it is necessary to use the expressions “to be acted upon” and “to be altered” as if they were proper and fitting names; and this is because the sensitive power is potentially that which the sense-object is actually. It follows that, while at the beginning of being acted upon, the sense is not like its object, in being acted upon it now becomes like the sensible object and it is such as the other is. It was because they failed to make this distinction that the earlier philosophers thought that sense powers were composed of the sensible objects. Lectio 13 Lecture 13 Primum de sensibilibus uniuscuiusque sensus dicendum esse proponit. Deinde sensibilia dividit in tria: in sensibilia per accidens, et sensibilia per se, quorum alia propria, alia communia iure sunt appellata Sense-objects in general Dicendum autem secundum unumquemque sensum de sensibilibus primo. Dicitur autem sensibile tripliciter, quorum duo quidem dicimus per se sentiri, unum autem secundum accidens; duorum autem aliud quidem proprium est uniuscuiusque sensus, aliud vero commune omnium. In treating of each sense, we must first discuss sense-objects. We speak of a sense-object in three ways: two of which we say are sensed through themselves, but one accidentally. Of the two former, one is proper to each sense, the other common to all. Dico autem proprium quidem quod non contingit altero sensu sentiri, et circa quod non contingit errare, ut visus coloris et auditus soni et gustus humoris, tactus autem habet plures differentias. Now, I call the proper object of a sense that which does not fall within the ambit of another sense and about which it cannot err, as sight is of color, and hearing of sound, and taste of flavor, while touch has several different objects. Sed unusquisque iudicat de his et non decipitur quoniam color neque quoniam sonus, sed quid coloratum aut ubi aut quid sonans. Huiusmodi quidem igitur dicuntur propria uniuscuiusque. Each particular sense can discern these objects and it is not deceived; thus, sight does not err as to color, nor hearing as to sound, though it might err about what is colored, or where it is, or about what is giving forth a sound. This, then, is what is meant by the proper objects of each sense. Communia autem motus, quies, numerus, figura, magnitudo; huiusmodi enim nullius unius sunt propria, sed communia omnibus: tactui enim motus aliquis sensibilis et visui. Per se quidem igitur sunt sensibilia haec. Now, the common sense-objects are movement, rest, number, shape, magnitude. Such things are proper to no one sense but are common to all; thus a certain movement is sensible both by touch and by sight. These, then, are through themselves objects of sensation. Secundum accidens autem dicitur sensibile, ut si album sit Diarris: secundum accidens enim hoc sentitur, quoniam accidit albo hoc quod sentitur. Unde nihil patitur, secundum quod huiusmodi est, a sensibili. Sensibilium autem secundum se propria proprie sensibilia sunt, et ad quae substantia apta nata est uniuscuiusque sensus. However, that is said to be a sense-object accidentally, for example, if the white thing is the son of Diares. For this is sensed accidentally because what is sensed is accidental to the white. Whence the sense is unaffected by that sensible object as such. Of things that are sensible through themselves, the proper objects are sensible properly speaking and to these the substance of each sense is naturally adapted. 383. Dicendum autem secundum unumquemque etc. Postquam philosophus ostendit quomodo se habet sensus ad sensibilia, incipit determinare de sensibili et sensu. Et dividitur in partes duas: 383. In treating of each sense (418a7). Having explained how the sense powers are related to their objects, the Philosopher now begins his examination of sensible objects and sense powers. This inquiry divides into two parts. in prima parte determinat de sensibilibus; The first part is concerned with the sense-objects. in secunda de sensu, ibi: oportet autem universaliter de omni sensu etc. The second, starting at it must be taken universally (424a17; [386]), is concerned with the sense powers. Prima dividitur in duas: The first part again divides into two. in prima distinguit sensibilia propria ab aliis modis sensibilium; First, he distinguishes the proper sense-objects from the rest. in secunda determinat de sensibilibus propriis secundum unumquemque sensum, ibi: cuius quidem est visus etc. And second, at that of which there is sight (418a26; [399]), he examines the proper objects of each sense. Circa primum duo facit: About the first, he does two things: primo ponit divisionem sensibilium; first, he makes a division of the sense-objects; secundo exponit membra divisionis, ibi: dico autem proprium quidem etc. second, at now, I call that the proper object (418a11; [384]), he explains the members of this division. Dicit ergo quod antequam determinetur de sensu quid sit, oportet primo dicere de sensibilibus secundum unumquemque sensum, quia obiecta sunt praevia potentiis. Sensibilia vero tribus modis dicuntur, uno quidem modo per accidens et duobus modis per se, quorum uno dicuntur sensibilia illa quae propria sint singulis sensibus, alio modo dicuntur sensibilia illa quae communiter sentiuntur ab omnibus sensibus. Beginning, then, he observes that before we determine what a sense is, we first must discuss sense-objects, for objects are prior to their powers. Now, the term, “sensible,” or, “sense-object,” is used in three ways: in one way accidentally, and in two ways through itself; and of the latter, we use one in referring to the objects proper to each sense, and the other in referring to objects that are sensed commonly by all the senses. 384. Deinde cum dicit: dico autem proprium etc., exponit membra divisionis. Et primo exponit quae sunt sensibilia propria et dicit quod sensibile proprium est quod ita sentitur uno sensu quod non potest alio sensu sentiri, et circa quod non potest errare sensus, sicut visus proprie est cognoscitivus coloris et auditus soni et gustus humoris, id est saporis; sed tactus habet plures differentias appropriatas sibi: cognoscit enim calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, grave et leve, et huiusmodi multa. Unusquisque autem horum sensuum iudicat de propriis sensibilibus et non decipitur in eis, sicut visus non decipitur quin sit talis color neque auditus decipitur de sono; 384. Then, at now, I call that (418a11), he explains the members of the division, and first, what he means by a proper sense-object. He says that he means by this term what is so sensed by one sense that it cannot be sensed by another sense, and about which it cannot err; thus, it is proper to sight to know color; to hearing, to know sound; to taste, to know flavor or savor. Touch, however, has several objects proper to itself—hot and cold, wet and dry, heavy and light, etc. Each sense can discern the objects proper to itself and is not deceived about these, for example, sight is not deceived that this is such and such a color, nor is hearing deceived about sound. 385. sed circa sensibilia per accidens vel communia decipiuntur sensus, sicut decipitur visus si velit iudicare homo per ipsum quid est coloratum aut ubi sit, et similiter decipitur quis si velit iudicare per auditum quid est id quod sonat. Haec igitur sunt propria sensibilia uniuscuiusque sensus. 385. Though a sense can be deceived both about objects only accidentally sensible and about the common objects. For example, sight is deceived if a man wanted to discern by sight what is colored, or where it is; and likewise he is deceived if he wanted to discern by hearing alone what was causing a sound. Such, then, are the proper objects of each sense. 386. Secundo ibi: communia autem etc., exponit secundum membrum divisionis, dicens quod communia sensibilia sunt ista quinque: motus, quies, numerus, figura et magnitudo; haec enim nullius unius sensus sunt propria, sed sunt communia omnibus. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi omnia ista sint omnibus communia, sed quaedam horum, scilicet numerus, motus et quies, sunt communia omnibus sensibus, tactus vero et visus percipiunt omnia quinque. Sic igitur manifestum est quae sint sensibilia per se. 386. Next, at now, the common sense-objects (418a17), he says, touching the second member of the division, that the common sense-objects are five: movement, rest, number, shape, and magnitude. These are proper to no one sense but are common to all. This we must not take so as to mean that all these are common to all the senses, but that some of them, that is, number, movement, and rest, are common to all. But touch and sight perceive all five. It is clear, then, what are through themselves objects of sensation. 387. Tertio ibi: secundum accidens autem etc., exponit tertium membrum divisionis et dicit quod secundum accidens sensibile dicitur ut si dicimus quod Diarris vel Socrates est sensibile per accidens, quia accidit ei esse album: hoc enim sentitur per accidens quod accidit ei quod sentitur per se; accidit autem albo, quod est sensibile per se, quod sit Diarris; unde Diarris est sensibile per accidens. Unde nihil patitur ab hoc inquantum huiusmodi. Quamvis autem sensibilia communia et sensibilia propria sint per se sensibilia, tamen propria sensibilia sunt proprie per se sensibilia, quia substantia uniuscuiusque sensus et eius definitio est in hoc quod est aptum natum pati a tali sensibili; ratio enim uniuscuiusque potentiae consistit in habitudine ad proprium obiectum. 387. Then, at however, that is said to be a sense-object accidentally (418a20), he takes the third member of the division. We might, he says, call Diares or Socrates a sense-object accidentally because each happens to be white, for that is sensed accidentally which happens to (or is accidental to) what is sensed through itself. It is accidental to the white thing, which is sensed through itself, that it should be Diares; hence Diares is a sense-object accidentally. Whence the sense is unaffected by this man as such. While it is true, however, that both common and proper sense-objects are all sensible through themselves, yet the proper objects are sensible properly speaking through themselves, for the very substance and definition of each sense consists in its being naturally fitted to be acted upon by this sort of sensible object. For the account of each and every power consists in an orientation to a proper object. 388. Dubitatur autem hic de distinctione sensibilium communium a sensibilibus per accidens. 388. A difficulty arises here about the distinction between common and accidental sense-objects. Sicut enim sensibilia per accidens non apprehenduntur nisi inquantum sensibilia propria apprehenduntur, ita nec sensibilia communia: nunquam enim visus apprehendit magnitudinem aut figuram nisi inquantum apprehendit coloratum; videtur igitur quod sensibilia communia sunt etiam sensibilia per accidens. For just as the latter are apprehended only insofar as the proper objects are apprehended, so too, the same is true of the common sense-objects: the eye would never apprehend magnitude or shape if it did not apprehend what is colored. It would seem, then, that the common sense-objects are also accidental sense-objects. 389. Dicunt igitur quidam quod huiusmodi communia sensibilia non sunt sensibilia per accidens, propter duas rationes: 389. Now, there are some who base the distinction between common and accidental sense-objects upon two reasons. primo quidem quia huiusmodi sensibilia communia sunt propria sensui communi, sicut sensibilia propria sunt propria singulis sensibus; First, they say that the common sense-objects are proper to the common sense, as the proper sense-objects are proper to the individual senses. secundo quia sensibilia propria non possunt esse sine sensibilibus communibus, possunt autem esse sine sensibilibus per accidens. Second, that the proper sense-objects are inseparable from the common sense-objects, but not from the accidental sense-objects. 390. Utraque autem responsio incompetens est. 390. But both answers are inadequate. Prima quidem quia falsum est quod ista sensibilia communia sunt propria obiecta sensus communis. Sensus enim communis est quaedam potentia ad quam terminantur immutationes omnium sensuum, ut infra patebit; unde impossibile est quod sensus communis habeat aliquod proprium obiectum quod non sit obiectum sensus proprii, sed circa ipsas immutationes sensuum propriorum a suis obiectis habet sensus communis aliquas operationes proprias quas sensus proprii habere non possunt, sicut quod percipit ipsas immutationes sensuum et discernit inter sensibilia diversorum sensuum: sensu enim communi percipimus nos videre et discernimus inter album et dulce. The first is based on the fallacy that these common sense-objects are the proper object of the common sense. For, as we shall see later, the common sense is the power at which the modifications affecting all the particular senses terminate; hence it is impossible that it have as its proper object anything that is not an object of a proper sense. Rather, in reference to those very modifications of the proper senses, coming from their objects, the common sense has certain proper activities that the proper senses themselves cannot have; for example, it perceives the senses’ modifications themselves and it discerns between the sense-objects of the diverse senses. For it is by the common sense that we perceive our seeing and we distinguish between the white and the sweet. 391. Praeterea, dato quod sensibilia communia essent propria obiecta sensus communis, non excluderetur quin essent per accidens sensibilia respectu sensuum propriorum: sic enim agitur hic de sensibilibus secundum quod habent habitudinem ad sensus proprios (nam potentia sensus communis nondum est declarata); quod autem est obiectum proprium alicuius interioris potentiae contingit esse per accidens sensibile, ut postea dicetur. Nec est mirum, quia quod est per se sensibile uni sensuum exteriorum, est per accidens sensibile respectu alterius, sicut dulce est per accidens visibile. 391. Moreover, even if it were granted that the common sense-objects were proper to the common sense, this would not prevent their being the accidental sense-objects of the proper senses. For we are still studying the sense-objects in relation to the proper senses; for the common sense has not yet been elucidated. As we shall see later, the proper object of an interior power may happen to be accidentally sensible. Nor is this strange; for even as regards the exterior senses, what is through itself sensible for one of these exterior senses is accidentally sensible relative to another, just as the sweet is accidentally visible. 392. Secunda etiam ratio non est competens: non enim refert ad id quod est esse sensibile per accidens utrum id quod est subiectum sensibilis qualitatis sit per se subiectum eius vel non per se; nullus enim diceret ignem, quod est proprium subiectum caloris, esse per se sensibile tactu. 392. The second reason is also inadequate. For it is irrelevant to what is sensible accidentally whether what underlies a sensible quality underlies it through itself or not. For no one, for instance, would maintain that fire, which is properly speaking the underlying of heat, is through itself an object of touch. 393. Et ideo aliter dicendum quod sentire consistit in quodam pati et alterari, ut supra dictum est, quicquid igitur facit differentiam in ipsa passione vel alteratione sensus habet per se habitudinem ad sensum et dicitur sensibile per se, quod autem nullam facit differentiam circa immutationem sensus dicitur sensibile per accidens. Unde et in littera dicit philosophus quod a sensibili per accidens nihil patitur sensus secundum quod huiusmodi. 393. So we must respond in another way, by saying that we have seen that sensing is a being acted upon and a being altered in some way. Whatever, then, makes a difference within the undergoing itself or alteration of the sense has, through itself, an orientation to the sense, and it is called “sensible through itself.” But whatever makes no difference as regards the modification of the sense is called an “sensible accidentally.” Hence, the Philosopher says explicitly that the sense is unaffected by the accidental object as such. 394. Differentiam autem circa immutationem sensus potest aliquid facere dupliciter. 394. Now, something can make a difference in the modification of the sense in two ways. Uno modo quantum ad ipsam speciem agentis, et sic faciunt differentiam circa immutationem sensus sensibilia per se secundum quod hoc est color, illud autem est sonus, hoc autem est album, illud vero nigrum; ipsae enim species activorum in sensu sunt sensibilia propria ad quae habet naturalem aptitudinem potentia sensitiva et propter hoc secundum aliquam differentiam horum sensibilium diversificantur sensus. One way is with respect to the very species of agent, and in this way things sensible through themselves make a modification of the sense, inasmuch as this is a color, whereas that is a sound, this is white, that is black. For the very species of the things acting in sensation are the proper sense-objects, to which the sensitive power has a natural aptitude, and on account of this the senses are divided in reference to some difference of these sense-objects.