Quid igitur est odorare, praeter pati aliquid? Aut odorare sentire est, aer autem patiens hoc mox sensibilis fit. What, then, is it to smell, save to be acted upon somehow? But to smell is to sense. Air, however, being so acted upon, becomes rapidly sensible. 551. Oportet autem universaliter etc. Postquam philosophus determinavit de sensibus secundum unumquemque sensum, hic determinat de sensu. Et circa hoc tria facit: 551. It must be taken universally (424a17). Having examined each of the senses separately, the Philosopher now draws a conclusion about sensation. About this he does three things. primo ostendit quid sit sensus; First, he explains what sensation is. secundo concludit solutionem quarumdam quaestionum ex definitione sensus posita, ibi: manifestum autem ex his etc.; Second, at it is clear (424a28; [556]), he solves certain problems connected with that definition of sensation. tertio movet quasdam dubitationes circa passionem sensus a sensibilibus, ibi: dubitabit autem etc. And third, at it might be asked (424b3; [558]), he raises certain questions about the way a sense is affected by its object. Circa primum duo facit: As regards the first point, he does two things. primo ostendit quid sit sensus; First, he shows what sensation is; secundo quid sit organum sensus, ibi: sensitivum autem primum etc. second, he shows what the organ of sensation is, at the primary sensitive part (424a24; [555]). Dicit ergo primo quod hoc oportet accipere universaliter et communiter omni sensui inesse quod sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia, sicut cera recipit signum anuli sine ferro et auro. First, then, he says that it must be taken universally, and as commonly present in every sensation, that all sensation is the receiving of species without matter, just as wax receives the sign of the signet-ring without the iron or gold. Sed videtur hoc esse commune omni patienti: omne enim patiens recipit aliquid ab agente secundum quod est agens; agens autem agit per suam formam et non per suam materiam; omne igitur patiens recipit formam sine materia. Et hoc etiam ad sensum apparet: non enim aer recipit ab igne agente materiam eius, sed formam. Non <igitur> videtur hoc esse proprium sensus, quod sit receptivus specierum sine materia. This, however, would seem to be common to all cases of being acted upon; for every patient receives from an agent insofar as the agent is acting; and since the agent acts through its form, not its matter, every patient receives the form without matter. And this indeed is sensibly apparent; for example, air does not receive matter from fire acting upon it, but form. So it would seem not to be peculiar to sensation that it receives species without matter. 552. Dicendum est igitur quod, licet hoc sit commune omni patienti quod recipiat formam ab agente, differentia tamen est in modo recipiendi. Nam forma quae in patiente recipitur ab agente, quandoque quidem habet eumdem modum essendi in patiente quem habet in agente (et hoc quidem contingit quando patiens eamdem habet dispositionem ad formam quam habet et agens; unumquodque enim recipitur in altero secundum modum recipientis, unde si eodem modo disponatur patiens sicut agens, eodem modo recipitur forma in patiente sicut erat in agente), et tunc non recipitur forma sine materia, quia, licet illa et eadem materia numero quae est agentis non fiat patientis, fit tamen quodammodo eadem inquantum similem dispositionem materialem ad formam acquirit ei quae erat in agente; et hoc modo aer patitur ab igne, et quicquid patitur passione naturali. 552. I answer that, while it is true that every patient receives form from an agent, there are differences in the manner of receiving. For form received in a patient from an agent sometimes has the same mode of existence in the patient as it has in the agent; and this occurs when the patient has the same disposition to the form as the agent has. For whatever is received is received according to the manner of the receiver; so that, if the patient is disposed as the agent is, the form is received in the patient in the manner in which it exists in the agent. And then the form is not received without matter; for although it and numerically the same matter that is in the agent does not come to belong to the patient, nevertheless, the patient becomes, in a way, the same, inasmuch as it acquires the same material disposition to the form that was in the agent. And it is in this way that air is acted upon by fire, and in the same way is whatever else is acted upon with a natural passion. 553. Quandoque vero forma recipitur in patiente secundum alium modum essendi quam sit in agente, quia dispositio materialis patientis ad recipiendum non est similis dispositioni materiali quae erat in agente, et ideo forma recipitur in patiente sine materia inquantum patiens assimilatur agenti secundum formam et non secundum materiam; et per hunc modum sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu et in re sensibili: nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale sive spirituale; 553. Sometimes, however, the form is received in the patient according to a manner of existence other than was in the agent, because the material disposition of the patient to receive form is not like the material disposition that was in the agent. In these cases, then, the form is received in the patient without matter, inasmuch as the patient is made like the agent according to form and not according to matter. And it is thus that a sense receives form without matter, the form having, in the sense, a different manner of being than that which it has in the sensible reality. For in the sensible reality it has a natural existence, but in the sense it has an intentional or spiritual existence. 554. et ponit conveniens exemplum de sigillo et cera, non enim eadem est dispositio cerae ad imaginem, quae erat in ferro et auro. 554. Aristotle finds an apt example of this in the signet-ring and wax. For the disposition of the wax to the image is not the same as that of the iron or gold. Et ideo subiungit quod cera accipit signum, id est imaginem sive figuram auream aut aeneam, sed non inquantum est aurum aut aes: assimilatur enim cera aureo sigillo quantum ad imaginem, sed non quantum ad dispositionem auri. Et similiter sensus patitur a sensibili habente colorem aut humorem, id est saporem, aut sonum, sed non inquantum unumquodque illorum dicitur, id est non patitur a lapide colorato inquantum est lapis nec a melle dulci inquantum est mel, quia in sensu non fit similis dispositio ad formam, quae erat in illis subiectis, sed patitur ab eis inquantum huiusmodi, id est inquantum coloratum vel saporosum, et secundum rationem, id est secundum formam: assimilatur enim sensus sensibili secundum formam, sed non secundum dispositionem materiae. Hence, wax, he says, receives the sign (424a20), that is, a shape or image of what is gold or bronze, but not insofar as it is gold or bronze. For the wax becomes like the gold signet-ring in respect of its image, but not in respect of the disposition of gold. Similarly, the sense is acted upon by the sense-object by a thing having color or flavor (that is, taste) or sound, not, however, in respect of what each is called as a particular thing, that is, it is not acted upon by a colored stone precisely as stone, or by sweet honey precisely as honey, because in the sense there arises no similar disposition to the form that was present in those subjects; but it is acted upon by them insofar as each is of a certain sort, that is, insofar as it is colored or tasteable, and according to its account, that is, according to form. For the sense is assimilated to the sensible object according to form, not according to the disposition of matter. 555. Deinde cum dicit: sensitivum autem etc., determinat de organo sensus; quia enim dixerat quod sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia, quod etiam intellectui convenit, posset aliquis credere quod sensus non esset potentia in corpore sicut nec intellectus, et ideo ad hoc excludendum assignat ei organum. Et dicit quod primum sensitivum, id est primum organum sensus, est in quo est potentia huiusmodi, quae scilicet est susceptiva specierum sine materia. Organum igitur sensus cum potentia ipsa, utputa oculus, est idem subiecto, sed esse alterum est, quia ratione differt a corpore potentia; potentia enim est quasi forma organi, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo subdit quod magnitudo, id est organum corporeum, est quod sensum patitur, id est quod est susceptivum sensus sicut materia formae, non tamen est eadem ratio magnitudinis et sensitivi seu sensus, sed sensus est quaedam ratio, id est proportio et forma, et potentia illius, scilicet magnitudinis. 555. Next, at the primary sensitive part (424a24), he concludes about the organ of sense. Since from his teaching that sense receives species without matter—which is true of the intellect also—one might be led to suppose that sense was not a power in a body, like the intellect, to preclude this error, Aristotle assigns to sense an organ, observing that the primary sensitive part, that is, the first organ of sense, is that in which a power of this sort resides, namely a capacity to receive species without matter. For a sense organ, for example, the eye, shares the same subject with the power itself, but they differ in mode of being, because the power differs from the body in its account, for the power is, as it were, the form of the organ, as was said above. So he goes on to say a magnitude, that is, a bodily organ, is what is acted upon in sensation, that is, is the receptive subject of the sense power, as matter of form; but the magnitude and the sensitivity or sense differ by account, the sense being a certain ratio, that is, proportion and form, and a power of that magnitude. 556. Deinde cum dicit: manifestum autem ex his etc., ex praemissis concludit solutionem duorum quae possent quaeri. 556. Then, when he says, it is clear (424a28), he infers from these premises a reply to two questions that might arise. Et dicit quod manifestum est ex praedictis propter quid excellentia sensibilium corrumpunt organa sensuum: oportet enim in organis sentiendi ad hoc quod sentiatur esse quamdam rationem, id est proportionem, ut dictum est; si ergo motus sensibilis fuerit fortior quam organum natum sit pati, solvitur proportio et corrumpitur sensus, qui consistit in quadam proportione organi, ut dictum est; et est simile sicut cum aliquis fortiter percutit chordas, solvitur symphonia et tonus instrumenti, qui in quadam proportione consistit. From what has been said, he observes, it is clear why an excess in the object destroys the organs of sense; for, if sensation is to take place there must preexist in the organs of sense a certain ratio, that is, a proportion, as was said. But if the motion of the sense-object is stronger than what the organ is naturally able to bear, the proportion is lost and the sense itself, which consists, as has been said, in a certain proportion of the organ, is corrupted. It is as though one were to twang cords violently, destroying the tone and harmony of the instrument, which consists in a certain proportion. 557. Et manifestum est etiam ex praedictis ratio alterius quaestionis, propter quid scilicet plantae non sentiunt, cum tamen habeant quamdam partem animae et patiantur a quibusdam sensibilibus, scilicet a tangibilibus (manifestum est enim quod calescunt et infrigidantur); causa igitur quare non sentiunt est quia non est in illis illa proportio quae requiritur ad sentiendum: non enim habent medietatem secundum complexionem inter tangibilia, quod requiritur ad organum tactus sine quo nullus sensus esse potest; et ideo non habent in se huiusmodi principium quod potest recipere speciem sine materia, scilicet sensum, sed accidit eis pati cum materia, scilicet secundum materialem transmutationem. 557. His analysis also gives us the answer to another question, namely, why plants do not sense, though they have some share in soul and are acted upon by certain sensible objects, that is, tangible things (for it is manifest that they heat up and cool down). The reason why they do not feel is that they lack the proportion needed for sensation; in particular, they do not have that mediate state in complexion between the tangible qualities, which is a prerequisite of the organ of touch, apart from which there can be no sensation. Hence, they have no intrinsic principle of the sort that can receive a species without matter, that is to say, no sense. But they are acted upon with matter, that is, according to a material change. 558. Deinde cum dicit: dubitabit autem aliquis etc., movet quamdam dubitationem circa passionem a sensibilibus, quia dixerat quod plantae patiuntur a tangibilibus. Movet igitur primo dubitationem, utrum ab aliis sensibilibus aliquid possit pati quod non habet sensum, puta ab odore quod non habet olfactum, a colore quod non habet visum, a sono quod non habet auditum. 558. Next, when he says, it might be asked (424b3), he raises a question about the sense-object’s action on the senses, because he said that plants are acted upon by tangibles. He raises the question whether a subject can ever be acted upon by objects other than those of which it possesses the sense, for example, by odor if it cannot have the sense of smell, or by color, if it has no sight, or by sound, if it is without hearing. 559. Secundo ibi: si autem olfactus etc., inducit duas rationes ad ostendendum quod non. 559. Then, at but if what can be smelled is odor (424b5), he brings two reasons against this suggestion. Quarum prima est quod proprium olfactibilis est facere olfactum; odor autem est olfactibile; ergo, si aliquid facit, facit olfactum; quod ergo non habet sensum olfactus, non potest pati ab odore. Et eadem ratio videtur esse de aliis, quod non sit quorumcumque posse pati a sensibilibus, sed solum habentium sensum. In the first place, it is proper to what can be smelled to cause smell, whereas odor is such, so if anything causes smell, it causes it by odor. Whence it follows that whatever lacks a sense of smell cannot be acted upon by odor. And the same argument holds for the other senses, that it is impossible that anything whatever might be acted upon by sense-objects; this can only happen in things endowed with sense. 560. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: simul autem manifestum etc. Et dicit quod hoc idem quod prima ratio concludit manifestum est per experimentum, quia lumen et tenebra, odor et sonus nullum effectum faciunt <in corpora> insensibilia, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum corpora habentia huiusmodi qualitates aliquid agunt, sicut aer qui, quando est tonitruum, scindit lignum: lignum igitur patitur non a sono per se loquendo, sed ab aere moto. 560. At the same is evident thus (424b9), he states the second reason, as follows. The above argument is confirmed by experience. For light and darkness, smell and sound, produce no effect on bodies without sensation, except accidentally, inasmuch as the bodies with those qualities do something, like the air that smashes trees when it thunders; therefore the tree is acted upon not by the sound, properly speaking, but rather by the moving air. 561. Tertio ibi: sed tangibilia etc., ostendit aliter esse de qualitatibus tangibilibus. Et dicit quod tangibilia et humores, id est sapores, faciunt quemdam effectum <in> insensibilibus (sed hoc intelligendum est de saporibus non inquantum sunt sapores, sed inquantum gustabile est quoddam tangibile et gustus quidam tactus): si enim corpora insensibilia non patiuntur a tangibilibus, non esset ponere a quo paterentur et alterarentur inanimata. Nam tangibilia sunt qualitates activae et passivae elementorum secundum quas accidit universaliter alteratio in corporibus. 561. Then, at but things tangible and savors (424b12), he shows that it is otherwise with tangible qualities; tangible things and savors, that is, flavors, do so have an effect on things without sensation. (But this is to be understood of the flavors not as such, but just insofar as the tasteable is something tangible, and taste a sort of touch.) For if insensitive things were not acted upon by tangible qualities, there would be no question of non-souled things being acted upon and altered at all, these tangibles being the active and passive qualities of the elements in virtue of which all bodily alterations take place. 562. Quarto ibi: ergone et illa etc., ostendit quod etiam alia sensibilia agunt in quasdam res inanimatas, licet non in omnes, dicens: ergone et illa, scilicet sensibilia etiam alia, faciunt aliquem effectum in res inanimatas? Quasi dicat: sic. Sed tamen non omne corpus passivum est ab odore et sono, sicut omne corpus passivum est a calore et frigore, sed ab istis sensibilibus pati possunt solum corpora indeterminata et quae non manent, ut aer et aqua, quae sunt humida et non bene terminabilia termino proprio; et quod aer possit pati ab odore, manifestum est quia aer fetet sicut patiens aliquid ab odore. Alia litera habet: “feret,” quia videlicet media in aliis sensibilibus deferunt species ad sensum. Ratio autem huius diversitatis est quia qualitates tangibiles sunt causae aliorum sensibilium et ideo habent plus de virtute activa et possunt agere in quaecumque corpora, sed alia sensibilia, quae habent minus de virtute activa, non possunt agere nisi in corpora valde passibilia; et similis etiam ratio est de luce corporum caelestium, quae alterat inferiora corpora. 562. Next, at but not every body (424b14), he shows that other sense-objects act on non-souled things, though not on all. For, in asking, therefore, do not other sense-objects have a like effect on non-souled things as odor does? he implies that they do. Yet not every body is acted upon by odor and sound, though all are by heat and cold. But such sense-objects are acted upon only by unstable, indeterminate bodies, like air and water, which, being fluid, are not very self-contained; and that air can be acted upon by odor is obvious enough since it can stink. Another reading for “stink” (fetet) says “bears” (feret), meaning that the species is borne to the other senses by the medium for the sake of sensation. The reason for this difference is that, as tangible qualities are causes of the other sense-objects, they have more of an active power and can act on all bodies whatsoever, whereas the other sense-objects, having less of an active power, can act only on things that are especially impressionable. The same account applies to the luminosity of the heavenly bodies, which alter lower bodies. 563. Quinto ibi: quid igitur est odorare etc., solvit rationem supra positam, dicens: si quid aliquid patitur ab odore quod non odorat, quid est odorare, nisi pati aliquid ab odore? Et respondet quod odorare est sic aliquid pati ab odore quod sentiat odorem, aer autem non sic patitur ut sentiat, quia non habet potentiam sensitivam, sed sic patitur ut sit sensibilis, inquantum scilicet est medium in sensu. 563. Lastly, at what, then, is it to smell (424b16), he solves the problem raised by the argument stated above. If a thing, he asks, can be acted upon by odor and yet not smell it, what is it to smell other than to be acted upon by the smell? And he answers that smelling happens when a thing is acted upon by odor in such a way as to sense it. But air is not acted upon in this way, nor does it sense it, since it has no sensitive potency; rather, it is acted upon only so as to become a sense-object, inasmuch as it is a medium for sensation. Lectio 25 Lecture 25 Praeter quinque sensus externos, nullum esse alium sensum extrinsecum animalibus necessarium ostendit The common sense-objects and whether there is a sixth sense Quod autem non sit sensus alter praeter quinque (dico autem hos visum, auditum, olfactum, gustum, tactum), ex his credet aliquis. That there is no other sense besides the five enumerated—I mean, sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch—anyone may believe from these things. Si enim omnis cuius est sensus tactus et nunc sensum habemus (omnes enim tangibilis inquantum tangibile passiones tactu nobis sensibiles sunt), necesseque, si quidem deficit aliquis sensus, et organum aliquod nobis deficere. For if we have sensation of all the objects of the sense of touch (all varieties of the tangible being in fact sensible to us through touch), then, if we lack some sense, we must be lacking also in some sense organ. Et quaecumque quidem ipsi tangentes sentimus, tactu sensibilia sunt, quem existimus habentes; quaecumque vero per media et non ipsa tangentes, simplicibus, dico autem ut aere et aqua, habet autem sic ut, si quidem per unum plura sensibilia existentia altera ab invicem genere, necesse habentem huiusmodi sensitivum utrorumque sensitivum esse (ut si ex aere est sensitivum, et est aer soni et coloris), Now, whatever we sense by contact is sensible to us through that sense of touch, which we do in fact possess. But whatever we sense through a medium and without contact is sensed through intervening simple things (I mean, for example, air and water); and in this case, things are so disposed that if several sense-objects, differing generically from one another, are perceptible through one thing, then, necessarily, what has a sense organ of this kind can perceive either object—e.g., if the organ is constituted of air, then air is the medium for both color and sound. si vero plura eiusdem sint, ut coloris et aer et aqua (utraque enim dyaphana), et quod alterum ipsorum est habens solum sentiet id quod per utraque aut quod ab ambobus. But if several work for the same thing (like both air and water for color, for both are transparent), then what has either of these will sense what is transmitted through each or by both. Simplicium autem ex duobus his sensitiva solum sunt, ex aere et aqua (pupilla quidem enim aquae, auditus vero aeris, olfactus autem horum alterius est), ignis autem aut nullius est aut communis omnibus (nihil enim sine calore sensitivum est), terra vero aut nullius est aut in tactu maxime miscetur, unde relinquitur nullum esse sensitivum extra aerem et aquam; haec autem et nunc quaedam habent animalia; omnes igitur sensus habentur a non imperfectis neque orbatis (videtur enim et talpa sub pelle habens oculos). Quare, si non aliquod alterum est corpus, et passio que nullius est eorum quae sunt hic corporum, neque unus utique deficiet sensus. Now, the sense organs are formed of these two simple bodies only, air and water. For the pupil is of water; the organ of hearing, of air; and smell, of either. But fire either is found in none or is common to all, for nothing without heat is sensitive. Earth either belongs to none or is especially involved in touch. Whence it remains that there is no sense organ without air and water. Now, certain animals do in fact possess these organs. All the senses, therefore, are found in animals neither incomplete nor defective (for even the mole is observed to have eyes beneath its skin). Therefore, if there is no other kind of body and no qualities other than those of the bodies here present, no sense will be missing. At vero neque communium potest esse sensitivum aliquod proprium, quae unoquoque sensu sentimus non secundum accidens, ut motus, status, figurae, magnitudinis, numeri, unius. But there cannot be a sense proper to the common things that we sense by each sense not accidentally: for example, movement, rest, shape, magnitude, number, and unity. Haec enim omnia motu sentimus, ut magnitudinem motu; quare et figuram: magnitudo enim quaedam et figura est; For we sense all these by motion: that is, we know magnitude by movement, and from magnitude, shape as well; for a shape is also a magnitude. quiescens autem in eo quod non movetur; numerus vero negatione continui et propriis; unusquisque enim unum sentit sensus. Quare manifestum est quoniam impossibile est cuiuslibet proprium sensum esse horum. What is at rest is sensed as not moving, and number as the negation of the continuous and its properties. For each sense senses one thing. Whence it is manifest that it is impossible that there should be any proper sense for any of these. Sic enim erit sicut nunc visu dulce sentimus: hoc autem est quoniam amborum habentes existimus sensum, quo cum conciderint cognoscimus; si vero non, nequaquam utique, sed aut secundum accidens sentiebamus (ut Cleonis filium, non quia Cleonis filius est, sed quoniam albus, huic autem accidit filium Cleonis esse); communium autem habemus iam sensum communem non secundum accidens; non igitur est proprius; nequaquam enim utique sentiremus sed aut sic sicut dictum est Cleonis filium nos videre. The situation would, in that case, be as when we sense what is sweet by sight. This happens because the sensation of both is present in us, whereby when they coincide we are aware of it. If it were not so, we should sense this only accidentally, as when we see the son of Cleon not as the son of Cleon but as something white, which object happens to be the son of Cleon. But we already have a common sense of the common things, and this not merely accidentally. Hence, there is not a proper sense for them. If there were, we should never sense them except in the way we have said that we see the son of Cleon.