sed intellectus, cum intelligit aliquid valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit infima, sed magis; sensitivum quidem enim non sine corpore est, hic autem separatus est. But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand lower things less, but more. For whereas the sensitive power is not without the body, the intellect is separate. 671. De parte autem animae. Postquam philosophus determinavit de parte animae sensitiva et ostendit etiam quod sentire et intelligere non sunt idem, hic incipit determinare de parte animae intellectiva. Et dividitur in partes duas: 671. As to the part of the soul (429a10). Having treated of the sensitive part of the soul, and shown that to sense and to understand are quite distinct activities, the Philosopher now turns to the intellectual part of the soul. His treatment falls into two main divisions. in prima determinat de parte animae intellectiva; First, he comes to certain conclusions on the intellectual part in general. in secunda, ex his quae determinata sunt de sensu et intellectu, ostendit quid sit de anima sentiendum, ibi: nunc autem de anima dicta recapitulantes etc. Second, from what has been concluded about sense and intellect, he deduces, at now recapitulating (431b20; [787]), some necessary consequences with regard to the soul as a whole. Prima dividitur in partes duas: The former division falls into two sections. in prima determinat de intellectu; In the first, he makes determinations about the intellect as such. in secunda comparat ipsum ad sensum, ibi: videtur autem sensibile etc. In the second, at and it appears that the sense-object (431a4; [765]), he compares the intellect with the senses. Prima dividitur in duas: The first divides into two parts. in prima determinat de intellectu; In the first, the intellect is treated in itself. in secunda de operatione eius, ibi: indivisibilium quidem igitur intelligentia etc. In the second, at the intellectual grasping of indivisible things (430a26; [746]), the intellect is treated according to its activity. Prima dividitur in tres: The former part then subdivides again into three parts. in prima determinat de intellectu possibili; First, he determines about the potential intellect; in secunda de intellectu agente, ibi: quoniam autem sicut in omni; second, about the agent intellect, at now, since in all nature (430a10; [728]); in tertia de intellectu in actu, ibi: idem autem est secundum actum. third, about the intellect in act, at but knowledge in act (430a19; [740]). Circa primum tria facit: Concerning the first, he does three things. primo determinat de intellectu possibili; First, he determines the potential intellect; secundo de obiecto eius, ibi: quoniam autem aliud est magnitudo etc.; second, he determines its object, at now, as magnitude is one thing (429b10); tertio movet dubitationem circa praedeterminata, ibi: dubitabit autem aliquis. and third, he adduces an objection, at one might well inquire (429b22). Circa primum duo facit: The determination of the potential intellect is in two parts. primo ostendit naturam intellectus possibilis; First, he explains the nature of the potential intellect. secundum ostendit quomodo reducatur in actum, ibi: cum autem sic singula. Second, he explains the way it is reduced to act, at but when it becomes particular objects (429b5; [700]). Circa primum duo facit: And as to its nature, he does two things: primo dicit de quo est intentio; first, he states the problems he is attempting to solve; secundo ostendit propositum, ibi: si igitur est intelligere etc. second, at for if understanding is like sensing (429a13), he shows what he proposes. 672. Dicit ergo primo quod, postquam determinatum est de parte animae sensitiva et ostensum est quod sapere et intelligere non est idem quod sentire, considerandum est nunc de parte animae qua cognoscit anima, id est intelligit, et sapit; supra autem dictum est quod differt inter sapere et intelligere: nam sapere pertinet ad iudicium intellectus, intelligere autem ad eius apprehensionem. 672. So he says that, having dealt with the sensitive part of the soul, and having shown that judgment and understanding differ from sensation, it is now time to consider that part of the soul by which it knows (429a10), that is, understands, and judges. We have already distinguished between rational judgment and understanding: for to judge rationally pertains to the judgment of the intellect, but to understand pertains to its apprehension. 673. Circa hanc autem partem aliquid est quod praetermittit, de quo erat apud antiquos dubium, utrum scilicet haec pars animae sit separabilis ab aliis partibus animae subiecto sive non sit separabilis subiecto sed ratione tantum; intelligit autem esse separabile subiecto per hoc quod dicit esse separabile secundum magnitudinem, propter Platonem qui, ponens partes animae subiecto ad invicem separatas, attribuit eis organa in diversis partibus corporis; hoc est ergo quod praetermittit. 673. At this point, an old problem emerges (which Aristotle for the time being sets aside), namely, whether this part of the soul is separable as a subject from the other parts of the soul, or is not separable as a subject but only in its account. He understands separability in subject when he speaks of its being separable according to magnitude, because Plato, asserting that the soul’s parts are separate from each other in subject, associated them with different organs of the body. This problem Aristotle sets aside. 674. Sed duo sunt quae inquirere intendit, quorum primum est, si sit separabilis secundum rationem haec pars animae ab aliis, quam differentiam habet ad alias; et quia proprietas potentiae ex qualitate actus cognoscitur, secundum quod inquirere intendit est quomodo sit ipsum intelligere, id est quomodo operatio intellectualis compleatur. 674. And he keeps two ends in view. One is to examine how this part of the soul differs from the others, if it can be separated from them in account. And, as the property of a power is known from the quality of its act, his second aim is to examine how understanding itself arises, that is, how intellectual activity is completed. 675. Deinde cum dicit: si igitur est intelligere, ostendit propositum. Et circa hoc tria facit: 675. Next, at for if understanding (429a13), he presents what he proposes in three stages: primo proponit similitudinem intellectus ad sensum; first, he suggests a similarity between intellect and sense; secundo ex huiusmodi similitudine concludit naturam possibilis intellectus, ibi: necesse est itaque; second, he argues, at it is also necessary (429a18; [677]), to a conclusion touching the nature of the potential intellect; tertio ostendit ex his quae de intellectu probaverat differentiam inter intellectum et sensum, ibi: quoniam autem non similis sit etc. third, he in turn deduces a difference between intellect and sense, at that the impassibility (429a29; [587]). Primum igitur ex cuius suppositione procedit ad propositum ostendendum est quod intelligere est simile ei quod est sentire, quae quidem similitudo ex hoc manifesta est quod, sicut sentire est quoddam cognoscere et sentimus quandoque quidem in potentia quandoque autem in actu, sic et intelligere cognoscere quoddam est et quandoque quidem intelligimus in potentia quandoque in actu; ex hoc autem sequitur quod, cum sentire sit quoddam pati a sensibili aut aliquid simile passioni, quod intelligere sit vel pati aliquid ab intelligibili vel aliquid alterum huiusmodi, simile scilicet passioni; First of all, then, to show what was proposed, he starts on the supposition that understanding and sensing are similar; he manifests this likeness by noting that just as sensing is a certain knowing, and we of course sometimes sense in potency and sometimes in act, so too, understanding is a certain knowing, and sometimes we understand in potency and sometimes in act. Whence it follows that, as sensing is a certain being acted upon by a sensible object (or is something like a passion), so understanding is either some kind of being acted upon by the intelligible object or something of that sort, that is, like a passion. 676. horum autem duorum secundum verius est: nam sentire, ut supra in II dictum est, non proprie pati est (patitur enim proprie aliquid a contrario), sed habet aliquid simile passioni inquantum sensus est in potentia ad sensibile et est susceptivus sensibilium. Ergo, si intelligere est simile ei quod est sentire, et partem intellectivam oportet esse impassibilem passione proprie accepta, sed oportet quod habeat aliquid simile passibilitati, quia oportet huiusmodi partem esse susceptivam speciei intelligibilis et quod sit in potentia ad huiusmodi speciem sed non sit hoc in actu, et sic oportet, sicut se habet sensitivum ad sensibilia, similiter se habere intellectivum ad intelligibilia, quia utrumque est in potentia ad suum obiectum et est susceptivum eius. 676. Of these alternatives, the second is the more true. For even sensing, as we have seen in Book II, is not properly speaking a being acted upon—for being acted upon, properly speaking, involves something coming from its contrary. Yet sensing resembles a passion inasmuch as the sense is potential with respect to its sensible object, and it is receptive of sensibles. Then, if understanding resembles sensing, the intellectual part too must be impassible (taking “passion” properly), yet it must have some likeness to passibility, for it must be receptive to an intelligible species; and it must be in potency for such a species, but not this in act. And thus it must be the case that as the sense power stands to the sense-object, so will the intellect to the intelligible, each being potential with respect to its own object and able to receive that object. 677. Deinde cum dicit: necesse est itaque, ex praemissis ostendit naturam intellectus possibilis. Et circa hoc duo facit: 677. Then, at it is also necessary (429a18), he proceeds to deduce the nature of the potential intellect. And about this he does two things. primo ostendit quod intellectus possibilis non est aliquid corporeum vel commixtum ex rebus corporalibus; First, he shows that the potential intellect is not a bodily thing nor compounded of bodily things; secundo ostendit quod neque habet organum corporale, ibi: unde neque misceri etc. second, at hence it is a reasonable (429a24; [684]), he shows that it has no bodily organ.