Non reminiscimur autem, quia hoc quidem inpassibile, passivus vero intellectus corruptibilis, et sine hoc nihil intelligit. It does not remember, however, because it is impassible; but the passive intellect is corruptible, and the soul understands nothing without that. 728. Quoniam autem sicut in omni natura etc. Postquam philosophus determinavit de intellectu possibili, nunc determinat de intellectu agente. Et circa hoc duo facit: 728. Now, since in all nature (430a10). Having examined the potential intellect, the Philosopher now turns his attention to the agent intellect. And about this, he does two things. primo ostendit esse intellectum agentem praeter possibilem, et ratione, et exemplo; First, he shows by argument and illustration that there is such a thing as the agent intellect beyond the potential intellect; secundo ostendit huius intellectus naturam, ibi: et hic intellectus. second, at and this intellect (430a17; [732]), he explains its nature. Ponit ergo circa primum talem rationem: in omni natura quae est quandoque in potentia et quandoque in actu oportet ponere aliquid quod est sicut materia in unoquoque genere (quod scilicet est in potentia ad omnia quae sunt illius generis), et aliud quod est sicut causa agens et factivum, quod ita se habet in faciendo omnia sicut ars ad materiam; sed anima secundum partem intellectivam quandoque est in potentia et quandoque in actu; necesse est igitur in anima intellectiva esse has differentias, ut scilicet sit unus intellectus in quo possint omnia intelligibilia fieri (et hic est intellectus possibilis, de quo supra dictum est) et alius intellectus sit ad hoc quod possit omnia intelligibilia facere in actu (qui vocatur intellectus agens) et est sicut habitus quidam. The argument he uses is this. In all nature, which is sometimes in potency and sometimes in actuality, we must posit something that is as matter in the genus (that is, what is potentially all the things that are in that genus); and another thing that is as an active and productive cause, as art with respect to its material. But soul in its intellectual part is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act. Therefore, there must be these differences in the intellectual soul: first, an intellect of the sort that it can become all intelligible things (this is the potential intellect already discussed); and also another intellect such that it can make everything intelligible in act. And this latter is called the “agent intellect”; and it stands as a sort of habit. 729. Huius autem verbi occasione, quidam posuerunt intellectum agentem idem esse cum intellectu qui est habitus principiorum. 729. This last phrase has led some to suppose that the agent intellect is the same as the intellect that is the habitual possession of the principles. Quod esse non potest, quia intellectus qui est habitus principiorum praesupponit aliqua iam intellecta in actu, scilicet terminos principiorum per quorum intelligentiam cognoscimus principia, et sic sequeretur quod intellectus agens non faceret omnia intelligibilia in actu, ut hic philosophus dicit. But it is not so; for the intellect that is the habit of the principles presupposes certain things that have already been actually understood, namely, the terms of the principles, through the grasping of which we know the principles. And then it would follow that the agent intellect did not make all intelligible objects in act, as the Philosopher here maintains. Dicendum est ergo quod habitus hic accipitur secundum quod philosophus frequenter consuevit nominare omnem formam et naturam habitum, prout habitus distinguitur contra privationem et potentiam, ut sic per hoc quod nominat eum habitum distinguat eum ab intellectu possibili qui est potentia. Therefore, I hold that the term “habit” is used here in the sense in which the Philosopher often calls any form and nature a “habit,” insofar as a habit is distinct from privation and potency. In this case, the agent intellect is called a “habit” to distinguish it from the potential intellect, which is in potency. 730. Unde dicit quod est habitus ut lumen, quod quodammodo facit colores existentes in potentia esse actu colores. Et dicit quodammodo, quia supra ostensum est quod color secundum seipsum est visibilis, hoc autem solummodo lumen facit ipsum esse actu colorem inquantum facit diaphanum esse in actu ut moveri possit a colore et sic color videatur; intellectus autem agens facit ipsa intelligibilia esse in actu, quae prius erant in potentia, per hoc quod abstrahit ea a materia: sic enim sunt intelligibilia in actu, ut dictum est. 730. So he calls it a habit like light, which in a way makes potential colors actual. He says, “in a way,” because, as we have seen, color is visible of itself; like only makes a color be in act insofar as it makes the transparent actual, such that it can be moved by color, and thereby the color is seen. The agent intellect, on the other hand, makes the intelligible objects themselves, which before were in potency, to be in act, through abstracting them from matter; for it is thus that they are intelligible in act, as was said. 731. Inducitur autem Aristoteles ad ponendum intellectum agentem ad excludendum opinionem Platonis, qui posuit quidditates rerum sensibilium esse a materia separatas et intelligibiles actu, unde non erat ei necessarium ponere intellectum agentem; sed quia Aristoteles ponit quod quidditates rerum sensibilium sunt in materia et non intelligibiles actu, oportuit quod poneret intellectum aliquem qui abstraheret eas a materia et sic faceret eas intelligibiles actu. 731. The reason why Aristotle is led to assert that there is an agent intellect is to rule out Plato’s view, which asserted that the whatnesses of sensible realities exist separately from matter, in a state of actual intelligibility. This is why, for Plato, there was no need to posit an agent intellect. But because Aristotle asserts that whatnesses of sensible realities exist in matter and are not intelligible in act, he had to assert that there is some intellect that abstracts them from matter and thus makes them intelligible in act. 732. Deinde cum dicit: et hic intellectus, ponit quatuor conditiones intellectus agentis, quarum prima est quod sit separabilis, secunda quod sit impassibilis, tertia quod sit immixtus, id est non compositus ex naturis corporalibus neque adiunctus organo corporali, et in his tribus convenit cum intellectu possibili; quarta autem conditio est quod sit in actu secundum suam substantiam, in quo differt ab intellectu possibili, qui est in potentia secundum suam substantiam, sed est in actu solum secundum speciem susceptam. 732. Next, at and this intellect (430a17), he states four conditions of the agent intellect: first, its being separable; second, its being impassible; third, its being unmixed, that is, not composed of bodily natures nor conjoined with a bodily organ. Now, these three are also found in the potential intellect; but the fourth condition is that it is in act according to its own substance, and in this it differs from the potential intellect, which is in potency according to its own substance, but is in act only insofar as it has received a species. 733. Et ad has quatuor conditiones probandas inducit unam rationem, quae talis est: agens est honorabilius patiente et principium activum materia; sed intellectus agens comparatur ad possibilem sicut agens ad materiam, sicut iam dictum est; ergo intellectus agens est nobilior possibili; sed intellectus possibilis est separatus, impassibilis et immixtus, ut supra ostensum est; ergo multo magis intellectus agens. Ex quo etiam patet quod sit secundum substantiam suam in actu, quia agens non est nobilius patiente et materia nisi secundum quod est in actu. 733. To demonstrate these four conditions he argues as follows. For the agent is always more honorable than the recipient, and the active principle than its material. But the agent intellect, as we have said, is to the potential intellect as an agent to its material; therefore the agent intellect is nobler than the potential; but the potential intellect is (as has been shown) separate, impassible, and unmixed; therefore the agent intellect will be even more so. From which also it is clear that the agent intellect is in act according to its own substance, for an agent is nobler than its patient and matter only insofar as it is in act. 734. Occasione autem horum quae hic dicuntur, quidam posuerunt intellectum agentem substantiam separatam et quod differt secundum substantiam ab intellectu possibili. 734. Now, what is said here has led some to assert that the agent intellect is a separated substance, and that it differs in its substance from the potential intellect. Illud autem non videtur esse verum. Non enim homo esset sufficienter a natura institutus si non haberet in seipso principia quibus posset suam operationem explere, quae est intelligere; quae quidem compleri non potest nisi per intellectum possibilem et per intellectum agentem; unde perfectio humanae naturae requirit quod utrumque eorum sit aliquid in homine. But this does not seem to be true; for man would not be adequately established by nature if he lacked within himself the principles whereby he can carry out his own activity, which is understanding; this of course cannot be brought to completion except through both the potential intellect and the agent intellect. Hence, the completion of human nature requires that both of these be something within a man. Videmus etiam quod, sicut operatio intellectus possibilis, quae est percipere intelligibile, attribuitur homini, ita etiam operatio intellectus agentis, quae est abstrahere intelligibilia; hoc autem non posset esse nisi principium formale huius actionis esset ei secundum esse coniunctum. Moreover, we see that just as the potential intellect’s activity, which is perceiving the intelligible, is attributed to the man, so too is the activity of the agent intellect, which is the abstracting of intelligible objects. And this is not possible unless a formal principle of this activity were joined to him in his being. 735. Nec sufficit, ad hoc quod haec actio attribuatur homini, hoc quod species intelligibiles factae per intellectum agentem habent quodammodo pro subiecto phantasmata quae sunt in nobis, quia, ut supra diximus cum de intellectu possibili ageretur, species non sunt intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum quod sunt abstractae a phantasmatibus et sic eis mediantibus actio intellectus agentis non posset nobis attribui; et praeterea intellectus agens comparatur ad species intellectas in actu sicut ars ad species artificiatorum, per quas manifestum est quod artificiata non habent actionem artis, unde, etiam dato quod species factae intelligibiles actu essent in nobis, non sequeretur quod nos possemus habere actionem intellectus agentis. 735. Nor is it enough, to attribute the action to the man, to say that the intelligible species made by the agent intellect have as their subject in some way the phantasms, which are internal to us. For, as we have already observed in treating of the potential intellect, the species become actually intelligible only insofar as they are abstracted from the phantasms; thus the act of the agent intellect could not be attributed to us by their mediation. Besides, the agent intellect is to the actually understood species as the art is to the species of the artifacts, and obviously the artifacts do not have the activity of the art; hence, even granted that the species made actually intelligible were in us, it would not follow that we can have the action of the agent intellect. 736. Est etiam praedicta positio contra Aristotelis intentionem qui expresse dicit has duas differentias, scilicet intellectum agentem et intellectum possibilem, esse in anima, ex quo expresse dat intelligere quod sint partes vel potentiae animae et non aliquae substantiae separatae. 736. Nor does the above position agree with the intent of Aristotle, who expressly states that these two distinct things, the agent intellect and the potential intellect, are in the soul; thus, he expressly teaches us to understand that they are parts or powers of the soul and not separate substances. 737. Sed contra hoc praecipue videtur esse quod intellectus possibilis comparatur ad intelligibilia ut in potentia existens ad illa, intellectus autem agens comparatur ad ea ut ens in actu; non autem quod idem respectu eiusdem possit esse in potentia et in actu; unde non videtur possibile quod intellectus agens et possibilis conveniant in una substantia animae. 737. The chief difficulty arises from the fact that, while the potential intellect is in potency to intelligible objects, the agent intellect stands to the latter as a being already in act. And the same thing cannot be in act and in potency relative to the same thing, and therefore it seems that it is not possible that the agent and the potential intellects should come together in the one substance of the soul. 738. Sed hoc de facili solvitur, si quis recte consideret quomodo intellectus possibilis sit in potentia ad intelligibilia et quomodo intelligibilia sunt in potentia respectu intellectus agentis. Est enim intellectus possibilis in potentia ad intelligibilia sicut indeterminatum ad determinatum: nam intellectus possibilis non habet determinate naturam alicuius rerum sensibilium, unumquodque autem intelligibile est aliqua determinata natura alicuius speciei; unde supra dixit quod intellectus possibilis comparatur ad intelligibilia sicut tabula ad determinatas picturas. Quantum autem ad hoc, intellectus agens non est in actu: 738. But this is easily resolved if we understand how the potential intellect is in potency to intelligible objects, and how the intelligible objects are in potency with respect to the agent intellect. For the potential intellect is in potency to the intelligible as the indeterminate to the determinate; for the potential intellect does not have determinately the nature of any sensible thing, whereas each intelligible object is some determinate nature of some species—hence Aristotle’s earlier comparison of the potential intellect’s relation to intelligible objects with that of a tablet to determinate pictures. And from this point of view, the agent intellect is not in act. 739. si enim intellectus agens haberet in se determinationem omnium intelligibilium, non indigeret intellectus possibilis phantasmatibus, sed per solum intellectum agentem reduceretur in actum omnium intelligibilium; et sic non compararetur ad intelligibilia ut faciens ad factum, ut philosophus hic dicit, sed ut existens ipsa intelligibilia. Comparatur igitur ut actus respectu intelligibilium inquantum est quaedam virtus immaterialis activa potens alia sibi similia facere, scilicet immaterialia, et per hunc modum ea quae sunt intelligibilia in potentia facit intelligibilia actu: sic enim et lumen facit colores in actu, non quod ipsum habeat in se determinationem omnium colorum. Huiusmodi autem virtus activa est quaedam participatio luminis intellectualis a substantiis separatis, et ideo philosophus dicit quod est sicut habitus, vel lumen, quod non competeret dici de eo si esset substantia separata. 739. For if the agent intellect had with itself the determination of all intelligible things, the potential intellect would not need the phantasms; rather, it would be reduced to the act of all intelligible things by the agent intellect alone. And thus, the agent intellect is not related to intelligible objects as a maker to the thing made, as the Philosopher here says, but as being the intelligible things themselves. Therefore, it is related as to the intelligible objects as an act insofar as it is a certain immaterial active power capable of making other things like itself—that is, making them immaterial; and in this way things that are potentially intelligible it makes actually intelligible. For so too does light make colors actual, but it does not have within itself the determination of all the colors. But this active power is a certain participation in the intellectual light of separated substances, so the Philosopher compares it to a habit, or a light, which would not be an appropriate way of describing it if it were itself a separate substance. 740. Deinde cum dicit: idem autem est etc., determinat de intellectu secundum actum. Et circa hoc duo facit: 740. Next, at but knowledge in act (430a19), he states his conclusions concerning intellect as in act. And about this he does two things. primo ponit conditiones intellectus in actu; First, he states the conditions of the intellect in act. secundo ostendit conditiones totius partis intellectivae secundum quod differt ab aliis partibus animae, ibi: separatus autem etc. Second, at when separated (430a22; [742]), he shows how the intellectual part of the soul in general differs from the rest of the soul. Circa primum tres ponit conditiones intellectus in actu. Regarding the former point, he states three conditions of the intellect in act. Quarum prima est quod scientia in actu est idem rei scitae, quod non est verum de intellectu in potentia. First, its actual knowledge is the same as the thing known, which is not true of the intellect in potency. Secunda conditio eius est quod scientia in potentia in uno et eodem est tempore prior quam scientia in actu, sed universaliter non est prior, non solum natura, sed neque etiam tempore; et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit in IX Metaphysicae quod actus est prior potentia natura, tempore vero in uno et eodem potentia prior est actu, quia unum et idem prius est in potentia, et postea fit actu, sed universaliter loquendo etiam tempore actus est prior: nam quod est in potentia non reducitur in actum nisi per aliquid quod est actu, et sic etiam de potentia sciente non fit aliquis actu sciens nec inveniendo nec addiscendo nisi per aliquam scientiam praeexistentem in actu, quia omnis doctrina et disciplina intellectiva fit ex praeexistenti cognitione, ut dicitur in I Posteriorum. Second, though within one and the same thing potential knowledge is prior in time to actual knowledge, yet, speaking universally, this is not the case, neither in nature nor with respect to time. In Metaphysics 9, Aristotle had said that act is by nature prior to potency, but potency is prior to act in time within one and the same thing, since a thing is first in potency and afterwards in act. But universally speaking, act is prior even in time, because no potency would ever be actualized unless something were already in act. So, even in the case of potential knowledge, someone does not become an actual knower, whether by discovery or by learning from a teacher, unless through some preexisting knowledge, since all intellectual teaching and learning arise from preexisting knowledge, as it is said in Posterior Analytics 1. 741. Tertia conditio intellectus in actu est per quam differt ab intellectu possibili et intellectu agente, quorum uterque quandoque intelligit et quandoque non intelligit; sed hoc non potest dici de intellectu in actu, qui consistit in ipso intelligere. 741. The third condition of the intellect in act distinguishes it from both the potential intellect and the agent intellect, both of which sometimes understand and sometimes do not understand. But this cannot be said of the intellect in act, for it consists in understanding itself. 742. Deinde cum dicit: separatus autem, ponit conditiones totius intellectivae partis. 742. Next, at when separated (430a22), he states the conditions of the whole intellectual part. Et primo proponit veritatem; And first, he points to the truth; secundo excludit obiectionem, ibi: non reminiscimur. second, he refutes an objection, at it does not remember (430a23; [744]). Dicit ergo primo quod solus intellectus separatus est hoc quod vere est. Quod quidem non potest intelligi neque de intellectu agente neque de intellectu possibili tantum, sed de utroque, quia de utroque supra dixit quod est separatus; et sic patet quod hic loquitur de tota parte intellectiva, quae quidem dicitur separata ex hoc quod habet operationem sine organo corporali. He says, then, that the intellect alone, when separated, truly exists; and this cannot be understood only of the agent or potential intellect, but of both together, since both have been described as separated. And thus it is clear that he is speaking of the whole intellectual part, which indeed is called “separate” because it has an activity without a bodily organ. 743. Et quia in principio huius libri dixit quod, si aliqua operatio animae sit propria ei, contingit animam separari, concludit quod haec sola pars animae, scilicet intellectiva, est incorruptibilis et perpetua; et hoc est quod supra supposuit in II, quod hoc genus animae separatur ab aliis sicut perpetuum a corruptibili. Dicitur autem perpetua non quia semper fuerit, sed quia semper erit; unde Philosophus dicit in XI Metaphysicae quod forma numquam est ante materiam, sed posterius remanet anima, non omnis sed intellectus. 743. And because he said at the beginning of this book that if any activity of the soul is proper to it, the soul could be separated, he concludes that only this part of the soul (that is, the intellectual part) is incorruptible and perpetual. This is what he has said in book 2, namely, that this kind of soul was separable from others as the perpetual from the corruptible—perpetual in the sense that it will always exist, not in the sense that it always has existed; for as he shows in Metaphysics 12, forms cannot exist before their matter. The soul, then (not all of it, but only the intellect) will survive its matter. 744. Deinde cum dicit: non reminiscimur, excludit quamdam obiectionem. Posset enim aliquis credere quod, quia pars intellectiva animae est incorruptibilis, remanet post mortem in anima intellectiva scientia rerum eodem modo quo nunc eam habet, cuius contrarium supra dixit in I, quod intelligere corrumpitur quodam interius corrupto, et quod corrupto corpore non reminiscitur neque amat. 744. Next, at it does not remember (430a23), he meets an objection. For someone might suppose that, because part of the soul is incorruptible, after death the knowledge of things would remain in the way as it is now. But already in book 1, he has disallowed this, where he observed that understanding must cease with the decay of something else within; and that after death the soul does not remember or love. 745. Et ideo hic dicit quod non reminiscitur, scilicet post mortem eorum, quae in vita scivimus, quia hoc quidem impassibile est, id est ista pars animae intellectivae impassibilis est, unde ipsa non est subiectum passionum animae, sicut sunt amor et odium et reminiscentia et huiusmodi quae cum aliqua passione corporali contingunt; passivus vero intellectus corruptibilis est, id est pars animae quae est subiecta praedictis passionibus est corruptibilis: pertinent enim ad partem sensitivam (tamen haec pars animae dicitur intellectus, sicut et dicitur rationalis inquantum aliqualiter participat rationem obediendo rationi et sequendo motum eius, ut dicitur in I Ethicorum); sine hac autem parte animae corruptibili, intellectus noster nihil intelligit: non enim intelligit aliquid sine phantasmate, ut infra dicetur, et ideo destructo corpore non remanet in anima separata scientia rerum secundum eundem modum quo modo intelligit. Sed quomodo tunc intelligat, non est praesentis intentionis discutere. 745. So now he adds that what we have known in life it does not remember after death because it is impassible, that is, that part of the intellectual soul is impassible; it is, therefore, not subject to the passions of the soul, such as love and hatred and recollection and so forth, which all depend on some passion of the body. But the passive intellect—that is, the part of the soul that is subject to the passions mentioned—is corruptible, for it pertains to the sensitive part. Nevertheless, this part of the soul is called an “intellect” just as it is also called “rational”: inasmuch as it in some way participates in reason by being obedient to reason, and by following its movement, as is said in the Ethics. But without this corruptible part of the soul, our intellect understands nothing; for the intellect understands nothing without a phantasm, as we shall see below. Hence, after the body’s destruction, there does not remain in the separated soul knowledge of things in the same way as it understands now. But how it does understand anything then is not part of our present inquiry. Lectio 5 Lecture 5 Duplicem esse intellectus operationem exponit: unam circa indivisibilia et simplicia, in qua nec verum nec falsum est nisi per accidens; alteram, circa compositionem et divisionem conceptuum secundum affirmationem et negationem, in qua iam verum vel falsum est Intellectual activities with simple and complex intelligibles