Lectio 7 Lecture 7 Intellectum vel animam esse omnia non quidem per compositionem, ut volebant antiqui, sed per apprehensionem, probat: quia item non contingat fieri intellectionem absque sensu ostendit Recapitulation of the intellect, sense, and imagination Nunc autem de anima dicta recapitulantes, dicamus iterum quod omnia ea quae sunt quodam modo est anima: aut enim sensibilia quae sunt aut intelligibilia, est autem scientia quidem scibilia quodam modo, sensus autem sensibilia. Qualiter autem hoc sit, oportet inquirere: secatur igitur scientia et sensus in res, quae quidem potentia est in ea quae sunt potentia, quae vero actu in ea quae sunt actu; animae autem sensitivum et quod scire potest potentia haec sunt, hoc quidem scibile, illud vero sensibile. Now, recapitulating what we have said about the soul, let us repeat that the soul is in a way all things that exist; for things are either sensible or intelligible, and knowledge is in some way the things knowable, and sensation is the things sensible. But how this is so we must inquire. For knowledge and sensation are divided into the realities: the potential answers to things that exist in potency, the actual to things that exist in act. In the soul, the sensitive power and that which can know are these things in potency: the latter, the knowable; the former, the sensible. Necesse est autem aut ipsa aut species esse. Ipsa quidem igitur non sunt: non enim lapis in anima est, sed species. Quare anima sicut manus est: manus enim organum organorum, et intellectus species specierum et sensus species sensibilium. Now, they must be either the things themselves or their species. But they are certainly not, then, the things themselves, for a stone is not in the soul, but its species is. Thus the soul is like a hand: for the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the intellect is the species of species, and sense is the species of sensible things. Quoniam autem neque res nulla est praeter magnitudines, sicut videntur sensibilia separata, in speciebus sensibilibus intelligibilia sunt, et quae abstractione dicuntur et quaecumque sensibilium habitus et passiones. Et ob hoc neque non sentiens nihil, nihil utique addiscet neque intelliget, sed cum speculetur, necesse simul phantasma aliquod speculari; phantasmata autem sicut sensibilia sunt praeter quod sunt sine materia. But since there are no real things apart from magnitudes, as sensible objects are seen to be separate, then within the sensible species are the intelligible objects, both the things that are spoken of by abstraction and whatever qualities and habits belong to sensible things. And on this account, what does not sense neither learns nor understands anything. Rather, when one contemplates, he must at the same time contemplate some phantasm; for the phantasms are as the sense-objects, save that they are without matter. Est autem phantasia alterum a dictione et negatione: complexio enim intellectuum est verum aut falsum. But imagination is other than affirmation and denial: for the true and the false are a combining of concepts. Primi autem intellectus quid different ut non phantasmata sint? Aut neque alii phantasmata, sed non sine phantasmatibus. What difference have the primary concepts that they should not be phantasms? But neither are the others phantasms, though they do not exist without phantasms. 787. Nunc autem de anima etc. Postquam philosophus determinavit de sensu et intellectu, per ea quae de utroque determinata sunt ostendit quid sit de natura animae sentiendum. Et dividitur in partes duas: 787. Now, recapitulating what we have said (431b20). After treating of sense and intellect, through the things he has determined the Philosopher goes on now to manifest what one should think about the nature of the soul. And this is divided into two parts. in prima ostendit quod natura animae quodammodo est sicut antiqui credebant et quodammodo aliter; In the first, he shows that the early philosophers were partly right and partly wrong about the nature of the soul. in secunda ostendit dependentiam intellectus a sensu, ibi: quoniam autem neque res. In the second, he clarifies the intellect’s dependence on the senses, at but since there are no real things (432a3; [791]); Circa primum duo facit: As to the former point, he does two things: primo ostendit quod anima quodammodo est omnia, ut antiqui dixerunt; first, he explains how the soul, as the early philosophers said, is in a way all things; secundo ostendit quod aliter est omnia quam illi dixerunt, ibi: necesse est autem. second, he says how it is not all things in the way they supposed, at now, they must be the things (431b28; ]789]). Dicit ergo primo quod nunc recapitulantes ea quae dicta sunt de anima ut ex his propositum ostendamus, dicamus quod anima quodammodo est omnia: omnia enim quae sunt aut sunt sensibilia aut intelligibilia, anima autem est quodammodo et sensibilia et intelligibilia, quia in anima est sensus et intellectus sive scientia, sensus autem quodammodo est ipsa sensibilia et intellectus intelligibilia sive scientia scibilia. He says, then: now, recapitulating what we have said about the soul, let us repeat that the soul is in a way all things; for all things are either sensible or intelligible, but the soul is in a certain way both the sensible things and the intelligible things, because sense and intellect (or scientific knowledge) are in the soul, whereas sensation is in some way the sensibles themselves, and the intellect, or knowledge, the intelligible things, that is, the scientifically knowable. 788. Et qualiter hoc sit, oportet inquirere: sensus enim et scientia dividuntur in res, id est dividuntur in actum et potentiam quemadmodum et res, ita tamen quod scientia et sensus quae sunt in potentia se habent ad scibilia et sensibilia quae sunt in potentia, scientia vero et sensus quae sunt in actu ordinantur ad scibilia et sensibilia quae sunt in actu; sed tamen diversimode: nam sensus in actu et scientia vel intellectus in actu sunt scibilia et sensibilia etiam in actu, sed potentia animae sensitiva et id quod scire potest, id est potentia intellectiva, non est ipsum sensibile vel scibile, sed est in potentia ad ipsa, sensitivum quidem ad sensibile, quod autem scire potest ad scibile. Relinquitur igitur quod anima quodammodo sit omnia. 788. But how this is so we must inquire. For sense and knowledge are divided into the realities, that is, they are divided into act and potency in the same way that realities are, but in such a way that potential knowledge and sensation are oriented to the knowable and the sensible that exist in potency, and actual knowledge and sensation are actually ordered to the knowable and sensible that exist in act. But there is a difference between the two relationships. For the sense in act and knowledge or the intellect in act are also the objects they actually sense or understand, the soul’s sensitive power and that which can know, that is, the intellectual power, are not the sensible or knowable thing itself; but rather, they are in potency as regards them, the sensitive as regards the sensible, and what can know as regards the knowable. And thereby it is granted that the soul is “somehow” all things. 789. Deinde cum dicit: necesse est autem etc., ostendit quod alio modo est omnia quam antiqui ponebant. Et dicit quod, si anima est omnia, necesse est quod vel sit ipsae res sensibiles et scibiles, sicut Empedocles posuit quod terra terram cognoscimus et aqua aquam et sic de aliis, aut quod sit species ipsarum. Non autem anima est ipsae res, sicut illi posuerunt, quia lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis; et per hunc modum dicitur intellectus in actu esse ipsum intellectum in actu, inquantum species intellecti est species intellectus in actu. 789. Next, at now, they must be (431b28), he shows that it is “all things” in a way other than what the ancients claimed. He says that if the soul is indeed all things, it must either be the sensible and knowable realities themselves, as Empedocles said that we, being earth, know earth, and being water, know water, or it is the species of the things themselves. But the soul is not the realities itself, as they asserted, since a stone is not in the soul, but the stone’s species is; and this enables us to see how intellect in act is said to be the very thing understood in act, insofar as the species of the intellect is the species of the thing actually understood. 790. Ex quo patet quod anima assimilatur manui: manus enim est organum organorum, quia manus datae sunt homini loco omnium organorum quae data sunt aliis animalibus ad defensionem vel impugnationem vel cooperimentum: omnia enim haec homo sibi manu praeparat; 790. Thus it is clear that the soul resembles the hand. For the hand is the instrument of instruments, for hands are given to man in place of all the organs that are given to other animals for purposes of defense or attack or assistance. For man can provide all these needs for himself with his hands. et similiter anima data est homini loco omnium formarum, ut sit homo quodammodo totum ens, inquantum secundum animam est quodammodo omnia, prout eius anima est receptiva omnium formarum; nam intellectus est quaedam forma receptiva omnium formarum intelligibilium et sensus est quaedam forma receptiva omnium formarum sensibilium. And in a similar way, the soul is given to man as the place of all forms, so that a human being is in a way the whole of being, inasmuch as through his soul is all things, in a way, as his soul is able to receive all forms. For the intellect is a certain form receptive of all intelligible forms, and the sense is a certain form receptive of all sensible forms. 791. Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem neque res etc., quia dixerat quod intellectus est quodammodo intelligibilia sicut sensus est sensibilia, posset aliquis credere quod intellectus non dependeret a sensu, et hoc quidem verum esset si intelligibilia nostri intellectus essent a sensibilibus separata secundum esse, ut Platonici posuerunt; et ideo hic ostendit quod intellectus indiget sensu, 791. Next, at but since there are (432a3), because the doctrine just stated, that intellect is in a way the intelligible objects just as sense is the sensible objects, might lead one to suppose that the intellect did not depend on the sense (as would be the case indeed if the things intelligible to our intellect were separate from sensible things in their being, as the Platonists thought), so he now shows the intellect’s dependence on the senses. et postmodum quod intellectus differt a phantasia, quae etiam a sensu dependet, ibi: est autem phantasia. And afterwards, at but imagination is other (432a10), he shows that it differs, nonetheless, from imagination, which also depends on the senses. Dicit ergo primo quod, quia nulla res intellecta a nobis est praeter magnitudines sensibiles, quasi ab eis separata secundum esse, sicut sensibilia videntur ab invicem separata, necesse est quod intelligibilia intellectus nostri sint in speciebus sensibilibus secundum esse, tam illa quae dicuntur per abstractionem, scilicet mathematica, quam naturalia, quae sunt habitus et passiones sensibilium. First, then, he observes that, since there are no real things that are understood by us except sensible magnitudes, as things separate from them in being, as the sensible objects are seen to be separate from each other, so it is necessary that things intelligible to our intellect exist within the sensible species in their being, both the things said to exist through abstraction, that is, mathematical objects, and natural things, which are the qualities and habits belonging to sensible things. Et propter hoc sine sensu non potest aliquid homo addiscere quasi de novo acquirens scientiam neque intelligere quasi utens scientia habita, sed oportet, cum aliquid speculatur in actu, quod simul formet sibi aliquod phantasma; phantasmata autem sunt similitudines sensibilium, It follows, then, that without some use of the senses, a human being can neither learn, as acquiring new knowledge, nor understand, as though using knowledge that was already acquired. Rather, when the intellect actually contemplates anything, it must at the same time form for itself some phantasm; for phantasms are likenesses of sensible things. 792. sed in hoc differunt ab eis quod sunt praeter materiam: nam sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia, ut supra dictum est, phantasia autem est motus a sensu secundum actum. 792. But they differ from them in their being outside matter. For as we have shown, the sense is receptive of the species without matter; and imagination is a movement produced by sensation in act. Patet autem ex hoc falsum esse quod Avicenna dicit quod intellectus non indiget sensu postquam acquisivit scientiam; manifestum est enim quod, etiam postquam aliquis habet habitum scientiae, necesse est ad hoc quod speculetur quod utatur phantasmate; et propter hoc per laesionem organi impeditur usus scientiae iam acquisitae. It will be clear now that Avicenna erred in saying that once the intellect has acquired knowledge, it no longer needs the senses. For it is manifest that even after someone has the habit of knowledge, in order to contemplate it, one must use a phantasm; and any injury to the organ will impede our using the knowledge we already have. 793. Deinde cum dicit: est autem phantasia, ostendit differentiam inter phantasiam et intellectum. 793. Then, at but imagination is other (432a10), he distinguishes between intellect and imagination. Et primo quantum ad operationem intellectus quae est compositio et divisio, dicens quod phantasia alterum est ab affirmatione et negatione intellectus, quia in complexione intellectuum iam est verum et falsum, quod non est in phantasia: nam cognoscere verum et falsum est solius intellectus. First, with respect to the activity of the intellect that is composing and dividing, he says that imagining is other than the intellect’s affirmation and denial; for in the bringing together of concepts there is immediately the true and the false, which is not the case with imagining. For knowing truth and falsehood belong to the intellect alone. 794. Secundo ibi: primi autem intellectus, inquirit in quo differunt primi intellectus, id est intelligentiae indivisibilium, quod non sint phantasmata. Et respondet quod non sunt sine phantasmatibus, sed tamen non sunt phantasmata, quia phantasmata sunt similitudines particularium, intellecta autem sunt universalia ab individuantibus conditionibus abstracta: unde phantasmata sunt indivisibilia in potentia et non in actu. 794. Second, at what difference (432a12), he asks how the primary concepts, the grasping of indivisible objects, are so different that they are not the phantasms; and he replies that these are not without phantasms, but nonetheless they are not phantasms, because phantasms are likenesses of particulars; the things understood, however, are universals abstracted from individuating conditions. Phantasms, then, are not actually, but only potentially, the indivisibles. Lectio 8 Lecture 8 Proposita dicendorum intentione, arguit illas virium animae divisiones, quae dividuntur in rationales et irrationales, vel in rationalem, irascibilem et concupiscibilem; deinde probat vim animae motivam secundum locum non esse vegetandi principium, nec sensu, nec intellectum, vel appetitum The principle of movement in living beings: what it is not Quoniam autem anima secundum duas diffinita est potentias quae animalium est, et discretio, quod intelligentiae opus est et sensus, et adhuc in movendo secundum locum motum, de sensu quidem et intellectu determinata sint tanta, Since the soul is defined in terms of two powers that belong to animate beings—the one, discernment, which is the work of intellect and sensation; the other, movement by local motion—and so much has been determined about sensation and understanding, de movente autem quid forte animae sit, speculandum est, utrum una quaedam pars ipsius sit separabilis aut magnitudine aut ratione, aut omnis anima, et si pars aliqua, utrum propria quaedam sit praeter consuetas dici et dictas, aut harum una aliqua sit. we must now contemplate what can be the moving factor in the soul: whether this is a single part of it, separable either in magnitude or by account, or the whole soul; and, if it is a part of the soul, whether it is a special part other than those generally acknowledged and already dealt with, or some one among these. Habet autem dubitationem mox quomodo oportet partes animae dicere et quot. Modo enim quodam infinitae videntur, et non solum quas quidam dicunt determinantes rationativam et irascibilem et appetitivam, hii autem rationem habentem et irrationabilem. A difficulty at once arises as to how it is possible to speak at all of parts of the soul or to say how many they are. For in one way their number seems to be infinite and not merely, as some say, the reasoning, the irascible, and the appetitive; or as others say, the rational and irrational. Secundum enim differentias per quas has separant, et aliae videntur partes maiorem differentiam his habentes de quibus et nunc dictum est, vegetativa enim quae et plantis inest et omnibus animalibus vel viventibus, et sensitiua, quam neque sicut irrationalem neque sicut rationem habentem ponet quis utique facile. For according to the differences by which they separate these, other parts seem to show greater diversity than in those just mentioned: in particular, the vegetative part, which is in plants and all animals or living things; and the sensitive, which one cannot easily place among either the irrational or the rational elements. Adhuc autem et phantastica quae per esse quidem ab omnibus altera est, cui autem harum eadem vel altera sit, habet multam dubitationem, si aliquis ponat separatas partes animae. Further, there is the imaginative power, which seems in its being to be quite different from any other. If one is to suppose that parts of the soul are separate, with which of these others it is identical, or from which it differs, are difficult problems. Adhuc autem appetitiva, quae et ratione et potentia altera utique videtur esse ab omnibus, et inconveniens utique hanc sequestrare: et in rationativa enim voluntas fit, et in irrationabili concupiscentia et ira; si autem tria anima, in unoquoque erit appetitus. Furthermore, there is the appetitive power, which seems distinct, both in account and as a different power, from all others; and it would be unsuitable to split this up. For will is in the rational part, desire and anger in the irrational; and if soul is three, an appetite will be in each. Et etiam de quo nunc sermo instat, quid movens secundum locum animal est? Secundum quidem enim augmentum et decrementum motum qui omnibus inest, quod omnibus inest videbitur utique movere, generativum et vegetativum. De respiratione autem et exspiratione et somno et vigilia, posterius perspiciendum; habent enim et haec dubitationem multam. But to come to the matter that is now before us: what is it that moves the animal by local motion? For the movement that is in all animals, by which they grow and decrease, would certainly seem to be due to the generative and vegetative power. Of respiration and exhalation, sleep and waking, we must treat later on: these also raise many difficulties.