Intellectum vel animam esse omnia non quidem per compositionem, ut volebant antiqui, sed per apprehensionem, probat: quia item non contingat fieri intellectionem absque sensu ostendit
Recapitulation of the intellect, sense, and imagination
Nunc autem de anima dicta recapitulantes, dicamus iterum quod omnia ea quae sunt quodam modo est anima: aut enim sensibilia quae sunt aut intelligibilia, est autem scientia quidem scibilia quodam modo, sensus autem sensibilia. Qualiter autem hoc sit, oportet inquirere: secatur igitur scientia et sensus in res, quae quidem potentia est in ea quae sunt potentia, quae vero actu in ea quae sunt actu; animae autem sensitivum et quod scire potest potentia haec sunt, hoc quidem scibile, illud vero sensibile.
Now, recapitulating what we have said about the soul, let us repeat that the soul is somehow all that exists; for things are either sensible or intelligible; and knowledge is in some way the knowable, and sensation is the sense object. But how this is so we must inquire. For knowledge and sensation are divided into realities: the potential answers to things that are really in potency, the actual to things really in act. In the soul the sensitive faculty and that which can know are these things in potency; the latter the understandable, the former the sensible.
Necesse est autem aut ipsa aut species esse. Ipsa quidem igitur non sunt: non enim lapis in anima est, sed species. Quare anima sicut manus est: manus enim organum organorum, et intellectus species specierum et sensus species sensibilium.
Now they must be the things themselves or their forms. But they are certainly not the things themselves: no stone is in the soul, but only its form. Thus the soul is like a hand: the hand is the instrument that includes other instruments, and the intellect is the form that includes other forms, and sense the form that includes sensible things.
Quoniam autem neque res nulla est praeter magnitudines, sicut videntur sensibilia separata, in speciebus sensibilibus intelligibilia sunt, et quae abstractione dicuntur et quaecumque sensibilium habitus et passiones. Et ob hoc neque non sentiens nihil, nihil utique addiscet neque intelliget, sed cum speculetur, necesse simul fantasma aliquod speculari; fantasmata autem sicut sensibilia sunt praeter quod sunt sine materia.
But since there are no real things apart from things sensible and extended (so it would seem), then in the sensible species are the intelligible, both what are predicated as a result of abstraction and whatever qualities and habits are found in sensible things. And on this account, what does not perceive by sensation acquires no knowledge or understanding at all; and when thinking occurs there must be at the same time a phantasm as its object; for phantasms are as sense objects save that they are without matter.
Est autem fantasia alterum a dictione et negatione: complexio enim intellectuum est verum aut falsum.
Imagination is other than affirmation and negation: for the true and the false are a combining of intellectual concepts.
Primi autem intellectus quid different ut non fantasmata sint? Aut neque alii fantasmata, sed non sine fantasmatibus.
What difference have the primary concepts that they should not be phantasms? But neither are the others phantasms, though they do not exist apart from phantasms.
787. Nunc autem de anima etc. Postquam philosophus determinavit de sensu et intellectu, nunc per ea quae de utroque dicta sunt ostendit quid de natura animae sit sentiendum. Et dividitur in partes duas.
787. Now, recapitulating what we have said (431b20). After treating of its powers of sense and intellect the Philosopher goes on now to draw conclusions about the nature of the soul. And this is divided into two parts.
In prima ostendit, quod natura animae est quodammodo sicut antiqui credebant et quodammodo aliter.
In the first, he shows that the early philosophers were partly right and partly wrong about the soul;
In secunda ostendit dependentiam intellectus a sensu, ibi, quoniam autem neque res.
In the second, he explains how the intellect depends on the senses.
Circa primum duo facit.
As to the former point he does two things;
Primo ostendit quod anima quodammodo est omnia sicut antiqui dixerunt.
first, he explains how the soul, as the early philosophers said, is in a way all things, at but since there are no real things;
Secundo dicit quod aliter est omnia, quam illi dixerunt, ibi, necesse est autem.
second, he says how it is not all things in the way they supposed, at now they must be the things.
Dicit ergo primo, quod nunc recapitulantes quae dicta sunt de anima, ut ex his propositum ostendamus, dicamus quod omnia quodammodo est omnia. Omnia enim quae sunt, aut sunt sensibilia, aut intelligibilia; anima autem est quodammodo omnia sensibilia et intelligibilia, quia in anima est sensus et intellectus sive scientia, sensus autem quodammodo est ipsa sensibilia, et intellectus intelligibilia, sive scientia scibilia.
He says then, now recapitulating, that one can say that the soul is in a way all things; for everything is either sensible or intelligible, and sense and intellect (or science) are in the soul, sense being somehow the sensible, and intellect, or science, the intelligible or the scientifically knowable.
788. Et qualiter hoc sit oportet inquirere. Sensus enim et scientia dividuntur in res, idest dividuntur in actum et potentiam quemadmodum et res, ita tamen quod scientia et sensus quae sunt in potentia ad sensibilia et scibilia, se habent ad scibilia et sensibilia quae sunt in potentia; scientia vero et sensus quae sunt in actu, ordinantur in sensibilia et scibilia quae sunt in actu, sed tamen diversimode. Nam sensus in actu, et scientia vel intellectus in actu, sunt scibilia et sensibilia in actu. Sed potentia animae sensitivae, et id quod scire potest idest potentia intellectiva, non est ipsum sensibile vel scibile, sed est in potentia ad ipsa. Sensitivum quidem ad sensibile; quod autem scire potest, ad scibile. Relinquitur igitur quod anima quodammodo sit omnia.
788. But we must ask how this is so. For sense and intellectual knowledge are divided into realities, that is, their division into act and potency corresponds to a like division in reality; but in such a way that while potential intellectual or sense knowledge answers to things potentially understood or sensed, and actual intellectual or sense knowledge answers to things actually understood or sensed, there is a difference between the two relationships. For the sense in act and the intellect in act are the objects they actually sense or understand; but neither the sensitive nor the intellectual potency is actually its object; it is only so potentially. And that is how the soul is "somehow" everything.
789. Deinde cum dicit necesse est autem etc., ostendit quod alio modo est omnia, quam antiqui ponerent; et dicit, quod si anima est omnia, necesse est quod sit, vel ipsae res scibiles et sensibiles, sicut Empedocles posuit quod terra terram cognoscimus, et aqua aquam, et sic de aliis; aut sit species ipsarum. Non autem anima est ipsa res, sicut illi posuerunt, quia lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis. Et per hunc modum dicitur intellectus in actu esse ipsum intellectum in actu, inquantum species intellecti est species intellectus in actu.
789. Next, at now they must be (431b28) he shows how the ancients misapplied this formula. He says that if the soul is indeed all things, it must be either simply identical with all things or a formal likeness of all things. The former view was that of Empedocles who made out that we, being earth, know earth, and being water know water, and are in the likeness of each. But obviously the soul is not simply identical with the things it knows; for not stone itself, but its formal likeness exists in the soul. And this enables us to see how intellect in act is what it understands; the form of the object is the form of the mind in act.
790. Ex quo patet quod anima assimilatur manui. Manus enim est organum organorum, quia manus datae sunt homini loco omnium organorum, quae data sunt aliis animalibus ad defensionem, vel impugnationem, vel cooperimentum. Omnia enim haec homo sibi manu praeparat.
790. Thus the soul resembles the hand. The hand is the most perfect of organs, for it takes the place in man of all the organs given to other animals for purposes of defense or attack or covering. Man can provide all these needs for himself with his hands.
Et similiter anima data est homini loco omnium formarum, ut sit homo quodammodo totum ens, inquantum secundum animam est quodammodo omnia, prout eius anima est receptiva omnium formarum. Nam intellectus est quaedam potentia receptiva omnium formarum intelligibilium, et sensus est quaedam potentia receptiva omnium formarum sensibilium.
And in the same way the soul in man takes the place of all the forms of being, so that through his soul a man is, in a way, all being or everything; his soul being able to assimilate all the forms of being—the intellect intelligible forms and the senses sensible forms.
791. Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem neque res etc., quia dixerat quod intellectus est quodammodo intelligibilis, sicut sensus sensibilis, posset aliquis credere, quod intellectus non dependeret a sensu. Et hoc quidem verum esset si intelligibilia nostri intellectus essent a sensibilibus separata secundum esse, ut Platonici posuerunt. Et ideo hic ostendit, quod intellectus indiget sensu. Et postmodum quod intellectus differt a phantasia, quae etiam a sensu dependet, ibi, est autem phantasia.
791. Next, at but since there are (432a3): the doctrine just stated, namely that intellect is, in a way, the intelligible object as sense is the sensible object, might lead one to suppose that the intellect did not depend on the senses; as would be the case indeed if the intelligible objects attained by our mind had their existence apart from sensible things, as the Platonists thought. So he now shows the intellect’s dependence on the senses; and then goes on, at imagination is other, to show that it differs, nonetheless, from imagination which also depends on the senses.
Dicit ergo primo, quod quia nulla res intellecta a nobis, est praeter magnitudines sensibiles, quasi ab eis separata secundum esse, sicut sensibilia videntur abinvicem separata: necesse est quod intelligibilia intellectus nostri sint in speciebus sensibilibus secundum esse, tam illa quae dicuntur per abstractionem, scilicet mathematica, quam naturalia, quae sunt habitus et passiones sensibilium.
First, then, he observes that, since all the objects of our understanding are included within the range of sensible things existing in space, that is to say, that none seems to have that sort of distinct existence apart from things of sense which particular things of sense have apart from one another, it follows that all these intelligible objects have their beings in the objects of sense; this being true not only of the objects studied by natural science, the properties and modifications of things of sense, but even of mathematical abstractions.
Et propter hoc sine sensu non potest aliquis homo addiscere quasi de novo acquirens scientiam, neque intelligere, quasi utens scientia habita. Sed oportet, cum aliquis speculatur in actu, quod simul formet sibi aliquod phantasma.
It follows then that without some use of the senses we can neither learn anything new, as it were for the first time, nor bring before our understanding any intellectual knowledge already possessed. Whenever the intellect actually regards anything there must at the same time be formed in us a phantasm, that is, a likeness of something sensible.
792. Phantasmata autem sunt similitudines sensibilium. Sed in hoc differunt ab eis, quia sunt praeter materiam. Nam sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia, ut supradictum est. Phantasia autem est motus factus a sensu secundum actum.
792. Phantasms, however, differ from things of sense by their immateriality. For as we have shown, the senses receive the forms of things immaterially; and phantasms are nothing but movements started by actual sensation.
Patet autem ex hoc falsum esse, quod Avicenna ponit, quod intellectus non indiget sensu postquam acquisivit scientiam. Manifestum est enim quod postquam aliquis acquisivit habitum scientiae, necesse est ad hoc quod speculetur, quod utatur phantasmate; et propter hoc per laesionem organi impeditur usus scientiae iam acquisitae.
It will be clear now that Avicenna erred in saying that once the mind had acquired knowledge it no longer needed the senses. For we know by experience that in order to reflect on knowledge already gained we have to make use of phantasms; and that any injury to the physical apparatus underlying these will tend to prevent our using the knowledge we already have.
793. Deinde cum dicit est autem phantasia etc., ostendit differentiam inter phantasiam et intellectum.
793. Then, at imagination is other (432a10) he distinguishes between intellect and imagination.
Et primo quantum ad operationem communem intellectus, quae est compositio et divisio; dicens quod phantasia alterum est ab affirmatione et negatione intellectus; quia in complexione intellectuum iam est verum et falsum: quod non est in phantasia. Nam cognoscere verum et falsum est solius intellectus.
First, with respect to the normal activity of the intellect, which is composing and dividing, he says that imagining is neither intellectual affirmation nor intellectual denial; for these immediately involve truth and falsehood; which is not the case with imagining. Only the intellect knows truth and falsehood.
794. Secundo ibi primi autem intellectus etc., inquirit in quo differant primi intellectus, idest intelligentiae indivisibilium, cum non sint phantasmata. Et respondet, quod non sunt sine phantasmatibus, sed tamen non sunt phantasmata, quia phantasmata sunt similitudines particularium, intellecta autem sunt universalia ab individuantibus conditionibus abstracta: unde phantasmata sunt indivisibilia in potentia, et non in actu.
794. Second, at what difference (432a12), he asks how the primary intellectual notions, the understanding of indivisible objects, differ from phantasms; and he replies that while these are always attended by phantasms, they differ from phantasms by their universality: they are abstracted from individuating conditions, whereas phantasms are always of particulars. Phantasms in fact are not actually, but only potentially, indivisible.
Proposita dicendorum intentione, arguit illas virium animae divisiones, quae dividuntur in rationales et irrationales, vel in rationalem, irascibilem et concupiscibilem; deinde probat vim animae motivam secundum locum non esse vegetandi principium, nec sensu, nec intellectum, vel appetitum
The principle of movement in living beings: what it is not
Quoniam autem anima secundum duas diffinita est potentias quae animalium est, et discretio, quod intelligentiae opus est et sensus, et adhuc in movendo secundum locum motum, de sensu quidem et intellectu determinata sint tanta,
Since the soul is defined by two powers found in animate beings: the one, discernment, the work of intellect and sensation, the other, movement by local motion; and as a certain amount has been decided about sensation and understanding,
De movente autem quid forte animae sit, speculandum est, utrum una quaedam pars ipsius sit separabilis aut magnitudine aut ratione, aut omnis anima, et si pars aliqua, utrum propria quaedam sit praeter consuetas dici et dictas, aut harum una aliqua sit.
we must now consider what can be the moving factor in the soul: whether this is a single part of it, separate either spatially or by definition, or the whole soul; and, if it is a part of the soul, whether it is a special part other than those generally acknowledged and already dealt with, or some one among these.
Habet autem dubitationem mox quomodo oportet partes animae dicere et quot. Modo enim quodam infinitae videntur, et non solum quas quidam dicunt
determinantes rationativam et irascibilem et appetitivam, hii autem rationem habentem et irrationabilem.
A difficulty at once arises as to how it is possible to speak at all of parts of the soul, or to say how many they are. For in one way their number seems to be infinite and not merely, as some say, the reasoning, the irascible and the concupiscible; or as others say, the rational and irrational.
Secundum enim differentias per quas has separant, et aliae videntur partes maiorem differentiam hiis habentes de quibus et nunc dictum est, 1 vegetativa enim quae et plantis inest et omnibus animalibus vel viventibus, et sensitiua, quam neque sicut irrationalem neque I sicut rationem habentem ponet quis utique facile.
For according to the differences by which these are distinguished, other parts seem to show greater diversity than in those just mentioned. In particular: the vegetative part, which is in plants and all living things; and the sensitive, which one cannot easily place among either the irrational or the rational elements.
Adhuc autem et fantastica quae per esse quidem ab omnibus altera est, cui autem harum eadem vel altera sit, habet multam dubitationem, si aliquis ponat separatas partes animae.
Further, there is the imaginative power, which seems in essence to be quite different from any other. If one is to suppose that parts of the soul are separate, with which of these others it is identical, or from which it differs, are difficult problems:
Adhuc autem appetitiva, quae et ratione et potentia altera utique videtur esse ab omnibus, et inconveniens utique hanc sequestrare: et in rationativa enim voluntas fit, et in irrationabili concupiscentia et ira; si autem tria anima, in unoquoque erit appetitus.
Furthermore, there is the appetitive faculty, which, both by its notion and as a capacity, seems to be diverse from all others; and it would be unreasonable to split this up. For will operates in the rational part, desire and anger in the irrational; and if the soul is in three parts, appetition will be in each.
Et etiam de quo nunc sermo instat, quid movens secundum locum animal est? Secundum quidem enim augmentum et decrementum motum qui omnibus inest, quod omnibus inest videbitur utique movere, generativum et vegetativum. De respiratione autem et exspiratione et somno et vigilia, posterius perspiciendum; habent enim et haec dubitationem multam.
But to come to the matter that is now before us: what is it that moves the animal by local motion? For the movement which is in all animals, by which they grow and decay, would certainly seem to be due to the principle of generation and nutrition. Of respiration and exhalation, sleep and waking, we must treat later on: these also raise many difficulties.
Sed de motu secundum locum, quid movens animal secundum processivum motum, considerandum. Quod quidem ergo non vegetativua potentia, manifestum: semper enim propter aliquid motus hic, et aut cum fantasia aut appetitu est; nihil enim non appetens aut fugiens movetur, sed aut violentia.
But of local motion: what, we must consider, is it that moves an animal from place to place? It is obviously not the vegetative power. For a movement of this sort is always directed towards an end, and is accompanied by phantasm or desire. For nothing moves unless with desire or dislike, except under compulsion.