457. Deinde cum dicit: de his quidem etc., ostendit difficultatem harum quaestionum. Et dicit bonum esse inquirere de his dubitationibus: subdit autem: et ad eam quae ad plus intelligentiam. Quam quidem litteram Alexander dicit esse defectivam; et est subintelligendum quod ea quae circa hoc excedunt nostram intelligentiam, oportet magis suscipere, quam amplius quaerere per nos ipsos. Non autem est consuetudo Aristotelis, quamvis sit breviloquus, defectivis locutionibus uti, ut Simplicius dicit. Et ideo ipse sic exponit: quod de his bene se habet quaerere, sed hoc non ad quoslibet pertinet, sed solum ad eos qui plus intelligunt. Averroes autem in suo commento exponit secundum hoc, ut intelligamus quod inquirere de his quaestionibus et in se bonum est, et etiam ad hoc est utile quod homo magis ac magis intelligat: qui enim se exercitat circa intellectum difficilium, magis potest intelligere alia, ut dicitur in III De anima. 457. Then, at on these questions, I say [323], he shows the difficulty of these questions. He says that it is good to investigate these doubtful matters, and adds, for a greater understanding. This text, says Alexander, is defective, and one should understand it as meaning that whatever in these matters is too much for our intelligence one must simply accept, rather than make them a subject of further investigation by ourselves. But it is not Aristotle's custom, in spite of his laconic style, to employ defective language, as Simplicius says. Hence he explains it to the effect that, while it is good to investigate such things, it is not a task suited to just anyone but only those of wider understanding. However, Averroes in his Commentary explains it this way: namely, that we should understand that to investigate these matters is both good in itself, and also contributes to man's growth in understanding Therefore a person who exercises his mind by trying to understand difficult matters, can better understand others, as is said in On the Soul III. Ista autem quae inquirenda sunt, difficultatem habent: quia modicum de causis eorum percipere possumus, et accidentia eorum magis sunt remota a cognitione nostra, quam etiam ipsa corpora elongentur a nobis secundum corporalem situm. Et tamen, si ex his quae dicentur contemplemur harum dubitationum veritatem, apparebit non esse irrationabile id quod inquirendo dubitabile videbatur. Now the matters to be investigated are difficult, because we can perceive only a little about their causes; and their accidents are further removed from our ken than the bodies themselves are physically distant from us. Yet, if what we shall say enables us to contemplate the truth of these doubtful matters, then what seemed to be doubtful at the beginning of our inquiry will be seen not to be devoid of all explanation. Lectio 18 Lecture 18 Solvitur prima dubitatio lect. praec. posita, de numero motuum caelestium corporum: quem etiam a modernis astrologis convenienter assignari ostenditur The first difficulty, concerning the number of motions of the stars, is solved. The number shown to agree with modern astronomers Sed nos ut de corporibus ipsis solis et solitariis, ordinem quidem habentibus, inanimatis autem omnino, perquirimus. Oportet autem tanquam participantia existimare actione et vita: sic enim nihil videtur praeter rationem accidere. 234 We may object that we have been thinking of the stars as mere bodies, and as units with a serial order indeed but entirely inanimate; but should rather conceive them as enjoying life and action. On this view the facts cease to appear surprising. Videtur autem optime quidem habenti existere quod bene sine actione, propinquissimo autem per paucam et unam, his autem qui longius per plures. 235 For it is natural that the best-conditioned of all things should have its good without action, that which is nearest to it should achieve it by little and simple action, and that which is farther removed by a complexity of actions, Quemadmodum in corpore hoc quidem neque exercitatum bene habere, hoc autem modicum deambulans; hoc autem et cursu indiget et lucta et pugna. 236 just as with men's bodies one is in good condition without exercise at all, another after a short walk, while another requires running and wrestling and hard training, Iterum autem alteri neque quantumcumque laboranti hoc utique adhuc existet bonum, sed alterum aliquid. 237 and there are yet others who however hard they worked themselves could never secure this good, but only some substitute for it. Est autem dirigere difficilc aut multa aut multoties. 238 To succeed often or in many things is difficult. Puta myrios astragalos Chios iacere difficile, sed unum aut duo facile. Et iterum, quando hoc quidem indiguerit huius gratia operari, hoc autem alterius, et hoc alterius; in uno quidem aut duobus facile adipisci, quanto autem utiqueper plura, difficilius. 239 For instance, to throw ten thousand Coan throws with the dice would be impossible, but to throw one or two is comparatively easy. In action, again, when A has to be done to get B, B to get C, and C to get D, one step or two present little difficulty, but as the series extends the difficulty grows. Propter quod oportet putare astrorum actionem esse talem, qualis quidem animalium et plantarum. Etenim hic hominis plurimae operationes: multorum enim eorum quae bene possunt adipisci, ut et multa operentur et aliorum gratia. Quod autem est ut optime habens, nihil indiget actione: est enim ipsum quod cuius gratia; actio autem semper est in duobus, cum et cuius gratia sit, et quod huius gratia. Aliorum autem animalium pauciores; plantarum autem parva quaedam et una forte. Aut enim unum aliquid est quo sortietur utique, quemadmodum et homo; aut et multa omnia praevia sunt ad optimum. 331 We must, then, think of the action of the lower stars as similar to that of animals and plants. For on our earth it is man that has the greatest variety of actions—for there are many goods that man can secure; hence his actions are various and directed to ends beyond them—while the perfectly conditioned has no need of action, since it is itself the end, and action always requires two terms, end and means. The lower animals have less variety of action than man; and plants perhaps have little action and of one kind only. For either they have but one attainable good (as indeed man has), or, if several, each contributes directly to their ultimate good. Hoc quidem igitur habet et participat optimo, hoc autem attingit prope per paucos motus, hoc autem per multos; hoc autem neque participat, sed sufficiens ad prope extremo venire. Puta si sanitas finis, hoc quidem utique semper sanum est, hoc quidem extenuatum, hoc autem currens et extenuatum, hoc autem et aliud aliquid operans currendi gratia: quare plures motus. Alterum autem non potest ad sanari pervenire, sed ad currere solum aut extenuari: et horum alterum finis ipsis. Maxime quidem enim illo sortiri fine optimum omnibus: si autem non, semper melius erit quanto utique propinquius sit optimo. Et propter hoc terra quidem totaliter non movetur; propinqua autem paucis motibus (non enim attingunt ad extremum, sed usque quo possunt sortiri divinissimo principio); primum autem caelum confestim sortitur per unum motum; quae autem in medio primi et extremorum, attingunt quidem, per plures autem attingunt motus. 332 One thing then has and enjoys the ultimate good, other things attain to it, one immediately by few steps, another by many, while yet another does not even attempt to secure it but is satisfied to reach a point not far removed from that consummation. Thus, taking health as the end, there will be one thing that always possesses health, others that attain it, one by reducing flesh, another by running and thus reducing flesh, another by taking steps to enable himself to run, thus further increasing the number of movements, while another cannot attain health itself, but only running or reduction of flesh, so that one or other of these is for such a being the end. For while it is clearly best for any being to attain the real end, yet, if that cannot be, the nearer it is to the best the better will be its state. It is for this reason that the earth moves not at all and the bodies near to it with few movements. For they do not attain the final end, but only come as near to it as their share in the divine principle permits. But the first heaven finds it immediately with a single movement, and the bodies intermediate between the first and last heavens attain it indeed, but at the cost of a multiplicity of movement. 458. Praemissis duabus dubitationibus, hic ad earum solutiones accedit: 458. Having proposed the two doubts, the Philosopher here starts to solve them. et primo solvit primam quaestionem; First he solves the first question; secundo secundam, ibi: de dubitatione autem et cetera. secondly, the second one, at as to the difficulty (L. 19). Circa primum duo facit: As to the first he does two things: primo ostendit quid oporteat supponere, ad hoc ut de facili solvatur quaestio primo mota; first he shows what ought to be assumed in order to make the first question easier to resolve; secundo ponit solutionem, ibi: videtur autem et cetera. secondly, he gives the solution, at for it is natural 459. Dicit ergo primo quod ideo prima quaestio difficilis videtur, quia nos inquirimus de corporibus caelestibus ac si essent sola corpora habentia quendam ordinem, absque hoc quod sint animata; et sic videtur nobis quod debeat in eis esse ordo motuum secundum ordinem numerorum, et secundum situm corporum. Sed ad hoc quod praedicta dubitatio solvatur, oportet opinionem habere de eis quod participent non solum vitam quamcumque, sed etiam actionem; quod est proprium habentium animam rationalem, quae agunt propter finem, tanquam habentia dominium sui actus, et non agunt ex solo naturae impetu, sicut omnia irrationalia. Hoc autem supposito, nihil videtur praeter rationem accidere, si multitudo motuum non procedat secundum corporum situm: quia magis est accipienda diversitas motuum et multitudo eorum secundum habitudinem ad bonum finale, quod est principium in omnibus agibilibus, ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethic. et II Physic. Et est attendendum quod, quantum ad hoc, non refert utrum ponamus corpora caelestia moveri a substantiis intellectualibus coniunctis per modum animae, vel etiam separatis. Non autem esset via solvendi, si moverentur per solum naturae impetum, sicut corpora gravia et levia. He says therefore first [324] that the reason why the first question is difficult is that we investigate the heavenly bodies as though they were merely an orderly system of bodies without being animated. As a consequence, it seems to us that the order of their motions should be in accord with the order of numbers and according to the position of the bodies. But if the problem at hand is to be settled, we must assume that they have not only some sort of life but also actions — this being proper to things with a rational soul, which act for an end as being masters of their act, and do not act by the sole impulse of nature as do all irrational things. If this is assumed, nothing is seen to be occurring unreasonably if the number of their motions does not proceed according to the position of the bodies. For the diversity and number of the motions is to be taken more in terms of a relation to the final good, which is the principle in all things able to be done [i.e., voluntary actions], as is plain from the words of the Philosopher in Ethics VII and Physics II. One should note in this regard that it makes no difference whether we suppose that the heavenly bodies are moved by intellectual substances united to them after the manner of a soul, or by these as separated. But there would be no way to solve this question if they were moved by the sole impulse of nature, as heavy and light bodies are. 459. Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc., ponit solutionem. 459. Then, at for it is natural [235], he presents his solution. Et primo ponit solutionis principia; First he states the principles of the solution; secundo applicat ad propositum, ibi: hoc quidem igitur habet et cetera. secondly, he applies them to the question at hand, at one thing then has 463. Circa primum duo facit: With respect to the first he does two things: primo ponit principia, ex quibus assignatur ratio quare superiores planetae moventur pluribus motibus, primum autem mobile uno solo motu; first he states the principles from which we obtain the reason why the higher planets are moved with a number of motions, while the first mobile is moved with only one; secundo ponit principia, ex quibus assignatur ratio quare superiores planetae moventur pluribus motibus, inferiores autem paucioribus, secundum suppositionem Eudoxi, ibi: iterum autem alteri et cetera. secondly, he states the principles from which we obtain the reason why the higher planets are moved with a number of motions while the lower planets with fewer, according to the theory of Eudoxus, at and there are yet others 460. Circa primum duo facit: About the first he does two things: primo ponit principium; first he states the principle; secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi: quemadmodum in corpore et cetera. secondly, he shows it with an example, at just as with men's bodies 459. Dicit ergo primo quod in his quae possunt pervenire ad aliquod bonum perfectum, triplex gradus invenitur. He says therefore first [325] that in things that can arrive at a perfect good, three degrees are found. Quorum supremus est eius quod optime se habet, et non indiget aliqua actione ad acquirendum bonum perfectum; sed hoc existit ei sine aliqua actione. The highest degree is that of a thing which is in the best state and does not need any action to acquire perfect good, which is already present to it without any action. Secundus gradus eius est quod est propinquissimum in bonitate dispositionis optimo, quod scilicet acquirit perfectum bonum per unam et modicam actionem. The second degree is that of a thing which is nearest to the best in the goodness of its condition, and which, namely, acquires its perfect good by means of one slight action. Tertius gradus est eorum quae magis distant ab optimo, quae tamen acquirunt perfectum bonum per plures operationes. The third degree belongs to things that are more removed from the best but still acquire their perfect good through several operations. Deinde cum dicit: quemadmodum in corpore etc., manifestat per exemplum. Et dicit quod in corporibus videtur illud corpus optime esse dispositum, quod non indiget aliqua exercitatione ad bonam sui habitudinem (quae dicitur euechia); in secundo autem gradu est corpus quod per modicam deambulationem consequitur bonam habitudinem; in tertio autem gradu est corpus quod ad bonam habitudinem consequendam indiget multis exercitiis, puta cursu, lucta et pugna. Then, at just as with men's bodies [326], he manifests this by an example. And he says that among bodies, that body is seen to be in the best condition which does not require any exercise to maintain its good condition, (which is called euechia—"well-being'); in the second grade is a body which attains a good condition by walking just a bit; in the third grade is the body which in order to acquire a good condition needs many forms of exercise such as running, wrestling and boxing. 460. Deinde cum dicit: iterum autem alteri etc., ponit principia per quae solvitur secunda pars quaestionis, quare scilicet inferiores planetae paucioribus motibus moventur quam superiores. 460. Then, at and there are yet others [327] he states the principles with which to solve the second part of the question, namely, why the lower planets are moved with fewer motions than the higher planets. Et primo ponit principia; First he states the principles; secundo adhibet exemplum, ibi: propter quod oportet putare et cetera. secondly, he gives an example, at we must, then, think 461.