Hoc quidem igitur habet et participat optimo, hoc autem attingit prope per paucos motus, hoc autem per multos; hoc autem neque participat, sed sufficiens ad prope extremo venire. Puta si sanitas finis, hoc quidem utique semper sanum est, hoc quidem extenuatum, hoc autem currens et extenuatum, hoc autem et aliud aliquid operans currendi gratia: quare plures motus. Alterum autem non potest ad sanari pervenire, sed ad currere solum aut extenuari: et horum alterum finis ipsis. Maxime quidem enim illo sortiri fine optimum omnibus: si autem non, semper melius erit quanto utique propinquius sit optimo. Et propter hoc terra quidem totaliter non movetur; propinqua autem paucis motibus (non enim attingunt ad extremum, sed usque quo possunt sortiri divinissimo principio); primum autem caelum confestim sortitur per unum motum; quae autem in medio primi et extremorum, attingunt quidem, per plures autem attingunt motus. 332 One thing then has and enjoys the ultimate good, other things attain to it, one immediately by few steps, another by many, while yet another does not even attempt to secure it but is satisfied to reach a point not far removed from that consummation. Thus, taking health as the end, there will be one thing that always possesses health, others that attain it, one by reducing flesh, another by running and thus reducing flesh, another by taking steps to enable himself to run, thus further increasing the number of movements, while another cannot attain health itself, but only running or reduction of flesh, so that one or other of these is for such a being the end. For while it is clearly best for any being to attain the real end, yet, if that cannot be, the nearer it is to the best the better will be its state. It is for this reason that the earth moves not at all and the bodies near to it with few movements. For they do not attain the final end, but only come as near to it as their share in the divine principle permits. But the first heaven finds it immediately with a single movement, and the bodies intermediate between the first and last heavens attain it indeed, but at the cost of a multiplicity of movement. 458. Praemissis duabus dubitationibus, hic ad earum solutiones accedit: 458. Having proposed the two doubts, the Philosopher here starts to solve them. et primo solvit primam quaestionem; First he solves the first question; secundo secundam, ibi: de dubitatione autem et cetera. secondly, the second one, at as to the difficulty (L. 19). Circa primum duo facit: As to the first he does two things: primo ostendit quid oporteat supponere, ad hoc ut de facili solvatur quaestio primo mota; first he shows what ought to be assumed in order to make the first question easier to resolve; secundo ponit solutionem, ibi: videtur autem et cetera. secondly, he gives the solution, at for it is natural 459. Dicit ergo primo quod ideo prima quaestio difficilis videtur, quia nos inquirimus de corporibus caelestibus ac si essent sola corpora habentia quendam ordinem, absque hoc quod sint animata; et sic videtur nobis quod debeat in eis esse ordo motuum secundum ordinem numerorum, et secundum situm corporum. Sed ad hoc quod praedicta dubitatio solvatur, oportet opinionem habere de eis quod participent non solum vitam quamcumque, sed etiam actionem; quod est proprium habentium animam rationalem, quae agunt propter finem, tanquam habentia dominium sui actus, et non agunt ex solo naturae impetu, sicut omnia irrationalia. Hoc autem supposito, nihil videtur praeter rationem accidere, si multitudo motuum non procedat secundum corporum situm: quia magis est accipienda diversitas motuum et multitudo eorum secundum habitudinem ad bonum finale, quod est principium in omnibus agibilibus, ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethic. et II Physic. Et est attendendum quod, quantum ad hoc, non refert utrum ponamus corpora caelestia moveri a substantiis intellectualibus coniunctis per modum animae, vel etiam separatis. Non autem esset via solvendi, si moverentur per solum naturae impetum, sicut corpora gravia et levia. He says therefore first [324] that the reason why the first question is difficult is that we investigate the heavenly bodies as though they were merely an orderly system of bodies without being animated. As a consequence, it seems to us that the order of their motions should be in accord with the order of numbers and according to the position of the bodies. But if the problem at hand is to be settled, we must assume that they have not only some sort of life but also actions — this being proper to things with a rational soul, which act for an end as being masters of their act, and do not act by the sole impulse of nature as do all irrational things. If this is assumed, nothing is seen to be occurring unreasonably if the number of their motions does not proceed according to the position of the bodies. For the diversity and number of the motions is to be taken more in terms of a relation to the final good, which is the principle in all things able to be done [i.e., voluntary actions], as is plain from the words of the Philosopher in Ethics VII and Physics II. One should note in this regard that it makes no difference whether we suppose that the heavenly bodies are moved by intellectual substances united to them after the manner of a soul, or by these as separated. But there would be no way to solve this question if they were moved by the sole impulse of nature, as heavy and light bodies are. 459. Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc., ponit solutionem. 459. Then, at for it is natural [235], he presents his solution. Et primo ponit solutionis principia; First he states the principles of the solution; secundo applicat ad propositum, ibi: hoc quidem igitur habet et cetera. secondly, he applies them to the question at hand, at one thing then has 463. Circa primum duo facit: With respect to the first he does two things: primo ponit principia, ex quibus assignatur ratio quare superiores planetae moventur pluribus motibus, primum autem mobile uno solo motu; first he states the principles from which we obtain the reason why the higher planets are moved with a number of motions, while the first mobile is moved with only one; secundo ponit principia, ex quibus assignatur ratio quare superiores planetae moventur pluribus motibus, inferiores autem paucioribus, secundum suppositionem Eudoxi, ibi: iterum autem alteri et cetera. secondly, he states the principles from which we obtain the reason why the higher planets are moved with a number of motions while the lower planets with fewer, according to the theory of Eudoxus, at and there are yet others 460. Circa primum duo facit: About the first he does two things: primo ponit principium; first he states the principle; secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi: quemadmodum in corpore et cetera. secondly, he shows it with an example, at just as with men's bodies 459. Dicit ergo primo quod in his quae possunt pervenire ad aliquod bonum perfectum, triplex gradus invenitur. He says therefore first [325] that in things that can arrive at a perfect good, three degrees are found. Quorum supremus est eius quod optime se habet, et non indiget aliqua actione ad acquirendum bonum perfectum; sed hoc existit ei sine aliqua actione. The highest degree is that of a thing which is in the best state and does not need any action to acquire perfect good, which is already present to it without any action. Secundus gradus eius est quod est propinquissimum in bonitate dispositionis optimo, quod scilicet acquirit perfectum bonum per unam et modicam actionem. The second degree is that of a thing which is nearest to the best in the goodness of its condition, and which, namely, acquires its perfect good by means of one slight action. Tertius gradus est eorum quae magis distant ab optimo, quae tamen acquirunt perfectum bonum per plures operationes. The third degree belongs to things that are more removed from the best but still acquire their perfect good through several operations. Deinde cum dicit: quemadmodum in corpore etc., manifestat per exemplum. Et dicit quod in corporibus videtur illud corpus optime esse dispositum, quod non indiget aliqua exercitatione ad bonam sui habitudinem (quae dicitur euechia); in secundo autem gradu est corpus quod per modicam deambulationem consequitur bonam habitudinem; in tertio autem gradu est corpus quod ad bonam habitudinem consequendam indiget multis exercitiis, puta cursu, lucta et pugna. Then, at just as with men's bodies [326], he manifests this by an example. And he says that among bodies, that body is seen to be in the best condition which does not require any exercise to maintain its good condition, (which is called euechia—"well-being'); in the second grade is a body which attains a good condition by walking just a bit; in the third grade is the body which in order to acquire a good condition needs many forms of exercise such as running, wrestling and boxing. 460. Deinde cum dicit: iterum autem alteri etc., ponit principia per quae solvitur secunda pars quaestionis, quare scilicet inferiores planetae paucioribus motibus moventur quam superiores. 460. Then, at and there are yet others [327] he states the principles with which to solve the second part of the question, namely, why the lower planets are moved with fewer motions than the higher planets. Et primo ponit principia; First he states the principles; secundo adhibet exemplum, ibi: propter quod oportet putare et cetera. secondly, he gives an example, at we must, then, think 461. Circa primum tria facit: As to the first, he does three things: primo ponit esse quendam gradum inferiorem tribus praedictis. Et dicit quod invenitur in quarto gradu aliquid quod, quibuscumque laboribus, non potest pertingere ad hoc quod adipiscatur bonum perfectum, sed potest consequi quoddam aliud bonum minus perfecto bono; puta si aliquod corpus per nullum exercitium posset consequi perfecte bonam habitudinem, sed per aliqua exercitia consequeretur aliquantulum meliorem dispositionem quam prius habebat. first he asserts that there is a certain grade below the three already mentioned [327], and he says that in the fourth degree is found something that, in spite of all its labors, cannot reach the state of attaining its perfect good; yet it can attain a certain other good less than the perfect good. For example, a case of this would be should a body be unable, in spite of all its exercise, perfectly to attain to a good condition, but should through certain exercises attain to a slightly better condition than it previously had. Secundo, ibi: est autem dirigere etc., ostendit in hoc etiam gradu esse quandam diversitatem; dicens quod difficile est dirigere, idest rectificare, aut multa aut multoties: difficilius enim est rectum se habere in multis quam in paucis. Multitudo autem accipi potest vel secundum diversitatem rerum, vel secundum diversitatem actionum ordinatarum ad aliquid unum; ad quorum primum pertinet quod dicit multa, ad secundum pertinet quod dicit multoties, maxime si actiones non simul fuerint. Ex quo apparet quod maioris virtutis est quod per multa potest in aliquod bonum pertingere, quam quod in illa multa non potest, et ita non consequitur illud bonum. Secondly, at to succeed often [328] he shows that even in this grade there is a certain variety. And he says that it is difficult to direct, i.e., to proceed rightly, in the case either of many things or many times, for it is more difficult to be correct in many things than in few. "Many" may be taken as referring either to a diversity of things or to a diversity of actions aimed at one objective—thus his statement, many things, refers to the first; and his statement many times, refers to the second, especially if the actions are not all at once. From this we understand that something which can achieve a good by means of many things is of greater power than something which cannot employ that many, and as a consequence does not attain the good in question. Tertio, cum dicit: puta myrios etc., ponit exemplum de eo quod nunc dictum est. Thirdly, at for instance, to throw ten thousand [329] he gives an example of what he is talking about. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod dixit multa; dicens quod difficile est proiicere myrios astragalos, idest decem millia astragalorum, quae sunt quaedam genera missilium, ex insula quae dicitur Chios, ubi sunt magni astragali (alia littera habet Coos, quae est alia insula Graeciae, in qua similiter sunt magni astragali); facile est autem quod aliquis iaciat unum ex his vel duo. And first of all with reference to the phrase, many things. And he says that it is difficult to throw a myriad, i.e., 10,000, astragals, which are a type of missile from the island of Chios where there are great astragal-throwers (another text has Coos, another Greek island, where there are also great astragal-throwers), but it is easy to throw one or two of them. Secundo, ibi: et iterum etc., exemplificat quantum ad id quod dixit, multoties. Et dicit quod quando oportet operari aliquid huius gratia, et hoc alterius gratia, et illud adhuc alterius gratia (ita scilicet quod ad unum finem oporteat perveniri per multas actiones ad invicem ordinatas), facile est hunc finem adipisci, quando per unam actionem vel duas potest aliquis consequi finem; puta si aliquis emit equum ad hoc quod aequitet, et aequitando perveniat ad locum aliquem. Sed quando oportet ad finem pervenire per plures actiones, tunc hoc est difficilius; puta si non habeat pecuniam in promptu unde emat equum, sed oportet eam acquirere per operationem alicuius artificii, ad quae exercenda iterum indigeat quaerere instrumenta alicuius artificii. Manifestum est igitur quod maior virtus requiritur, et ex parte intellectus ordinantis et ex parte potentiae exequentis, per plures actiones pervenire in finem, quam per unam vel pauciores. Secondly, at in action, again he gives an example of his statement, many times. And he says that whenever it is necessary to do one thing for the sake of another, and this for the sake of another and that for the sake of still another, in such a way, namely, that it is necessary to arrive at one goal by a series of subordinated actions, it is easy to obtain this goal when it can be achieved by one or two actions: for example, if someone buys a horse in order to ride and by riding reaches a certain place. But when a number of actions are required in order to achieve the goal, then it is more difficult. For example, if he should not have ready money with which to buy the horse, but must obtain it by working at some trade, in order to exercise which he must seek the tools required by that trade. It is plain, therefore, that greater power is required, both on the part of the ordering intellect, and on the part of the faculty carrying things out, to reach an objective by many actions, rather than by one or a few. 461. Deinde cum dicit: propter quod oportet putare etc., ponit exempla praemissi principii. Et dicit quod propter praemissa oportet existimare quod actio stellarum, secundum multitudinem vel paucitatem motus earum, sit similis actioni animalium et plantarum. Videmus enim quod in istis inferioribus homo, habens perfectam animae virtutem, habet multiplices operationes, quia potest multa bona adipisci: et propter hoc multa potest operari, non solum absolute, sed etiam secundum ordinem unius ad aliud, ut puta cum excogitat magnam seriem actionum ordinatarum in unum finem. Nec tamen propter hoc homo est optimum in universo: quia id quod est optimum in universo, scilicet Deus, nulla indiget actione quoad adipiscendum proprium bonum. Non enim habet aliquem finem extra se, quem oporteat adipisci per aliquam actionem, sed ipse est finis sui ipsius et omnium aliorum: actio autem quae est propter finem, semper in duobus consistit, cum oporteat ibi considerari et finem cuius gratia aliquid agitur, et id quod est ad finem, quod agitur gratia huius, scilicet finis. Sed animalium praeter hominem sunt pauciores actiones quam hominis: tum quia non habent actiones intellectivae partis; tum quia in actionibus exterioribus habent determinatum modum praefixum sibi a natura, sicut hirundo semper eodem modo facit nidum. Sed plantae habent forte unam operationem tantum, scilicet nutritivam, et hanc parvam, idest imperfectam, respectu operationis sensitivae et intellectivae. Et huius diversitatis ratio est, quia finis ad quem pervenitur, vel est unum aliquod bonum perfectum, puta ad quem pervenit homo, scilicet beatitudo, quam homo consequitur per multas operationes; aut sunt multa quae praeexiguntur ad perfectum bonum, ad quorum aliquod pertingunt plantae et animalia per unam vel paucas operationes. Puta ad beatitudinem praeexigitur primo conservatio vitae, deinde cognitio sensibilium, et ultimo apprehensio universalis veritatis, in qua consistit finalis beatitudo: et hanc solus homo consequitur, conservationem autem vitae consequitur planta per actum nutritivae partis, animalia autem irrationabilia super hoc consequuntur cognitionem singularium. 461. Then, at we must, then, think [331], he gives examples of this principle. And he says that, in view of the foregoing, we must reckon that the action of the stars, so far as the multitude or fewness of their actions is concerned, is akin to the action of animals and plants. For we observe among these lower things that man, possessing perfect power of soul, has many operations, because he is able to attain to many goods—for which reason, he can do many things, not only absolutely, but according to the order of one thing to another, as, for example, when he plans a long series of actions all directed to one end. This does not mean, however, that man is the best thing in the universe—for that which is best in the universe, namely, God, needs no action in order to attain his own appropriate good. For he has no end outside himself which must be obtained by some action, but he is his own end and the end of all other things. Now action which is for the sake of an end always involves two things, since it is necessary to consider the end for the sake of which something is done and that which is directed to the end, which is done for the sake of this, i.e., of the end. But animals other than man have fewer actions than man, both because they do not have actions of the intellectual part and because in their exterior actions they have a set pattern predetermined for them by nature—for example, a swallow always builds its nest in the same manner. But plants have perhaps one operation, namely, the nutritive and this small, i.e., imperfect, in comparison to sentient and intellectual operation. The explanation of this diversity is that the end which is reached is either some one perfect good, for example, the end which man reaches, namely, beatitude, which he acquires through many operations, or else the many things pre-requisite to the perfect good, to some one of which plants and animals attain through one or a few operations. For example, beatitude presupposes, first of all, the preservation of life, then knowledge of sensible things, and finally the apprehension of the universal truth, in which final beatitude lies. This last, man alone obtains, but preservation of life plants attain through the act of the nutritive part, while irrational animals, in addition to this, attain the knowledge of individual things. 462. Sic igitur patet ex omnibus praemissis quinque esse ordines rerum. Nam supremum in entibus est quod habet perfectum bonum sine actione; secundum autem est quod habet perfectum bonum per unum vel paucos motus; tertium autem est quod acquirit perfectum bonum per multas operationes, sicut homo. Quartus autem gradus est qui non potest acquirere perfectum bonum ullo modo, sed acquirit aliquid praevium per paucos motus vel per unum tantum, sicut animalia et plantae. Relinquitur autem infimum esse quod nihil horum potest acquirere, et propter hoc non habet participare aliquem motum. 462. Therefore, it is plain from all the above that there are five orders of things. For the highest among beings is that which possesses perfect good without acting; the second is that which has perfect good through one or a few actions; the third is that which acquires perfect good through many actions, as does man. The fourth grade is that which cannot attain perfect good in any way, but acquires something preliminary to it by a few actions or just one, as is true of animals and plants. There remains for that to be the lowest which can acquire none of these, and because of this does not have as a property the participation in any motion. Sic igitur quod aliquid omnino careat motu, potest dupliciter contingere: uno modo quia est perfectissimum, alio modo quia est imperfectissimum. Similiter etiam quod aliquid habeat unum vel paucos motus, potest dupliciter contingere: uno modo quia est propinquum perfectissimo, alio modo quia est propinquum imperfectissimo. Quod autem aliquid habeat multas actiones vel motus, contingit ex eo quod medio modo se habet. Thus that a thing entirely lack motion can occur in two ways: in one way, because it is most perfect; in another, because it is most imperfect. Likewise, that a thing have one or a few motions can occur in two ways: in one way, because it is near to the most perfect; in another, because it is near to the most imperfect. But that a thing have many actions or motions is due to its being in a mediate position. 463. Deinde cum dicit: hoc quidem igitur habet etc., adaptat praedicta principia ad propositum. 463. Then, at one thing then has [332], he adapts the aforesaid principles to his purpose. Et dicit quod in ordine rerum hoc quod supremum est, habet et participat optimo absque omni motu: quod quidem contingit substantiis separatis, quae sunt omnino immobiles. Dicit autem habet, propter supremam causarum, quae est Deus altissimus, qui est ipsa essentia bonitatis: dicit autem participat, propter inferiores substantias separatas, quae esse et bonum habent ex alio: nam participare nihil aliud est quam ab alio partialiter accipere. Hic est igitur primus et supremus ordo entium. And he says that in the order of things, that which is supreme has and participates in the best without any motion—which indeed happens with the separated substances, which are wholly immobile. Now he says has on account of the highest of the causes, which is the most high God, Who is the very essence of goodness; but he says participates on account of the lower separated substances, which receive being and goodness from another—for to participate is nothing other than to receive from another partially. This, therefore, is the first and supreme order of beings.