Inconveniens autem et non considerare quia prius quidem propter gyrationem ferebantur partes terrae ad medium: nunc autem utique propter quam causam omnia gravitatem habentia feruntur ad ipsam? Non enim gyratio propinquat ad nos. 369 It is absurd too not to perceive that, while the whirling movement may have been responsible for the original coming together of the art of earth at the center, the question remains, why now do all heavy bodies move to the earth. For the whirl surely does not come near us. Adhuc autem et ignis sursum fertur propter quam causam? Non enim propter gyrationem. Si autem hic ferri alicubi natus est, palam quia et terram existimandum. 370 Why, again, does fire move upward? Not, surely, because of the whirl. But if fire is naturally such as to move in a certain direction, clearly the same may be supposed to hold of earth. Sed adhuc neque gyratione grave et leve determinatum est; sed prius existentibus gravibus et levibus, haec quidem ad medium veniunt, haec autem sursum conantur, propter motum. Erat igitur et ante fieri gyrationem grave et leve; quae quodam determinata erant, et aliqualiter apta nata erant ferri aut alicubi. Infinito enim existente, impossibile est esse sursum aut deorsum: determinata sunt autem his grave et leve. Plurimi quidem igitur circa causas has detriti sunt. 371 Again, it cannot be the whirl which determines the heavy and the light. Rather that movement caused the pre-existent heavy and light things to go to the middle and stay on the surface respectively. Thus, before ever the whirl began, heavy and light existed; and what can have been the ground of their distinction, or the manner and direction of their natural movements? In the infinite chaos there can have been neither above nor below, and it is by these that heavy and light are determined. It is to these causes that most writers pay attention: 508. Praemissis tribus rationibus de quiete terrae, quae sumebantur ex parte inferiorum corporum, scilicet ipsius terrae, aquae et aeris, hic ponit alias rationes, quae sumuntur ex parte caelestis corporis. 508. Having presented three reasons for the earth's rest, taken on the part of the lower bodies, namely, earth,. water and air, he here presents other arguments taken on the part of the heavenly body. Et primo ponit quartam rationem quietis terrae, quam ponebat Empedocles; First he gives the fourth reason for the earth's rest, namely, the one which Empedocles gave; secundo improbat eam, ibi: quamvis neque gyratione et cetera. secondly, he refutes it, at but suppose both the 'whirl' 509. Dicit ergo primo quod, cum omnes philosophi qui ponunt mundum generatum esse, assignant causam motus terrae ad medium, violentiam circumgyrationis caeli, quaerunt etiam causam huius quod terra quiescit in medio. Et quidam dicunt quod causa huius est latitudo et magnitudo terrae, sicut supra dictum est; quidam autem, sicut Empedocles, dicunt quod motus caeli circa terram, propter sui velocitatem, prohibet terram moveri. Et ponunt exemplum de aqua contenta in cyathis, idest in quibusdam vasis aereis. Si enim vas illud in circuitu velocius moveatur, et sit aliquod foramen in aliqua parte aerei vasis, multoties vase circulariter moto, aqua descendet ad inferiora vasis aerei, ubi est foramen, et tamen non cadet inferius extra vas, secundum quod habet aptitudinem naturalem, propter eandem causam; quia scilicet prohibetur ex velocitate motus ipsius vasis, ita quod aqua ante rapiatur a motu vasis quam possit cadere. Et simili ratione dicunt quod terra impeditur a velocitate motus caeli ne deorsum cadere possit. He says therefore first [366] that, since all the philosophers who assert than the world was generated, assign, as the cause of the earth's movement to the middle, the violence of the heaven's circumgyration, they also inquire into the reason why the earth rests in the middle. Some say that the cause of this is the earth's width and size, as was said above; but others, such as Empedocles, assert that the motion of the heaven around the earth is so swift that it keeps the earth from being moved. And they give the example of water contained in cyathi, i.e., certain bronze vessels. For if that vessel be given a quite rapid circular motion and there is an opening in some part of the bronze vessel, then, after the vessel is spun a number of times, the water will descend to the bottom of the bronze vessel where the opening is; yet it will not fall out of the vessel (as it normally should according to its natural inclination) for the same reason, namely, because it is prevented by the speed of the vessel's motion in such a way that the water is seized by the motion of the vessel before it can fall. With a like argument, they say that the earth. is prevented by the speed of the heaven's motion from being able to fall downwards. 509. Deinde cum dicit: quamvis neque gyratione etc., improbat praedictam rationem. 509. Then, at but suppose both the 'whirl' [367] he rejects this reason. Et primo quantum ad quietem terrae; First with respect to the earth's rest; secundo quantum ad motum, ibi: inconveniens autem et cetera. secondly, with respect to its motion, at it is absurd. Circa primum duo facit: In regard to the first he does two things: primo improbat causam quietis terrae communiter, tam quantum ad illos qui causam quietis terrae ponunt latitudinem vel magnitudinem terrae, quam etiam quantum ad Empedoclem; first he rejects the cause of the earth's rest in general, both with respect to those who assign the width or size of the earth as the cause of its rest, and also with respect to Empedocles; secundo specialiter improbat hanc positionem quantum ad Empedoclem, qui posuit causam quietis terrae velocitatem motus caeli; et hoc ibi: adhuc autem ad Empedoclem et cetera. secondly, he specifically rejects this theory as far as it pertains to Empedocles, who assigned the speed of the heaven's motion as the cause of the earth's rest, at adhuc autem ad Empedoclem Dicit ergo primo quod, ex quo praedicti philosophi causam quietis terrae ponunt motum caeli vel latitudinem terrae, quae coarctat inferiorem aerem ut non possit diffugere, necessarium videtur quod, si gyratio caeli non prohiberet motum terrae, neque etiam prohiberet ipsum latitudo terrae, coarctans aerem, sed aer libere veniret et recederet, quod terra alicubi ferretur: quia tunc, remotis causis quietis, oporteret eam moveri. Non autem videtur secundum eorum positionem, quod ferretur ad medium secundum suam naturam: si enim, sicut ipsi ponunt, terra fertur ad medium per violentiam, necesse est quod per violentiam quiescat in medio; quod etiam ipsi ponunt. Sed tamen necesse est quod terra habeat aliquem motum naturalem, cessante omni violentia: oportet enim corporibus naturalem motum assignare, sicut supra dictum est. Restat igitur quaerendum versus quam partem naturaliter moveretur, violentia cessante; scilicet utrum sursum vel deorsum, vel versus aliquam aliam differentiam, puta ad dextrum vel sinistrum: quia omnino oportet quod habeat aliquem motum naturalem. Nec est dare quod ad aliquam aliam partem naturaliter moveatur nisi deorsum et ad medium, ut patet ex motu partium terrae, quae ad nullam aliam partem naturaliter moventur. Sic igitur male assignant causam quietis terrae in medio ex aliqua violentia. Si vero dicant quod terra, secundum motum suum naturalem, non magis habet quod moveatur deorsum quam sursum, videtur sequi quod, sicut aer qui est supra terram, non prohibet eam moveri sursum, ita etiam nec aer qui est sub terra, prohibebit eam moveri deorsum, vel propter comprehensionem eius a latitudine terrae, vel propter revolutionem eius ex motu caeli: quia in eisdem rebus, quantum ad eosdem effectus, necesse est ponere easdem causas. He says therefore first [367] that, since the aforesaid philosophers declare that the cause of the earth's rest is the motion of the heaven, or the earths width which corners the lower air so that it cannot escape, then it seems necessary that, if the heaven's gyration should not. restrain the earth from moving; and if the earth's width should not restrain it by confining the air, but the air should freely come and go, the earth would be carried somewhere—since now, the causes of rest removed, it would have to move. But it does not seem, according to their theory, that it would be carried to the middle according to its nature. If, then, as they say, the earth is carried to the middle by compulsion, then it would have to rest in the middle by compulsion, which they also posit. However, the earth has to have some natural motion after all compulsion ceases—for all bodies have some motion that is natural, as has been said above. It remains, therefore, to investigate in which direction the earth would be moved naturally, if all compulsion ceased—whether upward, or downward, or in some other direction, e.g., to the right or to the left, for it certainly must have some natural motion. Nor can a reason be found for it to be naturally moved in any other direction except down and to the middle, as is evident from the motion of particles of earth, which are naturally moved in no other direction. Consequently, in assigning compulsion as the cause of the earth's rest in the middle, they make a poor choice. But if they say that the natural motion of the earth does not incline it downward any more than upward, it seems to follow that, just as the air which is atop the earth does not keep it from being moved upward, so too neither will the air under the earth keep it from being moved downward, whether on account of the air's being confined by the earth's width or on account of its being revolved by the motion of the heaven—because, in dealing with the same things as to the same effects, the same causes must be posited. 510. Deinde cum dicit: adhuc autem ad Empedoclem etc., improbat specialiter solutionem Empedoclis. Considerandum est autem quod Empedocles ponebat quatuor elementa materialia et duo moventia, scilicet litem et amicitiam; quae per congregationem et segregationem elementorum, sunt causa generationis et corruptionis mundi, et omnium quae in mundo sunt. Dicit ergo quod aliquis potest quaestionem movere contra Empedoclem: quando elementa erant ab invicem separata propter litem, oportebat terram quiescere (non enim coniungebat se aliis elementis, dominio litis durante): est ergo quaerendum quae fuit tunc causa quod terra quiesceret. Nec potest assignari pro causa gyratio caeli; quia caelum nondum erat generatum. Videtur ergo quod nullo modo oporteat dicere gyrationem caeli causam quietis terrae. 510. Then, at adhuc autem ad Empedoclem [368], he specifically disproves Empedocles' solution. Here it should be kept in mind that Empedocles posited four material elements and two movers, namely, friendship and strife, which, by associating and disassociating the elements, are the cause of the generation and corruption of the world and all things in the world. Aristotle says, therefore, that someone can bring against Empedocles the following difficulty: when the elements were separated from one another by strife, earth had to be at rest—because it did not join itself to the other elements so long as strife ruled. Therefore, one should ask what caused earth to be at rest at that time. One cannot give as a cause the gyration of the heaven, because the heaven had not yet been generated. It seems, therefore, that one can in no way say that the gyration of the heaven is the cause of the earth's rest. Sed de hac ratione videtur esse dubium. Videtur enim lis esse causa generationis mundi, distinguendo elementa ab invicem; amicitia autem esse causa corruptionis eiusdem, congregando elementa in unum chaos. Unde nunc videtur esse litis dominium, propter hoc quod elementa sunt ab invicem distincta. Et ideo Alexander exposuit haec verba sic: quando elementa distabant seorsum, non quidem ab invicem, sed a lite; idest quando lis ab elementis aberat, tempore scilicet quo amicitia dominabatur. Sed quia haec expositio videtur esse extorta, ideo exponenda est, sicut Simplicius dicit: quando elementa distabant seorsum, scilicet ab invicem, et hoc a lite, idest propter litem. Est enim considerandum quod Empedocles ponebat mundum generari non ex sola lite, sed etiam cum admixtione amicitiae. Et sicut ipse per verba Empedoclis probat, ex dominio amicitiae provenit circumgyratio caeli, quia motus caeli quasi omnia convolvit in unum. Et ideo convenienter Aristoteles quaerit, antequam gyratio caeli per amicitiam causaretur, secundum Empedoclem, quae erat causa quietis terrae. But there seems to be some problem about this argument. For strife seems to be the cause of the generation of the world by disassociating the elements from one another, while friendship seems to be the cause of its corruption by uniting the elements into one chaos. Hence, one seems to have at present the rule of strife, since the elements are disassociated from one another. Accordingly, Alexander expounds these words in the following manner: when the elements were apart, means, not from one another, but from strife, i.e., at the time when strife was disassociated from the elements, namely, at the time when friendship ruled. But because this explanation seems extorted, it should be explained as Simplicius says, as follows: when the elements were apart, i.e., from one another, and this from strife, i.e., on account of strife. For it must be remembered that Empedocles explained the generation of the world, not in teems of strife alone, but with an admixture of friendship as well. And, as he [Simplicius] proves from the words of Empedocles, it is from the dominance of friendship that the circumgyration of the heaven comes, since the motion of the heaven masses, as it were, all things into one. Therefore, it is suitable for Aristotle to ask: What was the cause of the earth's rest before the gyration of the world was, according to Empedocles, caused by friendship? 511. Deinde cum dicit: inconveniens autem etc., improbat rationem quam assignant communiter de motu terrae, tribus rationibus. 511. Then, at it is absurd [369] he rejects the reason which they assign in general for the motion of the earth. This he does with three arguments. Circa quarum primam dicit quod inconveniens est non considerare quare, si prius, quando generabatur mundus, partes terrae ferebantur ad medium propter gyrationem caeli, nunc non est talem causam assignare quare, sicut videmus, omnia gravia ferantur ad medium. Gyratio enim caeli simul circumgyrat ignem et superiorem partem aeris, non autem hanc inferiorem aeris partem: et ita illa gyratio non attingit usque ad nos. Videmus enim quod gravia feruntur ad medium et in hoc aere propinquo. Non ergo gyratio caeli debet poni causa motus gravium ad medium: quia remota causa, removetur effectus. With respect to the first of which, he says that it is unacceptable not to consider why it is that if before, when the world was being generated, the parts of earth were carried to the middle on account of the heaven's gyration, now, when such a cause can no longer be assigned, we still see all heavy things carried to the middle. For the heaven's gyration rotates at once fire and the upper region of air, but not this lower region of air—and, consequently, this gyration does not reach as far as us. Yet we observe that heavy things are carried to the middle in this air near us. Therefore, the gyration of the heaven ought not be posited as the cause of heavy things' being moved to the middle—because if the cause is taken away, so too the effect. 512. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc autem et ignis et cetera. Et dicit quod considerare oportet propter quam causam ignis feratur sursum. Non enim potest dici quod hoc sit propter gyrationem caeli: non enim ad hoc se extendit exemplum ab eis inductum. Si vero ignis feratur ad aliquem locum propter suam aptitudinem naturalem, manifestum est quod est idem existimare de terra, quae habet contrarietatem ad ignem, ut supra dictum est: contrariorum enim sunt contrarii motus, et si unum contrariorum est naturale, et aliud naturale esse oportet, ut supra dictum est. 512. At why, again, does fire [370] he presents the second argument. And he says that we must consider why it is that fire is borne upwards. For it cannot be said that this s due to the heaven's gyration— since the example they give does not extend this far. However, if it is on account of its natural inclination that fire is borne to some certain place, then it is plain that the same should be thought of earth, which has contrariety to fire, as has been said above—for the motions of contraries are themselves contrary, and if one of the contraries is natural, the other too must be natural, as has been said. 513. Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: sed adhuc neque gyratione et cetera. Et dicit quod si quis eorum verba et exempla consideret, non videtur dicendum quod grave distinguatur a levi in corporibus propter ipsam gyrationem caeli; sed praesupposita distinctione gravium et levium, quaedam veniunt ad medium, scilicet gravia, quaedam autem, scilicet levia, conantur sursum ferri, propter motum, inquantum repelluntur a loco medio a corporibus gravibus in ipsum latis. Et sic solum per accidens gyratio caeli causat motum ignis sursum. Quod autem gyratio non distinguat grave et leve, sed eorum distinctionem praesupponat, potest videri ex exemplo quod inducunt: in gyratione enim aeris et liquidorum, ea quae prius erant gravia, feruntur ad medium. Sic igitur antequam esset gyratio caeli, erat grave et leve. Quae secundum aliquid distinguebantur, scilicet secundum aptitudinem ad hoc quod aliquo modo et ad aliquem locum moveantur: nam grave dicitur aliquid vel leve, propter inclinationem ad aliquem motum localem. Et ita gyratio non est causa quare levia moventur sursum, vel gravia deorsum. 513. He presents the third reason at again, it cannot be the whirl [371] and says that if anyone considers their words and examples, it does not seem that one should say that the heavy is distinguished from the light among bodies on account of the heaven's gyration, but that, if we presuppose the distinction between the heavy and the light, then some, namely, the heavy, move to the middle, while others, namely, the light, try to move upward, insofar as they are repelled from the middle place by the heavy bodies carried there. Consequently, it is only by accident that the heaven's gyration causes the upward motion of fire. But that the gyration of the heaven does not distinguish the heavy from the light, but pre-supposes their distinction, can be seen from the example they adduce—for it: the gyration of air and liquids, things that are already heavy are carried to the middle. Consequently, before there was a gyration of the heaven, there existed heavy and light. These were distinguished according to something, namely, their aptitude to be moved in some way and to some certain place—for a thing is called "heavy" or "light" on account of an inclination to some certain local motion. Consequently, gyration is not the reason why light things are moved upward or heavy things downward. Poterant autem hi distinguere grave et leve, et loca eorum, quae sunt sursum et deorsum, quia non ponebant universum esse infinitum: non enim impossibile est distinguere sursum vel deorsum, si apud istos distinguitur grave et leve, sicut dictum est. Et quia aliqui ponebant universum infinitum, scilicet Anaximenes et Xenophanes, ideo signanter dicit quod plurimi, non autem omnes, sunt detriti, idest consueti et exercitati, circa istas causas motus et quietis gravium et levium. Now these could distinguish heavy and light and their places, which are above and below, because they did not posit the universe to be infinite. For it is not impossible to distinguish up and down, if they distinguish heavy and light. And because some assumed an infinite universe, namely, Anaximenes and Xenophanes, Aristotle therefore says significantly that many of them, but not all, were worn out, i.e., accustomed to, and practiced in, the matter of the causes of the motion and rest of heavy and light things. Lectio 25 Lecture 25 Ratio quietis terrae non est quod similiter se habet ad omnem caeli partem Reason for earth's rest not from same relation to every part of the heaven Sunt autem quidam, qui propter similitudinem dicunt ipsam manere, sicut antiquorum Anaximander. Magis quidem enim nihil sursum aut deorsum aut in plagas ferri convenit quod in medio est collocatum, et similiter ad extrema se habens. Simul autem impossibile ad contrarium facere motum. Quare ex necessitate manere. 372 but there are some, Anaximander, for instance, among the ancients, who say that the earth keeps its place because of its indifference. Motion upward and downward and sideways were all, they thought, equally inappropriate to that which is set at the center and indifferently related to every extreme point; and to move in contrary directions at the same time was impossible: so it must needs remain still. Hoc autem dicitur persuasibiliter quidem, non vere autem. Secundum enim hanc rationem necessarium omne quodcumque ponatur in medio, manere: quare et ignis quiescet. Quod enim dictum est, non proprium in terra. 373 This view is ingenious but not true. The argument would prove that everything, whatever it be, which is put at the center, must stay there. Fire, then, will rest at the center: for the proof turns on no peculiar property of earth. Sed et non necessarium. Non enim solum videtur manens, sed et lata ad medium: quo enim quaecumque fertur particula ipsius, necesse est ferri et totam. Ubi autem fertur secundum naturam, et manet ibi secundum naturam. Non igitur propter similiter se habere ad extrema: hoc quidem enim omnibus commune, ferri autem ad medium proprium terrae. 374 But this does not follow. The observed facts about earth are not only that it remains at the center, but also that it moves to the center. The place to which any fragment of earth moves must necessarily be the place to which the whole moves; and in the place to which a thing naturally moves, it will naturally rest. The reason then is not in the fact that the earth is indifferently related to every extreme point: for this would apply to any body, whereas movement to the center is peculiar to earth. Inconveniens autem et hoc quidem quaerere, propter quid maneat terra in medio, ignis autem non quaerere propter quid in extremo. Si quidem enim et illi natura locus extremus, palam quia necessarium est esse quendam et terrae natura locum. Si autem non huic iste locus, sed propter necessitatem manet eam quae similitudinis (quemadmodum qui de trichos sermo, fortiter quidem, similiter autem undique tensae, quoniam non discerpetur; et esuriente et sitiente valde quidem, similiter autem, et ab esibilibus et potabilibus aequaliter distante; etenim hunc quiescere necessarium), quaerendum ipsis de ignis mansione in extremis. 375 Again it is absurd to look for a reason why the earth remains at the center and not for a reason why fire remains at the extremity. If the extremity is the natural place of fire, clearly earth must also have a natural place. But suppose that the center is not its place, and that the reason of its remaining there is this necessity of indifference—on the analogy of the hair which, it is said, however great the tension, will not break under it, if it be evenly distributed, or of the men who, though exceedingly hungry and thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay where he is—even so, it still remains to explain why fire stays at the extremities. Mirabile autem et de mansione quidem quaerere, de latione autem ipsorum non quaerere; propter quam causam hoc quidem sursum fertur, hoc autem ad medium, nullo impediente. 376 It is strange, too, to ask about things staying still but not about their motion,—why, I mean, one thing, if nothing stops it, moves up, and another thing to the center. Sed adhuc neque verum quod dicitur. Secundum accidens tamen hoc verum, quia necessarium manere in medio omne, cui nihil magis huc quam illuc moveri convenit. Sed propter hanc rationem non manet, sed movebitur; non tamen totum, sed divulsum. Eadem enim ratio congruit et in igne. Necesse enim posito manere similiter quemadmodum terram: similiter enim se habebit ad signorum extremorum quodcumque. Sed tamen feretur a medio, quemadmodum et videtur latus, si non aliquid prohibeat, ad extremum. Veruntamen non totum ad unum signum (hoc enim necessarium solum accidere ex ratione ca quae de similitudine), sed proportionata particula ad proportionatum extremi; dico autem, puta, quarta pars ad quartam continentis partem: neque enim punctum corpus est. Quemadmodum autem et si ex magno conveniat densatum in minorem locum, sic utique ex parvo in maiorem rarius factum. Quare utique et terra hoc modo moveretur a medio, propter similitudinis rationem, si non natura terrae iste locus esset. 377 Again, their statements are not true. It happens, indeed, to be the case that a thing to which movement this way and that is equally inappropriate is obliged to remain at the center. But so far as their argument goes, instead of remaining there, it will move, only not as a mass but in fragments. For the argument applies equally to fire. Fire, if set at the center, should stay there, like earth, since it will be indifferently related to every point on the extremity. Nevertheless it will move, as in fact it always does move when nothing stops it, away from the center to the extremity. It will not, however, move in a mass to a single point on the circumference—the only possible result on the lines of the indifference theory—but rather each corresponding portion of fire to the corresponding part of the extremity, each fourth part, for instance, to a fourth part of the circumference. For since no body is a point, it will have parts. The expansion, when the body increased the place occupied, would be on the same principle as the contraction, in which the place was diminished. Thus, for all the indifference theory shows to the contrary, earth also would have moved in this manner away from the center, unless the center had been its natural place. Quaecumque quidem igitur existunt de figura ipsius suspicata, et de locis, et mansione et motu, fere haec sunt. We have now outlined the views held as to the shape, position, and rest or movement of the earth. 514. Praemissa quarta solutione, secundum quam sumebatur ratio quietis terrae ex violentia gyrationis caeli, hic ponit quintam solutionem, secundum quam assignatur ratio quietis terrae ex simili habitudine caeli ad terram ex omni parte. 514. Having presented the fourth solution according to which the explanation of the earth's rest was taken from the violence of the heaven's gyration, the Philosopher here presents the fifth solution in which the explanation of the earth's rest is based on the fact of a similar relation of the heaven to the earth from all directions. Et primo assignat hanc rationem; First, he presents this explanation; secundo improbat eam, ibi: hoc autem dicitur et cetera. secondly, he disproves it, at this view is ingenious 515. Dicit ergo primo quod quidam dixerunt terram quiescere in medio propter similitudinem, idest similem eius habitudinem ad omnem partem caeli. Et hoc inter antiquos dixit Anaximander. Per quod dat intelligere quod etiam aliquibus sui temporis hoc videbatur. Dicitur enim Plato hoc posuisse: sed tamen Aristoteles hoc ei non imponit, quia supra ei imposuerat quod moveretur in medio circa axem mundi. Ideo autem dicebant terram propter similitudinem manere, quia nulla est ratio quare id quod est in medio collocatum, magis moveatur sursum vel deorsum, aut versus alias plagas caeli, cum similiter se habeat undique ad extrema; impossibile est autem quod simul moveatur ad contrarias partes; ergo relinquitur quod ex necessitate quiescat in medio. He says therefore first that some have said that the earth rests in the middle because of likeness, i.e., on account of its being similarly related to every part of the heaven. Among the ancients, Anaximander held this opinion. By this he gives us to understand that some of his contemporaries believed this. For Plato is said to have posited this; yet Aristotle does not attribute it to him because above he had attributed to him the opinion that the earth was moved in the middle about the axis of the world. Now the reason why they said that the earth stays put on account of likeness, is that there is no reason why that which is placed in the middle should be moved upward or downward, or toward other reaches of the heaven, since it is related in the same way to the extremes in every direction. Now it is impossible for it to be moved simultaneously in contrary directions. Therefore it remains that it necessarily rests in the middle. 515. Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem dicitur etc., improbat praedictam rationem. 515. Then, at this view is ingenious, he disproves this explanation. Et primo ex hoc quod ratio non est necessaria; First, on the ground that the argument does not have necessity;