In librum B. Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio Commentary on the Book On the Divine Names of Blessed Denys Prooemium Prooemium Ad intellectum librorum beati Dionysii considerandum est quod ea quae de Deo in sacris Scripturis continentur, artificialiter quadrifariam divisit. For the understanding of the books of blessed Denys, it must be considered that those things that are contained in the Sacred Scriptures concerning God divide artfully into four parts. Nam in libro quodam, qui apud nos non habetur, qui intitulatur De divinis hypotyposibus idest characteribus, ea de Deo tradidit quae ad unitatem divinae essentiae et distinctionem personarum pertinent. Cuius unitatis et distinctionis sufficiens similitudo in rebus creatis non invenitur, sed hoc mysterium omnem naturalis rationis facultatem excedit. For in a certain book, which is not had among us, which is entitled On the Divine Hypotyposes, that is, characters, he treats those things concerning God that pertain to the unity of the divine essence and the distinction of persons. Of which unity and distinction a sufficient likeness is not found in created things, but this mystery exceeds every faculty of natural reason. Quae vero dicuntur de Deo in Scripturis, quarum aliqua similitudo in creaturis invenitur, dupliciter se habent. Nam huiusmodi similitudo in quibusdam quidem attenditur secundum aliquid quod a Deo in creaturas derivatur. Sicut a primo bono sunt omnia bona et a primo vivo sunt omnia viventia et sic de aliis similibus. Et talia pertractat Dionysius in libro De divinis nominibus, quem prae manibus habemus. Whereas those things that are said of God in the Scriptures, of which a likeness is found in creatures, have themselves in two ways. For a likeness of this sort in certain things is considered according to something that is derived from God into creatures. Just as from the first good are all good things and from the first life are all living things and thus concerning other similar things. And such things Denys treats thoroughly in the book On the Divine Names, which we have before our hands. In quibusdam vero similitudo attenditur secundum aliquid a creaturis in Deum translatum. Sicut Deus dicitur leo, petra, sol vel aliquid huiusmodi; sic enim Deus symbolice vel metaphorice nominatur. Et de huiusmodi tractavit Dionysius in quodam suo libro quem De symbolica theologia intitulavit. Whereas in certain things a likeness is considered according to something transferred from creatures to God. Just as God is called a lion, a stone, the sun, or something of this sort; for thus God is named symbolically or metaphorically. And concerning things of this sort Denys treats in a certain book of his that he entitled On the Symbolic Theology. Sed quia omnis similitudo creaturae ad Deum deficiens est et hoc ipsum quod Deus est omne id quod in creaturis invenitur excedit, quicquid in creaturis a nobis cognoscitur a Deo removetur, secundum quod in creaturis est; ut sic, post omne illud quod intellectus noster ex creaturis manuductus de Deo concipere potest, hoc ipsum quod Deus est remaneat occultum et ignotum. Non solum enim Deus non est lapis aut sol, qualia sensu apprehenduntur, sed nec est talis vita aut essentia qualis ab intellectu nostro concipi potest et sic hoc ipsum quod Deus est, cum excedat omne illud quod a nobis apprehenditur, nobis remanet ignotum. De huiusmodi autem remotionibus quibus Deus remanet nobis ignotus et occultus fecit alium librum quem intitulavit De mystica idest occulta theologia. But because every likeness of a creature to God is failing and this very what-God-is itself exceeds everything that is found in creatures, whatever in creatures is known by us is removed from God, according as it is in creatures. And thus, after everything that our intellect, led by the hand from creatures, can conceive about God, this very what-God-is itself remains hidden and unknown. For not only is God not a stone or the sun, as they are apprehended by sense, but neither is he such life or essence as can be conceived by our intellect. And thus this very what-God-is itself, since it exceeds everything that is apprehended by us, remains unknown to us. Yet concerning removals of this sort, by which God remains unknown to us and hidden from us, he made another book, which he entitled On the Mystical, that is, the hidden, Theology. Est autem considerandum quod beatus Dionysius in omnibus libris suis obscuro utitur stilo. Quod quidem non ex imperitia fecit, sed ex industria ut sacra et divina dogmata ab irrisione infidelium occultaret. Yet it must be considered that blessed Denys in all his books used an obscure style, a dark pen. Which indeed he did not from inexperience, but from industry, in order to hide the sacred and divine dogmas from the derision of the infidels. Accidit etiam difficultas in praedictis libris, ex multis. Difficulty also happens in the aforesaid books, from many causes. Primo, quidem, quia plerumque utitur stilo et modo loquendi quo utebantur Platonici, qui apud modernos est inconsuetus. Platonici enim omnia composita vel materialia, volentes reducere in principia simplicia et abstracta, posuerunt species rerum separatas, dicentes quod est homo extra materiam, et similiter equus, et sic de aliis speciebus naturalium rerum. Dicebant, ergo, quod hic homo singularis sensibilis non est hoc ipsum quod est homo, sed dicitur homo participatione illius hominis separati. Unde in hoc homine sensibili invenitur aliquid quod non pertinet ad speciem humanitatis, sicut materia individualis et alia huiusmodi. Sed in homine separato nihil est nisi quod ad speciem humanitatis pertinet. Unde hominem separatum appellavit per se hominem, propter hoc quod nihil habet nisi quod est humanitatis; et principaliter hominem, inquantum humanitas ad homines sensibiles derivatur ab homine separato, per modum participationis. Sic etiam dici potest quod homo separatus sit super homines et quod homo separatus sit humanitas omnium hominum sensibilium, inquantum natura humana pure competit homini separato, et ab eo in homines sensibiles derivatur. First of all, because generally he uses the style and mode of speaking that the Platonists use, to which modern men are unaccustomed. For the Platonists, wishing to reduce composed or material things to simple and abstract principles, posited separated species of things, saying that there is man beyond matter, and likewise horse, and thus concerning the other species of natural things. They said, therefore, that this sensible singular man is not the very what-man-is itself, but is called man by participation of that separated man. Whence in this sensible man there is found something that does not pertain to the species of humanity, such as individual matter and other things of this sort. But in separated man there is nothing but what pertains to the species of humanity. Whence he named separated man per se man, because he has nothing but what belongs to humanity; and principally man, inasmuch as humanity is derived to sensible men from separated man, through the mode of participation. Thus also it can be said that separated man is above men and that separated man is the humanity of all sensible men, inasmuch as human nature applies purely to separated man, and is derived from him to sensible men. Nec solum huiusmodi abstractione Platonici considerabant circa ultimas species rerum naturalium, sed etiam circa maxime communia, quae sunt bonum, unum et ens. Nor by an abstraction of this sort did the Platonists consider only about the ultimate species of natural things, but also about the most common things, which are the good, one, and being. Ponebant, enim, unum primum quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis et unitatis et esse, quod dicimus Deum et quod omnia alia dicuntur bona vel una vel entia per derivationem ab illo primo. Unde illud primum nominabant ipsum bonum vel per se bonum vel principale bonum vel superbonum vel etiam bonitatem omnium bonorum seu etiam bonitatem aut essentiam et substantiam, eo modo quo de homine separato expositum est. For they posited a first one that is the very essence of goodness and of unity and of being, which we call God, and that all other things are called good or one or beings through derivation from that first. Whence they named that first the good itself or per se good or principal good or supergood or also the goodness of all good things or even goodness or essence and substance, by that mode in which it is expounded concerning separated man. Haec igitur Platonicorum ratio fidei non consonat nec veritati, quantum ad hoc quod continet de speciebus naturalibus separatis, sed quantum ad id quod dicebant de primo rerum principio, verissima est eorum opinio et fidei Christianae consona. This ratio of the Platonists, therefore, does not accord with the faith nor with the truth, as regards what it contains concerning separated natural species. But as regards what they said concerning the first principle of things, their opinion is most true and consonant with the Christian faith. Unde Dionysius Deum nominat quandoque ipsum quidem bonum aut superbonum aut principale bonum aut bonitatem omnis boni. Et similiter nominat ipsum supervitam, supersubstantiam et ipsam deitatem thearchicam, idest principalem deitatem, quia etiam in quibusdam creaturis recipitur nomen deitatis secundum quamdam participationem. Whence Denys names God at times goodness itself or supergood or principal good or the goodness of every good thing. And similarly he names him superlife, supersubstance, and the very thearchic deity, that is, principal deity, because even in certain creatures there is received the name of deity according to a certain participation. Secunda autem difficultas accidit in dictis eius, quia plerumque rationibus efficacibus utitur ad propositum ostendendum et multoties paucis verbis vel etiam uno verbo eas implicat. Yet the second difficulty happens in his sayings, because generally he uses efficacious arguments to show a proposition, and many times he implies them with few words or even one word. Tertia, quia multoties utitur quadam multiplicatione verborum quae, licet superflua videantur, tamen diligenter considerantibus magnam sententiae profunditatem continere inveniuntur. Third, because many times he uses a certain multiplication of words that, although it may seem superfluous, nevertheless for those diligently considering is found to contain a great profundity of knowledge. Caput 1 Chapter 1 Quae sermonis intentio et quae de divinis nominibus traditio What Is the Intention of the Discussion and What Is the Tradition Concerning the Divine Names Lectio 1 Lectio 1 De modo procedendi in hoc opere On the Mode of Proceeding in This Work C. I, § 1. 1. Nunc autem, O beate, post Theologicas hypotyposes, ad divinorum nominum reserationem, sicut est possibile, transibo. C. I, § 1. 1. Yet now, O blessed one, after the Theological Hypotyposes, I shall cross over to the opening up of the divine names, as is possible. 2. Esto autem et nunc a nobis eloquiorum lex praedefinita veritatem de Deo dictorum nos asseverare non in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae verbis sed in demonstratione a Spiritu virtutis motae theologorum, 2. Yet be even now by us the predefined law of the eloquences, that we should assert the truth of things said about God not in persuasive words of human wisdom (1 Cor 2:4) but in the demonstration of the power of the theologians, moved by the Spirit, 3. secundum quam ineffabilibus et ignotis, ineffabiliter et ignote, coniungimur secundum meliorem nostrae rationabilis et intellectualis virtutis et operationis unionem. 3. according to which we are joined to ineffable and unknown things, ineffably and unknowingly, according to the better union of our reasonable and intellectual power and operation. 4. Igitur universaliter non est audendum dicere aliquid nec etiam cogitare de supersubstantiale et occulta deitate, praeter ea quae divinitus nobis ex sanctis eloquiis sunt expressa. 4. Therefore universally we must not dare to say nor even to think anything about the supersubstantial and hidden deity (Isa 45:15), beyond those things which divinely are expressed to us from the holy eloquences (1 Cor 4:6). 5. Nam supersubstantialem scientiam ignorantiae supersubstantialitatis, quae est super rationem et intellectum et substantiam ipsam, ipsi attribuere convenit, tantum ad superius respicientes, quantum thearchicorum eloquiorum radius seipsum immittit ad splendores superiores, et simus circa divina, temperantia et sanctitate constricti. 5. For it is fitting to attribute to it the supersubstantial science of the ignorance of supersubstantiality, which is above reason and intellect and substance itself, and looking to the superior as much as the ray of the thearchic eloquences sends itself to superior splendors, let us be constrained by temperance and sanctity about divine things. 6. Etenim si aliquid convenit omni sapienti et verissimae theologiae credere, secundum proportionem uniuscuiusque mentium revelantur divina et inspiciuntur, thearchica bonitate, in salutari iustitia, a mensuratis immensuratione, sicut incomprehensibilem, ut decet Deum, segregante. 6. For if it is fitting at all to believe all-wise and most true theology, divine things are revealed and inspected according to the proportion of the minds of each, with the thearchic goodness segregating, in saving justice, by immeasurability from the measured, as incomprehensible, as befits God. 7. Sicut enim incomprehensibilia et incontemplabilia sunt a sensibilibus intelligibilia; et his quae in compositione sunt et figura, simplicia et infigurabilia; et formatis secundum corporum figuras, incorporalium intangibilis et infigurabilis, formae carentia; secundum eamdem veritatis rationem, superponitur substantiis quae est supersubstantialis et mentibus quae est super mentem unitas et omnibus deliberationibus est indeliberabile quod est super deliberationem et ineffabile verba omni, quod est super verbum, bonum; unitas unificans omnem unitatem et supersubstantialis substantia et intellectus non-intelligibilis et verbum non dicibile et irrationalitas, non-intelligibilitas et innominabilitas, secundum nihil existentium existens et causa quidem essendi omnibus, ipsum autem non existens, sicut supra omnem substantiam et sic ut ipsum de seipso proprie et scienter enuntiet. 7. For just as intelligible things are incomprehensible and uncontemplatable by sensible things; and simple and unfigurable things by these things which are in composition and figure; and the intangible and the unfigurable lacking of the form of incorporeal things by things formed according to the figures of bodies; according to the same ratio of truth, that unity is super-posited above substances which is supersubstantial, and above minds that which is above mind, and to all deliberations that is indeliberable which is above deliberation, and ineffable by every word that which is above word, the good; unity unifying every unity and supersubstantial substance and unintelligible intellect and an unspeakable word and irrationality, unintelligibility, and unnameability, according to nothing existing of existing things and indeed the cause of being for all things, yet itself not existing, as above every substance and such that it might articulate properly and knowingly about itself. § 2. 8. De hac igitur, sicut dictum est, supersubstantiali et occulta deitate, non est audendum dicere neque cogitare aliquid praeter illa quae divinitus nobis ex sanctis eloquiis sunt expressa. § 2. 8. Therefore, as has been said, concerning this supersubstantial and hidden deity, we must not dare to say nor to think anything beyond those things that divinely have been expressed to us from the holy eloquences. 9. Etenim sicut ipsa de seipsa in eloquiis, ut decet bonam, tradidit, ipsius quidem quidquid est scientia et contemplatio omnibus est invia existentibus sicut ab omnibus supersubstantialiter segregata. Et multos theologorum invenies non solum sicut invisibilem ipsam et incomprehensibilem laudavisse sed inscrutabilem simul et non-investigabilem, sicut non existente vestigio ullo eorum qui ad occultam ipsius infinitatem transierunt. 9. For just as this itself handed on concerning itself in the eloquences, as befits its being good, for all existing things whatever is science and contemplation of it is inaccessible, as segregated from all things supersubstantially. And you shall find that many of the theologians have praised it not only as invisible and incomprehensible but likewise as inscrutable and non-investigable, as with no vestige existing of those who have crossed over to its hidden infinity. 10. Non tamen incommunicabile est universaliter bonum ulli existentium, sed in seipso singulariter supersubstantialem collocans radium uniuscuiusque existentium proportionabilibus illuminationibus, benigne superapparet et ad possibilem ipsius contemplationem et communionem et assimilationem extendit sanctas mentes, quae ipsi, sicut est fas et ut decet sanctos, se immittunt et neque ad superius quam convenienter data Dei apparitione superbe praesumunt, neque ad inferius ex subiectione ad peius prolabuntur, sed firme et indeclinabiliter ad radium ipsius supersplendentem extenduntur et commensurato amore convenientium illuminationum, cum reverentia sancta et caste et sancte altius elevantur. 10. Nevertheless the good is not universally incommunicable to each of existing things, but gathering singularly in itself the supersubstantial ray of each of existing things by proportional illuminations, kindly it super-appears above and extends to its possible contemplation and communion and assimilation holy minds, which, as is acceptable and as befits holy men, send themselves to it, and neither do they proudly presume to higher things than those fittingly given by the apparition of God, nor do they fall to lower things out of subjection to what is worse, but firmly and indeclinably they are extended to its super-resplendent ray and with commensurate love of the fitting illuminations, with holy reverence and chastely and in a holy manner they are elevated higher. 1. In hoc igitur libro, qui De divinis nominibus inscribitur, more eorum qui artificiose scientias tradiderunt, 1. In this book, therefore, which is entitled On the Divine Names, after the custom of those who artfully handed on the sciences, primo, praemittit quaedam necessaria ad sequentem considerationem; first, he sets out certain things necessary for the following consideration; secundo, incipit prosequi principale intentum in 3 cap. quod incipit ibi: et primam etc. second, he begins to pursue his principal intention in chapter 3, which begins, and we shall inspect the naming of the good. 2. Circa primum, duo facit: 2. About the first, he does two things: primo, ostendit rationem divinorum nominum; first, he shows the ratio of the divine names; secundo, ostendit quod nomina, de quibus in hoc libro tractatur, sunt communia toti Trinitati; et hoc 2 cap. quod incipit ibi: thearchicam totam essentiam etc. second, he shows that the names that are treated in this book are common to the whole Trinity; and this in chapter 2, which begins at per se goodness, determining and manifesting.