Lectio 5 Lectio 5 De pulchro et quomodo Deo attribuatur On the Beautiful and How It Is Attributed to God § 7. 132. Hoc bonum laudatur a sanctis theologis et sicut pulchrum et sicut pulchritudo et sicut dilectio et sicut diligibile et quaecumque aliae convenientes sunt pulchrificae et gratiose habitae pulchritudinis nominationes. § 7. 132. This good is praised by the holy theologians as beautiful and as beauty and as love and as lovable and whatever others are befitting namings of the beautifying and graciously had beauty. 133. Pulchrum autem et pulchritudo non sunt dividenda in causa quae in uno tota comprehendit. 133. Yet beautiful and beauty must not be divided in the cause that comprehends the whole of things in one. 134. Haec enim in existentibus, in participationes et participantia dividentes: pulchrum quidem esse dicimus quod participat pulchritudinem, pulchritudinem autem participationem, pulchrae facientis tota pulchra, causae. 134. For these in existing things, dividing in participations and participatings: we say that beautiful indeed is that which participates beauty, yet we say that beauty is the participation of the beautiful cause making the whole of things beautiful. 135. Supersubstantiale vero pulchrum, pulchritudo quidem dicitur propter traditam ab ipso omnibus existentibus, iuxta proprietatem uniuscuiusque, pulchritudinem et sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa, ad similitudinem luminis, cum fulgore immittens universis pulchrificas fontani radii ipsius traditiones et sicut omnia ad seipsum vocans unde et callos dicitur et sicut tota in totis congregans. 135. Whereas the supersubstantial beautiful is called beauty indeed on account of the beauty handed on by it to all existing things, according to the propriety of each, and as the cause of the consonance and clarity of the whole of things, unto the likeness of light, with radiance sending into all things the beautifying handings on of its fontal ray, and as calling all things to itself, whence also it is called kalos, and as gathering the whole of things in the whole of things. 136. Pulchrum autem sicut pulcherrimum simul et superpulchrum; 136. Yet beautiful as most beautiful and simultaneously super-beautiful; 137. et semper existens secundum eadem et similiter pulchrum et neque factum neque destructum neque auctum neque minoratum; neque in aliqua parte quidem pulchrum, in aliqua autem turpe; neque aliquando quidem, aliquando autem non; neque ad hoc quidem pulchrum, ad aliud, autem turpe; neque hic quidem, illic autem non, sicut quibusdam quidem existens pulchrum, quibusdam autem non pulchrum; sed sicut ipsum secundum seipsum cum seipso uniforme et semper existens pulchrum, 137. and always existing according to the same things and likewise beautiful, and neither made nor destroyed nor increased nor diminished; nor beautiful in some part indeed, yet ugly in another; nor at some time, yet at some time not; nor indeed beautiful unto this, yet ugly unto that; nor here, yet not there, as indeed to certain ones existing as beautiful, yet to certain ones as not beautiful; but as it according to itself with itself uniformly and always existing as beautiful, 138. et sicut omnis pulchri fontanam et pulchritudinem excedenter in seipso praehabens; etenim, simplici et supernaturali totorum pulchrorum natura, omnis pulchritudo et omne pulchrum uniformiter secundum causam praeextiterunt. 138. and as prepossessing in itself the font and beauty of every beautiful thing; for by the simple and supernatural nature of the whole of beautiful things, every beauty and every beautiful thing uniformly preexists according to cause. 139. Ex pulchro isto, omnibus existentibus est esse secundum propriam rationem singula pulchra et propter pulchrum omnium concordiae et amicitiae et communiones et pulchro omnia uniuntur, 139. From that beautiful, for all existing things according to proper ratio singulars are beautiful and on account of the beautiful the concords of all and the friendships and communions and all things are united by the beautiful; 140. et est principium omnium pulchrorum, sicut effectiva causa et movens tota et continens amore propriae pulchritudinis; et finis omnium sicut finalis causa, etenim pulchri causa cuncta fiunt; et exemplaris, quoniam secundum ipsum cuncta determinantur; 140. and it is the principle of all beautiful things, as effective cause and moving the whole of things and containing by love of its proper beauty; and the end of all as final cause, for for the sake of the beautiful all things are made; and exemplar, because according to it all things are determined; 141. propter quod et idem est bono pulchrum, quoniam bonum et pulchrum secundum omnem causam cuncta desiderant et non est aliquid existentium quod non participet pulchro et bono; audebit autem et hoc dicere sermo, quod et non-existens participat pulchro et bono; tunc enim et ipsum pulchrum et bonum, quando in Deo secundum omnium ablationem supersubstantialiter laudatur. 141. on account of which also the beautiful is the same as the good, because all things desire the good and the beautiful according to every cause and there is not anything of existing things that does not participate the beautiful and the good; yet the speech shall dare also to say this: that even non-existing participates the beautiful and the good; for then also this beautiful and good, when in God according to the removal of all things, is supersubstantially praised. 333. Postquam Dionysius tractavit de lumine, nunc agit de pulchro, ad cuius intellectum praeexigitur lumen; et circa hoc, duo facit, 333. After Denys has treated of light, now he treats of the beautiful, for the understanding of which light is prerequisite; and about this, he does two things: primo: praemittit quod pulchrum attribuitur Deo; first, he sets out that the beautiful is attributed to God; secundo, ostendit modum quo ei attribuitur; ibi: pulchrum autem etc. second, he shows the mode in which it is attributed to him, at yet beautiful as most beautiful. 334. Dicit ergo, primo, quod hoc supersubstantiale bonum quod est Deus laudatur a sanctis theologis in sacra Scriptura sicut pulchrum; Cant. I: ecce tu pulcher es, dilecte mi; et sicut pulchritudo; Psalm. 95: confessio et pulchritudo in conspectu eius; et sicut dilectio: I Ioan. 4: Deus caritas est, et sicut diligibile, ut in auctoritate canticorum inducta; et quaecumque aliae sunt convenientes Dei nominationes, ad pulchritudinem pertinentes: sive per causalitatem pulchritudinis, quod dicit propter pulchrum et pulchritudinem; sive secundum quod pulchritudo gratiose habetur, quod dicit propter dilectionem et diligibile. 334. Therefore he says, first, that this supersubstantial good which is God is praised by the holy theologians in Sacred Scripture as beautiful: lo you are beautiful, my beloved (Song 1:14); and as beauty: confession and beauty in your countenance (Ps. 95:6); and as love: God is charity (1 John 4:8); and as lovable, as introduced in the authority of the canticles; and whatever others are befitting namings of God, pertaining to beauty: whether through the causality of beauty, which he says on account of the beautiful and beauty; or according as beauty is had graciously, which he says on account of love and the lovable. 335. Deinde, cum dicit: pulchrum autem etc., ostendit quomodo Deo attribuitur; et circa hoc, tria facit: 335. Then when he says, yet beautiful as most beautiful, he shows how it is attributed to God; and about this, he does three things: primo, praemittit quod differenter attribuitur Deo et creaturis pulchrum et pulchritudo; first, he sets out that beautiful and beauty are attributed differently to God and to creatures; secundo, quomodo attribuitur creaturis; ibi: haec enim etc.; second, how it is attributed to creatures, at for these in existing things; tertio, quomodo attribuitur Deo; ibi: supersubstantiale etc. third, how it is attributed to God, at whereas the supersubstantial beautiful. 336. Dicit ergo primo quod in causa prima, scilicet Deo non sunt dividenda pulchrum et pulchritudo, quasi aliud sit in eo pulchrum et pulchritudo; et hoc ideo quia causa prima propter sui simplicitatem et perfectionem sola comprehendit tota, idest omnia in uno, unde etsi in creaturis differant pulchrum et pulchritudo, Deus tamen utrumque comprehendit in se, secundum unum et idem. 336. Therefore he says, first, that in the first cause, namely God, beautiful and beauty must not be divided, as though beautiful and beauty were other in it; and this because the first cause alone on account of its simplicity and perfection comprehends the whole of things, that is, all things, in one, whence although in creatures beautiful and beauty differ, nevertheless in God he comprehends both in himself according to one and the same thing. 337. Deinde, cum dicit: haec enim etc., ostendit qualiter attribuuntur creaturis; et dicit quod in existentibus, pulchrum et pulchritudo distinguuntur secundum participans et participatum ita quod pulchrum dicitur hoc quod participat pulchritudinem; pulchritudo autem participatio primae causae quae omnia pulchra facit: pulchritudo enim creaturae nihil est aliud quam similitudo divinae pulchritudinis in rebus participata. 337. Then when he says, for these in existing things, he shows how they are attributed to creatures; and he says that in existing things, beautiful and beauty are distinguished according to participating and participated, such that beautiful is said for that which participates beauty; yet beauty for the participation of the first cause that makes all things beautiful: for the beauty of a creature is nothing other than a likeness of the divine beauty participated in things. 338. Deinde, cum dicit: supersubstantiale etc., ostendit quomodo praedicta Deo attribuantur: 338. Then when he says, whereas the supersubstantial beautiful, he shows how the aforementioned are attributed to God: et primo, quomodo attribuatur ei pulchritudo; and first, how beauty is attributed to him; secundo, quomodo attribuatur ei pulchrum; ibi: pulchrum autem etc. second, how beautiful is attributed to him, at yet beautiful as most beautiful. 339. Dicit ergo primo quod Deus qui est supersubstantiale pulchrum, dicitur pulchritudo propter hoc quod omnibus entibus creatis dat pulchritudinem, secundum proprietatem uniuscuiusque: alia enim est pulchritudo spiritus et alia corporis, atque alia huius et illius corporis. Et in quo consistat pulchritudinis ratio, ostendit subdens quod sic Deus tradit pulchritudinem, inquantum est causa consonantiae et claritatis in omnibus: sic enim hominem pulchrum dicimus, propter decentem proportionem in quantitate et situ et propter hoc quod habet clarum et nitidum colorem. Unde proportionaliter est in caeteris accipiendum, quod unumquodque dicitur pulchrum, secundum quod habet claritatem sui generis vel spiritualem vel corporalem et secundum quod est in debita proportione constitutum. 339. Therefore he says, first, that God who is the supersubstantial beautiful, is called beauty because he gives beauty to all created beings, according to the propriety of each: for beauty of spirit is one thing and beauty of the body another, and the beauty of this body is one thing and of that body another. And he shows in what the ratio of beauty consists, adding that God so hands on beauty, inasmuch as he is the cause of the consonance and clarity in all things: for thus we call a man beautiful, on account of seemly proportion in quantity and position and on account of the fact that he has clear and shining color. Whence it must be received proportionally in the rest of things, that each is called beautiful according as it has clarity of its kind, whether spiritual or bodily, and according as it is constituted in due proportion. 340. Quomodo autem Deus sit causa claritatis, ostendit subdens, quod Deus immittit omnibus creaturis, cum quodam fulgore, traditionem sui radii luminosi, qui est fons omnis luminis; quae quidem traditiones fulgidae divini radii, secundum participationem similitudinis sunt intelligendae et istae traditiones sunt pulchrificae, idest facientes pulchritudinem in rebus. Rursus exponit aliud membrum, scilicet quod Deus sit causa consonantiae in rebus; est autem duplex consonantia in rebus: prima quidem, secundum ordinem creaturarum ad Deum et hanc tangit cum dicit quod Deus est causa consonantiae, sicut vocans omnia ad seipsum, inquantum convertit omnia ad seipsum sicut ad finem, ut supra dictum est et propter hoc pulchritudo in Graeco callos dicitur quod est a vocando sumptum; secunda autem consonantia est in rebus, secundum ordinationem earum ad invicem; et hoc tangit cum subdit, quod congregat omnia in omnibus, ad idem. Et potest hoc intelligi, secundum sententiam Platonicorum, quod superiora sunt in inferioribus, secundum participationem; inferiora vero sunt in superioribus, per excellentiam quamdam et sic omnia sunt in omnibus; et ex hoc quod omnia in omnibus inveniuntur ordine quodam, sequitur quod omnia ad idem ultimum ordinentur. 340. Yet he shows how God is the cause of clarity, adding that God sends into all creatures, with a certain radiance, the handing on of his own luminous ray, which is the font of all light; which radiant handings on indeed of the divine ray, must be understood according to the participation of likeness, and those handings on are beautifying, that is, making beauty in things. Again he expounds another member, namely that God is the cause of consonance in things; yet there is a twofold consonance in things: first of all, according to the order of creatures to God, and he touches on this when he says that God is the cause of consonance, as calling all things to itself, inasmuch as he converts all things to himself as to an end, as has been said above, and on account of this beauty in Greek is called kalos, which is taken from calling; yet there is a second consonance in things, according to their ordering to one another; and he touches on this when he adds that he gathers all things in all things, unto the same. And this can be understood, according to the opinion of the Platonists, such that superior things are in inferiors according to participation, whereas inferiors are in superiors through a certain excellence, and thus all things are in all things; and from the fact that all things are found in all things by a certain order, it follows that all things are ordered to the same ultimate thing. 341. Deinde, cum dicit: pulchrum autem etc., ostendit quomodo pulchrum de Deo dicitur; 341. Then when he says, yet beautiful as most beautiful, he shows how beautiful is said of God; et primo ostendit quod dicitur secundum excessum; and first he shows that it is said according to excess; secundo, quod dicitur per causam; ibi: ex pulchro isto etc. second, that it is said through cause, at from that beautiful, for all existing things. 342. Circa primum, duo facit: 342. About the first, he does two things: primo, proponit excessum; first, he proposes excess; secundo, exponit; ibi: et semper existens etc. second, he expounds it, at and always existing according to the same things. 343. Excessus autem est duplex: unus in genere, qui significatur per comparativum vel superlativum; alius extra genus, qui significatur per additionem huius praepositionis: super; puta, si dicamus quod ignis excedit in calore excessu in genere, unde dicitur calidissimus; sol autem excedit excessu extra genus, unde non dicitur calidissimus sed supercalidus, quia calor non est in eo, eodem modo, sed excellentiori. Et licet iste duplex excessus in rebus causatis non simul conveniat, tamen in Deo simul dicitur et quod est pulcherrimus et superpulcher; non quod sit in genere, sed quod ei attribuuntur omnia quae sunt cuiuscumque generis. 343. Yet excess is twofold: one in the genus, which is signified through the comparative or the superlative; the other outside the genus, which is signified through the addition of this preposition: super; for example, if we should say that fire exceeds in heat by excess in the genus, whence it is called hottest; yet the sun exceeds by excess outside the genus, whence it is not called hottest but super-hot, because heat is not in it, in the same mode, but more excellently. And although this twofold excess does not come together simultaneously in things caused, nevertheless in God is it said simultaneously that he is both most beautiful and super-beautiful; not that he is in the genus, but that all things that are of whatever genus are attributed to him. 344. Deinde, cum dicit: et semper existens etc., exponit quod dixerat; 344. Then when he says, and always existing according to the same things, he expounds what he had said; et primo, exponit quare Deus dicatur pulcherrimus; and first, he expounds why God is called most beautiful;