Secundo, quantum ad hoc quod omnia existentia continentur sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune continetur sub eius virtute, quia virtus divina plus extenditur quam ipsum esse creatum; et hoc est quod dicit, quod esse commune est in ipso Deo sicut contentum in continente et non e converso ipse Deus est in eo quod est esse. Second, as regards the fact that all existing things are contained under common being itself, yet God is not, but rather common being is contained under his virtue, because the divine virtue is extended more than created being itself; and this is what he says: that common being is in God himself as the contained in the containing and not conversely is God himself in that which is being. Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod omnia alia existentia participant eo quod est esse, non autem Deus, sed magis ipsum esse creatum est quaedam participatio Dei et similitudo ipsius; et hoc est quod dicit quod esse commune habet ipsum scilicet Deum, ut participans similitudinem eius, non autem ipse Deus habet esse, quasi participans ipso esse. Et ex hoc patet quod ipse Deus est ipsius esse creati aevum et duratio eius, hoc est durationis ratio et est etiam principium eius et mensura; ita tamen quod ipse est existens ante omnem substantiam et ante omne ens et ante omne aevum et non solum est ante, duratione vel ordine, sed etiam causalitate, quia est omnium substantificator, sicut causa subsistendi omnibus, est principium essendi omnibus et medietas, secundum quod duratio et processus omnium est ab eo et est etiam finis in quem omnia tendunt. Third, as regards the fact that all other existing things participate that which is being, yet God does not, but rather created being itself is a certain participation of God and a likeness of him; and this is what he says: that common being has this, namely God, as participating his likeness, yet God himself does not have being, as though participating being itself. And from this it is clear that God himself is the aevum of created being itself and its duration (this is the ratio of duration) and is also its principle and measure; nevertheless such that he is existing before every substance and before every being and before every aevum, and not only is he before by duration and order, but also by causality, because he is the substantifier of all things, as the cause of subsisting for all things, is the principle of being for all things, and the middle, according as the duration and procession of all things is from him, and he is also the end to which all things tend. 661. Deinde, cum dicit: propter hoc etc., infert conclusionem ex dictis; et dicit quod, propter hoc quod Deus est principium omnibus, in sacra Scriptura ipse Deus qui vere praeexistit omnibus, multipliciter laudatur secundum omnem rationem existentium. Dicitur enim de eo, quod erat et est et futurus est, per quod intelligitur quod factum est, idest praeteritum et quod fit, idest praesens et quod fiet, idest futurum. 661. Then when he says, and on account of this, from the eloquences, he infers a conclusion from the things said; and he says that, on account of this: that God is the principle of all things, in Sacred Scripture God himself who truly preexists all things is praised in many ways according to every ratio of existing things. For there is said of him what was and is and shall be, through which there is understood what has been made, that is, the past; and what is made, that is, the present; and what shall be made, that is, the future. Quod quidem non est intelligendum quasi esse divinum subiaceat tempori, sed per hoc significatur his qui possunt intelligere divina, ut decet secundum Deum, quod omne esse, secundum quamcumque rationem essendi, supersubstantialiter existit in eo, qui omnium existentium est causa: non enim esse suum est finitum per aliquam naturam determinatam ad genus vel speciem, ut possit dici, quod est hoc et non est illud, ut sunt determinatae etiam substantiae spirituales; neque etiam per locum, ut possit dici quod est hic et non est ibi, sicut accidit in corporibus, sed ipse quasi omnium causa est omnia, idest omne esse in se praehabet et in ipso comprehenduntur et praehabentur principia omnium entium et fines; non tamen eodem modo sicut in ipsis rebus, sed ipse est super omnia, sicut ante omnia supereminenter existens. Which indeed must not be understood as though the divine being should be subject to time, but through this there is signified, for those who can understand divine things, that it is befits according to God, that every being, according to whatever ratio of being, supersubstantially exists in him, who is the cause of all existing things: for his being is not finite through any nature determined to genus or species, so that it should be able to be said that he is this and is not that, as are even spiritual determinate substances; nor also through place, so that it should be able to be said that he is here and is not there, as happens in bodies, but he is all things as the cause of all things, that is, he prepossesses every being in himself, and in him there are comprehended and prepossessed the principles of all beings and ends; nevertheless not in the same mode as in things themselves, but he is above all things, supereminently existing before all things. Et quia in ipso, quodammodo, sunt omnia, quasi in se omnia comprehendente, simul de ipso omnia praedicantur et simul ab ipso omnia removentur, quia nihil est omnium, sed super omnia; sicut dicitur quod ipse est omnis figurae, inquantum omnes in ipso praeexistunt et tamen est sine figura, quia non habet esse ad modum rerum figuratarum; et eadem ratione est omnis pulchritudinis et tamen sine pulchritudine, inquantum scilicet ipse in seipso incomprehensibiliter et excellenter praeaccipit principia, media et fines, non secundum aliquam corruptionem, sed ex hoc quod ipse secundum unitatem unam, omnibus esse infundit, superlucendo eis absque sui maculatione: non enim est alterans alteratum, sicut in corporibus accidit. And because in him, in a certain way, are all things, as though comprehending all things in himself, simultaneously all things are predicated of him and simultaneously all things are removed from him, because he is nothing of all things, but above all things; as it is said that he is of every figure, inasmuch as all preexist in him, and nevertheless he is without figure, because he does not have that he should be figured unto the mode of things; and by the same ratio he is of every beauty and nevertheless without beauty, namely inasmuch as he pre-receives in himself incomprehensibly and excellently principles, middles, and ends, not according to any corruption, but from the fact that he, according to one unity, pours being into all things, by super-shining upon them without stain of himself: for altering he is not altered, as happens in bodies. 662. Deinde, cum dicit: si enim noster sol etc., manifestat quod dixerat per exemplum sensibile; et dicit quod noster sensibilis sol, unus existens et uniformiter lumen infundendo omnibus, omnia sensibilia et quantum ad substantias et quantum ad qualitates, renovat, quibusdam corruptis alia de novo generando, sicut in plantis et in vitibus ex gelu percussis apparet; et nutrit omnia viventia; et custodit, idest conservat universaliter omnia, tam viventia quam non viventia; et perficit, idest ad vitam et debitam perfectionem adducit; et discernit, idest distinguit sensibilium diversitatem; et unit, ex multis unum constituendo; et plantas hieme per frigus exsiccatas reflorere facit, etiam infra tecta conclusas et facit eas germinare, et eius virtute generantur plantae et animalia; et commutat ea quae commutantur in rerum natura; et collocat, idest firmiter esse et convalescere facit unumquodque in suo loco vel etiam in suis principiis; iterum, ex planta facit prodire fructus et semina et alias plantas; et sursum movet alimentum a radice plantarum ad summitates ipsarum; et vivificat omnia quae vivunt; et unumquodque omnium naturalium corporum, secundum suam proprietatem, participat virtutem unius et eiusdem solis. 662. Then when he says, for if our sun, he manifests what he had said through a sensible example; and he says that our sensible sun, existing as one and uniformly, light by infusing all things, all sensible things both as regards substances and as regards qualities, it renews, by generating other things anew when certain things have corrupted, as is apparent in plants and in vines stricken by frost; and nourishes all living things; and guards, that is, conserves all things universally, both living and non-living; and perfects, that is, leads to life and due perfection; and discerns, that is, distinguishes the diversity of sensible things; and unites, by establishing one from many; and makes plants in the winter dried up through cold to flourish again, even enclosed under covers, and makes them to seed, and by its virtue plants and animals are generated; and changes those things that are changed in the nature of things; and gathers, that is, makes each thing firmly to be and to thrive in its place or even in its principles; again, from plants it makes to go forth fruits and seeds and other plants; and moves food upwards from the root of the plants to their heights; and vivifies all things that live; and each of all natural bodies, according to its propriety, participates the virtue of one and the same sun. Ex quo patet, quod unus et idem sol in seipso causaliter praeaccepit uniformiter, idest secundum suam virtutem, ea quae a diversis participantur: non enim effectus participarent causam, nisi causa in se praehaberet causaliter ea quae sunt effectuum. From which it is clear that one and the same sun in itself causally pre-receives uniformly, that is, according to its virtue, those things that are participated by diverse things: for effects would not participate a cause, unless the cause were to prepossess in itself causally those things that are effects. Eadem autem est proportio causae particularis ad suos particulares effectus et causae universalis ad suos; quinimmo plus influit causa universalis ad suos effectus, quam causa particularis. Si igitur in sole secundum unam eius virtutem praeexistunt uniformiter omnes eius effectus, multo magis in Deo, qui est causa et ipsius solis et omnium existentium, concedendum est quod praeexistant exemplares rationes omnium entium secundum unitatem supersubstantialem, quae scilicet omnino substantiarum unitates excedit. Sic enim omnia praeexistunt in Deo, sicut ipse omnium est productivus; producit autem omnes substantias secundum virtutem quae excedit substantias omnes; unde sequitur quod omnia in Deo praeexistant, secundum virtutem substantialiter unam. Yet the proportion of a particular cause to its particular effects is the same as that of a universal cause to its effects; nay rather, a universal cause influences its effects more than a particular cause. If therefore in the sun according to its one virtue there preexist uniformly all its effects, much more in God, who is the cause both of this sun and of all existing things, must it be conceded that the exemplar rationes of all beings preexist according to a supersubstantial unity, namely which altogether exceeds the unities of substances. For thus all things preexist in God, as he is productive of all things; yet he produces all substances according to a virtue that exceeds all substances; whence it follows that all things preexist in God, according to a virtue substantially one. Lectio 3 Lectio 3 De exemplaribus On Exemplars 282. Exemplaria autem esse dicimus in Deo existentium rationes substantificas, et singulariter praeexistentes, quas Theologia praediffinitiones vocat et divinas et bonas voluntates, existentium praedeterminativas et effectivas, secundum quas substantialis essentia omnia praediffinivit et produxit. –282. Yet we say that exemplars are the substantifying rationes of existing things in God, and singularly preexisting, which theology calls predefinitions and divine and good wills, pre-determinative of existing things and effective, according to which substantial essence has predefined and produced all things (Rom 8:29–30, 1 Cor 2:7, Eph 1:5). § 9. 283. Si autem philosophus Clemens probat et ad aliquid exemplaria dici in existentibus principaliora, procedit quidem non per propria et perfecta et simplicia nomina, sermo ille. Concedentibus autem et hoc recte dici, memoranda est theologia, dicens quod non demonstrabo tibi illa ut eas post illa, sed ut per istorum proportionalem cognitionem, ad omnium causam, sicut possumus, sursum agamur. § 9. 283. Yet if the philosopher Clement proves that also to anything the more principal among existing things are called exemplars, that speech proceeds indeed not through proper and perfect and simple names. Yet even those conceding that this is said rightly must remember theology, saying that I shall not demonstrate to you those so that you might go after them, but so that through the proportional knowledge of them we might be driven upwards, as we can, to the cause of all things (Wis 13:5, Rom 1:20) . 284. Igitur, omnia existentia ipsi secundum unam omnium segregatam unitionem sunt attribuenda; quoniam ab essentia substantificae processionis et bonitatis incipiens et per omnia vadens et omnia ex ipsa essentia implens et in omnibus existentibus exultans, omnia quidem in seipsa praehabet secundum unum simplicitatis excessum, omnem duplicitatem refutans; omnia autem eodem modo continet, secundum supersimplificatam ipsius infinitatem et ab omnibus singulariter participatur, quemadmodum et vox una existens et eadem, a multis audientibus sicut una participatur. Omnium igitur existentium est principium et finis qui praeexistit: principium quidem sicut causa; finis autem sicut cuius gratia et terminus omnium et infinitas omnis infinitatis et finis, excedenter, sicut oppositorum. In uno enim, sicut multoties dictum est, existentia omnia et praehabet et subsistere facit, praesens omnibus et ubique et secundum unum et idem et secundum idem omne et ad omnia procedens et manens in seipso et stans et motus et neque stans neque motus neque principium habens aut medium aut finem neque in aliquo existentium neque aliquid existentium existens; et neque totaliter ipsi convenit aliquid aeternaliter existentium aut temporaliter subsistentium, sed et a tempore et aevo et his quae sunt in aevo et his quae sunt in tempore omnibus segregatur. Propter quod et ipsum aevum et existentia et mensurae existentium et mensurata per ipsum et ab ipso. 284. Therefore all existing things must be attributed to him according to one segregated unition of all things; because beginning from the essence of substantifying procession and goodness and going through all things and fulfilling all things from essence itself and exulting in all existing things, he indeed prepossesses all things in himself according to one excess of simplicity, refuting every duplicity; yet he contains all things in the same mode, according to his super-simplifying infinity, and he is participated singularly by all things, in which way also voice existing as one and the same is participated by many hearers as one. Therefore he is the principle of all existing things and the end that preexists: principle indeed as cause; yet end as that for the sake of which and the term of all things and the infinity of every infinity and the end, exceedingly, as of opposites. For in one, as has been said many times, he both prepossesses all existing things and makes them to subsist, present to all things and everywhere and according to one and the same and according to every same and proceeding to all things and remaining in himself and standing and moved and neither standing nor moved nor having principle or middle or end nor in any of existing things nor existing as anything of existing things; and neither does anything of eternally existing things or of temporally subsisting things totally befit him, but from time and the aevum and those things that are in the aevum and all those that are in time he is segregated. On account of which also the aevum itself and existing things and the measures of existing things and things measured are through him and from him. 663. Postquam Dionysius ostendit Deum esse causam omnium entium secundum proprias naturas, hic determinat de exemplaribus rerum secundum quae, quaecumque res in propriis naturis productae esse videntur; et circa hoc, duo facit: 663. After Denys has shown that God is the cause of all beings according to their proper natures, here he determines about the exemplars of things according to which whatever things seem to be produced in their proper natures; and about this, he does two things: primo enim ostendit quae sunt rerum exemplaria; for first he shows what the exemplars of things are; secundo, excludit errorem; ibi: si autem etc. second, he excludes an error, at yet if the philosopher Clement. 664. Circa primum, considerandum est quod Platonici, ponentes Deum esse totius esse causam, quia credebant quod idem non posset esse causa plurium, secundum propria in quibus differunt, sed solum secundum id quod est omnibus commune, posuerunt quasdam secundas causas per quas res ad proprias naturas determinantur et quae communiter esse a Deo recipiunt et has causas exemplaria rerum vocabant, sicut exemplar hominis dicebant quemdam hominem separatum, qui esset causa humanitatis omnibus singularibus hominibus; et similiter de aliis. Sed Dionysius, sicut dixerat Deum esse causam totius esse communis, ita dixerat eum esse causam proprietatis uniuscuiusque, unde consequebatur quod in ipso Deo essent omnium entium exemplaria. 664. About the first, it must be considered that the Platonists, positing that God is the cause of the whole of being, because they believed that the same thing could not be the cause of many things according to their proprieties in which they differ, but only according to what is common to all, posited certain second causes through which things are determined to their proper natures and which commonly receive being from God, and they called these causes the exemplars of things, as they called a certain separate man the exemplar of man, which would be the cause of humanity for all singular men; and likewise concerning other things. But Denys, just as he had said that God is the cause of the whole of common being, so had said that he is the cause of the propriety of each thing, whence it followed that in God himself were the exemplars of all beings. 665. Quod quidem hoc modo intelligi oportet: Deus enim, etsi sit in essentia sua unus, tamen intelligendo suam unitatem et virtutem, cognoscit quidquid in eo virtualiter existit. Sic igitur cognoscit ex ipso posse procedere res diversas; huiusmodi igitur quae cognoscit ex se posse prodire rationes intellectae dicuntur. Non autem omnes huiusmodi rationes exemplaria dici possunt: exemplar enim est ad cuius imitationem fit aliud; non autem omnia quae scit Deus ex ipso posse prodire, vult in rerum natura producere; illae igitur solae rationes intellectae a Deo exemplaria dici possunt, ad quarum imitationem vult res in esse producere, sicut producit artifex artificiata ad imitationem formarum artis quas mente concepit, quae etiam artificialium exemplaria dici possunt. 665. Which indeed it is necessary should be understood in this way: for God, although he is one in his essence, nevertheless by understanding his unity and virtue, knows whatever exists in him virtually. And therefore he knows that diverse things can proceed from him; therefore things of this sort that he knows can go forth from himself are called understood rationes. Yet not all rationes of this sort can be called exemplars: for an exemplar is that unto the imitation of which another is made; yet not all things that God knows can go forth from himself, does he will to produce in the nature of things; therefore only those rationes understood by God can be called exemplars, unto whose imitation he wills to produce things in being, as an artist produces artefacts unto the imitation of the forms of art that he conceives by his mind, which also can be called exemplars of artificial things. 666. Hoc est ergo quod dicit, quod exemplaria dicimus esse non res aliquas extra Deum, sed in ipso intellectu divino quasdam existentium rationes intellectas, quae sunt substantiarum factivae, et praeexistunt in Deo singulariter, idest unite et non secundum aliquam diversitatem; et huiusmodi rationes sacra Scriptura vocat praediffinitiones sive praedestinationes, secundum illud Rom. 8: quos praedestinavit hos et vocavit et vocat etiam eas, divinas et bonas voluntates, secundum illud Psalm. 110: magna opera domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius. Quae quidem praediffinitiones et voluntates sunt distinctivae entium et effectivae ipsorum, quia et secundum huiusmodi rationes, supersubstantialis Dei essentia praedeterminavit et omnia produxit. 666. Therefore this is what he says: that we say that exemplars are not any things outside of God, but certain understood rationes of existing things in the divine intellect itself, which are factive of substances, and preexist in God singularly, that is, unitedly and not according to any diversity; and Sacred Scripture calls rationes of this sort predefinitions or predestinations, according to Romans 8:30: whom he has predestined, these he also has called, and he calls them also divine and good wills, according to Psalm 110:2: great are the works of the Lord, exquisite in all his wills. Which predefinitions and wills indeed are distinctive of beings and effective of them, because also according to rationes of this sort, the supersubstantial essence of God has predetermined and produced all things. 667. Deinde, cum dicit: si autem philosophus Clemens etc., excludit contrarium errorem ponentium exemplaria rerum esse quaedam suprema entia separata et imponit hunc errorem cuidam Clementi philosopho; et dicit quod si ille philosophus approbat quod quantum ad aliquid ea quae sunt principaliora in existentibus dicuntur inferiorum exemplaria, non procedit eius ratio per nomina propria et perfecta et simplicia: exemplar enim est secundum quod fit aliud ut sic exemplar imitetur; res autem non sunt factae ad hoc ut imitentur aliqua superiora entia, sed ad hoc quod in eis impleatur quod divina sapientia ordinavit; unde non sunt proprie rerum exemplaria, quaecumque rerum principalia. Similiter etiam non sunt perfecta exemplaria, cum et ipsa aliis exemplaribus indigeant. Non sunt etiam simplicia, quia sunt simul exemplaria et exemplata. 667. Then when he says, yet if the philosopher Clement, he excludes the contrary error of those positing that the exemplars of things are certain separated supreme beings, and he imputes this error to a certain philosopher Clement; and he says that if that philosopher approves that as regards anything those things that are more principal in existing things are called the exemplars of inferior things, his argument does not proceed through proper and perfect and simple names: for an exemplar is that according to which something else is made so that thus it might imitate the exemplar; yet things are not made unto this: that they should imitate some superior beings, but unto this: that there should be fulfilled in them what the divine wisdom has ordained; whence whatever principles of things are not properly the exemplars of things. Likewise also they are not perfect exemplars, since they also need other exemplars. They also are not simple, because they are simultaneously exemplars and exemplated. 668. Sed si et hoc concedatur quod hoc recte dici possit quod superiora sunt inferiorum exemplaria inquantum inferiora imitantur secundum quod possunt superiora, tamen commemoranda est sacrae Scripturae sententia quae dicit: non monstrabo tibi illa, scilicet superiora entia ut eas post illa, sed ut cognoscendo ista secundum nostram proportionem elevemur, prout possumus, ad cognoscendum omnium causam. 668. But if it also should be conceded that this rightly can be said: that superior things are the exemplars of inferior things inasmuch as inferior things imitate superior things according as they can, nevertheless there must be remembered the judgment of Sacred Scripture that says, I shall not show to you those, namely superior beings, so that you might go after them, but so that by knowing those we might be elevated according to our proportion, as we can, to knowing the cause of all things. Sic ergo concedi potest quod sunt exemplaria, non quidem ut eis finaliter conformemur, sed ut per eorum considerationem tendamus in Deum, cui conformari debemus. Sumitur autem sententia illa sacrae Scripturae, ex hoc quod dicitur Deuter. 4: ne forte (inquit) oculis elevatis ad coelum, videas solem et lunam et omnia astra coeli et errore deceptus adores ea. And therefore it can be conceded that they are exemplars, not indeed so that we might finally be conformed to them, but so that through the consideration of them we might tend to God, to whom we ought to be conformed. Yet that judgment of Sacred Scripture is taken from what is said in Deuteronomy 4:19: lest perhaps (it says), with eyes raised to heaven, you should see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven and, deceived by error, should adore them. 669. Deinde, cum dicit: igitur etc., epilogat quae supra dicta sunt, ostendens quomodo Deus habet universalem habitudinem ad omnia. Concludit ergo primo ex praemissis, quod omnia sunt ei attribuenda, non quidem secundum aliquam compositionem, sed secundum aliquam simplicem unitatem. Et hoc ideo quia ipse Deus incipit suam perfectionem aliis communicare ab ipsa processione essendi per quam res substantificantur et ab ipsa processione bonitatis; haec enim inveniuntur primo inter ea quae a Deo procedunt in creaturas: esse et bonum; posteriora enim his sunt vita et sapientia, et huiusmodi processio esse et bonitatis vadit per omnia entia, quia omnia sunt entia et bona, non omnia sunt viventia vel sapientia; et sic omnia implentur ex participatione ipsius esse et sic in omnibus existentibus exultat per quamdam existentiam. 669. Then when he says, therefore all existing things must be attributed to him, he offers an epilogue for the things that have been said above, showing how God has universal habitude for all things. Therefore he concludes first from the things set forth that all things must be attributed to him, not indeed according to any composition, but according to a simple unity. And this because God himself begins to communicate his perfection to other things from the very procession of being through which things are substantified and from the very procession of goodness; for these are found first among the things that proceed from God into creatures: being and the good; for life and wisdom are posterior to these, and a procession of being and of goodness of this sort goes through all beings, because all things are beings and good; not all things are living or wise; and thus all things are fulfilled from the participation of being itself, and thus in all existing things he exults through a certain existence. Quia igitur sic omnibus esse largitur divina essentia, omnia in seipsa praehabet, non quidem secundum aliquam compositionem, sed secundum simplicissimam unitatem, omnem pluralitatem refutans. Sic igitur prima universalis habitudo est quod essentia divina omnia in seipsa praehabet. Therefore because the divine essence so lavishes being upon all things, he prepossesses all things in himself, not indeed according to any composition, but according to a most simple unity, refuting every plurality. And therefore the first universal habitude is that the divine essence prepossesses all things in itself. 670. Secunda est quod omnia in esse continet et conservat secundum simplicem sui infinitam unitatem. 670. The second is that it contains and conserves all things in being according to its simple infinite unity. 671. Tertia universalis habitudo est quod singularis et una existens participatur ab omnibus, sicut et vox, una et eadem existens, participatur a multis audientibus: est enim vox una secundum principium, multiplex vero secundum diffusionem. 671. The third universal habitude is that existing as singular and one it is participated by all things, as also voice, existing as one and the same, is participated by many hearers: for voice is one according to principle, whereas manifold according to diffusion. 672. Ex his autem concludit quartam universalem habitudinem scilicet quod divina essentia est principium omnium existentium et finis non quidem quod per existentia generetur, sicut sanitas generatur per medicinam, sed sicut qui existentibus praeexistit: principium quidem est omnium, sicut causa factiva rerum; finis vero sicut cuius gratia fiunt omnia; et ipse est etiam terminus omnium: cuiuslibet enim motus terminatio est ad divinam essentiam et ab ipsius infinitate derivatur omnis infinitas et omnis finis sicut a causa excedente quae producit opposita; quia neutri appropriatur tamquam ad unum eorum limitata. 672. Yet from these things he concludes a fourth universal habitude, namely that the divine essence is the principle and end of all existing things, not indeed that it should be generated through existing things, as health is generated through medicine, but as him who preexists existing things: the principle indeed of all things, as the cause factive of things; whereas the end as that for the sake of which all things are made; and he is also the term of all things: for the termination of whatever motion is unto the divine essence and from its infinity there is derived every infinity and every end as from an exceeding cause that produces opposites; because to neither is it appropriated as limited to one of them. Ratio quare potest esse omnium causa est ista: quia omnia existentia praehabet in sui unitate; et quia ex eo quod habet unumquodque et causat aliquid ad similitudinem sui, sequitur quod ille qui in se habet omnia, subsistere facit omnia, praesens omnibus rebus et ubique, non secundum diversas sui partes, sed secundum unum et idem et secundum idem est omnia, inquantum in sua simplici essentia, omnia virtualiter praeexistunt; et similiter secundum idem procedit ad omnia causative et tamen manet in seipso, immutabilis existens in causando et stans est inquantum non mutatur et motus inquantum diffundit ad alia sui similitudinem. The reason why he can be the cause of all things is this: because he prepossesses all existing things in his unity; and because from the fact that he has each thing and causes something unto his likeness, it follows that he who has all things in himself makes all things to subsist, present to all things and everywhere, not according to diverse parts of himself, but according to one and the same and according to the same he is all things, inasmuch as in his simple essence all things virtually preexist; and likewise according to the same he proceeds to all things causatively and nevertheless he remains in himself, existing as immutable in causing, and he is standing inasmuch as he is not changed and moved inasmuch as he diffuses his likeness to other things. 673. Et omnia ista quae de Deo affirmamus, possunt etiam ab eo negari, quia non ita conveniunt ei sicut inveniuntur in rebus creatis et sicut intelliguntur a nobis et significantur. 673. And all those things that we affirm of God can also be denied of him, because they do not so befit him as they are found in created things and as they are understood and signified by us. Unde, licet bene dictum sit quod sit principium omnium et finis, tamen neque habet principium neque medium, neque finem. Whence, although it has been well said that he is the principle and end of all things, nevertheless he has neither principle nor middle nor end. Et licet dictum sit quod est praesens omnibus et ubique, tamen non est in aliquo existentium, eo modo quo unum creatum dicitur esse in alio. And although it has been said that he is present to all things and everywhere, nevertheless he is not in any of existing things in that mode in which one created thing is said to be in another. Et licet dictum sit, quod ipse est omne existens, non tamen est aliquid existens de numero existentium creatorum. And although it has been said that he is every existing thing, nevertheless he is not anything existing from the number of existing creatures. Et universaliter non convenit ei aliquid de numero creatorum vel existentium aeternaliter, idest supra tempus vel etiam subsistentium temporaliter, sed separatur per quamdam eminentiam et a tempore quod mensurat motum et mutabilia et ab aevo quod mensurat ipsum esse et ea quae existunt immutabiliter; et etiam separatur ab his quae sunt in aevo et tempore per eminentiam quamdam. Et ideo ipsum aevum et ea quae sunt et quaecumque aliae mensurae entium et ea quae huiusmodi mensuris mensurantur, sunt per ipsum, quia similitudinem eius habent sicut primi exemplaris et ab ipso, sicut a primo activo principio. And universally anything from the number of creatures or of eternally existing things, that is, above time, or also of temporally subsisting things, does not befit him, but he is separated through a certain eminence both from time which measures motion and mutable things and from the aevum that measures being itself and those things that exist immutably; and he is also separated from those things that are in the aevum and time through a certain eminence. And for this reason the aevum itself and those things that are and whatever other measures of beings and those things that are measured by measures of this sort, are through him, because they have the likeness of him as of a first exemplar, and from him as from a first active principle. Caput 6 Chapter 6 De vita On Life Lectio 1 Lectio 1