Viso igitur quid significetur nomine essentiae in substantiis compositis, videndum est quomodo se habeat ad rationem generis speciei et differentiae. Quia autem id cui convenit ratio generis vel speciei vel differentiae praedicatur de hoc singulari signato, impossibile est quod ratio universalis, scilicet generis vel speciei, conveniat essentiae secundum quod per modum partis significatur, ut nomine humanitatis vel animalitatis; et ideo dicit Avicenna quod rationalitas non est differentia sed differentiae principium; et eadem ratione humanitas non est species, nec animalitas genus. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae secundum quod est quaedam res exsistens extra singularia, ut Platonici ponebant, quia sic genus et species non praedicarentur de hoc individuo; non enim potest dici quod Socrates sit hoc quod ab eo separatum est, nec iterum illud separatum proficeret in cognitionem huius singularis. Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae secundum quod significatur per modum totius, ut nomine hominis vel animalis, prout implicite et indistincte continet totum hoc quod in individuo est. Having seen what the term ‘essence’ signifies in composite substances, we ought next to see how essence is related to the logical intentions of genus, species, and difference. Since that to which the intentions of genus or species or difference is appropriate is predicated of this signate singular, it is impossible that a universal intention, like that of the species or genus, should be appropriate to the essence if the genus or species is signified as a part, as in the term ‘humanity’ or ‘animality.’ Thus, Avicenna says (Metaphysics 5.6) that rationality is not the difference but the principle of the difference. For the same reason, humanity is not a species, and animality is not a genus. Similarly, we cannot say that the intention of species or genus is appropriate to the essence as to a certain thing existing beyond singulars, as the Platonists used to suppose, for then the species and the genus would not be predicated of an individual: we surely cannot say that Socrates is something that is separated from him, nor would that separate thing advance our knowledge of this singular thing. And so it remains that the intention of genus or species is appropriate to the essence as the essence is signified as a whole, as the term ‘man’ or ‘animal’ implicitly and indistinctly contains the whole of what is in the individual. Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum rationem propriam, et haec est absoluta consideratio ipsius: et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi secundum quod huiusmodi; unde quicquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa est attributio. Verbi gratia homini in eo quod est homo convenit rationale et animal et alia quae in diffinitione eius cadunt; album vero aut nigrum, vel quicquid huiusmodi quod non est de ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini in eo quod homo. Unde si quaeratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis, et utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de intellectu eius, nunquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Socrate. Similiter si unitas esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem Socratis et Platonis nec posset in pluribus plurificari. Alio modo consideratur secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo: et sic de ipsa aliquid praedicatur per accidens ratione eius in quo est, sicut dicitur quod homo est albus quia Socrates est albus, quamvis hoc non conveniat homini in eo quod homo. The nature, however, or the essence thus understood can be considered in two ways. First, we can consider it according to its proper notion, and this is to consider it absolutely. In this way, nothing is true of the essence except what pertains to it absolutely: thus everything else that may be attributed to it will be attributed falsely. For example, to man, in that by which he is man, pertains animal and rational and the other things that fall in his definition; white or black or whatever else of this kind that is not in the notion of humanity does not pertain to man in that by which he is a man. Hence, if it is asked whether this nature, considered in this way, can be said to be one or many, we should concede neither alternative, for both are beyond the concept of humanity, and either may befall the conception of man. If plurality were in the concept of this nature, it could never be one, but nevertheless it is one as it exists in Socrates. Similarly, if unity were in the notion of this nature, then it would be one and the same in Socrates and Plato, and it could not be made many in many individuals. Second, we can also consider the existence the essence has in this thing or in that: in this way something can be predicated of the essence accidentally by reason of what the essence is in, as when we say that man is white because Socrates is white, although this does not pertain to man in that by which he is man. Haec autem natura duplex habet esse: unum in singularibus et aliud in anima, et secundum utrumque consequuntur dictam naturam accidentia; in singularibus etiam habet multiplex esse secundum singularium diversitatem. Et tamen ipsi naturae secundum suam primam considerationem, scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur. Falsum enim est dicere quod essentia hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat esse in hoc singulari, quia si esse in hoc singulari conveniret homini in quantum est homo, nunquam esset extra hoc singulare; similiter etiam si conveniret homini in quantum est homo non esse in hoc singulari, nunquam esset in eo: sed verum est dicere quod homo, non in quantum est homo, habet quod sit in hoc singulari vel in illo aut in anima. Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius eorum. Et haec natura sic considerata est quae praedicatur de individuis omnibus. The nature considered in this way, however, has a double existence. On the one hand, it exists in singulars, and, on the other hand, it exists in the soul, and from each of these the nature acquires certain accidents. In singulars, furthermore, the essence has a multiple existence according to the multiplicity of singulars. Nevertheless, if we consider the essence in the first, or absolute, sense, none of these pertain to the essence. For it is false to say that the essence of man, considered absolutely, has existence in this singular, because if existence in this singular pertained to man insofar as he is man, man would never exist outside this singular. Similarly, if it pertained to man insofar as he is man not to exist in this singular, then the essence would never exist in the singular. But it is true to say that man, but not insofar as he is man, has whatever may be in this singular or in that one, or else in the soul. Therefore, the nature of man considered absolutely abstracts from every existence, though it does not exclude the existence of anything either. And the nature thus considered is the one predicated of each individual. Non tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis conveniat naturae sic acceptae, quia de ratione universalis est unitas et communitas; naturae autem humanae neutrum horum convenit secundum absolutam suam considerationem. Si enim communitas esset de intellectu hominis, tunc in quocumque inveniretur humanitas inveniretur communitas; et hoc falsum est, quia in Socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, sed quicquid est in eo est individuatum. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum esse quod habet in individuis, quia non invenitur in individuis natura humana secundum unitatem ut sit unum quid omnibus conveniens, quod ratio universalis exigit. Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu. Nevertheless, the nature understood in this way is not a universal notion, because unity and commonality belong to the notion of a universal, but to human nature, considered absolutely, neither of these belong. For if commonality were in the concept of man, then in whatever humanity were found, there would be found commonality, and this is false, because no commonality is found in Socrates, but rather whatever is in him is individuated. Similarly, the notion of genus or species does not pertain to human nature because of the existence that that nature has in individuals, for human nature is not found in individuals with a unity that it will be one thing in all the individuals, which the notion of a universal demands. It remains, therefore, that the notion of species pertains to human nature according to the existence human nature has in the intellect. Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab omnibus individuantibus; et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia individua quae sunt extra animam, prout aequaliter est similitudo omnium et ducens in omnium cognitionem in quantum sunt homines. Et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad omnia individua, intellectus adinvenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi; unde dicit Commentator in principio de Anima quod intellectus est qui agit in rebus universalitatem; hoc etiam Avicenna dicit in sua Metaphysica. Et quamvis haec natura intellecta habeat rationem universalis secundum quod comparatur ad res extra animam, quia est una similitudo omnium, tamen secundum quod habet esse in hoc intellectu vel in illo est quaedam species intellecta particularis. Et ideo patet defectus Commentatoris in III de Anima, qui voluit ex universalitate formae intellectae unitatem intellectus in omnibus hominibus concludere; quia non est universalitas illius formae secundum hoc esse quod habet in intellectu, sed secundum quod refertur ad res ut similitudo rerum; sicut etiam si esset una statua corporalis repraesentans multos homines, constat quod illa imago vel species statuae haberet esse singulare et proprium secundum quod esset in hac materia, sed haberet rationem communitatis secundum quod esset commune repraesentativum plurium. Human nature in the intellect has existence abstracted from everything that individuates, and thus it is related uniformly to all individuals that exist outside the soul, as it is equally a likeness of all of them, and it leads to knowledge of all of them insofar as they are men. Since the nature in the intellect has this relation to each individual, the intellect invents the notion of species and attributes it to the nature. Hence, the Commentator, in de Anima 1, com. 8, says that the intellect is what makes universality in things; and Avicenna says the same in his Metaphysics 5.2. Although this nature understood in the intellect has the notion of a universal in relation to things outside the soul (because it is one likeness of them all), as the nature has existence in this intellect or in that one, it is a certain particular understood species. The Commentator, therefore, is in error in de Anima 3, com. 5, when he wants to infer the unity of intellect in all men from the universality of the understood form, because the universality of the form does not arise from the existence the form has in the intellect but rather from its relation to things as a likeness of them. It is as if there were a corporeal statue representing many men; that image or species of statue would have a singular and proper existence insofar as it exists in this matter, but it would have the character of commonality insofar as it was a common representative of many men. Et quia naturae humanae secundum suam absolutam considerationem convenit quod praedicetur de Socrate, et ratio speciei non convenit sibi secundum suam absolutam considerationem sed est de accidentibus quae consequuntur eam secundum esse quod habet in intellectu, ideo nomen speciei non praedicatur de Socrate ut dicatur Socrates est species: quod de necessitate accideret si ratio speciei conveniret homini secundum esse quod habet in Socrate, vel secundum suam considerationem absolutam, scilicet in quantum est homo; quicquid enim convenit homini in quantum est homo praedicatur de Socrate. Since human nature, considered absolutely, is properly predicated of Socrates, and since the notion of species does not pertain to human nature considered absolutely but only accidentally because of the existence the nature has in the intellect, the term ‘species’ is not predicated of Socrates, for we do not say that Socrates is a species. We would have to say that Socrates is a species if the notion of species pertained to man arising from the existence that the nature has in Socrates or from the nature considered absolutely, that is, insofar as man is man. For whatever pertains to man insofar as he is man is predicated of Socrates. Et tamen praedicari convenit generi per se, cum in eius diffinitione ponatur. Praedicatio enim est quiddam quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem eorum quorum unum de altero dicitur. Unde ratio praedicabilitatis potest claudi in ratione huius intentionis quae est genus, quae similiter per actum intellectus completur. Nihilominus tamen id cui intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis attribuit, componens illud cum altero, non est ipsa intentio generis, sed potius illud cui intellectus intentionem generis attribuit, sicut quod significatur hoc nomine animal. But ‘to be predicated’ pertains to a genus in itself, because being predicated is placed in its definition. Now, predication is completed by the action of the intellect in compounding and dividing, and it has as its basis the unity in the real thing itself of those things one of which is said of another. Hence, the notion of predicability can be placed under the notion of this intention which is the genus, which is itself completed by an act of the intellect. Still, that to which the intellect attributes the intention of predicability by compounding it with another is not itself this intention of genus; it is rather that to which the intellect attributes the intention of genus, as, for instance, to what is signified by the term ‘animal.’ Sic ergo patet qualiter essentia vel natura se habet ad rationem speciei, quia ratio speciei non est de his quae conveniunt ei secundum absolutam suam considerationem, neque est de accidentibus quae consequuntur ipsam secundum esse quod habet extra animam, ut albedo et nigredo; sed est de accidentibus quae consequuntur eam secundum esse quod habet in intellectu. Et per hunc modum convenit etiam sibi ratio generis vel differentiae. We have thus made clear how the essence or nature is related to the notion of species, for the notion of species is not among those that pertain to the essence considered absolutely; nor is it among the accidents that follow from the existence that the essence has outside the soul, as whiteness or blackness. Rather, the notion of species is among the accidents that follow from the existence the essence has in the intellect. And in this way as well do the notions of genus or difference pertain to essences. Capitulum 4 Chapter 4 Per quem modum sit essentia in substantiis separatis How essences exist in separated substances Nunc restat videre per quem modum sit essentia in substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima, intelligentia et causa prima. Quamvis autem simplicitatem causae primae omnes concedant, tamen compositionem formae et materiae quidam nituntur inducere in intelligentias et in animam; cuius positionis auctor videtur fuisse Avicebron, auctor libri Fontis vitae. Hoc autem dictis philosophorum communiter repugnat, qui eas substantias separatas a materia nominant et absque omni materia esse probant. Cuius demonstratio potissima est ex virtute intelligendi quae in eis est. Videmus enim formas non esse intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum quod separantur a materia et a condicionibus eius, nec efficiuntur intelligibiles in actu nisi per virtutem substantiae intelligentis, secundum quod recipiuntur in ea et secundum quod aguntur per eam. Unde oportet quod in qualibet substantia intelligente sit omnino immunitas a materia, ita quod neque habeat materiam partem sui, neque etiam sit sicut forma impressa in materia ut est de formis materialibus. We should now see how essences exist in separated substances, that is, in the soul, in the intelligences, and in the first cause. Now, although everyone concedes the simplicity of the first cause, some people have tried to introduce into the intelligences and the soul a composition of form and matter, a position that seems to have begun with Avicebron, the author of the book called Fons vitae. But this view is repugnant to the common teaching of the philosophers, for they call these things substances separated from matter, and they prove them to be wholly without matter. The most cogent demonstration of this proceeds from the excellence of understanding found in these substances. For we see that forms are not actually intelligible except as they are separated from matter and its conditions, and forms are not made actually intelligible except by virtue of an intelligent substance in which they are received and through which they are brought about. Hence, in any intelligent substance there is a complete absence of matter in such a way that the substance has neither a material part itself, nor even is the substance like a form impressed in matter, as is the case with material forms. Nec potest aliquis dicere quod intelligibilitatem non impediat materia quaelibet, sed materia corporalis tantum. Si enim hoc esset ratione materiae corporalis tantum, cum materia non dicatur corporalis nisi secundum quod stat sub forma corporali, tunc oporteret quod hoc haberet materia, scilicet impedire intelligibilitatem, a forma corporali; et hoc non potest esse, quia ipsa etiam forma corporalis actu intelligibilis est sicut et aliae formae, secundum quod a materia abstrahitur. Unde in anima vel in intelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex materia et forma, ut hoc modo accipiatur essentia in eis sicut in substantiis corporalibus. Sed est ibi compositio formae et esse; unde in commento IX propositionis libri de Causis dicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam et esse: et accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa quiditate vel natura simplici. Nor can someone say that only corporeal matter, and not some other kind of matter, impedes intelligibility. For, if it were only corporeal mater that impedes intelligibility, then, since matter is called corporeal only insofar as it exists under a corporeal form, it would follow that matter impedes intelligibility by the corporeal form; and this is impossible, for the corporeal form is actually intelligible just like any other form, insofar as it is abstracted from matter. Hence, in no way is there a composition of matter and form in either the soul or the intelligences, such that an essence is received in these as in corporeal substances. Nevertheless, in separate substances there is a composition of form and existence, and so in the Liber de causis 9, it is said that the intelligences have form and existence: and in this place form is taken in the sense of a simple quiddity or nature. Et quomodo hoc sit planum est videre. Quaecumque enim ita se habent ad invicem quod unum est causa esse alterius, illud quod habet rationem causae potest habere esse sine altero, sed non convertitur. Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae quod forma dat esse materiae, et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua forma; tamen non est impossibile esse aliquam formam sine materia, forma enim in eo quod est forma non habet dependentiam ad materiam. Sed si inveniantur aliquae formae quae non possunt esse nisi in materia, hoc accidit eis secundum quod sunt distantes a primo principio quod est actus primus et purus. Unde illae formae quae sunt propinquissimae primo principio sunt formae per se sine materia subsistentes, non enim forma secundum totum genus suum materia indiget, ut dictum est; et huiusmodi formae sunt intelligentiae, et ideo non oportet ut essentiae vel quiditates harum substantiarum sint aliud quam ipsa forma. It is easy to see how this is the case. Whenever two things are related to each other such that one is the cause of the other, the one that is the cause can have existence without the other, but not conversely. Now, we find that matter and form are related in such a way that form gives existence to matter, and therefore it is impossible that matter exist without a form; but it is not impossible that a form exist without matter, for a form, insofar as it is a form, is not dependent on matter. If we should find some forms that cannot exist except in matter, this happens because such forms are distant from the first principle, which is primary and pure act. Hence, those forms that are nearest the first principle are subsisting forms essentially without matter, for not the whole genus of forms requires matter, as said above, and the intelligences are forms of this type. Thus, the essences or quiddities of these substances are not other than the forms themselves. In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae compositae et substantiae simplicis, quod essentia substantiae compositae non est tantum forma sed complectitur formam et materiam, essentia autem substantiae simplicis est forma tantum. Et ex hoc causantur aliae duae differentiae. Una est quod essentia substantiae compositae potest significari ut totum vel ut pars, quod accidit propter materiae designationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo non quolibet modo praedicatur essentia rei compositae de ipsa re composita: non enim potest dici quod homo sit quiditas sua. Sed essentia rei simplicis quae est sua forma non potest significari nisi ut totum, cum nihil sit ibi praeter formam quasi formam recipiens; et ideo quocumque modo sumatur essentia substantiae simplicis, de ea praedicatur. Unde Avicenna dicit quod quiditas simplicis est ipsummet simplex, quia non est aliquid aliud recipiens ipsam. Secunda differentia est quia essentiae rerum compositarum ex eo quod recipiuntur in materia designata multiplicantur secundum divisionem eius, unde contingit quod aliqua sint idem specie et diversa numero. Sed cum essentia simplicis non sit recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse talis multiplicatio; et ideo oportet ut non inveniantur in illis substantiis plura individua eiusdem speciei, sed quot sunt ibi individua tot sunt ibi species, ut Avicenna expresse dicit. Therefore, the essence of a composite substance and that of a simple substance differ in that the essence of a composite substance is not form alone but embraces both form and matter, while the essence of a simple substance is form alone. And from this two other differences arise. One is that the essence of a composite substance can be signified as a whole or as a part, which happens because of the designation of the matter, as said above. Hence, the essence of a composite thing is not in every way predicated of the composite thing itself, for we cannot say that a man is his own quiddity. But the essence of a simple thing, which is its form, cannot be signified except as a whole, as in this case there is nothing beyond the form to receive the quiddity. And so, however we take the essence of a simple thing, the essence is predicated of it. Hence, Avicenna says (Metaphysics 5.5) that the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, because there is no other thing to receive the form. The second difference is that the essences of composite things, because they are received in designate matter, are multiplied according to the division of matter, and so it happens that some such things are the same in species but different in number. But since the essence of a simple thing is not received in matter, there can be no such multiplication in this case, and so among such substances we do not find many individuals of the same species, but rather there are as many species as there are individuals, as Avicenna expressly says in Metaphysics 5.2. Huiusmodi ergo substantiae, quamvis sint formae tantum sine materia, non tamen in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actus purus, sed habent permixtionem potentiae; et hoc sic patet. Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quiditatis, hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his quae sunt partes essentiae intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo: possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura; ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate. Nisi forte sit aliqua res cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse, et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima: quia impossibile est ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per additionem alicuius differentiae, sicut multiplicatur natura generis in species; vel per hoc quod forma recipitur in diversis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in diversis individuis; vel per hoc quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor separatus esset alius a calore non separato ex ipsa sua separatione. Si autem ponatur aliqua res quae sit esse tantum ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet additionem differentiae, quia iam non esset esse tantum sed esse et praeter hoc forma aliqua; et multo minus reciperet additionem materiae, quia iam esset esse non subsistens sed materiale. Unde relinquitur quod talis res quae sit suum esse non potest esse nisi una; unde oportet quod in qualibet alia re praeter eam aliud sit esse suum et aliud quiditas vel natura seu forma sua; unde oportet quod in intelligentiis sit esse praeter formam, et ideo dictum est quod intelligentia est forma et esse. Although substances of this kind are form alone and are without matter, they are nevertheless not in every way simple, and they are not pure act. Rather, they have an admixture of potency, and this can be seen as follows. Whatever is not in the concept of the essence or the quiddity comes from outside the essence and makes a composition with the essence, because no essence can be understood without the things that are its parts. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without understanding anything about its existence: I can understand what a man is or what a phoenix is, and nevertheless not know whether either has existence in reality. Therefore, it is clear that existence is something other than the essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there is something whose quiddity is its very own existence, and, if so, this thing must be one and primary. For there can be no plurification of something except by the addition of some difference, as the nature of a genus is multiplied in its species; or as the nature of the species is multiplied in diverse individuals since the form is received in diverse matters; or again as when one thing is absolute and another is received in something else, as if there were a certain separate heat that was other than unseparated heat by reason of its separation. But if we posit a thing that is existence only, such that it is subsisting existence itself, this existence will not receive the addition of a difference. For, if there were added a difference, it would be not only existence, but existence and also some form beyond this. Much less would such a thing receive the addition of matter, for then the thing would be not subsisting existence but material. Hence, it remains that a thing that is its own existence cannot be other than one, and so in every other thing, the thing’s existence is one thing, and its essence or quiddity or nature or form is another. In the intelligences, therefore, there is existence beyond the form, and so we say that an intelligence is form and existence. Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est causatum ex principiis naturae suae, sicut risibile in homine; vel advenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quiditate rei, dico sicut a causa efficiente, quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res se ipsam in esse produceret: quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia omne quod est per aliud reducitur ad id quod est per se sicut ad causam primam, oportet quod sit aliqua res quae sit causa essendi omnibus rebus eo quod ipsa est esse tantum; alias iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res quae non est esse tantum habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse, et quod esse habet a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hoc est causa prima quae Deus est. Everything that pertains to a thing, however, either is caused by the principles of its own nature, as risibility in man, or else comes from some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the influence of the sun. Now, it cannot be that existence itself is caused by the very form or quiddity of the thing (I mean as by an efficient cause), because then the thing would be its own efficient cause, and the thing would produce itself in existence, which is impossible. Therefore, everything the existence of which is other than its own nature has existence from another. And since everything that is through another is reduced to that which is through itself as to a first cause, there is something that is the cause of existence in all things in that this thing is existence only. Otherwise, we would have to go to infinity in causes, for everything that is not existence alone has a cause of its existence, as was said above. It is clear, therefore, that the intelligences are form and existence and have existence from the first being, which is existence alone, and this is the first cause, which is God. Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum est in eo est actus eius; ergo oportet quod ipsa quiditas vel forma quae est intelligentia sit in potentia respectu esse quod a Deo recipit, et illud esse receptum est per modum actus. Et ita invenitur potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non tamen forma et materia nisi aequivoce. Unde etiam pati, recipere, subiectum esse et omnia huiusmodi quae videntur rebus ratione materiae convenire, aequivoce conveniunt substantiis intellectualibus et substantiis corporalibus, ut in III de Anima Commentator dicit. Et quia, ut dictum est, intelligentiae quiditas est ipsamet intelligentia, ideo quiditas vel essentia eius est ipsum quod est ipsa, et esse suum receptum a Deo est id quo subsistit in rerum natura; et propter hoc a quibusdam dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae componi ex quo est et quod est, vel ex quod est et esse, ut Boethius dicit. Everything that receives something from another is in potency with respect to what it receives, and that which is received in the thing is its act. Therefore, a quiddity or form that is an intelligence is in potency with respect to the existence that it receives from God, and this received existence is received as its act. And thus there are found in the intelligences both potency and act, but not matter and form, unless in some equivocal sense. Hence it is also clear that ‘to suffer,’ ‘to receive,’ ‘to be a subject’ and everything of this type that seem to pertain to things by reason of their matter are said of intellectual substances and corporeal substances equivocally, as the Commentator says in de Anima 3, com. 14. Furthermore, since, as was said above, the quiddity of an intelligence is the intelligence itself, its quiddity or essence is itself the very thing that exists, and its existence received from God is that by which it subsists in reality; and because of this some people say that substances of this kind are composed of what is and that by which it is, or of what is and existence, as Boethius says in de Hebdomadibus. Et quia in intelligentiis ponitur potentia et actus, non erit difficile invenire multitudinem intelligentiarum, quod esset impossibile si nulla potentia in eis esset. Unde Commentator dicit in III de Anima quod si natura intellectus possibilis esset ignota, non possemus invenire multitudinem in substantiis separatis. Est ergo distinctio earum ad invicem secundum gradum potentiae et actus, ita quod intelligentia superior quae magis propinqua est primo habet plus de actu et minus de potentia, et sic de aliis. Moreover, since we posit in the intelligences potency and act, it will not be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences, which would be impossible if there were in them no potency. Hence, the Commentator says in de Anima 3, com. 5 that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown, we would not be able to find a multitude of separate substances. There is thus a distinction among separate substances according to their grade of potency and act such that the superior intelligences, which are nearer the first cause, have more act and less potency, and so on. Et hoc completur in anima humana, quae tenet ultimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus. Unde intellectus possibilis eius se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut materia prima, quae tenet ultimum gradum in esse sensibili, ad formas sensibiles, ut Commentator in III de Anima dicit; et ideo Philosophus comparat eam tabulae in qua nihil est scriptum. Et propter hoc quod inter alias substantias intellectuales plus habet de potentia, ideo efficitur in tantum propinqua rebus materialibus ut res materialis trahatur ad participandum esse suum: ita scilicet quod ex anima et corpore resultat unum esse in uno composito, quamvis illud esse prout est animae non sit dependens a corpore. Et ideo post istam formam quae est anima inveniuntur aliae formae plus de potentia habentes et magis propinquae materiae, in tantum quod esse earum sine materia non est; in quibus esse invenitur ordo et gradus usque ad primas formas elementorum, quae sunt propinquissimae materiae: unde nec aliquam operationem habent nisi secundum exigentiam qualitatum activarum et passivarum et aliarum quibus materia ad formam disponitur. This scale comes to an end with the human soul, which holds the lowest place among intellectual substances. The soul’s possible intellect is related to intelligible forms just as prime matter (which holds the lowest place in sensible existence) is related to sensible forms, as the Commentator says in de Anima 3, com. 5. The Philosopher thus compares the soul to a tablet on which nothing has been written, in de Anima 3.4. Since the soul has the most potency among the intellectual substances, it is so close to material things that a material thing is brought to participate in its existence: that is, from the soul and the body there results one existence in one composite thing, although this existence, as the existence of the soul, is not dependent on the body. Beyond this form that is the soul, there are other forms having more potency and being closer to matter, and so much so that they have no existence without matter. Among these forms there is an order and gradation down to the primary forms of the elements, which are closest to matter; and so these have no operation except as required by the active and passive qualities and other such qualities by which matter is disposed by form. Capitulum 5 Chapter 5 Quomodo essentia in diversis invenitur How essence is found in various kinds of things His igitur visis, patet quomodo essentia in diversis invenitur. Invenitur enim triplex modus habendi essentiam in substantiis. Aliquid enim est sicut Deus cuius essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam, quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse eius. Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere; quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem praeter esse suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis quorum est genus vel species, sed esse est diversum in diversis. Having treated these matters, we can see clearly how essence is found in various kinds of things. There are thus three ways in which substances may have an essence. First, surely, is the way God has his essence, which is his very existence itself, and so we find certain philosophers saying that God does not have a quiddity or essence because his essence is not other than his existence. From this it follows that he is not in any genus, for everything that is in a genus has a quiddity beyond its existence, since the quiddity or nature of the genus or species is not in the order of nature distinguished in the things of which it is the genus or species, but the existence is diverse in diverse things. Nec oportet, si dicimus quod Deus est esse tantum, ut in illorum errorem incidamus qui Deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale quo quaelibet res formaliter est. Hoc enim esse quod Deus est huius condicionis est ut nulla sibi additio fieri possit, unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni esse; propter quod in commento IX propositionis libri de Causis dicitur quod individuatio primae causae, quae est esse tantum, est per puram bonitatem eius. Esse autem commune sicut in intellectu suo non includit aliquam additionem, ita non includit in intellectu suo praecisionem additionis; quia, si hoc esset, nihil posset intelligi esse in quo super esse aliquid adderetur. Even though we say that God is existence alone, we should not fall into the error of those who said that God is that universal existence by which everything formally exists. The existence which is God is of such a kind that no addition can be made to it, whence through its purity it is distinct from every other existence; for this reason a comment on the Liber de causis 9 says that the individuation of the first cause, which is being alone, is through its pure goodness. But common existence, just as it does not include in its concept any addition, does not exclude any addition in its concept; for, if such existence did in its concept exclude any addition, nothing could be understood to exist in which there was added something beyond existence. Similiter etiam quamvis sit esse tantum, non oportet quod deficiant ei reliquae perfectiones et nobilitates. Immo habet omnes perfectiones quae sunt in omnibus generibus, propter quod perfectum simpliciter dicitur, ut Philosophus et Commentator in V Metaphysicae dicunt; sed habet eas modo excellentiori omnibus rebus, quia in eo unum sunt, sed in aliis diversitatem habent. Et hoc est quia omnes illae perfectiones conveniunt sibi secundum esse suum simplex; sicut si aliquis per unam qualitatem posset efficere operationes omnium qualitatum, in illa una qualitate omnes qualitates haberet, ita Deus in ipso esse suo omnes perfectiones habet. Similarly, although God is existence alone, the remaining perfections and nobilities are not lacking in him. On the contrary, he has all the perfections that exist in every genus, and for this reason he is called perfect without qualification, as the Philosopher, in Metaphysics 5.16, and the Commentator, in Metaphysics 5, com. 21, each say. But God has these perfections in a more excellent way than all other things have them, because in him they are one, while in other things they are diverse. And this is because all these perfections pertain to God according to his simple existence, just as, if someone through one quality could effect the operations of all qualities, such a person would have in that one quality all the qualities, so too does God in his very existence have all the perfections. Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus est aliud esse quam essentia earum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia. Unde esse earum non est absolutum sed receptum, et ideo limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis; sed natura vel quiditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia. Et ideo dicitur in libro de Causis quod intelligentiae sunt infinitae inferius et finitae superius; sunt enim finitae quantum ad esse suum quod a superiori recipiunt, non tamen finiuntur inferius quia earum formae non limitantur ad capacitatem alicuius materiae recipientis eas. In a second way, essence is found in created intellectual substances in which existence is other than essence, although in these substances the essence is without matter. Hence, their existence is not absolute but received, and so finite and limited by the capacity of the receiving nature; but their nature or quiddity is absolute and is not received in any matter. Thus, it says in the Liber de causis 16 that intelligences are infinite with respect to what is inferior to them and finite with respect to what is superior to them: they are finite with respect to their existence, which they receive from something superior, although they are not rendered finite with respect to what is inferior to them because their forms are not limited to the capacity of some matter receiving them. Et ideo in talibus substantiis non invenitur multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter corpus cui unitur. Et licet individuatio eius ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat quantum ad sui inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi esse individuatum nisi in corpore cuius est actus: non tamen oportet ut subtracto corpore individuatio pereat, quia cum habeat esse absolutum ex quo acquisitum est sibi esse individuatum ex hoc quod facta est forma huius corporis, illud esse semper remanet individuatum. Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod individuatio animarum vel multiplicatio pendet ex corpore quantum ad sui principium, sed non quantum ad sui finem. And thus among such substances we do not find a multitude of individuals in one species, as was said above, except in the case of the human soul, and there we do find a multitude of individuals in one species because of the body to which the soul is united. Now, the individuation of the soul depends on the body for the occasion of its inception, for the soul does not acquire for itself individual existence unless in the body of which it is the act. But nevertheless, if we remove the body, the individuation does not perish; rather, its existence remains individuated because, since the soul was made the form of a particular body, it acquired individuated existence and so has absolute existence. And thus Avicenna says (de Anima 5.3) that the individuation of souls and their multiplication depend on the body for their beginning but not for their end. Et quia in istis substantiis quiditas non est idem quod esse, ideo sunt ordinabiles in praedicamento; et propter hoc invenitur in eis genus et species et differentia, quamvis earum differentiae propriae nobis occultae sint. In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae differentiae essentiales ignotae sunt; unde significantur per differentias accidentales quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectum: sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis. Accidentia autem propria substantiarum immaterialium nobis ignota sunt, unde differentiae earum nec per se nec per accidentales differentias a nobis significari possunt. Since in these substances the quiddity is not the same as existence, these substances can be ordered in the categories, and for this reason we find genera, species, and differences among these things, although their proper differences are hidden from us. Even in sensible things, essential differences are unknown to us, and so they are signified through accidental differences that arise from the essential ones, just as a cause is signified through its effect. We take bipedality, for example, as the difference of man. The proper accidents of immaterial substances, however, are also unknown to us, and thus we can signify their differences neither essentially nor through their accidental differences. Hoc tamen sciendum est quod non eodem modo sumitur genus et differentia in illis substantiis et in substantiis sensibilibus, quia in substantiis sensibilibus genus sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, differentia vero ab eo quod est formale in ipsa; unde dicit Avicenna in principio libri sui de Anima quod forma in rebus compositis ex materia et forma est differentia simplex eius quod constituitur ex illa: non autem ita quod ipsa forma sit differentia, sed quia est principium differentiae, ut idem dicit in sua Metaphysica. Et dicitur talis differentia esse differentia simplex quia sumitur ab eo quod est pars quiditatis rei, scilicet a forma. Cum autem substantiae immateriales sint simplices quiditates, non potest in eis differentia sumi ab eo quod est pars quiditatis sed a tota quiditate; et ideo in principio de Anima dicit Avicenna quod differentiam simplicem non habent nisi species quarum essentiae sunt compositae ex materia et forma. We should note, though, that the genus and difference in immaterial substances are not taken in the same way as in sensible substances, for in sensible substances the genus is taken from that which is material in the thing, while the difference is taken from that which is formal in the thing. Hence, Avicenna says in his book de Anima 1.1 that, in things composed of form and matter, the form is its simple difference because the thing is constituted from it; not, however, because the form is the difference but rather because it is the principle of the difference, as Avicenna himself says in his Metaphysics 5.6. Further, this difference is called a simple difference because it is taken from that which is a part of the quiddity of the thing: namely, from the form. But since immaterial substances are simple quiddities, in such substances the difference cannot be taken from that which is a part of the quiddity but only from the whole quiddity, and so in de Anima 1.1, Avicenna says that substances have no simple difference except for those species of which the essences are composed of matter and form. Similiter etiam in eis ex tota essentia sumitur genus, modo tamen differenti. Una enim substantia separata convenit cum alia in immaterialitate, et differunt ab invicem in gradu perfectionis secundum recessum a potentialitate et accessum ad actum purum. Et ideo ab eo quod consequitur illas in quantum sunt immateriales sumitur in eis genus, sicut est intellectualitas vel aliquid huiusmodi; ab eo autem quod consequitur in eis gradum perfectionis sumitur in eis differentia, nobis tamen ignota. Nec oportet has differentias esse accidentales quia sunt secundum maiorem et minorem perfectionem, quae non diversificant speciem; gradus enim perfectionis in recipiendo eandem formam non diversificat speciem, sicut albius et minus album in participando eiusdem rationis albedinem: sed diversus gradus perfectionis in ipsis formis vel naturis participatis speciem diversificat, sicut natura procedit per gradus de plantis ad animalia per quaedam quae sunt media inter animalia et plantas, secundum Philosophum in VII de Animalibus. Nec iterum est necessarium ut divisio intellectualium substantiarum sit semper per duas differentias veras, quia hoc impossibile est in omnibus rebus accidere, ut Philosophus dicit in XI de Animalibus. Similarly, in immaterial things the genus is taken from the whole essence, though not in the same way as the difference is. Separated substance are alike with respect to their immateriality, but they differ one from another with respect to their grade of perfection according to how far each recedes from potentiality and approaches pure act. And so, in such substances, the genus is taken from that which arises in these substances insofar as they are immaterial, as intellectuality and such things; the difference, however, is taken from that which arises in these substances from their grade of perfection, although these differences are unknown to us. Nor are these differences accidental because they arise from greater and lesser perfection, which do not diversify the species. For, while the grade of perfection in receiving the same form does not diversify the species (as whiter and less white in participating in whiteness of the same type), nevertheless, a different grade of perfection in these participated forms or natures does diversify the species, just as nature proceeds by grades from plants to animals through those things that are median between plants and animals, as the Philosopher says in de Historia animalium 8.1. Nor is it necessary that the division of intellectual substances always be made through two true differences, for it is impossible that this happen in all cases, as the Philosopher says in de Partibus animalium 1.2. Tertio modo invenitur essentia in substantiis compositis ex materia et forma, in quibus et esse est receptum et finitum propter hoc quod ab alio esse habent, et iterum natura vel quiditas earum est recepta in materia signata. In a third way, essence is found in substances composed of matter and form, in which existence is both received and limited because such substances have existence from another, and again because the nature or quiddity of such substances is received in signate matter. Et ideo sunt finitae et superius et inferius; et in eis iam propter divisionem signatae materiae possibilis est multiplicatio individuorum in una specie. Et in his qualiter se habet essentia ad intentiones logicas dictum est supra. And thus such substances are finite both with respect to what is superior to them and with respect to what is inferior to them, and among such substances, because of the division of signate matter, there can be a multiplication of individuals in one species. Finally, we explained above the ways in which essence in such substances is related to the logical intentions. Capitulum 6 Chapter 6 Quomodo sit essentia in accidentibus How there are essences in accidents Nunc restat videre quomodo sit essentia in accidentibus; qualiter enim sit in omnibus substantiis dictum est. Et quia, ut dictum est, essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur, oportet ut eo modo habeant essentiam quo habent diffinitionem. Diffinitionem autem habent incompletam, quia non possunt diffiniri nisi ponatur subiectum in eorum diffinitione; et hoc ideo est quia non habent esse per se absolutum a subiecto, sed sicut ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale quando componuntur, ita ex accidente et subiecto relinquitur esse accidentale quando accidens subiecto advenit. Et ideo etiam nec forma substantialis completam essentiam habet nec materia, quia etiam in diffinitione formae substantialis oportet quod ponatur illud cuius est forma, et ita diffinitio eius est per additionem alicuius quod est extra genus eius sicut et diffinitio formae accidentalis; unde et in diffinitione animae ponitur corpus a naturali qui considerat animam solum in quantum est forma physici corporis. Having already said how essences are found in all types of substances, we should now see in what way there are essences in accidents. Now, as was said above, the essence is that which is signified by the definition, and so accidents will have essences in the same way in which they have definitions. But accidents have incomplete definitions, because they cannot be defined unless we put a subject in their definitions, and this is because they do not have absolute existence in themselves apart from a subject. Rather, just as from the form and the matter substantial existence results when these are compounded, so too from the accident and the subject does accidental existence result when the accident comes to the subject. Thus, neither the substantial form nor the matter has a complete essence, for even in the definition of the substantial form we place something of which it is the form, and so its definition involves the addition of something that is beyond its genus, just as with the definition of an accidental form. Hence, the natural philosopher places the body in the definition of the soul because he considers the soul only insofar as it is the form of the physical body. Sed tamen inter formas substantiales et accidentales tantum interest quia, sicut forma substantialis non habet per se esse absolutum sine eo cui advenit, ita nec illud cui advenit, scilicet materia; et ideo ex coniunctione utriusque relinquitur illud esse in quo res per se subsistit, et ex eis efficitur unum per se: propter quod ex coniunctione eorum relinquitur essentia quaedam. Unde forma, quamvis in se considerata non habeat completam rationem essentiae, tamen est pars essentiae completae. Sed illud cui advenit accidens est ens in se completum subsistens in suo esse, quod quidem esse naturaliter praecedit accidens quod supervenit. But as between substantial and accidental forms, there is this difference. For, just as the substantial form has no absolute existence in itself without that to which the form comes, so neither does that to which the form comes (namely, matter) have such existence. Rather, from the conjunction of both there results that existence in which the thing subsists in itself, and from these two there is made one thing in itself, and for this reason, from the conjunction of these, there results a certain essence. Hence, although considered in itself the form does not have the complete character of an essence, nevertheless it is part of a complete essence. But that to which an accident comes is in itself a complete being subsisting in its own existence, and this existence naturally precedes the accident that supervenes. Et ideo accidens superveniens ex coniunctione sui cum eo cui advenit non causat illud esse in quo res subsistit, per quod res est ens per se; sed causat quoddam esse secundum sine quo res subsistens intelligi potest esse, sicut primum potest intelligi sine secundo. Unde ex accidente et subiecto non efficitur unum per se sed unum per accidens. Et ideo ex eorum coniunctione non resultat essentia quaedam sicut ex coniunctione formae ad materiam; propter quod accidens neque rationem completae essentiae habet neque pars completae essentiae est, sed sicut est ens secundum quid, ita et essentiam secundum quid habet. Therefore, the supervening accident, from its conjunction with the thing to which it comes, does not cause that existence in which the thing subsists, the existence through which the thing is a being in itself; it causes, rather, a certain secondary existence without which the subsisting being can be understood to exist, as what is first can be understood without what is second. Hence, from the accident and the subject there is made something that is one accidentally, not essentially; and so from the conjunction of these two there does not result an essence as there does from the conjunction of form and matter. And so an accident has neither the character of a complete essence, nor is it a part of a complete essence; rather, just as an accident is a being only in a certain sense, so too does it have an essence only in a certain sense.