Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est causatum ex principiis naturae suae, sicut risibile in homine; vel advenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quiditate rei, dico sicut a causa efficiente, quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res se ipsam in esse produceret: quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia omne quod est per aliud reducitur ad id quod est per se sicut ad causam primam, oportet quod sit aliqua res quae sit causa essendi omnibus rebus eo quod ipsa est esse tantum; alias iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res quae non est esse tantum habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse, et quod esse habet a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hoc est causa prima quae Deus est. Everything that pertains to a thing, however, either is caused by the principles of its own nature, as risibility in man, or else comes from some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the influence of the sun. Now, it cannot be that existence itself is caused by the very form or quiddity of the thing (I mean as by an efficient cause), because then the thing would be its own efficient cause, and the thing would produce itself in existence, which is impossible. Therefore, everything the existence of which is other than its own nature has existence from another. And since everything that is through another is reduced to that which is through itself as to a first cause, there is something that is the cause of existence in all things in that this thing is existence only. Otherwise, we would have to go to infinity in causes, for everything that is not existence alone has a cause of its existence, as was said above. It is clear, therefore, that the intelligences are form and existence and have existence from the first being, which is existence alone, and this is the first cause, which is God. Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum est in eo est actus eius; ergo oportet quod ipsa quiditas vel forma quae est intelligentia sit in potentia respectu esse quod a Deo recipit, et illud esse receptum est per modum actus. Et ita invenitur potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non tamen forma et materia nisi aequivoce. Unde etiam pati, recipere, subiectum esse et omnia huiusmodi quae videntur rebus ratione materiae convenire, aequivoce conveniunt substantiis intellectualibus et substantiis corporalibus, ut in III de Anima Commentator dicit. Et quia, ut dictum est, intelligentiae quiditas est ipsamet intelligentia, ideo quiditas vel essentia eius est ipsum quod est ipsa, et esse suum receptum a Deo est id quo subsistit in rerum natura; et propter hoc a quibusdam dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae componi ex quo est et quod est, vel ex quod est et esse, ut Boethius dicit. Everything that receives something from another is in potency with respect to what it receives, and that which is received in the thing is its act. Therefore, a quiddity or form that is an intelligence is in potency with respect to the existence that it receives from God, and this received existence is received as its act. And thus there are found in the intelligences both potency and act, but not matter and form, unless in some equivocal sense. Hence it is also clear that ‘to suffer,’ ‘to receive,’ ‘to be a subject’ and everything of this type that seem to pertain to things by reason of their matter are said of intellectual substances and corporeal substances equivocally, as the Commentator says in de Anima 3, com. 14. Furthermore, since, as was said above, the quiddity of an intelligence is the intelligence itself, its quiddity or essence is itself the very thing that exists, and its existence received from God is that by which it subsists in reality; and because of this some people say that substances of this kind are composed of what is and that by which it is, or of what is and existence, as Boethius says in de Hebdomadibus. Et quia in intelligentiis ponitur potentia et actus, non erit difficile invenire multitudinem intelligentiarum, quod esset impossibile si nulla potentia in eis esset. Unde Commentator dicit in III de Anima quod si natura intellectus possibilis esset ignota, non possemus invenire multitudinem in substantiis separatis. Est ergo distinctio earum ad invicem secundum gradum potentiae et actus, ita quod intelligentia superior quae magis propinqua est primo habet plus de actu et minus de potentia, et sic de aliis. Moreover, since we posit in the intelligences potency and act, it will not be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences, which would be impossible if there were in them no potency. Hence, the Commentator says in de Anima 3, com. 5 that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown, we would not be able to find a multitude of separate substances. There is thus a distinction among separate substances according to their grade of potency and act such that the superior intelligences, which are nearer the first cause, have more act and less potency, and so on. Et hoc completur in anima humana, quae tenet ultimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus. Unde intellectus possibilis eius se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut materia prima, quae tenet ultimum gradum in esse sensibili, ad formas sensibiles, ut Commentator in III de Anima dicit; et ideo Philosophus comparat eam tabulae in qua nihil est scriptum. Et propter hoc quod inter alias substantias intellectuales plus habet de potentia, ideo efficitur in tantum propinqua rebus materialibus ut res materialis trahatur ad participandum esse suum: ita scilicet quod ex anima et corpore resultat unum esse in uno composito, quamvis illud esse prout est animae non sit dependens a corpore. Et ideo post istam formam quae est anima inveniuntur aliae formae plus de potentia habentes et magis propinquae materiae, in tantum quod esse earum sine materia non est; in quibus esse invenitur ordo et gradus usque ad primas formas elementorum, quae sunt propinquissimae materiae: unde nec aliquam operationem habent nisi secundum exigentiam qualitatum activarum et passivarum et aliarum quibus materia ad formam disponitur. This scale comes to an end with the human soul, which holds the lowest place among intellectual substances. The soul’s possible intellect is related to intelligible forms just as prime matter (which holds the lowest place in sensible existence) is related to sensible forms, as the Commentator says in de Anima 3, com. 5. The Philosopher thus compares the soul to a tablet on which nothing has been written, in de Anima 3.4. Since the soul has the most potency among the intellectual substances, it is so close to material things that a material thing is brought to participate in its existence: that is, from the soul and the body there results one existence in one composite thing, although this existence, as the existence of the soul, is not dependent on the body. Beyond this form that is the soul, there are other forms having more potency and being closer to matter, and so much so that they have no existence without matter. Among these forms there is an order and gradation down to the primary forms of the elements, which are closest to matter; and so these have no operation except as required by the active and passive qualities and other such qualities by which matter is disposed by form. Capitulum 5 Chapter 5 Quomodo essentia in diversis invenitur How essence is found in various kinds of things His igitur visis, patet quomodo essentia in diversis invenitur. Invenitur enim triplex modus habendi essentiam in substantiis. Aliquid enim est sicut Deus cuius essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam, quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse eius. Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere; quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem praeter esse suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis quorum est genus vel species, sed esse est diversum in diversis. Having treated these matters, we can see clearly how essence is found in various kinds of things. There are thus three ways in which substances may have an essence. First, surely, is the way God has his essence, which is his very existence itself, and so we find certain philosophers saying that God does not have a quiddity or essence because his essence is not other than his existence. From this it follows that he is not in any genus, for everything that is in a genus has a quiddity beyond its existence, since the quiddity or nature of the genus or species is not in the order of nature distinguished in the things of which it is the genus or species, but the existence is diverse in diverse things. Nec oportet, si dicimus quod Deus est esse tantum, ut in illorum errorem incidamus qui Deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale quo quaelibet res formaliter est. Hoc enim esse quod Deus est huius condicionis est ut nulla sibi additio fieri possit, unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni esse; propter quod in commento IX propositionis libri de Causis dicitur quod individuatio primae causae, quae est esse tantum, est per puram bonitatem eius. Esse autem commune sicut in intellectu suo non includit aliquam additionem, ita non includit in intellectu suo praecisionem additionis; quia, si hoc esset, nihil posset intelligi esse in quo super esse aliquid adderetur. Even though we say that God is existence alone, we should not fall into the error of those who said that God is that universal existence by which everything formally exists. The existence which is God is of such a kind that no addition can be made to it, whence through its purity it is distinct from every other existence; for this reason a comment on the Liber de causis 9 says that the individuation of the first cause, which is being alone, is through its pure goodness. But common existence, just as it does not include in its concept any addition, does not exclude any addition in its concept; for, if such existence did in its concept exclude any addition, nothing could be understood to exist in which there was added something beyond existence. Similiter etiam quamvis sit esse tantum, non oportet quod deficiant ei reliquae perfectiones et nobilitates. Immo habet omnes perfectiones quae sunt in omnibus generibus, propter quod perfectum simpliciter dicitur, ut Philosophus et Commentator in V Metaphysicae dicunt; sed habet eas modo excellentiori omnibus rebus, quia in eo unum sunt, sed in aliis diversitatem habent. Et hoc est quia omnes illae perfectiones conveniunt sibi secundum esse suum simplex; sicut si aliquis per unam qualitatem posset efficere operationes omnium qualitatum, in illa una qualitate omnes qualitates haberet, ita Deus in ipso esse suo omnes perfectiones habet. Similarly, although God is existence alone, the remaining perfections and nobilities are not lacking in him. On the contrary, he has all the perfections that exist in every genus, and for this reason he is called perfect without qualification, as the Philosopher, in Metaphysics 5.16, and the Commentator, in Metaphysics 5, com. 21, each say. But God has these perfections in a more excellent way than all other things have them, because in him they are one, while in other things they are diverse. And this is because all these perfections pertain to God according to his simple existence, just as, if someone through one quality could effect the operations of all qualities, such a person would have in that one quality all the qualities, so too does God in his very existence have all the perfections. Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus est aliud esse quam essentia earum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia. Unde esse earum non est absolutum sed receptum, et ideo limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis; sed natura vel quiditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia. Et ideo dicitur in libro de Causis quod intelligentiae sunt infinitae inferius et finitae superius; sunt enim finitae quantum ad esse suum quod a superiori recipiunt, non tamen finiuntur inferius quia earum formae non limitantur ad capacitatem alicuius materiae recipientis eas. In a second way, essence is found in created intellectual substances in which existence is other than essence, although in these substances the essence is without matter. Hence, their existence is not absolute but received, and so finite and limited by the capacity of the receiving nature; but their nature or quiddity is absolute and is not received in any matter. Thus, it says in the Liber de causis 16 that intelligences are infinite with respect to what is inferior to them and finite with respect to what is superior to them: they are finite with respect to their existence, which they receive from something superior, although they are not rendered finite with respect to what is inferior to them because their forms are not limited to the capacity of some matter receiving them. Et ideo in talibus substantiis non invenitur multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter corpus cui unitur. Et licet individuatio eius ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat quantum ad sui inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi esse individuatum nisi in corpore cuius est actus: non tamen oportet ut subtracto corpore individuatio pereat, quia cum habeat esse absolutum ex quo acquisitum est sibi esse individuatum ex hoc quod facta est forma huius corporis, illud esse semper remanet individuatum. Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod individuatio animarum vel multiplicatio pendet ex corpore quantum ad sui principium, sed non quantum ad sui finem. And thus among such substances we do not find a multitude of individuals in one species, as was said above, except in the case of the human soul, and there we do find a multitude of individuals in one species because of the body to which the soul is united. Now, the individuation of the soul depends on the body for the occasion of its inception, for the soul does not acquire for itself individual existence unless in the body of which it is the act. But nevertheless, if we remove the body, the individuation does not perish; rather, its existence remains individuated because, since the soul was made the form of a particular body, it acquired individuated existence and so has absolute existence. And thus Avicenna says (de Anima 5.3) that the individuation of souls and their multiplication depend on the body for their beginning but not for their end. Et quia in istis substantiis quiditas non est idem quod esse, ideo sunt ordinabiles in praedicamento; et propter hoc invenitur in eis genus et species et differentia, quamvis earum differentiae propriae nobis occultae sint. In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae differentiae essentiales ignotae sunt; unde significantur per differentias accidentales quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectum: sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis. Accidentia autem propria substantiarum immaterialium nobis ignota sunt, unde differentiae earum nec per se nec per accidentales differentias a nobis significari possunt. Since in these substances the quiddity is not the same as existence, these substances can be ordered in the categories, and for this reason we find genera, species, and differences among these things, although their proper differences are hidden from us. Even in sensible things, essential differences are unknown to us, and so they are signified through accidental differences that arise from the essential ones, just as a cause is signified through its effect. We take bipedality, for example, as the difference of man. The proper accidents of immaterial substances, however, are also unknown to us, and thus we can signify their differences neither essentially nor through their accidental differences. Hoc tamen sciendum est quod non eodem modo sumitur genus et differentia in illis substantiis et in substantiis sensibilibus, quia in substantiis sensibilibus genus sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, differentia vero ab eo quod est formale in ipsa; unde dicit Avicenna in principio libri sui de Anima quod forma in rebus compositis ex materia et forma est differentia simplex eius quod constituitur ex illa: non autem ita quod ipsa forma sit differentia, sed quia est principium differentiae, ut idem dicit in sua Metaphysica. Et dicitur talis differentia esse differentia simplex quia sumitur ab eo quod est pars quiditatis rei, scilicet a forma. Cum autem substantiae immateriales sint simplices quiditates, non potest in eis differentia sumi ab eo quod est pars quiditatis sed a tota quiditate; et ideo in principio de Anima dicit Avicenna quod differentiam simplicem non habent nisi species quarum essentiae sunt compositae ex materia et forma. We should note, though, that the genus and difference in immaterial substances are not taken in the same way as in sensible substances, for in sensible substances the genus is taken from that which is material in the thing, while the difference is taken from that which is formal in the thing. Hence, Avicenna says in his book de Anima 1.1 that, in things composed of form and matter, the form is its simple difference because the thing is constituted from it; not, however, because the form is the difference but rather because it is the principle of the difference, as Avicenna himself says in his Metaphysics 5.6. Further, this difference is called a simple difference because it is taken from that which is a part of the quiddity of the thing: namely, from the form. But since immaterial substances are simple quiddities, in such substances the difference cannot be taken from that which is a part of the quiddity but only from the whole quiddity, and so in de Anima 1.1, Avicenna says that substances have no simple difference except for those species of which the essences are composed of matter and form. Similiter etiam in eis ex tota essentia sumitur genus, modo tamen differenti. Una enim substantia separata convenit cum alia in immaterialitate, et differunt ab invicem in gradu perfectionis secundum recessum a potentialitate et accessum ad actum purum. Et ideo ab eo quod consequitur illas in quantum sunt immateriales sumitur in eis genus, sicut est intellectualitas vel aliquid huiusmodi; ab eo autem quod consequitur in eis gradum perfectionis sumitur in eis differentia, nobis tamen ignota. Nec oportet has differentias esse accidentales quia sunt secundum maiorem et minorem perfectionem, quae non diversificant speciem; gradus enim perfectionis in recipiendo eandem formam non diversificat speciem, sicut albius et minus album in participando eiusdem rationis albedinem: sed diversus gradus perfectionis in ipsis formis vel naturis participatis speciem diversificat, sicut natura procedit per gradus de plantis ad animalia per quaedam quae sunt media inter animalia et plantas, secundum Philosophum in VII de Animalibus. Nec iterum est necessarium ut divisio intellectualium substantiarum sit semper per duas differentias veras, quia hoc impossibile est in omnibus rebus accidere, ut Philosophus dicit in XI de Animalibus. Similarly, in immaterial things the genus is taken from the whole essence, though not in the same way as the difference is. Separated substance are alike with respect to their immateriality, but they differ one from another with respect to their grade of perfection according to how far each recedes from potentiality and approaches pure act. And so, in such substances, the genus is taken from that which arises in these substances insofar as they are immaterial, as intellectuality and such things; the difference, however, is taken from that which arises in these substances from their grade of perfection, although these differences are unknown to us. Nor are these differences accidental because they arise from greater and lesser perfection, which do not diversify the species. For, while the grade of perfection in receiving the same form does not diversify the species (as whiter and less white in participating in whiteness of the same type), nevertheless, a different grade of perfection in these participated forms or natures does diversify the species, just as nature proceeds by grades from plants to animals through those things that are median between plants and animals, as the Philosopher says in de Historia animalium 8.1. Nor is it necessary that the division of intellectual substances always be made through two true differences, for it is impossible that this happen in all cases, as the Philosopher says in de Partibus animalium 1.2. Tertio modo invenitur essentia in substantiis compositis ex materia et forma, in quibus et esse est receptum et finitum propter hoc quod ab alio esse habent, et iterum natura vel quiditas earum est recepta in materia signata. In a third way, essence is found in substances composed of matter and form, in which existence is both received and limited because such substances have existence from another, and again because the nature or quiddity of such substances is received in signate matter. Et ideo sunt finitae et superius et inferius; et in eis iam propter divisionem signatae materiae possibilis est multiplicatio individuorum in una specie. Et in his qualiter se habet essentia ad intentiones logicas dictum est supra. And thus such substances are finite both with respect to what is superior to them and with respect to what is inferior to them, and among such substances, because of the division of signate matter, there can be a multiplication of individuals in one species. Finally, we explained above the ways in which essence in such substances is related to the logical intentions. Capitulum 6 Chapter 6 Quomodo sit essentia in accidentibus How there are essences in accidents Nunc restat videre quomodo sit essentia in accidentibus; qualiter enim sit in omnibus substantiis dictum est. Et quia, ut dictum est, essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur, oportet ut eo modo habeant essentiam quo habent diffinitionem. Diffinitionem autem habent incompletam, quia non possunt diffiniri nisi ponatur subiectum in eorum diffinitione; et hoc ideo est quia non habent esse per se absolutum a subiecto, sed sicut ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale quando componuntur, ita ex accidente et subiecto relinquitur esse accidentale quando accidens subiecto advenit. Et ideo etiam nec forma substantialis completam essentiam habet nec materia, quia etiam in diffinitione formae substantialis oportet quod ponatur illud cuius est forma, et ita diffinitio eius est per additionem alicuius quod est extra genus eius sicut et diffinitio formae accidentalis; unde et in diffinitione animae ponitur corpus a naturali qui considerat animam solum in quantum est forma physici corporis. Having already said how essences are found in all types of substances, we should now see in what way there are essences in accidents. Now, as was said above, the essence is that which is signified by the definition, and so accidents will have essences in the same way in which they have definitions. But accidents have incomplete definitions, because they cannot be defined unless we put a subject in their definitions, and this is because they do not have absolute existence in themselves apart from a subject. Rather, just as from the form and the matter substantial existence results when these are compounded, so too from the accident and the subject does accidental existence result when the accident comes to the subject. Thus, neither the substantial form nor the matter has a complete essence, for even in the definition of the substantial form we place something of which it is the form, and so its definition involves the addition of something that is beyond its genus, just as with the definition of an accidental form. Hence, the natural philosopher places the body in the definition of the soul because he considers the soul only insofar as it is the form of the physical body. Sed tamen inter formas substantiales et accidentales tantum interest quia, sicut forma substantialis non habet per se esse absolutum sine eo cui advenit, ita nec illud cui advenit, scilicet materia; et ideo ex coniunctione utriusque relinquitur illud esse in quo res per se subsistit, et ex eis efficitur unum per se: propter quod ex coniunctione eorum relinquitur essentia quaedam. Unde forma, quamvis in se considerata non habeat completam rationem essentiae, tamen est pars essentiae completae. Sed illud cui advenit accidens est ens in se completum subsistens in suo esse, quod quidem esse naturaliter praecedit accidens quod supervenit. But as between substantial and accidental forms, there is this difference. For, just as the substantial form has no absolute existence in itself without that to which the form comes, so neither does that to which the form comes (namely, matter) have such existence. Rather, from the conjunction of both there results that existence in which the thing subsists in itself, and from these two there is made one thing in itself, and for this reason, from the conjunction of these, there results a certain essence. Hence, although considered in itself the form does not have the complete character of an essence, nevertheless it is part of a complete essence. But that to which an accident comes is in itself a complete being subsisting in its own existence, and this existence naturally precedes the accident that supervenes. Et ideo accidens superveniens ex coniunctione sui cum eo cui advenit non causat illud esse in quo res subsistit, per quod res est ens per se; sed causat quoddam esse secundum sine quo res subsistens intelligi potest esse, sicut primum potest intelligi sine secundo. Unde ex accidente et subiecto non efficitur unum per se sed unum per accidens. Et ideo ex eorum coniunctione non resultat essentia quaedam sicut ex coniunctione formae ad materiam; propter quod accidens neque rationem completae essentiae habet neque pars completae essentiae est, sed sicut est ens secundum quid, ita et essentiam secundum quid habet. Therefore, the supervening accident, from its conjunction with the thing to which it comes, does not cause that existence in which the thing subsists, the existence through which the thing is a being in itself; it causes, rather, a certain secondary existence without which the subsisting being can be understood to exist, as what is first can be understood without what is second. Hence, from the accident and the subject there is made something that is one accidentally, not essentially; and so from the conjunction of these two there does not result an essence as there does from the conjunction of form and matter. And so an accident has neither the character of a complete essence, nor is it a part of a complete essence; rather, just as an accident is a being only in a certain sense, so too does it have an essence only in a certain sense. Sed quia illud quod dicitur maxime et verissime in quolibet genere est causa eorum quae sunt post in illo genere, sicut ignis qui est in fine caliditatis est causa caloris in rebus calidis, ut in II Metaphysicae dicitur: ideo substantia quae est primum in genere entis, verissime et maxime essentiam habens, oportet quod sit causa accidentium quae secundario et quasi secundum quid rationem entis participant. Quod tamen diversimode contingit. Quia enim partes substantiae sunt materia et forma, ideo quaedam accidentia principaliter consequuntur formam et quaedam materiam. Forma autem invenitur aliqua cuius esse non dependet ad materiam, ut anima intellectualis; materia vero non habet esse nisi per formam. Unde in accidentibus quae consequuntur formam est aliquid quod non habet communicationem cum materia, sicut est intelligere, quod non est per organum corporale, sicut probat Philosophus in III de Anima; aliqua vero ex consequentibus formam sunt quae habent communicationem cum materia, sicut sentire. Sed nullum accidens consequitur materiam sine communicatione formae. But since that which is greatest and truest in a genus is the cause of the lesser things in the genus (as fire, which is the hottest of all things, is the cause of heat in other hot things, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 2.1), thus substance, which is first in the genus of beings and which has essence in the truest and greatest way, is the cause of accidents, which participate in the notion of being only secondarily and in a certain sense. But this happens in a variety of ways. Since the parts of substance are matter and form, certain accidents are principally a consequence of form, and certain accidents are principally a consequence of matter. Now, while we find some forms (like the intellectual soul) whose existence does not depend on matter, matter does not have existence except through form. Hence, among those accidents that are a consequence of form, there are some that have no communication with matter, such as understanding, which does not take place through a corporeal organ, as the Philosopher proves in de Anima 3.1. Other accidents that are a consequence of form do have communication with matter, and among these is sensation. But no accident that is a consequence of matter is without some communication with form. In his tamen accidentibus quae materiam consequuntur invenitur quaedam diversitas. Quaedam enim accidentia consequuntur materiam secundum ordinem quem habet ad formam specialem, sicut masculinum et femininum in animalibus, quorum diversitas ad materiam reducitur, ut dicitur in X Metaphysicae; unde remota forma animalis dicta accidentia non remanent nisi aequivoce. Quaedam vero consequuntur materiam secundum ordinem quem habet ad formam generalem; et ideo remota forma speciali adhuc in ea remanent, sicut nigredo cutis est in aethiope ex mixtione elementorum et non ex ratione animae, et ideo post mortem in eo manet. Among the accidents that are consequences of matter there is found a certain diversity. Some accidents follow from the order the matter has to a special form, as the masculine and the feminine in animals, the difference between which is reduced to the matter, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 10.9. Hence, the form of the animal having been removed, these accidents do not remain except in some equivocal sense. Other accidents follow from the order the matter has to a general form, and so with these accidents, if the special form is removed, the accidents still remain in the thing, as the blackness of the skin of an Ethiopian comes from the mixture of the elements and not from the notion of the soul, and hence the blackness remains in the man after death. Et quia unaquaeque res individuatur ex materia et collocatur in genere vel specie per suam formam, ideo accidentia quae consequuntur materiam sunt accidentia individui, secundum quae individua etiam eiusdem speciei ad invicem differunt; accidentia vero quae consequuntur formam sunt propriae passiones vel generis vel speciei, unde inveniuntur in omnibus participantibus naturam generis vel speciei, sicut risibile consequitur in homine formam, quia risus contingit ex aliqua apprehensione animae hominis. Since everything is individuated by matter and is placed in its genus or species through its form, the accidents that follow from the matter are accidents of the individual, and by these accidents individuals of the same species differ one from another. But the accidents that follow from the form are properly passions of the genus or species, and so they are found in all things participating in the nature of the genus or species, as risibility in man follows from the form, for laughter comes from a certain kind of understanding in the soul of man. Sciendum etiam est quod accidentia aliquando ex principiis essentialibus causantur secundum actum perfectum, sicut calor in igne qui semper est calidus; aliquando vero secundum aptitudinem tantum, sed complementum accidit ex agente exteriori, sicut diaphaneitas in aere quae completur per corpus lucidum exterius; et in talibus aptitudo est accidens inseparabile, sed complementum quod advenit ex aliquo principio quod est extra essentiam rei, vel quod non intrat constitutionem rei, est separabile, sicut moveri et huiusmodi. We should also note that some accidents are caused by the essential principles of a thing to be in perfect act, as heat in fire, which is always actually hot, while other accidents are the result of a mere aptitude in the substance, and in such cases the complete accident arises from an exterior agent, as transparency in air, which is completed through an exterior luminescent body. In such things, the aptitude is an inseparable accident, but the complete accident, which comes from some principle that is beyond the essence of the thing, or that does not enter into the constitution of the thing, is separable, as the ability to be moved, and so on. Sciendum est etiam quod in accidentibus modo alio sumitur genus, differentia et species quam in substantiis. Quia enim in substantiis ex forma substantiali et materia efficitur per se unum, una quadam natura ex earum coniunctione resultante quae proprie in praedicamento substantiae collocatur, ideo in substantiis nomina concreta quae compositum significant proprie in genere esse dicuntur, sicut species vel genera, ut homo vel animal. Non autem forma vel materia est hoc modo in praedicamento nisi per reductionem, sicut principia in genere esse dicuntur. Sed ex accidente et subiecto non fit unum per se; unde non resultat ex eorum coniunctione aliqua natura cui intentio generis vel speciei possit attribui. We should further note that in accidents, the genus, difference, and species are taken in a way different from that in substances. For in substances, from the substantial form and the matter there is made something one in itself, a certain single nature resulting from the conjunction of these two, and this nature is properly placed in the category of substance. Hence, in substances, the concrete terms (such as the species or genera) that signify the composite are properly said to be in the genus, as, for example, man or animal. But in this way neither the form nor the matter is in a category except by means of reduction, as when we say that principles are in a genus. For from the accident and the subject there does not result something that is one in itself, and thus from the conjunction of these two there does not result a nature to which the intention of genus or species may be attributed. Unde nomina accidentalia concretive dicta non ponuntur in praedicamento sicut species vel genera, ut album vel musicum, nisi per reductionem, sed solum secundum quod in abstracto significantur, ut albedo et musica. Et quia accidentia non componuntur ex materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis sumi genus a materia et differentia a forma sicut in substantiis compositis; sed oportet ut genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode secundum prius et posterius de decem generibus praedicamentorum, sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiae et qualitas secundum quod est dispositio substantiae, et sic de aliis, secundum Philosophum IX Metaphysicae. Therefore, when accidental terms are used concretely like species or genera, such as white or musical, they cannot be placed in a category, except by means of reduction; rather, they can be placed in a category only when they are signified in the abstract, as, for example, whiteness and music. And because accidents are not composed of matter and form, in accidents the genus cannot be taken from the matter nor the difference from the form, as is the case with composite substances; rather, the first genus is taken from their very mode of existing, as being is said in different ways according to what is prior and what is posterior in the ten categories, and thus we call the measure of a substance quantity, the disposition of a substance quality, and so on for the others, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 9.1. Differentiae vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum, ex quibus causantur. Et quia propriae passiones ex propriis principiis subiecti causantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in diffinitione eorum loco differentiae si in abstracto diffiniuntur, secundum quod sunt proprie in genere, sicut dicitur quod simitas est curvitas nasi. Sed e converso esset si eorum diffinitio sumeretur secundum quod concretive dicuntur; sic enim subiectum in eorum diffinitione poneretur sicut genus, quia tunc diffinirentur per modum substantiarum compositarum in quibus ratio generis sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus quod simum est nasus curvus. Similiter etiam est si unum accidens alterius accidentis principium sit, sicut principium relationis est actio et passio et quantitas; et ideo secundum haec dividit Philosophus relationem in V Metaphysicae. Sed quia propria principia accidentium non semper sunt manifesta, ideo quandoque sumimus differentias accidentium ex eorum effectibus, sicut congregativum et disgregativum dicuntur differentiae coloris quae causantur ex abundantia vel paucitate lucis, ex quo diversae species coloris causantur. The differences in accidents are taken from the diversity of principles by which they are caused. Since passions are properly caused by the proper principles of the subject, the subject is placed in the definition of the passion in place of the difference if the passion is being defined in the abstract and properly in its genus, as when we say that snubnosedness is the upward curvature of the nose. But it would be the converse if the definition of the passion were taken according to its concrete sense; in this way, the subject is placed in the definition as a genus, for then the passion is defined in the mode of composite substances in which the notion of the genus is taken from the matter, as when we say that a snub nose is an upwardly curving nose. The case is similar even when one accident is the principle of another, as the principle of relation is action and passion and quantity, and thus by reference to these the Philosopher divides relation in Metaphysics 5.15. But because the proper principles of accidents are not always manifest, we sometimes take the differences of accidents from their effects, as we do with the concentrative and the diffusive, which are called the differences of color and which are caused by the abundance or the paucity of light, which cause the different species of color. Sic ergo patet quomodo essentia est in substantiis et accidentibus, et quomodo in substantiis compositis et simplicibus, et qualiter in his omnibus intentiones universales logicae inveniuntur; excepto primo quod est in fine simplicitatis, cui non convenit ratio generis aut speciei et per consequens nec diffinitio propter suam simplicitatem: in quo sit finis et consummatio huius sermonis. Amen. We have thus made clear how essence is found in substances and in accidents, and how in composite substances and in simple ones, and in what way the universal intentions of logic are found in all of these, except for the first being, which is the height of simplicity and to which, because of its simplicity, the notions of genus, species, and thus definition do not apply. In him let there be an end and consummation of this discourse. Amen.