24. Secundam differentiam ponit ibi: quod est participare etc. Quae quidem differentia sumitur secundum rationem participationis. Est autem participare quasi partem capere. 24. He presents the second difference [between being and that which is] here, at: what is can participate in something. This is taken in line with the account of participation. Now participating is as it were taking a part. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter, dicitur participare illud, sicut homo dicitur participare animal quia non habet rationem animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione Socrates participat hominem. Hence: whenever something particularly receives what pertains universally to something else, it is said to participate in it. For instance, man is said to participate in animal, since it does not have the account of animal in its full generality. Socrates participates in man for the same reason. Similiter etiam subiectum participat accidens et materia formam, quia forma substantialis vel accidentalis, quae de sui ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel illud subiectum. The subject likewise participates in its accident, and so does matter in form, since the substantial or accidental form, which is common in virtue of its account, is determined to this or that subject. Et similiter etiam effectus dicitur participare suam causam, et praecipue quando non adaequat virtutem suae causae, puta si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis quia non recipit eam in claritate qua est in sole. The effect is similarly said to participate in its cause, especially when it isn’t equal to the power of its cause—for example, when we say that air “participates” in sunlight because it doesn’t receive it with the brightness there is in the sun. Praetermisso autem hoc tertio modo participandi, impossibile est quod secundum duos primos modos ipsum esse participet aliquid. Non enim potest participare aliquid per modum quo materia vel subiectum participat formam vel accidens quia ut dictum est ipsum esse significatur ut quiddam abstractum. Similiter autem nec potest aliquid participare per modum quo particulare participat universale; sic enim etiam ea quae in abstracto dicuntur participare aliquid possunt sicut albedo colorem, sed ipsum esse est communissimum, unde ipsum quidem participatur in aliis, non autem participat aliquid aliud. Putting aside this third mode of participation, it is impossible that being itself should participate in something according to the first or second mode. For it can’t participate in something the way that matter or the subject participates in form or accident, since being itself is signified as something abstract [23]. It likewise can’t participate in something the way a particular participates in the universal, for even those things that are said abstractly can participate in something in this way, as whiteness does in color. Rather, being itself is the most common. It is thus participated in by another while it doesn’t participate in anything else. Sed id quod est sive ens, quamvis sit communissimum, tamen concretive dicitur, et ideo participat ipsum esse, non per modum quo magis commune participatur a minus communi, sed participat ipsum esse per modum quo concretum participat abstractum. Hoc est ergo quod dicit quod id quod est, scilicet ens, participare aliquo potest; sed ipsum esse nullo modo participat aliquo; et hoc probat ex eo quod supra dictum est, quod scilicet ipsum esse nondum est. Manifestum est enim quod id quod non est non potest aliquo participare, unde consequens est quod participatio conveniat alicui cum iam est; sed ex hoc aliquid est quod suscipit ipsum esse sicut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod id quod est aliquid possit participare, ipsum autem esse non possit aliquid participare. But although that which is (namely an entity) is the most common, it’s nevertheless said concretely. Hence it participates in being itself—not in the way in which something less common participates in something more common, but it participates in being itself the way the concrete participates in the abstract. This is why Boethius says: that which is (namely, an entity) can participate in something, but being doesn’t itself in any way participate in anything. Boethius proves this on the basis of what has been said [23], namely: being itself is not yet, for that which being is clearly can’t participate in anything; it thus follows that participation is suitable for something once it already is. But on this score it is something that takes on being itself, as stated. Accordingly, it remains that that which is can participate in something, whereas being itself can’t participate in anything. 25. Tertiam differentiam ponit ibi: id quod est habere etc. Et sumitur ista differentia per admixtionem alicuius extranei. 25. Boethius presents the third difference [between being and that which is] here, at: that which is can have something, which is taken from the admixture of something extraneous. Circa quod considerandum est quod circa quodcumque abstracte significatum hoc habet veritatem quod non habet in se aliquid extraneum, quod scilicet sit praeter essentiam suam, sicut humanitas, albedo et quaecumque hoc modo dicuntur, cuius ratio est quia humanitas significatur ut quo aliquid est homo, et albedo ut quo aliquid est album; non est autem aliquid homo formaliter loquendo nisi per id quod ad rationem hominis pertinet, et similiter non est aliquid album formaliter nisi per id quod pertinet ad rationem albi; et ideo huiusmodi abstracta nihil alienum in se habere possunt. We should note on this score that anything considered abstractly has truth and that it doesn’t have anything extraneous in itself—namely anything that would be beyond its essence of it, for example, humanity and whiteness and anything said in this way. The reason for this is that humanity is signified as that by which something is a man, and whiteness as that by which something is white. Now something is a man, formally speaking, only through what pertains to the account of man. Likewise, something is white formally only through what pertains to the account of white. Hence such abstract items have nothing foreign in themselves. Aliter autem se habet in his quae significantur in concreto, nam homo significatur ut qui habet humanitatem, et album ut quod habet albedinem. Ex hoc autem quod homo habet humanitatem vel album albedinem, non prohibetur habere aliquid aliud quod non pertinet ad rationem horum, nisi solum quod est oppositum his; et ideo homo et album possunt aliquid aliud habere quam humanitatem vel albedinem; et haec est ratio quare albedo et humanitas significantur per modum partis et non praedicantur de concretis sicut nec aliqua pars de suo toto. Matters are otherwise for items that are signified concretely. For a man is signified as what has humanity, and a white thing as what has whiteness. The fact that a man has humanity or whiteness, however, doesn’t prevent him from having something else which doesn’t pertain to the account of humanity or whiteness (with the sole exception of what is opposed to them); hence a man and a white thing can have something other than humanity or whiteness. This is why whiteness and humanity are signified as parts and aren’t predicated of concrete items, just as a part isn’t predicated of its whole. Quia igitur, sicut dictum est, ipsum esse significatur ut abstractum, id quod est ut concretum, consequens est verum esse quod hic dicitur quod id quod est potest aliquid habere praeter quam quod ipsum est, id est praeter suam essentiam, sed ipsum esse nihil aliud habet admixtum praeter suam essentiam. Therefore, since being itself is signified as something abstract and that which is as something concrete [24], it follows that what Boethius says here is true: that which is can have something beyond the fact that it is (that is, beyond its essence), but being has nothing mixed in beyond its essence. 26. Deinde cum dicit: diversum est tamen esse etc., ponit conceptiones quae accipiuntur secundum comparationem eius quod est esse simpliciter ad id quod est esse aliquid. 26. Boethius now presents conceptions derived from comparing that which is being simply to that which is being something. Et primo ponit utriusque diversitatem. First, he presents their divergence [27]. Secundo assignat differentias, ibi: illic enim accidens etc. Second, he assigns the differences, at: in the former case an accident [28]. 27. Circa primum considerandum est quod ex quo id quod est potest aliquid habere praeter suam essentiam, necesse est quod in eo consideretur duplex esse: 27. With respect to the first point, we should note that because that which is can have something beyond its essence [25], being must be considered in two ways in it. quia enim forma est principium essendi, necesse est quod secundum quamlibet formam habitam habens aliqualiter esse dicatur. Si ergo forma illa non sit praeter essentiam habentis, sed constituat eius essentiam, ex eo quod habet talem formam dicetur habens esse simpliciter, sicut homo ex hoc quod habet animam rationalem. For since form is the principle of being, then, with regard to any given form that is possessed, its possessor must be said to be somehow. Thus if the form were not beyond the essence of its possessor but rather constitutes its essence, then from having such a form it will be said to have being simply, as man does from having the rational soul. Si vero sit talis forma quae sit extranea ab essentia habentis eam, secundum illam formam non dicitur habens esse simpliciter, sed esse aliquid, sicut secundum albedinem homo dicitur esse albus. Et hoc est quod dicit quod diversum est esse aliquid quod non est esse simpliciter et quod aliquid sit in eo quod est, quod est proprium esse subiecti. But if it were the sort of form that is extraneous to the essence of its possessor, then according to that form it won’t be said to be simply but rather to be something, as a man is said to be white according to his whiteness. This is why Boethius says that being something (which is not being simply) and that something is in that it is (which is the proper being of the subject) are different. 28. Deinde cum dicit: illic enim accidens etc., ponit tres differentias inter praemissa. 28. Then when he says, in the former case an accident, Boethius presents three differences between being something and being something in that it is. Quarum prima est quod illic, id est ubi dicitur de re quod sit aliquid et non quod sit simpliciter, significatur accidens, quia forma quae facit huiusmodi esse est praeter essentiam rei. Hic autem cum dicitur aliquid esse in eo quod est, significatur substantia, quia scilicet forma faciens hoc esse constituit essentiam rei. The first is that in the former case (i.e. where it is said of a thing that it is something and that it is not simply) an accident is signified, since the form which makes it to be of that sort is beyond the essence of the thing, whereas in the latter (when it is said to be something in that which it is) a substance is signified, since clearly the form making it to be constitutes the essence of that thing. 29. Secundam differentiam ponit ibi: omne quod est etc. Dicit quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit simpliciter subiectum participat ipsum esse, sed ad hoc quod sit aliquid, oportet quod participet aliquo alio; sicut homo ad hoc quod sit albus participat non solum esse substantiale sed etiam albedinem. 29. Boethius presents the second difference here, at: everything which is, saying that [everything] participates in being itself so as to be some subject simply, whereas it must participate in something else so as to be something. For instance, a man participates not only in substantial being but also in whiteness so as to be white. 30. Tertiam differentiam ponit ibi: ac per hoc etc. Quae quidem accipitur secundum ordinem utriusque et concluditur ex praemissis. Est autem haec differentia quod primo oportet ut intelligatur aliquid esse simpliciter, et postea quod sit aliquid, et hoc patet ex praemissis. Nam aliquid est simpliciter per hoc quod participat ipsum esse; sed quando iam est, scilicet per participationem ipsius esse, restat ut participet quocumque alio ad hoc scilicet quod sit aliquid. 30. Boethius presents the third difference here, at: accordingly, that which is, which is taken in order after the other two and drawn as a conclusion from them. Well, this difference is that something must first be understood to be simply, and only then that it is something. This is obvious from the foregoing: something is simply because it participates in being itself, but when it already is (namely by participation in being itself), it remains that it participate in something else, namely so as to be something. 31. Deinde cum dicit: omni composito etc., ponit conceptiones de composito et simplici, quae pertinent ad rationem unius, et est considerandum quod ea quae supra dicta sunt de diversitate ipsius esse et eius quod est, est secundum ipsas intentiones. Hic ostendit quomodo applicetur ad res; 31. Then when he says, in everything composite, Boethius now presents conceptions about the composite and the simple, which pertain to the account of unity. We should note that the points made above about the divergence between being itself and that which is are in accordance with the intentions themselves. Here Boethius points out how it applies to these matters. et primo ostendit hoc in compositis, And first, he shows this in composites [32]; secundo in simplicibus, ibi: omne simplex etc. second, in simples, at: everything simple [33]. 32. Est ergo primo considerandum quod sicut esse et quod est differunt secundum intentiones, ita in compositis differunt realiter. Quod quidem manifestum est ex praemissis. Dictum est enim supra quod ipsum esse neque participat aliquid ut eius ratio constituatur ex multis, neque habet aliquid extrinsecum admixtum ut sit in eo compositio accidentis; et ideo ipsum esse non est compositum; res ergo composita non est suum esse; et ideo dicit quod in omni composito aliud est esse ens et aliud ipsum compositum quod est participando ipsum esse. 32. Therefore, note first that just as being and that which is differ in simples according to their intentions, so too do they really differ in composites. This is surely evident from the foregoing. For being itself does not participate in anything so that its account is constituted out of many factors [24]. Nor does it have anything extraneous mixed in so that there is accidental composition in it [25]. Hence being itself is not composite. Therefore a composite thing is not its own being. This is why Boethius says that in everything composite, being and the composite itself differ, which participates in being itself. 33. Deinde cum dicit: omne simplex etc., ostendit qualiter se habeat in simplicibus in quibus necesse est quod ipsum esse et id quod est sit unum et idem realiter. Si enim esset aliud realiter id quod est et ipsum esse, iam non esset simplex sed compositum. 33. Then when he says, everything simple, Boethius here points out how matters stand in simples, wherein being itself and that which is must really be one and the same. For if that which is and being itself were really different, then it would not be simple but composite. 34. Est tamen considerandum quod, cum simplex dicatur aliquid ex eo quod caret compositione, nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid simplex, in quantum caret aliqua compositione, quod tamen non est omnino simplex; unde et ignis et aqua dicuntur simplicia corpora, in quantum carent compositione quae est ex contrariis quae invenitur in mixtis, quorum tamen unumquodque est compositum, tum ex partibus quantitativis, tum etiam ex forma et materia. Si ergo inveniantur aliquae formae non in materia, unaquaeque earum est quidem simplex quantum ad hoc quod caret materia, et per consequens quantitate quae est dispositio materiae. 34. Yet we should note that although something is called simple on the grounds that it lacks composition, nothing prevents something from being simple in a respect (insofar as it lacks composition) which nevertheless is not completely simple. Fire and water are accordingly called simple bodies insofar as they lack the composition stemming from contraries which is found in mixtures; yet each of them is composite—on the one hand, from parts of quantity; on the other hand, from form and matter. Thus if some forms were found not in matter, any one of them is indeed simple inasmuch as it lacks matter and consequently also quantity (which is a disposition of matter). Quia tamen quaelibet forma est determinativa ipsius esse, nulla earum est ipsum esse, sed est habens esse; puta secundum opinionem Platonis, ponamus formam immaterialem subsistere quae sit idea et ratio hominum materialium, et aliam formam quae sit idea et ratio equorum, manifestum erit quod ipsa forma immaterialis subsistens, cum sit quiddam determinatum ad speciem, non est ipsum esse commune, sed participat illud. Et nihil differt quantum ad hoc si ponamus illas formas immateriales altioris gradus quam sint rationes horum sensibilium ut Aristoteles voluit; unaquaeque enim illarum, in quantum distinguitur ab alia, quaedam specialis forma est participans ipsum esse, et sic nulla earum erit vere simplex. Yet since any given form is determinative of being itself, none of them is being itself but rather has being. For instance, let’s postulate in line with Plato’s view that an immaterial form subsists which is the idea and account of material men, and there is another form which is the idea and account of horses. The immaterial subsistent form, since it is something determined into species, will clearly not be general being itself but instead participates in it. And it makes no difference on this score if we postulate these immaterial forms to belong to a higher level than do the accounts of these sensible things, as Aristotle held: any given one of them, insofar as it is distinguished from another, is a certain specific form that participates in being itself. Thus none of them will be truly simple. 35. Id autem solum erit vere simplex quod non participat esse, non quidem inhaerens, sed subsistens. Hoc autem non potest esse nisi unum, quia, si ipsum esse nihil aliud habet admixtum praeter id quod est esse, ut dictum est, impossibile est id quod est ipsum esse multiplicari per aliquid diversificans, et, quia nihil aliud praeter se habet adiunctum, consequens est quod nullius accidentis sit susceptivum. Hoc autem simplex, unum et sublime est ipse Deus. 35. Now this alone will be truly simple: what does not participate in being, not inherent but subsistent. This can only be one, since if being itself has nothing else mixed in beyond that which being is [25], it is impossible for that which being is itself to be proliferated through any diversifying factor. And since it has nothing else mixed in beyond itself, it follows that it underlies no accident. Moreover, this sublime and simple one is God himself. 36. Deinde cum dicit: omnis diversitas etc., ponit duas conceptiones pertinentes ad appetitum ex quo definitur bonum, nam bonum dicitur quod omnia appetunt. 36. Then when he says, every diversity, Boethius now presents two conceptions relevant to pursuit, from which the good is defined. For what all men pursue is called good. 37. Est ergo prima conceptio quod omnis diversitas est discors et similitudo est appetenda. Circa quod considerandum est quod discordia importat contrarietatem appetitus, unde illud dicitur esse discors quod repugnat appetitui; omne autem diversum in quantum huiusmodi repugnat appetitui; cuius ratio est quia simile augetur et perficitur suo simili; unumquodque autem appetit suum augmentum et perfectionem; et ideo simile in quantum huiusmodi est unicuique appetibile et pari ratione diversum repugnat appetitui in quantum diminuit et impedit perfectionem. Et ideo dicit quod omnis diversitas est discors, id est ab appetitu discordans; similitudo vero est appetenda. 37. Thus the first conception is: every diversity is discord, whereas likeness is to be pursued. Note here that discord brings in the contrareity of pursuit. Accordingly, discord is said to be what fights off pursuit. Yet everything diverse, insofar as it is such, fights off pursuit. The reason for this is that like is increased and perfected by its like. Now everything pursues its own increase and perfection, as does its like, insofar as such is pursuable by anything. By the same argument, the diverse fights off pursuit, insofar as it decreases and hinders its perfection. Hence Boethius says that every diversity is discord (i.e. discordant with its pursuit), whereas likeness is to be pursued. Contingit tamen per accidens quod aliquis appetitus abhorret simile et appetit diversum sive contrarium, nam, sicut dictum, est unumquodque primo et per se appetit suam perfectionem quae est bonum uniuscuiusque et est semper proportionata perfectibili, et secundum hoc habet similitudinem ad ipsum. Alia vero quae sunt exterius appetuntur vel refutantur in quantum conferunt ad propriam perfectionem, a qua quidem deficit quandoque aliquid per defectum, quandoque autem per excessum, nam propria perfectio uniuscuiusque rei in quadam commensuratione consistit, sicut perfectio corporis humani consistit in commensurato calore, a quo si deficiat appetit aliquod calidum per quod calor augeatur; si autem superexcedat, appetit contrarium, scilicet frigidum, per quod ad temperamentum reducatur, in quo consistit perfectio conformis naturae. Et sic etiam unus figulus abhorret alium, in quantum scilicet aufert ei perfectionem desideratam, scilicet lucrum. Yet it does happen by accident that some pursuit hates its like and pursues what is diverse or contrary. For, as mentioned, everything pursues first and in itself its perfection, which is the good for anything and is always proportional to the perfectible; on this score it has a likeness to itself. But other items external to it are pursued or avoided insofar as they contribute to its proper perfection, which is sometimes lacking because of defect and sometimes because of excess. For the proper perfection of any given thing consists in a certain balance. For example, the perfection of the human body consists in a balance of heat; if this were lacking, one pursues something warm through which its heat is increased. On the other hand, if it were to exceed [the balance], one pursues the contrary—namely something cold through which one is brought down to the temperature wherein consists perfection in conformity with nature. So too one potter hates another, namely because he carries off for himself the desired perfection (namely, money). 38. Secundam autem conceptionem ponit ibi: et quod appetit etc., quae concluditur ex praemissis. Si enim similitudo per se est appetenda, consequenter id quod appetit aliud ostenditur tale naturaliter esse quale est hoc quod appetit, quia scilicet naturalem inclinationem habet ad id quod appetit; quae quidem naturalis inclinatio quandoque sequitur ipsam essentiam rei, sicut grave appetit esse deorsum secundum rationem suae essentialis naturae; quandoque vero consequitur naturam alicuius formae supervenientis, sicut cum aliquis habet habitum acquisitum desiderat id quod convenit ei secundum habitum illum. 38. Boethius presents the second conception here, at: whatever pursues, as a conclusion from what was said before [37]. For if likeness per se is to be pursued, as a result that which pursues something is shown to be itself by nature like the object it pursues, namely because it possesses a natural inclination towards what it pursues. This natural inclination sometimes follows upon the very essence of a thing. For instance, the heavy pursues being downward according to the account of its essential nature. But at other times it follows upon the nature of some supervenient form, for example, when someone has acquired a habit and desires whatever is appropriate to him according to that habit. 39. Ultimo autem epilogat et dicit quod sufficiunt ad propositum ea quae praemissa sunt et quod ille qui prudenter interpretatur rationes dictorum poterit unumquodque eorum adaptare congruis argumentis, applicando scilicet ea ad debitas conclusiones ut patebit in sequentibus. 39. Finally, as an epilogue, Boethius says that the matters set out above are sufficient for the case at hand, and that anyone who carefully interprets the reasons for his claims will be able to fit any of them to their appropriate arguments, namely by applying them to the requisite conclusions, as will be clear in what follows. Lectio 3 Lecture 3 Commentary on the Problem Quaestio vero huiusmodi est: ea quae sunt bona sunt; tenet enim communis sententia doctorum omne quod est ad bonum tendere, omne autem tendit ad simile; quae igitur ad bonum tendunt bona ipsa sunt. Now the problem is as follows. The things that are, are good. For the common view of the learned maintains that everything that is tends to the good, and everything tends towards its like; hence things that tend to the good are themselves good.