De memoria et reminiscentia Commentary on Aristotle’s On Memory and Recollection Tractatus 2 Treatise 2 De memoria et reminiscentia On Memory and Recollection Capitulum 1 Chapter 1 Quaenam dicenda sint: ex eis demum, quorum memoria esse dicitur, memoriae deducitur definitio The nature of memory De memoria et memorari dicendum quid est et propter quam causam fit, et cui animae partium haec accidat passio; et reminisci: About memory and remembering we must say what it is, and owing to what cause it comes about, and in which of the parts of the soul this affection occurs; and we must do the same about recollecting. non enim idem sunt memorativi et reminiscitivi, sed ut frequenter memorabiliores quidem qui tardi, reminiscibiliores autem qui veloces et bene discentes. For those who are good at remembering are not the same as those who are good at recollecting; rather, as frequently happens, those who are slow to learn are more able to remember, while those who are quick and learn easily are able to recollect. Primum quidem igitur accipiendum est qualia sunt memorabilia: multotiens enim decipit hoc. Since the question “What sort of things are memorable?” is frequently misleading, this is the first point to be taken up. Neque enim futura contingit memorari, sed est opinabile et sperabile. Erit autem utique et scientia quaedam sperativa, quemadmodum quidam divinativam dicunt. For the future is not remembered, but it can be thought about and expected. Moreover, there will also be a science of expectation, which some call divination. Neque praesentis est, sed sensus: hoc enim neque futurum neque factum cognoscimus, sed tantum praesens. Nor is memory of the present, but sense is. For by sense we know neither the future nor what’s been done, but only the present. Memoria autem facti est. Praesens autem cum adest, ut hoc album cum aliquis videt, nullus utique dicet memorari, But memory is of what has been: now no one will say that the present is being remembered while it is at hand, e.g., this white object while someone is seeing it, no one will say he is remembering it; neque quod consideratur cum sit considerans et intelligens, sed hoc quidem sentire dicunt, illud autem scire solum. nor will he say that he is remembering what is being considered while he is considering or understanding it; but they generally call the first act sense and only the second knowing. Cum vero sine vel operibus actibus scientiam et sensum habeat, sic memoratur eas quae trianguli quod duobus rectis equales; hoc quidem quia didicit aut speculatus fuit, illud vero quoniam audivit aut vidit aut aliquid tale. Semper enim, cum secundum memorari agat, sic in anima dicit, quod hoc prius audivit aut sensit aut intellexit. But since one may have knowledge and sense without the <corresponding> acts, one may remember that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles in this way: this occurs in the one case since he has learned or speculated upon it, and in the other since he has heard or seen it or some other such thing. For when one acts according to memory, one always speaks thus in one’s soul—that one has heard or felt or understood it before. Est quidem igitur memoria neque sensus neque opinio, sed horum alicuius habitus aut passio, cum factum fuerit tempus; ipsius autem nunc in ipso nunc non est memoria, sicut dictum est, sed praesentis quidem sensus, futuri vero spes, facti autem memoria est; unde cum tempore memoria omnis. Quare quaecumque tempus sentiunt et quo, haec sola animalium memorantur, et isto quo sentiunt. Therefore there is a thing called memory, and it is neither sense nor opinion, but with any of these there is a habit or an affection once time has passed. But of the now itself there is no memory in the now itself, as has been said. Rather sense is of the present; expectation, of the future; and memory, of the past. For this reason, only those animals that sense time remember, and they do so by the very thing by which they sense it. 298. Sicut Philosophus dicit in VII De historiis animalium, natura ex inanimatis ad animalia paulatim procedit, ita quod genus inanimatorum prius invenitur quam genus plantarum, quod quidem ad alia corpora comparatum videtur esse animatum, ad genus autem animalium, inanimatum; et similiter a plantis ad animalia quodam continuo ordine progreditur, quia quaedam animalia immobilia, quae scilicet terrae adhaerent, parum videntur a plantis differre. Ita etiam et in progressu ab animalibus ad homines quaedam inveniuntur in quibus aliqua similitudo rationis appareat: cum enim prudentia sit propria virtus hominis (est enim prudentia recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethicorum), inveniuntur quaedam animalia quamdam prudentiam participare, non ex eo quod habeant rationem, sed eo quod instinctu naturae moventur per apprehensionem sensitivae partis ad quaedam opera facienda ac si ex ratione operarentur. 298. As the Philosopher says in the seventh book on the Histories of Animals, nature proceeds from inanimate to animate things little by little, so that the genus of inanimate things comes before the genus of plants. For plants, when compared to other bodies, seem to be animate, even though when they are compared to the genus of animals they seem to be inanimate. In the same way, nature proceeds from plants to animals in a continuous order; for certain immobile animals—those that adhere to the earth—seem to differ little from plants. So, too, in the order of progression from animals to man, some animals are found in which something like reason appears. For although prudence—“the right reason of things one can do,” as it is called in the sixth book of the Ethics—is a virtue proper to man, some animals are found to participate in a sort of prudence. This is so not because they can reason, but because they are moved to act by a natural instinct. Such acts result from an apprehension by the sensitive part of the soul, as if they were done from reason. Pertinet autem ad prudentiam ut prudens dirigatur per eam in his quae imminent sibi agenda ex consideratione non solum praesentium, sed etiam praeteritorum; unde Tullius in sua Rhetorica partes prudentiae ponit non solum providentiam per quam futura disponuntur, sed etiam intelligentiam per quam considerantur praesentia et memoriam per quam apprehenduntur praeterita. Unde et in aliis animalibus in quibus invenitur prudentiae similitudo participata, necesse est esse non solum sensum praesentium, sed etiam memoriam praeteritorum, et ideo Philosophus dicit in principio Metaphysicae quod quibusdam animalibus ex <sensu> memoria fit, et propter hoc prudentia sunt. The role of prudence is to direct the prudent man to do what ought to be done by considering not only the present but also the past. This is why Cicero sets down as the parts of prudence not only foresight, through which future things are attended to, but also understanding, through which present things are considered, and memory, through which past things are apprehended. Accordingly, even other animals that seem to have something like prudence must have not only a sense awareness of present things but also a memory of past things. Therefore, at the beginning of the Metaphysics the Philosopher says that in the case of certain animals memory comes from sensation, and for this reason they are prudent. 299. Sed, sicut prudentiam imperfectam habent respectu hominis, ita etiam et memoriam: nam alia animalia memorantur tantum, homines autem et memorantur et reminiscuntur. Et ideo gradatim Aristoteles post librum in quo determinavit de sensu, qui communis est omnibus animalibus, determinat de memoria et reminiscentia, quorum alterum invenitur in solis hominibus, alterum vero in his et in animalibus perfectis. 299. Just as these animals have an imperfect sort of prudence compared to that of man, so is their memory likewise imperfect. For other animals only remember, while men both remember and recollect. Now Aristotle proceeds step by step, and, after the book in which he treats sensation, which is common to all the animals, he now treats of memory and recollection, the latter of which is found only in men, and the former both in men and in the perfect animals. 300. Dividitur ergo liber iste in partes duas: 300. Accordingly, this book is divided into two parts. primo enim ponitur prooemium, in quo manifestat suum propositum; In the first place Aristotle gives his prologue, in which he presents what he sets out to do; secundo accedit ad tractandum ea de quibus intendit, ibi: primum quidem igitur etc. in the second, he begins to treat the things he has in mind, where he says since the question (449b9; [303]). Circa primum dicit de duobus esse dicendum. As to the first point, he says that there are two things to be discussed. Primo quidem de memoria et memorari, quod est actus eius, circa quod tria se promittit dicturum, scilicet quid sit memoria et memorari, et quae sit causa eius, et ad quam partem animae pertineat passio memorandi (omnes enim operationes sensitivae partis passiones quaedam sunt, secundum quod sentire pati quoddam est). The first is concerned with memory and its activity, remembering. About this he promises to discuss three points, namely what memory or remembering is, what its cause is, and to which part of the soul the affection of remembering belongs. For all the operations of the sensitive part of the soul are affections, inasmuch as sensing is somehow to be affected. 301. Secundo promittit se dicturum de reminisci, et ne videretur idem esse reminisci et memorari, subiungit quoddam signum differentiae ipsorum ex parte hominum, in quibus invenitur utrumque: non enim iidem homines inveniuntur esse bene memorativi et bene reminiscitivi; sed, sicut frequenter accidit, illi sunt melius memorantes qui sunt tardi ad inveniendum et discendum, illi autem melius reminiscuntur qui sunt velocis ingenii ad inveniendum ex se et bene discendum ab aliis. 301. In the second place, he promises to discuss recollecting. Now lest recollecting and remembering appear to be identical, he indicates their difference: they are each found in different sorts of men. For we do not find that the same men have good memories and good powers of recollection. Rather, as frequently happens, those who are slow at discovering and learning have better memories; whereas those who are quick-witted at discovering things on their own and in learning things from others are better at recollecting. 302. Cuius ratio est quia diversae habitudines hominum ad opera animae proveniunt ex diversa corporis dispositione; videmus autem in corporalibus quod illa quae difficulter et tarde recipiunt impressionem bene retinent eam, sicut lapis, quae vero de facili recipiunt non retinent bene, sicut aqua; et quia memorari nihil est aliud quam bene conservare semel accepta, inde est quod illi qui sunt tardi ad recipiendum, bene retinent recepta, quod est bene memorari; qui autem de facili recipiunt, plerumque etiam de facili amittunt, sed reminisci est quaedam reinventio prius acceptorum non conservatorum, et ideo illi qui sunt velocis ingenii ad inveniendum et recipiendum disciplinam, etiam sunt bene reminiscitivi. 302. The reason for this is that the diversity of man’s capacity to perform various acts of the soul arises from the diverse dispositions of the body. We see that those bodily things that receive an impression slowly and with difficulty, such as stone, retain the impression well; while those, such as water, that take an impression easily, do not retain it well. Since remembering is merely keeping in good condition the things that have once been received, it follows that those who are slow to receive an impression retain it well once they have accepted it, and this is to remember it well; whereas those who accept something with ease often lose it just as easily. Recollecting, on the other hand, is a sort of rediscovery of things that were previously accepted but no longer preserved, and so those that are quick to discover things and to receive instruction are also good at recollecting. 303. Deinde cum dicit: primum quidem igitur etc., exequitur propositum. 303. Then, when he says since the question (449b9), he pursues what he set out to do. Et primo determinat de memorari; First, he treats of remembering; secundo de reminisci, ibi: de reminisci autem reliquum dicere etc. second of recollecting, at it remains, however, for us to talk about recollecting (451a18; [350]). Circa primum tria facit: In regard to the first topic, he does three things. primo ostendit quid sit memorari; In the first place, he shows what remembering is; secundo cuius partis animae sit, ibi: quoniam autem de phantasia etc.; second, he shows to what part of the soul it belongs, at we have spoken however, about imagination (ch. 2, 449b30; [311]); tertio propter quam causam fiat, ibi: dubitabit autem utique aliquis etc. third, he shows the cause of memory, at one might perhaps wonder (ch. 3, 450a25; [327]). Et, quia operationes et habitus et potentiae specificantur ex obiectis, ideo circa primum duo facit: Since operations, habits, and powers are specified by their objects, he does two things concerning the first topic. primo inquirit quid sit obiectum memoriae; First, he asks what the object of memory is; secundo concludit quid sit memoria, ibi: est quidem igitur memoria etc. second, he concludes with a definition of memory, at therefore there is a thing called memory (449b24; [309]). Circa primum duo facit: As to the first, he does two things. primo dicit de quo est intentio; First, he tells us what he wishes to discuss;