Capitulum 3 Chapter 3 The four causes Ex dictis igitur patet tria esse naturae principia, scilicet materia, forma et privatio; sed haec non sunt sufficientia ad generationem. Quod enim est in potentia non potest se reducere ad actum, sicut cuprum quod est potentia idolum non facit se idolum, sed indiget operante qui formam idoli extrahat de potentia in actum. Forma etiam non extraheret se de potentia in actum: et loquor de forma generati, quam diximus esse terminum generationis; forma enim non est nisi in facto esse, quod autem operatur est in fieri, idest dum res fit. Oportet ergo praeter materiam et formam esse aliquod principium quod agat, et hoc dicitur esse efficiens, vel movens, vel agens, vel unde est principium motus. From this it is plain, therefore, that there are three principles of nature: matter, form and privation. But these are not sufficient for generation. What is in potency cannot reduce itself to act: for example, the bronze which is in potency to being a statue cannot cause itself to be a statue. Rather, it needs an agent so that the form of the statue can pass from potency to act. Neither can the form draw itself from potency to act. I mean the form of the thing generated which we say is the term of generation, because the form exists only in that which has been made to be. However, what is made is in the state of becoming as long as the thing is coming to be. Therefore, it is necessary that besides the matter and form there be some principle which acts. This is called the efficient, moving, or agent cause, or that from which the principle of motion is. Et quia, ut dicit Aristoteles in II Metaphysicae, omne quod agit non agit nisi intendendo aliquid, oportet esse aliud quartum, id scilicet quod intenditur ab operante: et hoc dicitur finis. Et sciendum quod omne agens, tam naturale quam voluntarium, intendit finem; non tamen sequitur quod omne agens cognoscat finem, vel deliberet de fine. Cognoscere enim finem est necessarium in his quorum actiones non sunt determinatae, sed se habent ad opposita, sicut se habent agentia voluntaria; et ideo oportet quod cognoscant finem per quem suas actiones determinent. Sed in agentibus naturalibus sunt actiones determinatae, unde non est necessarium eligere ea quae sunt ad finem. Also, because, as Aristotle says in the second book of the Metaphysics, everything which acts, acts only by intending something, there must be some fourth thing: namely, that which is intended by the agent; and this is called the end. Again, we should notice that, although every agent, both natural and voluntary, intends an end, still it does not follow that every agent knows the end or deliberates about the end. To know the end is necessary in those whose actions are not determined, but which may act for opposed ends (as, for example, voluntary agents). Therefore, it is necessary that these know the end by which they determine their actions. But in natural agents the actions are determined; hence, it is not necessary to choose those things which are for the end. Et ponit exemplum Avicenna de citharaedo, quem non oportet de qualibet percussione chordarum deliberare, cum percussiones sint determinatae apud ipsum: alioquin esset inter percussiones mora, quod esset absonum. Magis autem videtur de operante voluntarie quod deliberet quam de agente naturali: et ita patet per locum a maiori quod possibile est agens naturale sine deliberatione intendere finem. Et hoc intendere nihil aliud erat quam habere naturalem inclinationem ad aliquid. Avicenna gives the following example. A harpist does not have to deliberate about the notes in any particular chord, since these are already determined for him; otherwise, there would be a delay between the notes, which would cause discord. However, it seems more reasonable to attribute deliberation to a voluntary agent than to a natural agent: and thus it is clear, by reasoning from the greater thing to the lesser, that a natural agent can intend the end without deliberation. Therefore, it is possible for the natural agent to intend the end without deliberation; and to intend this is nothing else than to have a natural inclination to something. Ex dictis ergo patet quod sunt quatuor causae, scilicet materialis, efficiens, formalis et finalis. Licet autem principium et causa dicantur convertibiliter, ut dicitur in V Metaphysicae, tamen Aristoteles in libro Physicorum ponit quatuor causas et tria principia. Causas autem accipit tam pro extrinsecis quam pro intrinsecis: materia et forma dicuntur intrinsecae rei eo quod sunt partes constituentes rem, efficiens et finalis dicuntur extrinsecae quia sunt extra rem; sed principia accipit solum causas intrinsecas. Privatio autem non nominatur inter causas, quia est principium per accidens, ut dictum est. Et cum dicimus quatuor causas, intelligimus de causis per se, ad quas tamen causae per accidens reducuntur, quia omne quod est per accidens reducitur ad id quod est per se. From the above it is plain that there are four causes: material, efficient, formal and final. But, although principle and cause are used convertibly, as is said in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, still, in the Physics, Aristotle gives four causes and three principles, because he takes as causes both what is extrinsic and what is intrinsic. Matter and form are said to be intrinsic to the thing because they are parts constituting the thing; the efficient and final causes are said to be extrinsic because they are outside the thing. But he takes as principles only the intrinsic causes. Privation, however, is not listed among the causes because it is an accidental principle, as was said. When we say that there are four causes we mean the essential causes, to which all the accidental causes are reduced, because everything which is accidental is reduced to that which is essential. Sed licet principia ponat Aristoteles pro causis intrinsecis in I Physicorum, tamen, ut dicitur in XI Metaphysicae, principium dicitur proprie de causis extrinsecis, elementum de causis quae sunt partes rei, id est de causis intrinsecis, causa dicitur de utrisque; tamen aliquando unum ponitur pro altero: omnis enim causa potest dici principium et omne principium causa. Sed tamen causa videtur addere supra principium communiter dictum, quia id quod est primum, sive consequatur esse posterius sive non, potest dici principium, sicut faber dicitur principium cultelli ut ex eius operatione est esse cultelli; sed quando aliquid movetur de nigredine ad albedinem, dicitur quod nigrum est principium illius motus, et universaliter omne id a quo incipit esse motus dicitur principium: tamen nigredo non est id ex quo consequatur esse albedo. Sed causa solum dicitur de illo primo ex quo consequitur esse posterioris: unde dicitur quod causa est ex cuius esse sequitur aliud; et ideo illud primum a quo incipit esse motus non potest dici causa per se, etsi dicatur principium. Et propter hoc privatio ponitur inter principia et non inter causas, quia privatio est id a quo incipit generatio; sed potest etiam dici causa per accidens, in quantum concidit materiae, ut supra expositum est. And, although Aristotle calls intrinsic causes ‘principles’ in the first book of the Physics, still, principle is applied properly to extrinsic causes, as is said in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics. ‘Element’ is used for those causes which are parts of the thing (namely, for the intrinsic causes). ‘Cause’ is applied to both. Nevertheless, one is sometimes used for the other: every cause can be called a principle and every principle a cause. However, cause seems to add something to principle as commonly used, because that which is primary, whether the existence of a posterior follows from it or not, can be called a principle: for example, the smith is called the principle of the knife because the existence of the knife comes from his operation. But when something is moved from whiteness to blackness, whiteness is said to be the principle of that motion; and universally, everything from which motion begins is called a principle. However, whiteness is not that from which the existence of blackness follows. But cause is said primarily only of that from which the existence of the posterior follows. Hence we say that a cause is that from whose existence another follows. Therefore, that primarily from which motion begins cannot really be called a cause, even though it may be called a principle. Because of this, privation is placed among the principles and not among the causes, because privation is that from which generation begins. But it can also be called an accidental cause insofar as it is coincident with matter, as was said above. Elementum vero non dicitur proprie nisi de causis ex quibus est compositio rei, quae proprie sunt materiales; et iterum non de qualibet causa materiali, sed de illa ex qua est prima compositio, sicut nec membra elementa sunt hominis, quia membra etiam sunt composita ex aliis: sed dicimus quod terra et aqua sunt elementa, quia haec non componuntur ex aliis corporibus, sed ex ipsis est prima compositio corporum naturalium. Unde Aristoteles in V Metaphysicae dicit quod elementum est id ex quo componitur res primo, et est in ea, et non dividitur secundum formam. Element, on the other hand, is applied properly only to the causes of which the thing is composed, which are properly the materials. Moreover, it is not said of just any material cause, but of that one of which a thing is primarily composed; for example, we do not say that the members of the body are the elements of man, because the members also are composed of other things. Rather, we say that earth and water are the elements, because these are not composed of other bodies, but natural bodies are primarily composed of them. Hence Aristotle says, in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, that an element is that of which a thing is primarily composed, which is in that thing, and which is not divided by a form. Expositio primae particulae, ex quo componitur res primo, patet per ea quae diximus. Secunda particula, scilicet et est in ea, ponitur ad differentiam illius materiae quae ex toto corrumpitur per generationem, sicut panis est materia sanguinis, sed non generatur sanguis nisi corrumpatur panis, unde panis non remanet in sanguine: unde non potest dici panis elementum sanguinis; sed elementa oportet aliquo modo manere cum non corrumpantur, ut dicitur in libro de Generatione. Tertia particula, scilicet et non dividitur secundum formam, ponitur ad differentiam eorum scilicet quae habent partes diversas in forma, id est in specie, sicut manus cuius partes sunt caro et ossa quae differunt secundum speciem; sed elementum non dividitur in partes diversas secundum speciem, sicut aqua cuius quaelibet pars est aqua. Non enim oportet ad esse elementi ut non dividatur secundum quantitatem, sed sufficit si non dividatur secundum speciem; et si etiam non dividatur, dicitur elementum, sicut litterae dicuntur elementa dictionum. Patet igitur quod principium quodammodo in plus habet se quam causa, et causa in plus quam elementum: et hoc est quod dicit Commentator in V Metaphysicae. The explanation of the first part of the definition, that of which a thing is primarily composed, is plain from the preceding. The second part, which is in that thing, differentiates it from that matter which is entirely corrupted by generation; for example, bread is the matter of blood, but blood is generated only by the corruption of bread. Thus bread does not remain in blood; and therefore bread cannot be called an element of blood. But the elements must remain in some way, since they are not entirely corrupted, as is said in the book On Generation. The third part, and which is not divided by a form, differentiates an element from those things which have parts diverse in form (that is, in species), as the hand whose parts are flesh and bone, which differ according to species. An element is not divided into parts diverse according to species: rather, it is like water whose every part is water. For an element to exist, it need not be undivided by quantity; rather, it is sufficient that it be undivided by form. Even if it is in no way divided, it is called an element, just as letters are the elements of words. This it is plain from what was said that ‘principle,’ in some way, applies to more than does ‘cause,’ and ‘cause’ to more than does ‘element.’ This is what the Commentator says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. Capitulum 4 Chapter 4 Coincidence of causes Viso igitur quod quatuor sunt causarum genera, sciendum est quod non est impossibile quod idem habeat plures causas, ut idolum cuius causa est cuprum et artifex, sed artifex ut efficiens, cuprum ut materia. Non autem est impossibile ut idem sit causa contrariorum, sicut gubernator est causa salutis navis et submersionis, sed huius per absentiam, illius quidem per praesentiam. Now that we have seen that there are four genera of causes, we must understand that it is not impossible that the same thing have many causes. For example, the statue whose causes are both the bronze and the artist: the artist is the efficient cause while the bronze is the material cause. Nor is it impossible that the same thing be the cause of contraries; for example, the captain is the cause of the safety of the ship and of its sinking. He is the cause of the latter by his absence and of the former by his presence. Sciendum est etiam quod possibile est ut aliquid idem sit causa et causatum respectu eiusdem, sed diversimode: ut deambulatio est causa sanitatis ut efficiens, sed sanitas est causa deambulationis ut finis, deambulatio enim est aliquando propter sanitatem; et etiam corpus est materia animae, anima vero est forma corporis. Efficiens enim dicitur causa respectu finis, cum finis non sit in actu nisi per operationem agentis; sed finis dicitur causa efficientis, cum non operetur nisi per intentionem finis. Unde efficiens est causa illius quod est finis—ut sit sanitas—non tamen facit finem esse finem; et ita non est causa causalitatis finis, id est non facit finem esse finalem: sicut medicus facit sanitatem esse in actu, non tamen facit quod sanitas sit finis. Also, notice that it is possible that the same thing be a cause and the thing caused with respect to the same thing, but in diverse ways. For example, walking is sometimes the cause of health, as the efficient cause, but health is the cause of the walking, as the end: walking is sometimes on account of health. Also, the body is the matter of the soul, but the soul is the form of the body. The efficient cause is called a cause with respect to the end, since the end is actual only by the operation of the agent. But the end is called the cause of the efficient cause, since the efficient cause does not operate except by the intention of the end. Hence the efficient cause is the cause of that which is the end—for example, walking in order to be healthy. However, the efficient cause does not cause the end to be the end. Therefore, it is not the cause of the causality of the end; that is, it does not cause the end to be the final cause. For example, the doctor causes health to actually exist, but he does not cause health to be the end. Finis autem non est causa illius quod est efficiens, sed est causa ut efficiens sit efficiens; sanitas enim non facit medicum esse medicum—et dico sanitatem quae fit operante medico—sed facit ut medicus sit efficiens. Unde finis est causa causalitatis efficientis, quia facit efficiens esse efficiens; similiter facit materiam esse materiam et formam esse formam, cum materia non suscipiat formam nisi per finem, et forma non perficiat materiam nisi per finem. Unde dicitur quod finis est causa causarum, quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis. Also, the end is not the cause of that which is the efficient cause, but it is the cause of the efficient cause being an efficient cause. For example, health does not cause the doctor to be a doctor—I am speaking of the health which comes about by the doctor’s activity—but it causes the doctor to be an efficient cause. Therefore, the end is the cause of the causality of the efficient cause, because it causes the efficient cause to be an efficient cause. Likewise, the end causes the matter to be the matter and the form to be the form, since matter receives the form only for the sake of the end and the form perfects the matter only through the end. Therefore, we say that the end is the cause of causes, because it is the cause of the causality in all causes. Materia enim dicitur causa formae in quantum forma non est nisi in materia; et similiter forma est causa materiae in quantum materia non habet esse in actu nisi per formam: materia enim et forma dicuntur relative ad invicem, ut dicitur in II Physicorum; dicuntur enim ad compositum sicut partes ad totum et simplex ad compositum. Also, we say that matter is the cause of the form, insofar as the form exists only in matter. Likewise, the form is the cause of the matter, insofar as matter has existence in act only through the form, because matter and form are spoken of in relation to each other, as is said in the second book of the Physics. They are also spoken of in relation to the composite, as the part to the whole and as the simple to the composed. Sed quia omnis causa in quantum est causa naturaliter prior est causato, sciendum quod prius dicitur duobus modis, ut dicit Aristoteles in XVI de Animalibus: per quorum diversitatem potest aliquid dici prius et posterius respectu eiusdem et causa et causatum. Dicitur enim aliquid prius altero generatione et tempore, et iterum in substantia et complemento. Cum ergo naturae operatio procedat ab imperfecto ad perfectum et ab incompleto ad completum, imperfectum est prius perfecto secundum generationem et tempus, sed perfectum est prius in complemento: sicut potest dici quod vir est ante puerum in substantia et complemento, sed puer est ante virum generatione et tempore. But, because every cause, as cause, is naturally prior to that which it causes, notice that we say a thing is prior in two ways, as Aristotle says in the History of Animals XVI. Because of this diversity, we can call something prior and posterior with respect to the same thing, both the cause and the thing caused. We say that one thing is prior to another from the point of view of generation and time, and likewise from the point of view of substance and completeness. Since the operation of nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect and from the incomplete to the complete, the imperfect is prior to the perfect (namely, from the point of view of generation and time), but the perfect prior to the imperfect from the point of view of substance. For example, we can say that the man is before the boy according to substance and completeness, but the boy is before the man according to generation and time. Sed licet in rebus generabilibus imperfectum sit prius perfecto et potentia prior actu, considerando in aliquo eodem quod prius est imperfectum quam perfectum et in potentia quam in actu, simpliciter tamen loquendo oportet actum et perfectum prius esse, quia quod reducit potentiam ad actum actu est, et quod perficit imperfectum perfectum est. Materia quidem est prior forma generatione et tempore, prius enim est cui advenit quam quod advenit; forma vero est prior materia perfectione, quia materia non habet esse completum nisi per formam. Similiter efficiens prior est fine generatione et tempore, cum ab efficiente fiat motus ad finem; sed finis est prior efficiente in quantum est efficiens in substantia et complemento, cum actio efficientis non compleatur nisi per finem. Igitur istae duae causae, scilicet materia et efficiens, sunt prius per viam generationis, sed forma et finis sunt prius per viam perfectionis. But, although in generable things the imperfect is prior to the perfect and potency to act, when we consider that in one and the same thing the imperfect is prior to the perfect and potency to act, still, simply speaking, the act and the perfect must be prior, because it is what is in act that reduces potency to act and it is the perfect that perfects the imperfect. Matter is prior to form from the point of view of generation and time because that to which something comes is prior to that which comes to it. But form is prior to matter from the point of view of substance and completeness, because matter has completed existence only through the form. Likewise, the efficient cause is prior to the end from the point of view of generation and time, since the motion to the end comes from the efficient cause. But the end is prior to the efficient cause, insofar as it is the efficient cause from the point of view of substance and completeness, since the action of the efficient cause is completed only through the end. Therefore, these two causes, the material and the efficient, are prior by way of generation, but the form and the end are prior by way of perfection. Et notandum quod duplex est necessitas, scilicet necessitas absoluta et necessitas conditionalis. Necessitas quidem absoluta est quae procedit a causis prioribus in via generationis, quae sunt materia et efficiens, sicut necessitas mortis quae provenit ex materia et ex dispositione contrariorum componentium: et haec dicitur absoluta, quia non habet impedimentum; haec etiam dicitur necessitas materiae. Necessitas autem conditionalis procedit a causis posterioribus in generatione, scilicet a forma et fine, sicut dicimus quod necessarium est esse conceptionem si debeat generari homo; et ista est conditionalis, quia hanc mulierem concipere non est necessarium simpliciter, sed sub conditione: si debeat generari homo. Et haec dicitur necessitas finis. It must be noted that there are two kinds of necessity: absolute and conditional. Absolute necessity is that which proceeds from the causes prior by way of generation: the material and the efficient causes. An example of this is the necessity of death which comes from the matter: namely, the disposition of the composing contraries. This is called ‘absolute’ because it does not have an impediment. It is also called the necessity of matter. Conditional necessity, on the other hand, proceeds from causes posterior in generation: namely, the form and the end. For example, we say that conception is necessary if a man is to be generated. This is called ‘conditional’ because it is not necessary simply that this woman conceive, but only conditionally, namely, if a man is to be generated. This is called the necessity of the end. Et est sciendum quod tres causae possunt incidere in unum, scilicet forma, finis et efficiens, sicut patet in generatione ignis: ignis enim generat ignem, ergo ignis est causa efficiens in quantum generat; et iterum ignis est forma in quantum facit esse actu quod prius erat potentia; et iterum est finis in quantum est intentum ab agente et in quantum terminantur ad ipsum operationes ipsius agentis. Notice, also, that three causes can coincide in one thing—namely, the form, the end and the efficient cause—as is plain in the generation of fire. Fire generates fire; therefore, fire is the efficient cause insofar as it generates. Fire is also the formal cause insofar as it causes to exist actually that which before was in potency. Again, it is the end insofar as the operations of the agent are terminated in it and insofar as it is intended by the agent. Sed duplex est finis, scilicet finis generationis et finis rei generatae, sicut patet in generatione cultelli: forma enim cultelli est finis generationis, sed incidere quod est operatio cultelli, est finis ipsius generati, scilicet cultelli. Finis autem generationis concidit ex duabus dictis causis aliquando, scilicet quando fit generatio a simili in specie, sicut homo generat hominem et oliva olivam: quod non potest intelligi de fine rei generatae. But the end is twofold: the end of generation and the end of the thing generated, as is plain in the generation of a knife. The form of the knife is the end of generation; but cutting, which is the operation of the knife, is the end of the thing generated, namely, of the knife. Moreover, the end of generation sometimes is coincident with the two aforementioned causes: namely, when generation takes place from what is similar in species, as when man generates man and the olive, an olive. But this cannot be understood of the end of the thing generated. Sciendum autem quod finis incidit cum forma in idem numero, quia illud idem in numero quod est forma generati est finis generationis. Sed cum efficiente non incidit in idem numero, sed in idem specie; impossibile est enim ut faciens et factum sint idem numero, sed possunt esse idem specie: ut quando homo generat hominem, homo generans et generatus sunt diversa in numero sed idem in specie. Notice that the end coincides with the form in something which is numerically the same, because that which is the form of the thing generated and that which is the end of generation are the same numerically. But it does not coincide with the efficient cause in a thing numerically the same, but in a thing specifically the same, because it is impossible that the maker and the thing made be numerically the same, but they can be specifically the same. Thus, when man generates man, the man generating and the one generated are numerically diverse, but they are specifically the same. Materia autem non concidit cum aliis, quia materia ex eo quod est ens in potentia, habet rationem imperfecti; sed aliae causae cum sint actu, habent rationem perfecti: perfectum autem et imperfectum non concidunt in idem. However, matter does not coincide with the others. This is because matter, by the fact that it is being in potency, has the nature of something imperfect; but the other causes, since they are in act, have the nature of something perfect. However, the perfect and the imperfect do not coincide in the same thing. Capitulum 5 Chapter 5 Causes and predication Viso igitur quod sint quatuor causae, scilicet efficiens, materialis, formalis et finalis, sciendum est quod quaelibet istarum causarum dividitur multis modis. Dicitur enim aliquid causa per prius et aliquid per posterius: sicut dicimus quod ars et medicus sunt causa sanitatis, sed ars est causa per prius et medicus per posterius; et similiter in causa formali et in aliis causis. Et nota quod semper debemus reducere quaestionem ad primam causam; ut si quaeratur Quare est iste sanus? dicendum est Quia medicus sanavit; et iterum Quare medicus sanavit? Propter artem sanandi quam habet. Therefore, now that we have seen that there are four causes—the efficient, formal, material and final—we must note that any of these causes can be spoken of in many ways. We call one thing a prior cause and another a posterior cause. For example, we say that art and the doctor are the cause of health, but art is a prior cause and the doctor is a posterior cause. And it is similar in the formal cause and in the other causes. Notice, also that we must always bring the question back to the first cause. For example, if it be asked: Why is this man healthy? we would answer: Because the doctor has healed him. Likewise, if it be asked: Why did the doctor heal him? we would say: Because of the art of healing which the doctor has. Sciendum est quod idem est dictu causa propinqua quod causa posterior, et causa remota quod causa prior; unde istae duae divisiones causarum, alia per prius alia per posterius, et causarum alia remota alia propinqua, idem significant. Hoc autem observandum est quod semper illud quod universalius est causa remota dicitur, quod autem specialius causa propinqua: sicut dicimus quod forma hominis propinqua est sua definitio, scilicet animal rationale mortale, sed animal est magis remota, et iterum substantia remotior est. Omnia enim superiora sunt formae inferiorum. Et similiter materia idoli propinqua est cuprum, sed remota est metallum, et iterum remotius corpus. Notice, also, that the proximate cause is the same as the posterior cause and that the remote cause is the same as the prior cause. Hence these two divisions of causes into prior and posterior, remote and proximate signify the same thing. Moreover, it must be observed that that which is more universal is always called the remote cause, but that which is more particular is called the proximate cause. For example, we say that the proximate form of man is his definition, namely, rational animal; but animal is more remote and substance is still more remote. All superiors are forms of the inferiors. Again, the proximate matter of the statue is bronze, but the remote matter is metal, and the still more remote is body. Item causarum alia est per se, alia per accidens. Causa per se dicitur causa alicuius rei in quantum huiusmodi, sicut aedificator est causa domus et lignum materia scamni. Causa per accidens est illa quae accidit causae per se, sicut cum dicimus ‘Grammaticus aedificat’; grammaticus enim dicitur causa aedificationis per accidens, non enim in quantum grammaticus sed in quantum accidit aedificatori. Et similiter est in aliis causis. Further, there is one cause which is an essential cause, another which is accidental. An essential cause is said of one which is the cause of something as such: for example, the builder is the cause of the house and the wood is the matter of the bench. An accidental cause is said of one which happens to an essential cause. For example, we say that ‘the grammarian builds’; the grammarian is called the cause of the building accidentally, not insofar as he is a grammarian, but insofar as it happens to the builder that he is a grammarian; and it is similar in other causes. Item causarum quaedam est simplex et quaedam composita. Simplex causa dicitur quando solum dicitur causa illud quod per se est causa, vel etiam solum illud quod est per accidens: sicut si dicamus aedificatorem esse causam domus, et similiter si dicamus medicum esse causam domus. Composita autem dicitur quando utrumque dicitur causa, ut si dicamus aedificator medicus est causa domus. Potest etiam dici causa simplex, secundum quod exponit Avicenna, illud quod sine adiunctione alterius est causa, sicut cuprum idoli, sine adiunctione enim alterius materiae ex cupro fit idolum; et sicut dicitur quod medicus facit sanitatem, vel quod ignis calefacit. Composita autem causa est quando oportet plura advenire ad hoc quod sit causa, sicut unus homo non est causa motus navis, sed multi; et sicut unus lapis non est materia domus, sed multi. Likewise, some causes are simple, others are composed. A cause is simple when that alone is said to be the cause which is the essential cause, or that alone which is the accidental cause; as if we were to say that the builder is the cause of the house and likewise if we were to say that the doctor is the cause of the house. A cause is composed when both are said to be the cause, as if we were to say that the medical builder is the cause of the house. According to the explanation of Avicenna, that can be called a simple cause also which is a cause without the addition of another. For example, bronze is the cause of the statue without the addition of another matter, because the statue is made of bronze; and we say that the doctor causes health or that fire heats. But a cause is composed when many things must come together in order that there be a cause. For example, not one man, but many, are the cause of the motion of a ship; and not one stone, but many, are the cause of a house. Item causarum quaedam est actu, quaedam potentia. Causa in actu est quae actu causat rem, sicut aedificator cum aedificat, vel cuprum cum ex eo est idolum; causa autem in potentia est quae, licet non causet rem in actu, tamen potest causare, ut aedificator dum non aedificat. Et sciendum quod loquendo de causis in actu, necessarium est causam et causatum simul esse, ita quod si unum sit, et alterum: si enim est aedificator in actu, oportet quod aedificet, et si sit aedificatio in actu, oportet quod sit aedificator in actu. Sed hoc non est necessarium in causis quae sunt solum in potentia. Again, some causes are in act, others are in potency. A cause in act is one which causes a thing in act, as the builder while he is building or the bronze when a statue is made of it. A cause in potency is one which, although it does not cause a thing in act, can cause it nevertheless, such as a builder when he is not building. Note that in speaking of causes in act, the cause and the thing caused must exist at the same time, so that if one exists the other does also. If there is a builder in act, he must be building and, if there is building in act, it is necessary that there be a builder in act. But this is not necessary in causes which are only in potency. Sciendum est autem quod causa universalis comparatur causato universali, causa vero singularis comparatur causato singulari: sicut dicimus quod aedificator est causa domus, et hic aedificator huius domus. Moreover, it should be noted that the universal cause is compared to the universal thing that is caused and the singular cause is compared to the singular thing that is caused. For example, we say that a builder is the cause of a house and that this builder is the cause of this house. Capitulum 6 Chapter 6 Analogy Sciendum est etiam quod loquendo de principiis intrinsecis, scilicet materia et forma, secundum convenientiam principiatorum et differentiam est convenientia et differentia principiorum. Quaedam enim sunt idem numero, sicut Socrates et ‘hic homo’ demonstrato Socrate; quaedam sunt diversa numero et sunt idem in specie, ut Socrates et Plato, qui licet conveniant in specie humana, tamen differunt numero. Quaedam autem differunt specie sed sunt idem genere, sicut homo et asinus conveniunt in genere animalis; quaedam autem sunt diversa in genere sed sunt idem solum secundum analogiam, sicut substantia et quantitas, quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere sed conveniunt solum secundum analogiam: conveniunt enim in eo solum quod est ens, ens autem non est genus, quia non praedicatur univoce sed analogice. Also, notice that, when we speak of intrinsic principles (namely, matter and form), according to the agreement and difference of things that are from principles and according to the agreement and difference of principles, we find that some are numerically the same, as are Socrates and this man in the Socrates now pointed out. Others are numerically diverse and specifically the same, as Socrates and Plato who, although they differ numerically, have the same human species. Others differ specifically but are generically the same, as man and ass have the same genus of animal. Others are generically diverse and are only analogically the same, as substance and quantity which have no common genus and are only analogically the same, because they are the same only insofar as they are beings. Being, however, is not a genus because it is not predicated univocally, but only analogically. Ad huius intelligentiam sciendum est quod tripliciter aliquid praedicatur de pluribus: univoce, aequivoce et analogice. Univoce praedicatur quod praedicatur secundum idem nomen et secundum rationem eamdem, id est definitionem, sicut animal praedicatur de homine et de asino: utrumque enim dicitur animal, et utrumque est substantia animata sensibilis, quod est definitio animalis. Aequivoce praedicatur quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et secundum diversam rationem, sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et de caelesti, quae conveniunt solum in nomine et non in definitione sive significatione; id enim quod significatur per nomen est definitio, sicut dicitur in IV Metaphysicae. Analogice dicitur praedicari quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt, sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem, sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem significat in omnibus: dicitur enim de urina ut de signo sanitatis, de corpore ut de subiecto, de potione ut de causa. Sed tamen omnes istae rationes attribuuntur uni fini, scilicet sanitati. In order to understand this last we must notice something is predicated of many things in three ways: univocally, equivocally, and analogically. Something is predicated univocally according to the same name and the same nature (that is, definition), as ‘animal’ is predicated of man and of ass because each is called animal and each is a sensible, animated substance, which is the definition of animal. That is predicated equivocally which is predicated of some things according to the same name but according to a different nature, as ‘dog’ is said of the thing that barks and of the star in the heavens, which two agree in the name but not in the definition or in signification, because that which is signified by the name is the definition, as is said in the fourth book of the Metaphysics. That is said to be predicated analogically which is predicated of many whose natures are diverse but which are attributed to one same thing, as ‘health’ is said of the animal body, or of urine and of food. But it does not signify entirely the same thing in all three. It is said of urine as a sign of health, of body as of a subject and of food as of a cause. But all these natures are attributed to one end: namely, to health. Aliquando enim ea quae conveniunt secundum analogiam, id est in proportione vel comparatione vel convenientia, attribuuntur uni fini, sicut patet in praedicto exemplo; aliquando uni agenti, sicut medicus dicitur et de eo qui operatur per artem et de eo qui operatur sine arte, ut vetula, et etiam de instrumentis, sed per attributionem ad unum agens quod est medicina; aliquando autem per attributionem ad unum subiectum, sicut ens dicitur de substantia, de qualitate et quantitate et aliis praedicamentis: non enim ex toto est eadem ratio qua substantia est ens et quantitas et alia, sed omnia dicuntur ex eo quod attribuuntur substantiae, quod est subiectum aliorum. Et ideo ens dicitur per prius de substantia et per posterius de aliis; et ideo ens non est genus substantiae et quantitatis, quia nullum genus praedicatur per prius et posterius de suis speciebus, sed praedicatur analogice. Et hoc est quod diximus, quod substantia et quantitas differunt genere sed sunt idem analogia. Sometimes those things which agree according to analogy—that is, in proportion, comparison, or agreement—are attributed to one end, as was plain in the preceding example of health. Sometimes they are attributed to one agent, as ‘medical’ is said of one who acts with art, of one who acts without art (like a midwife), and even of the instruments; but it is said of all by attribution to one agent, which is medicine. Sometimes it is said by attribution to one subject, as ‘being’ is said of substance, quantity, quality, and the other predicaments, because it is not entirely for the same reason that substance is being, and quantity and the others. Rather, all are called being insofar as they are attributed to substance, which is the subject of the others. Hence ‘being’ is said primarily of substance and secondarily of the others. Therefore, being is not a genus of substance and quantity because no genus is predicated of its species according to prior and posterior. Rather, being is predicated analogically. This is what we mean when we say that substance and quantity differ generically but are the same analogically. Eorum igitur quae sunt idem numero, forma et materia sunt idem numero, ut Tullii et Ciceronis; eorum autem quae sunt idem in specie, diversa numero, etiam materia et forma non est eadem numero sed specie, sicut Socratis et Platonis. Et similiter eorum quae sunt idem genere, et principia sunt idem genere, ut anima et corpus asini et equi differunt specie, sed sunt idem genere. Et similiter eorum quae conveniunt secundum analogiam tantum, principia sunt eadem secundum analogiam tantum sive proportionem. Materia enim et forma et privatio, sive potentia et actus, sunt principia substantiae et aliorum generum; tamen materia substantiae et quantitatis, et similiter forma et privatio, differunt genere, sed conveniunt solum secundum proportionem in hoc quod, sicut se habet materia substantiae ad substantiam in ratione materiae, ita se habet materia quantitatis ad quantitatem. Sicut tamen substantia est causa ceterorum, ita principia substantiae sunt principia omnium aliorum. Therefore, the form and matter of those things which are numerically the same are themselves likewise numerically the same, as are the form and matter of Tullius and Cicero. The matter and form of those things which are specifically the same and numerically diverse are not the same numerically, but specifically, as the matter and form of Socrates and Plato. Likewise, the matter and form of those things which are generically the same, as the soul and body of an ass and a horse differ specifically but are the same generically. Likewise, the principles of those things which agree only analogically or proportionally are the same only analogically or proportionally, because matter, form and privation or potency and act are the principles of substance and of the other genera. However, the matter, form and privation of substance and of quantity differ generically, but they agree according to proportion only, insofar as the matter of substance is to substance, in the nature of matter, as the matter of quantity is to quantity. Still, just as substance is the cause of the others, so the principles of substance are the principles of all the others.