Sciendum est etiam quod loquendo de principiis intrinsecis, scilicet materia et forma, secundum convenientiam principiatorum et differentiam est convenientia et differentia principiorum. Quaedam enim sunt idem numero, sicut Socrates et ‘hic homo’ demonstrato Socrate; quaedam sunt diversa numero et sunt idem in specie, ut Socrates et Plato, qui licet conveniant in specie humana, tamen differunt numero. Quaedam autem differunt specie sed sunt idem genere, sicut homo et asinus conveniunt in genere animalis; quaedam autem sunt diversa in genere sed sunt idem solum secundum analogiam, sicut substantia et quantitas, quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere sed conveniunt solum secundum analogiam: conveniunt enim in eo solum quod est ens, ens autem non est genus, quia non praedicatur univoce sed analogice.
Also, notice that, when we speak of intrinsic principles (namely, matter and form), according to the agreement and difference of things that are from principles and according to the agreement and difference of principles, we find that some are numerically the same, as are Socrates and this man in the Socrates now pointed out. Others are numerically diverse and specifically the same, as Socrates and Plato who, although they differ numerically, have the same human species. Others differ specifically but are generically the same, as man and ass have the same genus of animal. Others are generically diverse and are only analogically the same, as substance and quantity which have no common genus and are only analogically the same, because they are the same only insofar as they are beings. Being, however, is not a genus because it is not predicated univocally, but only analogically.
Ad huius intelligentiam sciendum est quod tripliciter aliquid praedicatur de pluribus: univoce, aequivoce et analogice. Univoce praedicatur quod praedicatur secundum idem nomen et secundum rationem eamdem, id est definitionem, sicut animal praedicatur de homine et de asino: utrumque enim dicitur animal, et utrumque est substantia animata sensibilis, quod est definitio animalis. Aequivoce praedicatur quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et secundum diversam rationem, sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et de caelesti, quae conveniunt solum in nomine et non in definitione sive significatione; id enim quod significatur per nomen est definitio, sicut dicitur in IV Metaphysicae. Analogice dicitur praedicari quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt, sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem, sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem significat in omnibus: dicitur enim de urina ut de signo sanitatis, de corpore ut de subiecto, de potione ut de causa. Sed tamen omnes istae rationes attribuuntur uni fini, scilicet sanitati.
In order to understand this last we must notice something is predicated of many things in three ways: univocally, equivocally, and analogically. Something is predicated univocally according to the same name and the same nature (that is, definition), as ‘animal’ is predicated of man and of ass because each is called animal and each is a sensible, animated substance, which is the definition of animal. That is predicated equivocally which is predicated of some things according to the same name but according to a different nature, as ‘dog’ is said of the thing that barks and of the star in the heavens, which two agree in the name but not in the definition or in signification, because that which is signified by the name is the definition, as is said in the fourth book of the Metaphysics. That is said to be predicated analogically which is predicated of many whose natures are diverse but which are attributed to one same thing, as ‘health’ is said of the animal body, or of urine and of food. But it does not signify entirely the same thing in all three. It is said of urine as a sign of health, of body as of a subject and of food as of a cause. But all these natures are attributed to one end: namely, to health.
Aliquando enim ea quae conveniunt secundum analogiam, id est in proportione vel comparatione vel convenientia, attribuuntur uni fini, sicut patet in praedicto exemplo; aliquando uni agenti, sicut medicus dicitur et de eo qui operatur per artem et de eo qui operatur sine arte, ut vetula, et etiam de instrumentis, sed per attributionem ad unum agens quod est medicina; aliquando autem per attributionem ad unum subiectum, sicut ens dicitur de substantia, de qualitate et quantitate et aliis praedicamentis: non enim ex toto est eadem ratio qua substantia est ens et quantitas et alia, sed omnia dicuntur ex eo quod attribuuntur substantiae, quod est subiectum aliorum. Et ideo ens dicitur per prius de substantia et per posterius de aliis; et ideo ens non est genus substantiae et quantitatis, quia nullum genus praedicatur per prius et posterius de suis speciebus, sed praedicatur analogice. Et hoc est quod diximus, quod substantia et quantitas differunt genere sed sunt idem analogia.
Sometimes those things which agree according to analogy—that is, in proportion, comparison, or agreement—are attributed to one end, as was plain in the preceding example of health. Sometimes they are attributed to one agent, as ‘medical’ is said of one who acts with art, of one who acts without art (like a midwife), and even of the instruments; but it is said of all by attribution to one agent, which is medicine. Sometimes it is said by attribution to one subject, as ‘being’ is said of substance, quantity, quality, and the other predicaments, because it is not entirely for the same reason that substance is being, and quantity and the others. Rather, all are called being insofar as they are attributed to substance, which is the subject of the others. Hence ‘being’ is said primarily of substance and secondarily of the others. Therefore, being is not a genus of substance and quantity because no genus is predicated of its species according to prior and posterior. Rather, being is predicated analogically. This is what we mean when we say that substance and quantity differ generically but are the same analogically.
Eorum igitur quae sunt idem numero, forma et materia sunt idem numero, ut Tullii et Ciceronis; eorum autem quae sunt idem in specie, diversa numero, etiam materia et forma non est eadem numero sed specie, sicut Socratis et Platonis. Et similiter eorum quae sunt idem genere, et principia sunt idem genere, ut anima et corpus asini et equi differunt specie, sed sunt idem genere. Et similiter eorum quae conveniunt secundum analogiam tantum, principia sunt eadem secundum analogiam tantum sive proportionem. Materia enim et forma et privatio, sive potentia et actus, sunt principia substantiae et aliorum generum; tamen materia substantiae et quantitatis, et similiter forma et privatio, differunt genere, sed conveniunt solum secundum proportionem in hoc quod, sicut se habet materia substantiae ad substantiam in ratione materiae, ita se habet materia quantitatis ad quantitatem. Sicut tamen substantia est causa ceterorum, ita principia substantiae sunt principia omnium aliorum.
Therefore, the form and matter of those things which are numerically the same are themselves likewise numerically the same, as are the form and matter of Tullius and Cicero. The matter and form of those things which are specifically the same and numerically diverse are not the same numerically, but specifically, as the matter and form of Socrates and Plato. Likewise, the matter and form of those things which are generically the same, as the soul and body of an ass and a horse differ specifically but are the same generically. Likewise, the principles of those things which agree only analogically or proportionally are the same only analogically or proportionally, because matter, form and privation or potency and act are the principles of substance and of the other genera. However, the matter, form and privation of substance and of quantity differ generically, but they agree according to proportion only, insofar as the matter of substance is to substance, in the nature of matter, as the matter of quantity is to quantity. Still, just as substance is the cause of the others, so the principles of substance are the principles of all the others.