Fides autem Christiana principaliter consistit in sanctae Trinitatis confessione et specialiter gloriatur in cruce Domini nostri lesu Christi, nam verbum crucis, ut Paulus dicit, etsi pereuntibus stultitia sit, his autem qui salvi fiunt, id est nobis, virtus Dei est. Spes etiam nostra in duobus consistit, scilicet in eo quod expectatur post mortem et in auxilio Dei quo in hac vita iuvamur ad futuram beatitudinem per opera liberi arbitrii promerendam. The Christian faith principally consists in acknowledging the holy Trinity, and it specially glories in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ. For the message of the cross, says Paul, is folly for those who are on the way to ruin, but for those of us who are on the road to salvation it is the power of God (1 Cor 1:18). Our hope is directed to two things: what we look forward to after death, and the help of God which carries us through this life to future happiness merited by works done by free will. Haec igitur sunt quae, ut asseris, ab infidelibus impugnantur et irridentur. Irrident enim Saraceni, ut dicis, quod Christum Dei Filium dicimus cum Deus uxorem non habeat; et reputant nos insanos quod tres personas confitemur in Deo, per hoc aestimantes nos tres deos profiteri. Irrident etiam quod Christum Dei Filium pro salute humani generis dicimus crucifixum, quia si est Deus omnipotens potuit absque sui Filii passione genus humanum salvare; potuit etiam sic constituere hominem ut peccare non posset. Improperant etiam Christianis quod cotidie in altari comedunt Deum suum et quod corpus Christi, si esset ita magnum sicut mons, iam deberet esse consumptum. The following are the things you say the Muslims attack and ridicule: they ridicule the fact that we say Christ is the Son of God, when God has no wife (Qur’ân 6:110; 72:3); and they think we are insane for professing three persons in God, even though we do not mean by this three gods. They also ridicule our saying that Christ the Son of God was crucified for the salvation of the human race (Qur’ân 4:157–8), for if almighty God could save the human race without the Son’s suffering he could also make man so that he could not sin. They also hold against Christians their claim to eat God on the altar, and that if the body of Christ were even as big as a mountain, by now it should have been eaten up. Circa statum vero animarum post mortem Graecos et Armenos asseris errare dicentes quod animae usque ad diem iudicii nec puniuntur nec praemiantur, sed sunt quasi in sequestro, quia nec poenam nec praemia debent habere sine corpore; et in sui erroris assertionem inducunt quod Dominus in evangelio dicit In domo Patris mei mansiones multae sunt. On the state of souls after death, you say that the Greeks and Armenians hold the error that souls after death are neither punished nor rewarded until the day of judgment, but are in some waiting room, since they can receive no punishment or reward without the body. To back up their error they quote the Lord in the Gospel: in my Father’s house there are many places to live in (John 14:2). Circa meritum vero quod ex libero dependet arbitrio, asseris tam Saracenos quam nationes alias necessitatem actibus humanis imponere ex praescientia vel ordinatione divina, dicentes quod homo non potest mori nec etiam peccare nisi sicut Deus ordinavit de homine, et quod quaelibet persona suum eventum habet scriptum in fronte. Concerning merit, which depends on free will, you assert that the Muslims and other nations hold that God’s foreknowledge or decree imposes necessity on human actions; thus they say that man cannot die or even sin unless God decrees this, and that every person has his destiny written on his forehead. Super quibus petis rationes morales et philosophicas quas Saraceni recipiunt; frustra enim videretur auctoritates inducere contra eos qui auctoritates non recipiunt. Tuae igitur petitioni quae ex pio desiderio videtur procedere, ut sis iuxta apostolicam doctrinam paratus ad satisfactionem omni poscenti te rationem, satisfacere volens, aliqua facilia secundum quod materia patitur super praemissis tibi exponam, quae tamen alibi diffusius pertractavi. On these questions you ask for moral and philosophical reasons which the Muslims can accept. For it would be useless to quote passages of Scripture against those who do not accept this authority. I wish to satisfy your request, which seems to arise from pious desire, so that you may be prepared with apostolic doctrine to satisfy anyone who asks you for an explanation. On these questions I will make some explanations as easy as the subjects allow, since I have written more amply about them elsewhere. Capitulum 2 Chapter 2 Qualiter sit disputandum contra infideles How to Argue with Unbelievers De hoc tamen primo admonere te volo quod in disputationibus contra infideles de articulis fidei, non ad hoc conari debes ut fidem rationibus necessariis probes, hoc enim sublimitati fidei derogaret cuius veritas non solum humanas mentes sed etiam angelorum excedit; a nobis autem creduntur quasi ab ipso Deo revelata. Quia tamen quod a summa veritate procedit falsum esse non potest, nec aliquid necessaria ratione impugnari valet quod falsum non est, sicut fides nostra necessariis rationibus probari non potest quia humanam mentem excedit, ita improbari necessaria ratione non potest propter sui veritatem. First of all I wish to warn you that in disputations with unbelievers about articles of the faith, you should not try to prove the faith by necessary reasons. This would belittle the sublimity of the faith, whose truth exceeds not only human minds but also those of angels; we believe in them only because they are revealed by God. Yet whatever come from the supreme truth cannot be false, and what is not false cannot be repudiated by any necessary reason. Just as our faith cannot be proved by necessary reasons, because it exceeds the human mind, so because of its truth it cannot be refuted by any necessary reason. Ad hoc igitur debet tendere christiani disputatoris intentio in articulis fidei, non ut fidem probet, sed ut fidem defendat; unde et beatus Petrus non dicit parati semper ad probationem sed ad satisfactionem, ut scilicet rationabiliter ostendatur non esse falsum quod fides catholica confitetur. So any Christian disputing about the articles of the faith should not try to prove the faith, but defend the faith. Thus blessed Peter did not say: always have your proof, but your answer ready (1 Pet 3:15), so that reason can show that what the Catholic faith holds is not false. Capitulum 3 Chapter 3 Qualiter in divinis generatio sit accipienda How Generation Applies to God The Trinity Primum igitur considerandum est derisibilem esse irrisionem qua nos irrident quod ponimus Christum Filium Dei, quasi Deus uxorem habuerit; cum enim sint carnales, non possunt nisi ea quae sunt carnis et sanguinis cogitare. Quilibet autem sapiens considerare potest quod non est idem modus generationis in omnibus rebus, sed in unaquaque re invenitur generatio secundum proprietatem suae naturae; in animalibus quidem quibusdam per maris et feminae commixtionem, in plantis vero per pullulationem seu germinationem, atque in aliis aliter. Deus autem non est carnalis naturae ut feminam requirat cui commisceatur ad prolis generationem, sed est spiritualis sive intellectualis naturae, immo magis supra omnem intellectum; est igitur in eo generatio accipienda secundum quod convenit intellectuali naturae. Et quamvis intellectus noster ab intellectu divino deficiat, non possumus tamen aliter loqui de intellectu divino nisi secundum similitudinem eorum quae in intellectu nostro invenimus. First of all we must observe that Muslims are silly in ridiculing us for holding that Christ is the Son of the living God, as if God had a wife. Since they are carnal, they can think only of what is flesh and blood. For any wise man can observe that the mode of generation is not the same for everything, but generation applies to each thing according to the special manner of its nature. In animals it is by copulation of male and female; in plants it is by pollination or generation, and in other things in other ways. God, however, is not of a fleshly nature, requiring a woman to copulate with to generate offspring, but he is of a spiritual or intellectual nature, much higher than every intellectual nature. So generation should be understood of God as it applies to an intellectual nature. Even though our own intellect falls far short of the divine intellect, we still have to speak of the divine intellect by comparing it with what we find in our own intellect. Est autem intellectus noster aliquando quidem in potentia intelligens, aliquando vero in actu. Quandocumque autem actu intelligit quoddam intelligibile format quod est quasi quaedam proles ipsius, unde et mentis conceptus nominatur; et hoc quidem est quod exteriori voce significatur, unde sicut vox significans verbum exterius dicitur, ita interior mentis conceptus verbo exteriori significatus dicitur verbum intellectus seu mentis. Our intellect understands sometimes potentially, sometimes actually. Whenever it actually understands it forms something intelligible, a kind of offspring, which is called a concept, something conceived by the mind. This is signified by an audible voice, so that as the audible voice is called the exterior word, the interior concept of the mind signified by the exterior audible word is called the word of the intellect or mind. Hic autem mentis nostrae conceptus non est ipsa mentis nostrae essentia, sed est quoddam accidens ei, quia nec ipsum intelligere nostrum est ipsum esse nostri intellectus, alioquin nunquam intellectus noster esset quin intelligeret actu. Verbum igitur intellectus nostri secundum quandam similitudinem dici potest vel conceptus vel proles, et praecipue cum intellectus noster se ipsum intelligit, in quantum scilicet est quaedam similitudo intellectus procedens ab eius intellectuali virtute, sicut et filius habet similitudinem patris procedens ab eius generativa virtute. Non tamen proprie verbum nostri intellectus potest dici proles vel filius, quia non est eiusdem naturae cuius est intellectus noster; non autem omne quod procedit ab aliquo, etiam si sit simile ei, dicitur filius, alioquin imago sui quam aliquis pingit proprie filius diceretur: sed ad hoc quod sit filius requiritur quod procedens et similitudinem habeat eius a quo procedit et sit eiusdem naturae cum ipso. A concept of our mind is not the very essence of our mind, but something accidental to it, because even our act of understanding is not the very being of our intellect; otherwise our intellect would have to be always in act. So the word of our intellect can be likened to a concept or offspring, especially when the intellect understands itself and the concept is a likeness of the intellect coming from its intellectual power, just as a son has a likeness to his father, from whose generative power he comes forth. The word of our intellect is not properly an offspring or son, because it is not of the same nature as our intellect. Not everything that comes forth from another, even if it is similar to its source, is called a son; otherwise a painted picture of someone would be a son. To be a son, it is required that the one coming forth from the other must not only resemble its source but also be of the same nature with it. Quia vero in Deo non est aliud intelligere quam suum esse, consequenter neque verbum quod in intellectu eius concipitur est aliquod accidens aut aliquid alienum ab eius natura; sed ex hoc ipso quod verbum est rationem habet procedentis ab altero et ut sit similitudo eius cuius est verbum: hoc enim in verbo nostro invenitur. Sed illud verbum divinum habet ulterius quod non sit aliquod accidens, neque aliqua pars Dei qui est simplex, neque aliquid alienum a divina natura, sed quoddam completum subsistens in natura divina habens rationem ab altero procedentis: sine hoc enim verbum intelligi non potest. But in God understanding is not different from his being. Consequently the word which is conceived in his intellect is not something accidental to him or alien from his nature but, by the very fact that it is a word, it must be coming forth from another and must be a likeness of its source. All this is true even of our own word. But besides this, the word of God is not an accident or a part of God, who is simple, nor something extrinsic to the divine nature, but is something complete, subsisting in the divine nature and coming forth from another, as any word must be. Hoc autem secundum humanae locutionis consuetudinem filius nominatur quod procedit ab alio in similitudinem eius, subsistens in eadem natura cum ipso. Secundum igitur quod divina verbis humanis nominari possunt, verbum intellectus divini Dei Filium nominamus; Deum vero cuius est verbum nominamus Patrem, et processum verbi dicimus esse generationem Filii, immaterialem quidem, non autem carnalem sicut carnales homines suspicantur. In our human way of talking, this is called a son, because it comes forth from another in its likeness and subsists in the same nature with it. Therefore, as far as divine things can be represented by human words, we call the word of the divine intellect the Son of God, while God, whose word he is, we call the Father. We say that the coming forth of the word is an immaterial generation of a Son, not a carnal one, as carnal men surmise. Est autem et aliud in quo excedit praedicta Filii Dei generatio omnem generationem humanam, sive materialem per quam homo ex homine nascitur, sive intelligibilem secundum quam verbum concipitur in mente humana; in utraque enim illud quod per generationem procedit invenitur posterius tempore eo a quo procedit. Pater enim non generat statim a principio sui esse, sed oportet quod de imperfecto ad statum perfectum perveniat in quo generare possit; nec iterum statim ut generationi operam dat filius nascitur, quia carnalis generatio in quadam mutatione et successione consistit. Secundum intellectum etiam non statim a principio homo est aptus ad intelligibiles conceptus formandos; et postquam etiam ad statum perfectionis venit non semper actu intelligit, sed prius est potentia intelligens tantum et postmodum fit intelligens actu, et interdum desinit actu intelligere et remanet intelligens in potentia vel in habitu tantum. There is another way that this generation of the Son of God surpasses every human generation, whether material, as when one man is born from another, or intelligible, as when a word is brought forth in the human mind. In either of these cases what is born is younger than its source. A father does not generate as soon as he begins to exist, but he must first mature. Even the act of generation takes time before a son is born, because carnal generation is a matter of stages. Likewise the human intellect is not ready to form intelligible concepts as soon as a man is born, but when he matures. So he does not always actually understand, but after potentially understanding he actually understands and again stops actually understanding and remains understanding only in potency or with habitual knowledge. Sic igitur verbum hominis posterius in tempore invenitur quam homo, et quandoque desinit esse ante quam homo; impossibile est autem ista Deo convenire in quo neque imperfectio neque mutatio aliqua locum habet, neque etiam aliquis exitus de potentia ad actum cum ipse sit actus purus et primus: verbum igitur Dei coaeternum est ipsi Deo. So a human word is younger than a man and sometimes stops existing before the man. But these two limitations cannot apply to God, who has no imperfection or change, or going from potency to act, since he is pure and first act. The Word of God, therefore, is co-eternal with God. Est autem et aliud in quo verbum nostrum differt a verbo divino. Intellectus enim noster non simul intelligit omnia, neque unico actu sed pluribus, et ideo verba intellectus nostri sunt multa; sed Deus omnia simul intelligit et unico actu, quia eius intelligere non potest esse nisi unum cum sit suum esse: unde sequitur quod in Deo sit unum verbum tantum. Another difference of our word from the divine is that our intellect does not simultaneously understand everything, or with one act, but by many different acts; therefore the words of our intellect are many. But God understands everything simultaneously by one single act, because his understanding must be one, since it is his very being. It follows therefore that in God there is only one Word. Ulterius autem est alia consideranda differentia, quod verbum intellectus nostri non adaequat intellectus virtutem, quia cum aliquid mente concipimus adhuc possumus alia multa concipere; unde verbum intellectus nostri et imperfectum est et in eo potest compositio accidere dum ex multis perfectis verbis fit unum verbum perfectius, sicut cum intellectus concipit aliquam enuntiationem aut definitionem alicuius rei. Sed verbum divinum adaequat virtutem Dei, quia Deus per essentiam suam se ipsum intelligit et omnia alia; unde quanta est essentia eius tantum est verbum quod concipit per essentiam suam se et omnia intelligendo: est ergo perfectum et simplex et aequale Deo. There is yet another difference: the word of our intellect does not measure up to the power of our intellect, because when we mentally conceive one thing we can still conceive many other things; thus the word of our intellect is imperfect and can be composed, when several imperfect notions are put together to form a more perfect word, as happens in the process of formulating a definition. But the divine Word measures up to the power of God, because by his essence he understands himself and everything else. So the Word he conceives by his essence, when he understands himself and everything else, is as great as his essence. It is therefore perfect, simple and equal to God. Et hoc verbum Dei Filium nominamus ratione iam dicta, quem eiusdem naturae cum Patre et Patri coaeternum, unigenitum et perfectum confitemur. We call this Word of God a Son, as said above, because he is of the same nature with the Father, and we profess that he is co-eternal with the Father, only-begotten and perfect. Capitulum 4 Chapter 4 Qualiter in divinis sit accipienda processio Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio How the Spirit Proceeds from the Father and the Son Est autem considerandum ulterius quod omnem cognitionem sequitur aliqua appetitiva operatio. Inter omnes autem appetitivas operationes invenitur amor esse principium, quo sublato neque gaudium erit si adipiscatur aliquis quod non amat, neque tristitia si impediatur ab eo quod non amat; si amor tollatur, et per consequens tolluntur omnes aliae appetitivae operationes quae quodam modo ad tristitiam et gaudium referuntur. Cum igitur in Deo sit perfectissima cognitio, oportet etiam in eo ponere perfectum amorem, in quo quidam processus per appetitivam operationem exprimitur sicut et in verbo per operationem intellectus. We must also observe that every act of knowledge is followed by an act of the appetite. Of all appetitive acts love is the principle. Without it there is no joy at gaining something one does not love, or sadness at missing something one does not love—that is, if love is taken away; likewise all other appetitive acts would go, since they are all somehow related to sadness and joy. Therefore, since God has perfect knowledge, he must also have perfect love, which arises as the expression of an appetitive act, as a word arises as the expression of an intellective act. Est autem attendenda differentia quaedam inter intellectualem operationem et appetitivam. Nam operatio intellectualis et omnino omnis cognitiva operatio completur per hoc quod cognoscibilia in cognoscente quodam modo existunt, scilicet sensibilia in sensu et intelligibilia in intellectu; operatio autem appetitiva completur secundum quendam ordinem vel motum appetentis ad res appetitui obiectas. Ea vero quae habent occultum principium sui motus spiritus nomen accipiunt; sic enim venti spiritus dicuntur quia eorum afflationis principium non apparet, respiratio etiam et arteriarum motus ab intrinseco et occulto procedens principio spiritus nomen accepit: unde convenienter, secundum quod divina humanis verbis significari possunt, ipse divinus amor procedens Spiritus nomen accepit. But there is a difference between an intellectual and an appetitive act. For an intellectual act and any other act of knowledge takes place by the knowable thing somehow existing in the knowing power, namely, sensible things in the sense and intelligible things in the intellect. But an appetitive act takes place by an orientation and movement of the appetitive power to the things exposed to the appetite. Things that have a hidden source of their motion are called spirits. For instance, winds are called spirits because their origin is not apparent. Likewise breath, which is a motion from an intrinsic source, is called spirit. So, as divine things are expressed in human terms, the very love coming from God is called a spirit. Sed in nobis amor ex duplici causa procedit: quandoque quidem ex corporea et materiali natura, qui plerumque est amor immundus quia per eum puritas mentis nostrae turbatur; quandoque autem ex ipsa proprietate spiritus naturae, sicut cum amamus intelligibilia bona et quae rationi conveniunt, et hic amor est purus. In Deo autem amor materialis locum non habet; convenienter igitur amorem ipsius non solum Spiritum, sed Spiritum Sanctum nominamus, ut per hoc quod dicitur Sanctus eius puritas exprimatur. But in us love comes from two different sources. Sometimes it comes from a bodily and material principle, which is impure love, since it disturbs the purity of the mind. Sometimes it comes from the a pure spiritual principle, as when we love intelligible goods and what is in accord with reason; this is pure love. God cannot have a material love. Therefore we fittingly call his love not simply Spirit, but the Holy Spirit, since holiness refers to his purity. Manifestum est autem quod nihil amare possumus intelligibili et sancto amore nisi quod actu per intellectum concipimus; conceptio autem intellectus est verbum: unde necesse est quod amor a verbo oriatur. Verbum autem Dei dicimus esse Filium; ex quo patet Spiritum Sanctum esse a Filio. It is clear that we cannot love anything with an intelligible and holy love unless we conceive it through an act of the intellect. The conception of the intellect is a word; so love must arise from a word. We call the Word of God the Son; so it is clear that the Holy Spirit comes from the Son. Sicut autem divinum intelligere est eius esse, ita etiam et amare Dei est esse ipsius; et sicut Deus semper actu intelligit et omnia intelligendo se ipsum intelligit, ita etiam semper actu amat et omnia amat suam bonitatem amando. Sicut igitur Dei Filius qui est Verbum Dei est subsistens in divina natura, coaeternus Patri, perfectus et unicus, ita etiam haec omnia de Spiritu Sancto confiteri oportet. Just as God’s act of knowledge is his very being, so also is his act of loving. And just as God is always actually understanding, so also he is always actually loving himself and everything else by loving his own goodness. Therefore, as the Son of God, who is the Word of God, subsists in the divine nature and is co-eternal with the Father and perfect and unique, likewise we must profess the same about the Holy Spirit. Ex his autem colligere possumus quod, cum omne quod subsistit in natura intelligente apud nos persona dicatur, apud Graecos autem hypostasis, necesse est dicere quod Verbum Dei, quod Dei Filium nominamus, sit quaedam hypostasis seu persona; et idem de Spiritu Sancto dici oportet. Nulli autem est dubium quin Deus a quo Verbum et Amor procedit sit res subsistens, ut etiam possit dici hypostasis vel persona; et per hunc modum convenienter ponimus in divinis tres personas, scilicet personam Patris, personam Filii, personam Spiritus Sancti. Since everything that subsists with an intelligent nature we call a person, which is equivalent to the Greek hypostasis, it is necessary to say that the Word of God, whom we call Son, is a hypostasis or person. No one doubts that God, from whom a word and a love comes forth, is a subsistent reality, and can also be called a hypostasis or a person. Thus we fittingly posit three persons in God: the person of the Father, the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Spirit. Has autem tres hypostases vel personas non dicimus esse per essentiam diversas, quia, sicut iam supra dictum est, sicut intelligere et amare Dei est eius esse, ita Verbum et Amor eius sunt ipsa Dei essentia. Quidquid autem de Deo absolute dicitur non est aliud quam Dei essentia; non enim est Deus vel magnus vel potens vel bonus accidentaliter sed per essentiam suam: unde tres personas vel hypostases non dicimus in divinis distinctas per aliquid absolutum, sed per solas relationes quae ex processione Verbi et Amoris proveniunt. Et quia processionem Verbi generationem nominamus, ex generatione autem proveniunt relationes paternitatis et filiationis, personam Filii a Patris persona distingui dicimus solummodo paternitate et filiatione, omnia alia communiter et indifferenter de utroque praedicantes: sicut enim dicimus Patrem verum Deum, omnipotentem, aeternum et quaecumque similiter dicuntur, sic et Filium; et eadem ratio est de Spiritu Sancto. We do not say that these three persons or hypostases are distinct by essence, since, just as God’s act of knowing and loving is his very being, so also his Word and Love are the very essence of God. Whatever is absolutely asserted of God is nothing other than his essence, since God is not great or powerful or good accidentally, but by his essence. So we do not say the three persons or hypostases are distinct absolutely, but by mere relations which arise from the coming forth of the word and the love. Since we call the coming forth of the word generation, and from generation result the relationships of fatherhood and sonship, we say that the person of the Son is distinct from the person of the Father only by fatherhood and sonship, while all else belongs to both commonly and without distinction. Just as we call the Father true God, almighty, eternal and whatever else, so also the Son, and for the same reason the Holy Spirit. Quia igitur Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non distinguuntur in natura divinitatis sed relationibus solis, convenienter tres personas non dicimus tres Deos, sed unum verum Deum et perfectum confitemur. In hominibus autem ideo tres personae tres homines dicuntur et non unus homo, quia natura humanitatis quae communis est tribus differenter convenit eis secundum materialem divisionem, quae omnino in Deo locum non habet; unde cum in tribus hominibus sint tres humanitates numero differentes, sola ratio humanitatis in eis communis invenitur. In tribus autem personis divinis non tres divinitates numero differentes, sed unam simplicem deitatem necesse est esse, cum non sit alia essentia Verbi et Amoris in Deo ab essentia Dei; et sic non tres Deos sed unum Deum confitemur propter unam et simplicem deitatem in tribus personis. Therefore, since the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinct in their divine nature, but only by relationship, we are right in saying that the three persons are not three gods, but one true and perfect God. Three human persons are three men and not one man, because the nature of humanity, which is common to them, belongs to each separately because they are materially distinct, which does not apply to God. So in three men there are three numerically different human natures, while only the essence of humanity is common to them. But in the divine persons there are not three numerically different divine natures, but necessarily only one simple divine nature, since the essence of God’s word and of his love is not different from the essence of God. So we profess not three gods, but one God, because of the one simple divine nature in three persons. Capitulum 5 Chapter 5 Quae fuit causa incarnationis Filii Dei The Reason for the Incarnation of the Son of God The Incarnation Ex simili autem mentis caecitate christianam fidem irrident quia confitetur Christum Dei Filium mortuum esse, tanti mysterii profunditatem non intelligentes. Et ne mors Filii Dei perverse intelligatur, prius aliquid de Filii Dei incarnatione dici oportet; non enim dicimus Filium Dei morti subiectum fuisse secundum naturam divinam in qua aequalis est Patri, quae est fontalis omnium vita, sed secundum nostram naturam quam assumpsit in unitatem personae. A similar blindness makes Muslims ridicule the Christian Faith by which we profess that the Son of God died, since they do not understand the depth of such a great mystery. First of all, lest the death of the Son of God be misinterpreted, we must first say something about the incarnation of the Son of God. For we do not say that the Son of God underwent death according to his divine nature, in which he is equal to the Father who is the foundational life of everything, but according to our own nature which he adopted into the unity of his person.