Nec solum in corporalibus subditos gravat, sed etiam spiritualia eorum bona impedit. Quia enim plus praeesse appetunt quam prodesse, omnem profectum subditorum impediunt, suspicantes omnem subditorum excellentiam suae iniquae dominationis praeiudicium esse: tyrannis enim magis boni quam mali suspecti sunt, semperque his aliena virtus formidolosa est. Conantur igitur praedicti tyranni ne ipsorum subditi virtuosi effecti magnanimitatis concipiant spiritum et eorum iniquam dominationem non ferant. Conantur etiam ne inter subditos amicitiae foedus firmetur et pacis emolumento ad invicem gaudeant, ut sic, dum unus de altero non confidit, contra eorum dominium aliquid moliri non possint. Propter quod inter ipsos discordias seminant, exortas nutriunt, et ea quae ad confoederationes hominum pertinent ut connubia et convivia prohibent, et caetera huiusmodi per quae inter homines solet familiaritas et fiducia generari. Conantur etiam ne potentes aut divites fiant, quia de subditis secundum suae malitiae conscientiam suspicantes, sicut ipsi potentia et divitiis ad nocendum utuntur, ita timent ne potentia et divitiae subditorum eis nocivae reddantur. Unde in Iob de tyranno dicitur Sonitus terroris semper in auribus illius, et cum pax sit, nullo scilicet ei malum intentante, ille semper insidias suspicatur. Nor does the tyrant merely oppress his subjects in corporal things but he also hinders their spiritual good. Those who seek more to use, than to be of use to, their subjects prevent all progress, suspecting all excellence in their subjects to be prejudicial to their own evil domination. For tyrants hold the good in greater suspicion than the wicked, and to them the valour of others is always fraught with danger. So, the above-mentioned tyrants strive to prevent those of their subjects who have become virtuous from acquiring valour and high spirit in order that they may not want to cast off their iniquitous domination. They also see to it that there be no friendly relations among these so that they may not enjoy the benefits resulting from being on good terms with one another, for as long as one has no confidence in the other, no plot will be set up against the tyrant’s domination. Wherefore they sow discords among the people, foster any that have arisen, and forbid anything which furthers society and co-operation among men, such as marriage, banquets, and anything of like character, through which familiarity and confidence are engendered among men. They moreover strive to prevent their subjects from becoming powerful and rich, since, suspecting these to be as wicked as themselves, they fear their power and wealth; for the subjects might become harmful to them even as they are accustomed to use power and wealth to harm others. Hence Job 15:21 says of the tyrant: The sound of dread is always in his ears and when there is peace, that is, when there is no one to harm him, he always suspects treason. Ex hoc autem contingit ut, dum praesidentes, qui subditos ad virtutes inducere deberent, virtuti subditorum nequiter invident et eam pro posse impediunt, sub tyrannis pauci virtuosi inveniantur. Nam, iuxta sententiam Aristotelis, apud illos inveniuntur fortes viri apud quos fortissimi quique honorantur; et ut Tullius dicit Iacent semper et parum vigent quae apud quosque improbantur. Naturale etiam est ut homines sub timore nutriti in servilem degenerent animum et pusillanimes fiant ad omne virile opus et strenuum: quod experimento patet in provinciis quae diu sub tyrannis fuerunt; unde Apostolus ad Colossenses dicit Patres, nolite ad indignationem provocare filios vestros ut non pusillo animo fiant. It thus results that when rulers, who ought to induce their subjects to virtue, are wickedly jealous of the virtue of their subjects and hinder it as much as they can, few virtuous men are found under the rule of tyrants. For, according to Aristotle’s sentence, brave men are found where brave men are honoured. And as Cicero says: Those who are despised by everybody are disheartened and flourish but little. It is also natural that men, brought up in fear, should become small-spirited and discouraged in the face of any strenuous and manly task. This is shown by experience in provinces that have long been under tyrants. Hence the Apostle says to the Colossians: Fathers, do not provoke your children to indignation, lest they become discouraged (Col 3:21). Haec igitur nocumenta tyrannidis rex Salomon considerans dicit Regnantibus impiis ruinae hominum, quia scilicet per nequitiam tyrannorum subiecti a virtutum perfectione deficiunt. Et iterum dicit Cum impii sumpserint principatum gemet populus, quasi sub servitute redactus; et iterum Cum surrexerint impii abscondentur homines, ut tyrannorum crudelitatem evadant. Nec est mirum, quia homo absque ratione secundum animi sui libidinem praesidens nihil differt a bestia; unde Salomon dicit Leo rugiens et ursus esuriens, princeps impius super populum pauperem; et ideo a tyrannis se abscondunt homines sicut a crudelibus bestiis, idemque videtur tyranno subiici et bestiae saevienti substerni. So, considering these evil effects of tyranny, King Solomon says: When the wicked reign, men are ruined (Prov 28:12), because, through the wickedness of tyrants, subjects fall away from the perfection of virtue. And again he says: When the wicked rule, the people groan (Prov 29:2), as though led into slavery. And again: When the wicked rise, men hide themselves (Prov 28:28), that they may escape the cruelty of the tyrant. It is no wonder, for a man governing without reason, following the lust of his soul, differs in no way from the beast. Hence Solomon says: Like a roaring lion or a charging bear is a wicked ruler over a poor people (Prov 28:15). Therefore, men hide from tyrants as from cruel beasts, and it seems that to be subject to a tyrant is the same thing as to lie prostrate beneath a raging beast. Capitulum 4 Chapter 4 Quare subditis regia dignatis redditur odiosa Why the royal dignity is rendered hateful to the subjects Quia igitur optimum et pessimum regimen existit in monarchia, id est in principatu unius, multis quidem propter tyrannorum malitiam redditur regia dignitas odiosa; quidam vero dum regimen regni desiderant, incidunt in saevitias tyrannorum, rectoresque quam plures tyrannidem exercent sub praetextu regis dignitatis. Because both the best and the worst government are latent in monarchy (that is, in the rule of one man), the royal dignity is rendered hateful to many people on account of the wickedness of tyrants. Some men, indeed, while they desire to be ruled by a king, fall under the cruelty of tyrants, and not a few rulers exercise tyranny under the cloak of royal dignity. Horum quidem exemplum evidenter apparet in Romana republica. Regibus enim a populo Romano expulsis, dum regium vel potius tyrannicum fastum ferre non possent, instituerant sibi consules et alios magistratus per quos regi coeperunt et dirigi, regnum in aristocratiam commutare volentes; et, sicut refert Salustius, incredibile est memoratu quantum adepta libertate in brevi Romana civitas creverit. Plerumque namque contingit ut homines sub rege viventes segnius ad bonum commune nitantur, utpote aestimantes id quod ad commune bonum impendunt non sibi ipsis conferre, sed alteri sub cuius potestate vident esse bona communia. Cum vero bonum commune non vident esse in potestate unius, non attendunt ad bonum commune quasi ad id quod est alterius, sed quilibet attendit ad illud sicut ad suum; unde experimento videtur quod una civitas per annuos rectores administrata plus potest interdum quam rex aliquis si haberet tales tres vel quatuor civitates, parvaque servitia exacta a regibus gravius ferunt quam magna onera si a communitate civium imponantur. Quod in promotione Romanae reipublicae servatum fuit. Nam plebs et ad militiam scribebatur et pro militantibus stipendia exsolvebant; et cum stipendiis exsolvendis non sufficeret commune aerarium, in usus publicos opes venere privatos, adeo ut praeter singulos annulos aureos singulasque bullas, quae erant dignitatis insignia, nihil sibi auri etiam senatus ipse reliquerit. A clear example of this is found in the Roman Republic. When the kings had been driven out by the Roman people, because they could not bear the royal, or rather tyrannical, arrogance, they instituted consuls and other magistrates by whom they began to be ruled and guided. They changed the kingdom into an aristocracy, and, as Sallust relates: The Roman city, once liberty was won, waxed incredibly strong and great in a remarkably short time. For it frequently happens that men living under a king strive more sluggishly for the common good, since they consider that what they devote to the common good they do not confer upon themselves, but upon another, under whose power they see the common goods to be. But when they see that the common good is not under the power of one man, they do not attend to it as if it belonged to another, but each one attends to it as if it were his own. Experience thus teaches that one city administered by rulers, changing annually, is sometimes able to do more than some kings having three or four such cities; and small taxes exacted by kings weigh more heavily than great burdens imposed by the community of citizens. This held good in the history of the Roman Republic. The plebs were enrolled in the army and were paid wages for military service; and when the common treasury was failing, private riches came forth for public uses, to such an extent that not even the senators retained any gold for themselves save one ring and the one bulla, which were the insignia of their dignity. Sed tamen dissensionibus fatigarentur continuis, quae usque ad bella civilia excreverunt; quibus bellis civilibus eis libertas ad quam multum studuerant de manibus erepta est, et sub potestate imperatorum esse coeperunt, qui se reges appellari a principio noluerunt quia Romanis fuerat nomen regium odiosum. Horum autem quidam more regio bonum commune fideliter procuraverunt, per quorum studium Romana respublica et aucta et conservata est; plurimi vero eorum in subditos quidem tyranni, ad hostes vero effecti desides et imbecilles, Romanam rempublicam ad nihilum redegerunt. On the other hand, when the Romans were worn out by continual dissensions taking on the proportion of civil wars, and when by these wars the freedom for which they had greatly striven was snatched from their hands, they began to find themselves under the power of emperors who, from the beginning, were unwilling to be called kings, for the royal name was hateful to the Romans. Some emperors, it is true, faithfully cared for the common good in a kingly manner, and by their zeal the commonwealth was increased and preserved. But most of them became tyrants towards their subjects while indolent and vacillating before their enemies, and brought the Roman Republic to nothing. Similis etiam processus fuit in populo Hebraeorum. Primo quidem dum sub iudicibus regebantur, undique diripiebantur ab hostibus; unusquisque quod bonum erat in oculis suis faciebat. Regibus vero eis divinitus datis ad eorum instantiam, propter regum malitiam a cultu unius Dei recesserunt et finaliter in captivitatem sunt ducti. A similar process also took place among the Hebrew people. At first, while they were ruled by judges, they were ravished by their enemies on every hand, for each one did what was good in his sight (1 Sam 3:18). Yet when God gave them kings at their insistance, they departed from the worship of the one God and were finally led into bondage on account of the wickedness of their kings. Utrinque igitur pericula imminent, sive dum timetur tyrannus evitetur regis optimum regimen, sive dum hoc desideratur potestas regia in malitiam tyrannicam convertatur. Danger thus lurks on either side. Either men are held by the fear of a tyrant and they miss the opportunity of having kingship, the best government, or they want a king, and the kingly power turns into tyrannical wickedness. Capitulum 5 Chapter 5 Quod minus malum est cum monarchia in tyrannidem convertitur quam cum regimen plurium optimatum corrumpitur That it is a lesser evil when a monarchy turns into tyranny than when an aristocracy becomes corrupt Cum autem inter duo ex quorum utroque periculum imminet eligere oportet, illud videtur potissime eligendum ex quo sequitur minus malum. Ex monarchia autem, si in tyrannidem convertatur, minus malum sequitur quam ex regimine plurium optimatum quando corrumpitur. Dissensio enim quae plurimumque sequitur ex regimine plurium contrariatur bono pacis, quod est praecipuum in multitudine sociali; quod quidem bonum per tyrannidem non tollitur, sed aliqua particularium hominum bona impediuntur, nisi fuerit excessus tyrannidis quod in totam communitatem desaeviat. Magis igitur praeoptandum est unius regimen quam multorum, quamvis in utroque sequantur pericula. When a choice is to be made between two things, from both of which danger impends, surely that one should be chosen from which the lesser evil follows. Now, lesser evil follows from the corruption of a monarchy (which is tyranny) than from the corruption of an aristocracy. Group government (polyarchy) most frequently breeds dissension. This dissension runs counter to the good of peace, which is the principal social good. A tyrant, on the other hand, does not destroy this good: rather, he obstructs one or the other individual interests of his subjects—unless, of course, there be an excess of tyranny, and the tyrant rages against the whole community. Monarchy is therefore to be preferred to polyarchy, although either form of government might become dangerous. Adhuc, illud magis fugiendum videtur ex quo pluries sequi possunt magna pericula; frequentius autem sequuntur maxima pericula multitudinis ex multorum regimine quam ex regimine unius. Plerumque enim contingit ut ex pluribus aliquis ab intentione communis boni deficiat, quam quod unus tantum. Quicumque autem ex pluribus praesidentibus divertat ab intentione boni communis, dissensionis periculum multitudini subditorum imminet, quia dissentientibus principibus consequens est ut in multitudine sequatur dissensio. Si vero unus praesit, plerumque quidem ad bonum commune respicit; aut si a bono communi intentionem avertat, non statim sequitur ut totaliter ad subditorum oppressionem intendat, quod est excessus tyrannidis et in malitia regiminis maximum gradum tenens, ut supra ostensum est. Magis igitur sunt fugienda pericula quae proveniunt ex regimine plurium quam ea quae proveniunt ex gubernatione unius. Further, it seems that from which great dangers may follow is to be avoided more frequently. Now, considerable dangers to the multitude follow more frequently from polyarchy than from monarchy. There is a greater chance that, where there are many rulers, one of them will abandon the intention of the common good than that it will be abandoned when there is but one ruler. When any one among several rulers turns aside from the pursuit of the common good, danger of internal strife threatens the group because, when the chiefs quarrel, dissension will follow in the people. When, on the other hand, one man is in command, he more often keeps to governing for the sake of the common good. Should he not do so, it does not immediately follow that he also proceeds to the total oppression of his subjects. This, of course, would be the excess of tyranny and the worst wickedness in government, as has been shown above. The dangers, then, arising from a polyarchy are more to be guarded against than those arising from a monarchy. Amplius, non minus contingit in tyrannidem verti regimen multorum quam unius, sed forte frequentius. Exorta namque dissensione per regimen plurium, contingit saepe unum alios superare et sibi soli multitudinis dominium usurpare: quod quidem ex his quae pro tempore fiunt manifeste inspici potest. Nam fere omne multorum regimen est in tyrannidem terminatum, ut in Romana republica manifeste apparet. Quae cum diu per plures magistratus administrata fuisset, exortis simultatibus, dissensionibus et bellis civilibus, in crudelissimos tyrannos inciderunt. Moreover, in point of fact, a polyarchy deviates into tyranny not less but perhaps more frequently than a monarchy. When dissensions arise in such a government on account of there being many rulers, it often happens that the power of one preponderates and he then usurps the government of the multitude for himself. This indeed may be clearly seen from history. There has hardly ever been a polyarchy that did not end in tyranny. The best illustration of this fact is the history of the Roman Republic. It was for a long time administered by the magistrates but then animosities, dissensions, and civil wars arose, and it fell into the power of the most cruel tyrants. Et universaliter si quis praeterita facta et quae nunc fiunt diligenter consideret, plures inveniet exercuisse tyrannidem in terris quae per multos reguntur, quam in illis quae gubernantur ab uno. Si igitur regium, quod est optimum regimen, maxime vitandum videatur propter tyrannidem, tyrannis autem non minus, sed magis contingere solet in regimine plurium quam unius: relinquitur simpliciter magis esse expediens sub rege uno vivere quam sub regimine plurium. In general, if one carefully considers what has happened in the past and what is happening in the present, he will discover that more men have held tyrannical sway in lands previously ruled by many rulers than in those ruled by one. The strongest objection why monarchy, although it is the best form of government, is not agreeable to the people is that, in fact, it may deviate into tyranny. Yet tyranny tends to occur not less but more frequently on the basis of a polyarchy than on the basis of a monarchy. It follows that it is, in any case, more expedient to live under one king than under the rule of several men. Capitulum 6 Chapter 6 Qualiter providendum est ne rex incidat in tyrannum How to make provision lest the king fall into tyranny Quia ergo unius regimen praeeligendum est, quod est optimum, et contingit ipsum in tyrannidem converti, quod est pessimum, ut ex dictis patet, diligenti studio laborandum est ut sic multitudini provideatur de rege ut non incidant in tyrannum. Therefore, since the rule of one man (which is the best) is to be preferred, and since it may happen to be changed into a tyranny (which is the worst), as is clear from what has been said, a scheme should be carefully worked out which would prevent the multitude ruled by a king from falling into the hands of a tyrant. Primum autem est necessarium ut talis conditionis homo, ab illis ad quos hoc spectat officium, promoveatur in regem, quem non sit probabile in tyrannidem declinare; unde Samuel Dei providentiam erga institutionem regis commendans ait Quaesivit sibi Dominus virum secundum cor suum, et praecepit ei Dominus ut esset dux super populum suum. Deinde sic disponenda est regni gubernatio ut regi iam instituto tyrannidis subtrahatur occasio. Simul etiam sic eius temperetur potestas ut in tyrannidem de facili declinare non possit; quae quidem quomodo fiant, in sequentibus considerandum erit. Demum vero curandum est, si rex in tyrannidem diverteret, qualiter posset occurri. First, it is necessary that the man who is raised up to be king by those whom it concerns should be of such condition that it is improbable that he should become a tyrant. Thus Samuel, commending the providence of God with respect to the institution of the king, says: The Lord sought a man according to his own heart, and the Lord appointed him to be prince over his people (1 Sam 13:14). Then, once the king is established, the government of the kingdom must be so arranged that opportunity to tyrannize is removed. At the same time his power should be so tempered that he cannot easily fall into tyranny. How these things may be done we must consider in what follows. Finally, provision must be made for facing the situation should the king stray into tyranny. Et quidem si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyrannidem tolerare ad tempus, quam contra tyrannum agendo multis implicari periculis quae sunt graviora ipsa tyrannide. Potest enim contingere ut qui contra tyrannum agunt praevalere non possint, et sic provocatus tyrannus magis desaeviat. Quod si praevalere quis possit adversus tyrannum, ex hoc multotiens proveniunt gravissimae dissensiones in populo, sive dum in tyrannum insurgitur, sive post deiectionem tyranni dum erga ordinationem regiminis multitudo separatur in partes. Contingit etiam interdum ut, dum alicuius auxilio multitudo expellit tyrannum, ille potestate accepta tyrannidem arripit, et timens pati ab alio quod ipse in alium fecit, graviori servitute subditos opprimat. Indeed, if there be not an excess of tyranny, it is more expedient to tolerate the milder tyranny for a while than to become involved in many perils more grievous than the tyranny itself by acting against the tyrant. For it may happen that those who act against the tyrant are unable to prevail and the tyrant then will rage the more. Yet if one can prevail against the tyrant, the gravest dissensions frequently ensue among the people from this very fact: the multitude may be broken up into factions either during their revolt against the tyrant, or in process of the organization of the government, after the tyrant has been overthrown. Moreover, it sometimes happens that while the multitude is driving out the tyrant by the help of some man, the latter, having received the power, thereupon seizes the tyranny. Then, fearing to suffer from another what he did to his predecessor, he oppresses his subjects with an even more grievous slavery. Sic enim in tyrannide solet contingere ut posterior gravior fiat quam praecedens, dum praecedentia gravamina non deserit et etiam ipse ex sui cordis malitia nova excogitat. Unde Syracusis quondam Dionysii mortem omnibus desiderantibus, anus quaedam ut incolumis et sibi superstes esset continue orabat; quod ut tyrannus cognovit, cur hoc faceret interrogavit. Tum illa Puella, inquit, existens cum gravem tyrannum haberemus, alium cupiebam; quo interfecto aliquantulum durior successit, eius quoque finiri dominationem magnum existimabam. Tertium te importuniorem habere coepimus rectorem; itaque si tu fueris absumptus, deterior in locum tuum succedet. This tends to happen in tyranny: the second becomes more grievous than the one preceding, inasmuch as, without abandoning the previous oppressions, he himself thinks up fresh ones from the malice of his heart. Thus, in Syracuse, when everyone desired the death of Dionysius, a certain old woman kept constantly praying that he might be unharmed and that he might survive her. When the tyrant learned this he asked why she did it. Then she said: When I was a girl we had a harsh tyrant and I wished for his death; when he was killed, there succeeded him one who was a little harsher. I was very eager to see the end of his dominion also, and we began to have a third ruler still more harsh—that was you. So if you should be taken away, a worse would succeed in your place. Et si sit intolerabilis excessus tyrannidis, quibusdam visum fuit ut ad fortium virorum virtutem pertineat tyrannum interimere, seque pro liberatione multitudinis exponere periculis mortis; cuius rei exemplum etiam in Veteri testamento habetur. Nam Aioth quidam Eglon regem Moab, qui gravi servitute populum Dei premebat, sica infixa in eius femore interemit, et factus est populi iudex. Sed hoc apostolicae doctrinae non congruit. Docet enim nos Petrus non solum bonis et modestis, verum etiam dyscolis dominis reverenter subditos esse: haec est enim gratia, si propter conscientiam Dei sustineat quis tristitias patiens iniuste. Unde cum multi Romanorum imperatores fidem Christi persequerentur tyrannice, magnaque multitudo tam nobilium quam populi esset ad fidem conversa, non resistendo sed mortem patienter et armati sustinentes pro Christo laudantur, ut in sacra Thebaeorum legione manifeste apparet. Magisque Aioth iudicandus est hostem interemisse quam populi rectorem, licet tyrannum; unde et in Veteri testamento leguntur occisi fuisse hi qui occiderunt Ioas regem Iuda, quamvis a cultu Dei recedentem, eorumque filiis reservatis secundum legis praeceptum. If the excess of tyranny is unbearable, some have been of the opinion that it would be an act of virtue for strong men to slay the tyrant and to expose themselves to the danger of death in order to set the multitude free. An example of this even occurs in the Old Testament, for a certain Aioth slew Eglon, King of Moab, who was oppressing the people of God under harsh slavery, thrusting a dagger into his thigh; and he was made a judge of the people. But this opinion is not in accord with apostolic teaching. For Peter admonishes us to be submissive to your masters with all respect, not only to the kind and gentle but also to the overbearing. For one is approved if, mindful of God, he endures pain while suffering unjustly (1 Pet 2:18–19). Wherefore, when many emperors of the Romans tyrannically persecuted the faith of Christ, a great number both of the nobility and the common people were converted to the faith and were praised for patiently bearing death for Christ. They did not resist although they were armed, and this is plainly manifested in the case of the holy Theban legion. Aioth, then, must be considered rather as having slain a foe than assassinated a ruler, however tyrannical, of the people. Hence in the Old Testament we also read that they who killed Joas, the king of Judah, who had fallen away from the worship of God, were slain and their children spared according to the precept of the law. Esset autem hoc multitudini periculosum et eius rectoribus, si privata praesumptione aliqui attentarent praesidentium necem, etiam tyrannorum: plerumque enim huiusmodi periculis magis exponunt se mali quam boni; malis autem solet esse grave dominium non minus regum quam tyrannorum, quia, secundum sententiam Salomonis, dissipat impios rex sapiens. Magis igitur ex huiusmodi praesumptione immineret periculum multitudini de amissione boni regis, quam remedium de subtractione tyranni. Should private persons attempt on their own private presumption to kill the rulers, even though tyrants, this would be dangerous for the multitude as well as for their rulers. This is because the wicked usually expose themselves to dangers of this kind more than the good, for the rule of a king, no less than that of a tyrant, is burdensome to them since, according to the words of Solomon: A wise king winnows the wicked (Prov 20:26). Consequently, by presumption of this kind, danger to the people from the loss of a good king would be more probable than relief through the removal of a tyrant. Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum saevitiam non privata praesumptione aliquorum, sed auctoritate publica procedendum. Primo quidem, si ad ius alicuius multitudinis pertineat sibi providere de rege, non iniuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destitui, vel refrenari eius potestas, si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur. Nec putanda est talis multitudo infideliter agere tyrannum destituens, etiam si ei se in perpetuum ante subiecerat; quia hoc ipse meruit in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens ut exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum a subditis non servetur. Sic Romani Tarquinium Superbum, quem in regem susceperant, propter eius et filiorum tyrannidem a regno eiecerunt, substituta minori, scilicet consulari, potestate. Sic etiam Domitianus, qui modestissimis imperatoribus Vespasiano patri et Tito fratri eius successerat, dum tyrannidem exercet a senatu Romano interemptus est, omnibus quae idem perverse fecerat per senatusconsultum iuste et salubriter in irritum revocatis. Quo factum est ut beatus Ioannes evangelista, dilectus Dei discipulus, qui per ipsum Domitianum in Patmos insulam fuerat exilio relegatus, ad Ephesum per senatusconsultum remitteretur. Furthermore, it seems that to proceed against the cruelty of tyrants is an action to be undertaken not through the private presumption of a few, but rather by public authority. If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power. It must not be thought that such a multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved that the covenant with his subjects should not be kept, since, in ruling the multitude, he did not act faithfully as the office of a king demands. Thus did the Romans, who had accepted Tarquin the Proud as their king, cast him out from the kingship on account of his tyranny and the tyranny of his sons; and they set up in their place a lesser power: namely, the consular power. Similarly Domitian, who had succeeded those most moderate emperors, Vespasian, his father, and Titus, his brother, was slain by the Roman senate when he exercised tyranny, and all his wicked deeds were justly, and profitably, declared null and void by a decree of the senate. Thus it came about that Blessed John the Evangelist, the beloved disciple of God, who had been exiled to the island of Patmos by that very Domitian, was sent back to Ephesus by a decree of the senate. Si vero ad ius alicuius superioris pertineat multitudini providere de rege, expectandum est ab eo remedium contra tyranni nequitiam. Sic Archelai, qui in Iudaea pro Herode patre suo regnare iam coeperat, paternam malitiam imitantis, Iudaeis contra eum querimoniam ad Caesarem Augustum deferentibus, primo quidem potestas diminuitur, ablato sibi regio nomine et medietate regni sui inter duos fratres eius divisa; demum cum nec sic a tyrannide compesceretur, a Tiberio Caesare relegatus est in exilium apud Lugdunum Galliae civitatem. If, on the other hand, it pertains to the right of a higher authority to provide a king for a certain multitude, a remedy against the wickedness of a tyrant is to be looked for from him. Thus when Archelaus, who had already begun to reign in Judaea in the place of Herod his father, was imitating his father’s wickedness, a complaint against him having been laid before Caesar Augustus by the Jews, his power was at first diminished by depriving him of his title of king and by dividing one-half of his kingdom between his two brothers. Later, since he was not restrained from tyranny even by this means, Tiberius Caesar sent him into exile to Lugdunum, a city in Gaul. Quod si omnino contra tyrannum auxilium humanum haberi non possit, recurrendum est ad regem omnium Deum qui est adiutor in opportunitatibus, in tribulatione. Eius enim potentiae subest ut cor tyranni crudele convertat in mansuetudinem, secundum Salomonem Cor regis in manu Dei, quocumque voluerit inclinabit illud; ipse enim regis Assueri crudelitatem, qui Iudaeis mortem parabat, in mansuetudinem vertit; ipse est qui ita Nabuchodonosor crudelem regem in tantam devotionem convertit, quod factus est divinae potentiae praedicator: Nunc igitur, inquit, ego Nabuchodonosor laudo et magnifico et glorifico regem caeli, quia opera eius vera et viae eius iudicia, et gradientes in superbia potest humiliare. Should no human aid whatsoever against a tyrant be forthcoming, recourse must be had to God, the King of all, who is a helper in due time in tribulation (Ps 9:10). For it lies in his power to turn the cruel heart of the tyrant to mildness. According to Solomon: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; he turns it wherever he will (Prov 21:1). It was he who turned into mildness the cruelty of King Assuerus, who was preparing death for the Jews. It was he who so filled the cruel king Nebuchadnezzar with piety that he became a proclaimer of the divine power. Therefore, he said, I, Nabuchodonosor do now praise and magnify and glorify the King of Heaven; because all his works are true and his ways judgments, and they that walk in pride he is able to abase (Dan 4:34). Tyrannos vero quos reputat conversione indignos, potest auferre de medio vel ad infimum statum reducere, secundum illud Sapientis Sedes ducum superborum destruxit Deus et sedere fecit mites pro eis. Ipse est qui videns afflictionem populi sui in Aegypto et audiens eorum clamorem, Pharaonem tyrannum deiecit cum exercitu suo in mare. Ipse est qui memoratum Nabuchodonosor prius superbientem, eiectum non solum de regni solio sed etiam de hominum consortio, in similitudinem bestiae commutavit. Nec est abbreviata manus eius, ut populum suum a tyrannis liberare non possit: promittit enim per Isaiam populo suo requiem se daturum a labore et concussione et servitute dura qua ante servierat; et per Ezechielem dicit Liberabo meum gregem de ore eorum, scilicet pastorum qui pascunt se ipsos. Sed ut hoc beneficium populus a Deo consequi mereatur, debet a peccatis cessare, quia in ultionem peccati divina permissione impii accipiunt principatum, dicente Domino per Oseam Dabo tibi regem in furore meo; et in Iob dicitur quod regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi. Tollenda est igitur culpa ut cesset tyrannorum plaga. Those tyrants, however, whom he deems unworthy of conversion, he is able to put out of the way or to degrade, according to the words of the wise man: The Lord has cast down the thrones of rulers, and has seated the lowly in their place (Sir 10:14). He it was who, seeing the affliction of his people in Egypt and hearing their cry, hurled Pharaoh, a tyrant over God’s people, with all his army into the sea. He it was who not only banished from his kingly throne the above-mentioned Nabuchodonosor because of his former pride, but also cast him from the fellowship of men and changed him into the likeness of a beast. Indeed, his hand is not shortened so that he cannot free his people from tyrants. For by Isaiah he promised to give his people rest from pain and turmoil and hard service (Isa 14:3) in which they had formerly served; and by Ezekiel he says: I will rescue my sheep from their mouths (Ezek 34:10), that is, from the mouth of shepherds who feed themselves. But to deserve to secure this benefit from God, the people must desist from sin, for it is by divine permission that wicked men receive power to rule as a punishment for sin, as the Lord says by the Prophet Hosea: I will give you a king in my wrath (Hos 13:11) and it is said in Job that he makes a man who is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people (Job 34:30). Sin must therefore be done away with in order that the scourge of tyrants may cease. Capitulum 7 Chapter 7 Quod mundanus honor seu gloria non sunt sufficiens premium regis That worldly honor and glory are not an adequate reward for a king Quoniam autem secundum praedicta regis est bonum multitudinis quaerere, nimis videretur onerosum regis officium nisi ei aliquod proprium bonum ex hoc proveniret. Oportet igitur considerare quale sit boni regis conveniens praemium. Since, according to what has been said thus far, it is the king’s duty to seek the good of the multitude, the task of a king may seem too burdensome unless some advantage to himself should result from it. Therefore, we must consider what a suitable reward for a good king is. Quibusdam igitur visum est regis praemium non esse aliud quam honorem et gloriam, unde et Tullius in libro de Republica definit principem civitatis esse alendum gloria; cuius rationem Aristoteles in libro Ethicorum assignare videtur, quia princeps cui non sufficit honor et gloria consequenter tyrannus efficitur. Inest enim animis omnium ut proprium bonum quaerant; si ergo contentus non sit princeps gloria et honore, quaeret voluptates et divitias, et sic ad rapinas et subditorum iniurias convertitur. Some men considered this reward to be nothing other than honor and glory. Hence Cicero says in the book On the Republic: The prince of the city should be nourished by glory, and Aristotle seems to assign the reason for this in the Ethics: Because the prince for whom honor and glory is not sufficient consequently turns into a tyrant. For it is in the hearts of all men to seek their proper good. Therefore, if the prince is not content with glory and honor, he will seek pleasures and riches, and so will resort to plundering and injuring his subjects. Sed si hanc sententiam receperimus, plurima sequuntur inconvenientia. Primo namque hoc esset regibus dispendiosum, si tot labores et sollicitudines paterentur pro mercede tam fragili: nihil enim videtur in rebus humanis fragilius gloria et honore favoris hominum, cum dependeat ex opinionibus hominum et verbis eorum, quibus nihil mutabilius in vita hominibus; et inde est quod Isaias propheta huiusmodi gloriam nominat florem foeni. Deinde humanae gloriae cupido animi magnitudinem aufert: qui enim favorem hominum quaerit, necesse est ut in omni quod dicit aut facit eorum voluntati deserviat; et sic dum placere omnibus studet, fit servus singulorum. Propter quod et idem Tullius, in libro de Officiis, cavendam dicit esse gloriae cupidinem: Eripit enim animi libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nihil autem principem qui ad magna peragenda instituitur, magis decet quam animi magnitudo; est igitur incompetens regis officio humanae gloriae praemium. However, if we accept this opinion, a great many incongruous results follow. In the first place, it would be costly to kings if so many labors and anxieties were to be endured for a reward so perishable: for nothing, it seems, is more perishable among human things than the glory and honor of men’s favor, since it depends upon the report of men and their opinions, which nothing in human life is more fickle than. And this is why the Prophet Isaiah calls such glory the flower of grass (Isa 40:6). Moreover, the desire for human glory takes away greatness of soul. For he who seeks the favor of men must serve their will in all he says and does, and thus, while striving to please all, he becomes a slave to each one. Therefore, the same Cicero says in his book On Duties that the inordinate desire for glory is to be guarded against: It takes away freedom of soul, for the sake of which high-minded men should put forth all their efforts. Indeed, there is nothing more becoming to a prince who has been set up for the doing of good works than greatness of soul. Thus, the reward of human glory is not enough for the services of a king. Simul etiam est multitudini noxium si tale praemium statuatur principibus. Pertinet enim ad boni viri officium ut contemnat gloriam sicut et alia temporalia bona: virtuosi enim et fortis animi est pro iustitia contemnere gloriam sicut et vitam. Unde fit quiddam mirabile, ut quia virtuosos actus consequitur gloria ipsaque gloria virtuose contemnatur, ex contemptu gloriae homo gloriosus reddatur, secundum sententiam Fabii dicentis Gloriam qui spreverit, veram habuit. Et de Catone dixit Salustius Quo minus petebat gloriam, tanto magis assequebatur illam; ipsique Christi discipuli se sicut Dei ministros exhibebant per gloriam et ignobilitatem, per infamiam et bonam famam. Non est igitur boni viri conveniens praemium gloria quam contemnunt boni. Si igitur hoc solum praemium statuatur principibus, sequetur bonos viros non assumere principatum, aut si assumpserint impraemiatos esse. At the same time it also hurts the multitude if such a reward be set up for princes, for it is the duty of a good man to take no account of glory, just as he should take no account of other temporal goods. It is the mark of a virtuous and brave soul to despise glory as he despises life, for justice’s sake. From this comes a wonder: glory ensues from virtuous acts, and out of virtue glory itself is despised. And therefore, through his very contempt for glory, a man is made glorious—according to the sentence of Fabius: He who scorns glory shall have true glory, and as Sallust says of Cato: The less he sought glory the more he achieved it. Even the disciples of Christ exhibited themselves as the ministers of God in honor and dishonor, in ill repute and good repute (2 Cor 6:8). Therefore, it is not fitting for glory, spurned by good men, to be the reward of a good man. And, if it alone be set up as the reward for princes, it will follow that good men will not take upon themselves the chief office of the city, or if they take it, they will go unrewarded. Amplius, ex cupidine gloriae periculosa mala proveniunt. Multi enim dum immoderate gloriam in rebus bellicis quaerunt, se ac suos exercitus perdiderunt, libertate patriae sub hostium servitute redacta: unde Torquatus Romanus princeps, in exemplo huius vitandi discriminis, filium, qui contra imperium suum ab hoste provocatus iuvenili ardore pugnavit, licet vicisset occidit, ne plus mali esset in praesumptionis exemplo quam utilitatis in gloria hostis occisi. Furthermore, dangerous evils come from the desire for glory. Many have been led unrestrainedly to seek glory in warfare, and have sent their armies and themselves to destruction, while the freedom of their country was turned into servitude under an enemy. Consider Torquatus, the Roman chief: in order to impress upon the people how imperative it is to avoid such danger, he slew his own son who had acted against his orders (he had been challenged by an enemy whom he had fought and vanquished). Torquatus acted thus lest more harm should accrue from the example of his son’s presumption than advantage from the glory of slaying the enemy. Habet etiam cupido gloriae aliud sibi familiare vitium, simulationem videlicet. Quia enim difficile est paucisque contingit veras virtutes assequi, quibus solis honor debetur et gloria, multi gloriam cupientes virtutum simulatores fiunt; propter quod, sicut Salustius dicit, ambitio multos mortales falsos fieri coegit: aliud clausum in pectore, aliud promptum habere in lingua, magisque vultum quam ingenium bonum habere. Sed et Salvator noster eos qui bona opera faciunt ut ab hominibus videantur, hypocritas, id est simulatores, vocat. Sicut igitur periculosum est multitudini si princeps voluptates et divitias quaerat pro praemio, ne raptor contumeliosus fiat, ita periculosum est si ei determinetur gloriae praemium, ne praesumptuosus et simulator existat. Moreover, the desire for glory has another vice akin to it: namely, hypocrisy. Since it is difficult to acquire true virtues, to which alone honor and glory are due, and it is therefore the lot of but a few to attain them, many who desire glory become simulators of virtue. On this account, as Sallust says: Ambition drives many mortals to become false. They keep one thing shut up in their heart, another ready on the tongue, and they have more countenance than character. But our Savior also calls those persons ‘hypocrites,’ or simulators, who do good works to be seen by men. Therefore, just as there is danger for the multitude that the prince may become abusive and a plunderer if he seeks pleasures and riches as his reward, so there is danger that he may become presumptuous and a hypocrite if glory is assigned to him as reward.