Capitulum 8 Chapter 8 Quod sufficiens premium regis est a Deo expectandum That the king should look to God for adequate reward Quoniam ergo mundanus honor et hominum gloria regiae sollicitudini non est sufficiens praemium, inquirendum restat quale sit eius sufficiens praemium. Therefore, since worldly honor and human glory are not a sufficient reward for royal cares, it remains to inquire what sort of reward is sufficient. Est autem conveniens ut rex praemium expectet a Deo. Minister enim pro suo ministerio praemium expectat a domino; rex autem populum gubernando minister Dei est, dicente Apostolo quod omnis potestas a Domino Deo est, et quod est Dei minister vindex in iram ei qui male agit; et in libro Sapientiae reges regni Dei esse ministri describuntur. Debent igitur reges pro suo regimine praemium expectare a Deo. It is proper that a king look to God for his reward, for a servant looks to his master for the reward of his service. The king is indeed the minister of God in governing the people, as the Apostle says: There is no authority except from God (Rom 13:1) and God’s minister is the servant of God to execute his wrath on the wrongdoer (Rom 13:4). And in the Book of Wisdom, kings are described as being ministers of God (Wis 6:5). Consequently, kings ought to look to God for the reward of their ruling. Remunerat autem Deus pro suo ministerio interdum temporalibus bonis, sed talia praemia sunt bonis malisque communia; unde Dominus ad Ezechielem dicit Nabuchodonosor rex Babylonis servire fecit exercitum suum servitute magna adversus Tyrum, et merces non est reddita ei neque exercitui eius de Tyro pro servitute qua servivit mihi adversus eam, ea scilicet servitute qua potestas, secundum Apostolum, Dei minister est, vindex in iram ei qui male agit. Et postea de praemio subdidit Propterea haec dicit Dominus Deus: Ecce ego dabo Nabuchodonosor regem Babylonis in terra Aegypti, et diripiet spolia eius et erit merces exercitui eius. Now God sometimes rewards kings for their service by temporal goods, but such rewards are common to both the good and the wicked. Hence the Lord says to Ezechiel: Nabuchodonosor king of Babylon made his army labor hard against Tyre; every head was made bald and every shoulder was rubbed bare; yet neither he nor his army got anything from Tyre to pay for the labor that he had performed for me against it (Ezek 29:18), namely, for that service by which power is the minister of God and the avenger to execute wrath upon him who does evil (Rom 13:4). Afterwards he adds, regarding the reward: Therefore, thus says the Lord God: Behold, I will give the land of Egypt to Nabuchodonosor king of Babylon; and he shall carry off its wealth and despoil it and plunder it; and it shall be the wages for his army (Ezek 29:19). Si ergo reges iniquos contra Dei hostes pugnantes, licet non intentione serviendi Deo sed sua odia et cupiditates exequendi, tanta mercede Dominus remunerat ut eis de hostibus victoriam tribuat, regna subiiciat et spolia diripienda proponat, quid faciet bonis regibus qui pia intentione populum Dei regunt et hostes impugnant? Non quidem terrenam sed aeternam eis mercedem promittit, nec in alio quam in se ipso, dicente Petro pastoribus populi Dei Pascite qui in vobis est gregem Domini, ut cum venerit Princeps pastorum, id est Rex regum Christus, percipiatis immarcescibilem gloriae coronam; de qua dicit Isaias Erit Dominus sertum exultationis et diadema gloriae populo suo. Therefore, if God recompenses wicked kings who fight against the enemies of God, though not with the intention of serving him but to execute their own hatred and cupidity, by giving them such great rewards as to yield them victory over their foes, subject kingdoms to their sway, and grant them spoils to rifle, what will he do for kings who rule the people of God and assail his enemies from a holy motive? Indeed, he promises them not an earthly reward, but an everlasting one, and in none other than in himself. As Peter says to the shepherds of the people: Tend the flock of God that is your charge . . . and when the chief Shepherd is manifested, that is, Christ the King of kings, you will obtain the unfading crown of glory (1 Pet 5:2, 4). Concerning this, Isaiah says: The Lord of hosts will be a crown of glory and a diadem of beauty to his people (Isa 28:5). Hoc autem ratione manifestatur. Est enim mentibus omnium ratione utentium inditum virtutis praemium beatitudinem esse; virtus enim uniuscuiusque rei esse describitur quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit. Ad hoc autem quisque bene operando nititur pervenire quod est maxime desiderio inditum; hoc autem est esse felicem, quod nullus potest non velle: hoc igitur praemium virtutis convenienter expectatur quod hominem facit beatum. Si autem bene operari virtutis est opus, regis autem opus est bene regere subditos, hoc etiam erit praemium regis quod eum faciat beatum. Quid autem hoc sit, hinc considerandum est. This is also clearly shown by reason. It is implanted in the minds of all who have the use of reason that the reward of virtue is happiness. The virtue of anything whatsoever is explained to be that which makes its possessor good and renders his deed good. Moreover, everyone strives by working well to attain what is most deeply implanted in desire: namely, to be happy. No one is able not to wish this. It is therefore fitting to expect as a reward for virtue that which makes man happy. Now, if to work well is a virtuous deed, and the king’s work is to rule his people well, then that which makes him happy will be the king’s reward. What this is has now to be considered. Beatitudinem quidem dicimus ultimum desideriorum finem; neque enim desiderii motus usque in infinitum procedit, esset enim inane naturale desiderium, cum infinita pertransiri non possint. Cum autem desiderium intellectualis naturae sit universalis boni, hoc solum bonum vere beatum facere poterit, quo adepto nullum bonum restat quod amplius desiderari possit; unde et beatitudo dicitur bonum perfectum, quasi omnia desiderabilia in se comprehendens. Tale autem non est aliquod bonum terrenum; nam qui divitias habent amplius habere desiderant, qui voluptatibus perfruuntur amplius perfrui desiderant, et simile patet in caeteris. Et si ampliora non quaerunt, desiderant tamen ut ea permaneant, vel alia in locum eorum succedant: nihil enim permanens invenitur in rebus terrenis; nihil igitur terrenum est quod quietare desiderium possit. Neque igitur terrenum aliquod beatum facere potest, ut possit esse regis conveniens praemium. Happiness, we say, is the ultimate end of our desires. Now the movement of desire does not go on to infinity, else natural desire would be vain, for infinity cannot be traversed. Since, then, the desire of an intellectual nature is for universal good, that good alone can make it truly happy which, when attained, leaves no further good to be desired. Hence happiness is called the perfect good inasmuch as it comprises in itself all things desirable. But no earthly good is such a good. They who have riches desire to have more, they who enjoy pleasure desire to enjoy more, and the like is clear for the rest: and if they do not seek more, they at least desire that those they have should abide or that others should follow in their stead. For nothing permanent is found in earthly things. Consequently, there is nothing earthly which can calm desire. Thus, nothing earthly can make man happy, so that it may be a fitting reward for a king. Adhuc, cuiuslibet rei finalis perfectio et bonum completum ab aliquo superiore dependet, quia et ipsa corporalia meliora redduntur ex adiunctione meliorum, peiora vero si deterioribus misceantur; sicut argento si misceatur aurum, argentum fit melius, quod ex plumbi admixtione impurum efficitur. Constat autem terrena omnia esse infra mentem humanam; beatitudo autem est hominis finalis perfectio et bonum completum ad quod omnes pervenire desiderant: nihil igitur terrenum est quod hominem possit beatum facere, neque igitur terrenum aliquod est praemium regis sufficiens. Non enim, ut Augustinus dicit, christianos principes felices dicimus quia diutius imperarunt, vel imperatores filios morte placida reliquerunt, vel hostes reipublicae domuerunt, vel cives adversum se insurgentes et cavere et opprimere potuerunt; sed felices eos dicimus si iuste imperant, si malunt cupiditatibus potius quam gentibus quibuslibet imperare, si omnia faciunt non propter ardorem inanis gloriae, sed propter caritatem felicitatis aeternae. Tales imperatores christianos dicimus esse felices, interim spe, postea re ipsa futuros cum id quod expectamus advenerit. Sed nec aliud aliquod creatum est quod hominem beatum faciat et possit regi decerni pro praemio. Tendit enim uniuscuiusque rei desiderium in suum principium a quo suum esse causatur; causa vero mentis humanae non est aliud quam Deus qui eam ad suam imaginem facit: solus igitur Deus est qui hominis desiderium quietare potest et facere hominem beatum et esse regi conveniens praemium. Again, the last perfection and perfect good of anything one chooses depends upon something higher, for even bodily things are made better by the addition of better things and worse by being mixed with baser things. If gold is mingled with silver, the silver is made better, while by an admixture of lead it is rendered impure. Now all earthly things are beneath the human mind; but happiness is the last perfection and the perfect good of man, which all men desire to reach. Therefore, there is no earthly thing which could make man happy, nor is any earthly thing a sufficient reward for a king. For, as Augustine says, We do not call Christian princes happy merely because they have reigned a long time, or because after a peaceful death they have left their sons to rule, or because they subdued the enemies of the state, or because they were able to guard against or to suppress citizens who rose up against them. Rather, we call them happy if they rule justly, if they prefer to rule their passions rather than nations, and if they do all things not for the love of vainglory but for the love of eternal happiness. Such Christian emperors we say are happy, now in hope, afterwards in very fact when that which we await shall come to pass. But neither is there any other created thing which would make a man happy and which could be set up as the reward for a king. For the desire of each thing tends towards its source which causes its being. But the cause of the human soul is none other than God, who made it to his own image. Therefore, it is God alone who can still the desires of man, and make him happy, and be the fitting reward for a king. Amplius, mens humana universalis boni cognoscitiva est per intellectum et desiderativa per voluntatem; bonum autem universale non invenitur nisi in Deo, nihil igitur est quod possit hominem beatum facere eius implendo desiderium nisi Deus, de quo dicitur in Psalmo Qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum; in hoc ergo rex suum praemium statuere debet. Hoc igitur considerans David rex dicebat Quid mihi est in caelo et a te quid volui super terram?; cui quaestioni postea respondens subdit Mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est et ponere in Deo spem meam. Ipse enim est qui dat salutem regibus, non solum temporalem qua communiter salvat homines et iumenta, sed eam de qua per Isaiam dicit Salus autem mea in sempiternum erit, qua homines salvat eos ad aequalitatem angelorum perducens. Furthermore, the human mind knows the universal good through the intellect, and desires it through the will: but the universal good is not found except in God. Therefore, there is nothing which could make man happy, fulfilling his every desire, but God, of whom it is said in the Psalm: Who satisfies your desire with good (Ps 103 [102]:5). In this, therefore, should the king place his reward. Thus King David, with this in mind, said: Whom have I in heaven but you? And there is nothing upon earth that I desire besides you (Ps 73 [72]:25) and he afterwards adds in answer to this question: It is good for me to adhere to my God and to put my hope in the Lord God (Ps 73 [72]:28). For it is he who gives salvation to kings, not merely temporal salvation by which he saves both men and beasts together, but also that salvation of which he says by the mouth of Isaiah: But my salvation shall be forever (Isa 51:6), that salvation by which he saves man and makes them equal to the angels. Sic igitur verificari potest quod regis praemium sit honor et gloria. Quis enim mundanus et caducus honor huic honori similis esse potest, ut homo sit civis sanctorum et domesticus Dei, et inter Dei filios computatus haereditatem regni caelestis assequatur cum Christo? Hic est honor quem concupiscens et admirans rex David dicebat Nimis honorati sunt amici tui, Deus. Quae insuper humanae laudis gloria huic gloriae comparari potest, quam non fallax blandientium lingua, non decepta hominum opinio profert, sed ex interioris conscientiae testimonio prodit et Dei testimonio confirmatur qui suis confessoribus repromittit quod confiteatur eos in gloria Patris coram angelis Dei? Qui autem hanc gloriam quaerunt eam inveniunt, et quam non quaerunt gloriam hominum consequuntur, exemplo Salomonis qui non solum sapientiam quam quaesivit accepit a Domino, sed factus est super reges alios gloriosus. It can thus also be verified that the reward of the king is honor and glory. What worldly and frail honor can indeed be likened to this honor, that a man be made a fellow citizen with the saints and member of the household of God (Eph 2:19), numbered among the sons of God, and that he obtain the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom with Christ? This is the honor of which King David, in desire and wonder, says: Your friends, O God, are made exceedingly honorable (Ps 138:17). And further, what glory of human praise can be compared to this, not uttered by the false tongue of flatterers nor the fallacious opinion of men, but issuing from the witness of our inmost conscience and confirmed by the testimony of God, who promises to those who confess him that he will confess them before the angels of God in the glory of the Father? They who seek this glory will find it and they will win the glory of men which they do not seek: witness Solomon, who not only received from the Lord wisdom which he sought, but was made glorious above other kings. Capitulum 9 Chapter 9 Quem gradum in beatitudine optinebunt reges beati What degree of heavenly beatitude the king may obtain Considerandum autem restat ulterius, quod sublimen et eminentem obtinebunt caelestis beatitudinis gradum qui officium regium digne et laudabiliter exequuntur. Si enim beatitudo virtutis est praemium, consequens est ut maiori virtuti maior gradus beatitudinis debeatur. Est autem virtus praecipua qua homo aliquis non solum se ipsum, sed etiam alios dirigere potest, et tanto magis quanto plurium est regitiva, quia et secundum virtutem corporalem tanto aliquis virtuosior reputatur, quanto plures vincere potest aut pondera plura levare. Sic igitur maior virtus requiritur ad regendum domesticam familiam quam ad regendum se ipsum, multoque maior ad regimen civitatis et regni. Est igitur excellentis virtutis bene regium officium exercere: debetur igitur ei excellens in beatitudine praemium. Now it remains further to consider that they who discharge the kingly office worthily and laudably will obtain an elevated and outstanding degree of heavenly happiness. For if happiness is the reward of virtue, it follows that a higher degree of happiness is due to greater virtue. Now, that virtue is eminent by which a man can guide not only himself but others, and the more persons he rules, the greater his virtue. Similarly, in regard to bodily strength, a man is reputed to be more powerful the more adversaries he can beat or the more weights he can lift. Thus, greater virtue is required to rule a household than to rule one’s self, and much greater to rule a city and a kingdom. To discharge well the office of a king is therefore a work of extraordinary virtue. To it, therefore, is due an extraordinary reward of happiness. Adhuc, in omnibus artibus et potentiis laudabiliores sunt qui alios bene dirigunt, quam qui secundum aliorum directionem bene se habent. In speculativis enim maius est veritatem docendo aliis tradere, quam ab alio traditam capere posse; in artificiis etiam maius existimatur maiorique conducitur praemio architector qui aedificium disponit, quam artifex qui secundum eius dispositionem manualiter operatur; et in rebus bellicis maiorem gloriam de victoria consequitur prudentia ducis quam militis fortitudo. Sic autem se habet rector multitudinis in his quae sunt a singulis secundum virtutem agenda, sicut doctor in disciplinis et architector in aedificiis et dux in bellis. Est igitur rex maiori praemio dignus si bene subiectos gubernaverit, quam aliquis subditorum si sub rege bene se habuerit. Again, those who rule others well are more worthy of praise than those who act well under others’ direction. This applies to the field of all arts and sciences. In the speculative sciences, for instance, it is nobler to impart truth to others by teaching than to be able to grasp what is taught by others. So, too, in matters of the crafts, an architect who plans a building is more highly esteemed and paid a higher wage than is the builder who does the manual labor under his direction; and in warfare the strategy of the general wins greater glory from victory than the bravery of the soldier. Now, the ruler of a multitude stands in the same relation to the virtuous deeds performed by each individual as the teacher to the matters taught, the architect to the buildings, and the general to the wars. Consequently, the king is worthy of a greater reward if he governs his subjects well than any of his subjects who act well under him. Amplius, si virtutis est ut per eam opus hominis bonum reddatur, maioris virtutis esse videtur quod maius bonum aliquis operetur. Maius autem et divinius est bonum multitudinis quam unius; unde et interdum malum unius sustinetur si in bonum multitudinis cedat, sicut occiditur latro ut pax multitudini detur. Et ipse Deus mala esse in mundo non sineret, nisi ex eis bona eliceret ad utilitatem et pulchritudinem universi. Pertinet autem ad regis officium ut bonum multitudinis studiose procuret; maius igitur praemium debetur regi pro bono regimine, quam subdito pro recta actione. Further, if it is the part of virtue to render a man’s work good, it seems that one does greater good from greater virtue. But the good of the multitude is greater and more divine than the good of one man. Hence the evil of one man is sometimes endured if it redounds to the good of the multitude, as when a robber is killed to bring peace to the multitude. God himself would not allow evils to be in the world unless he brings good out of them for the advantage and beauty of the universe. Now, it belongs to the office of the king to have zealous concern for the good of the multitude. Therefore, a greater reward is due to the king for good ruling than to the subject for acting according to rule. Hoc autem manifestius fiet si quis magis in speciali consideret. Laudatur enim ab hominibus quaevis privata persona et ei a Deo computatur in praemium, si egenti subveniat, si discordantes pacificet, si oppressum a potentiore eripiat, denique si alicui qualitercumque opem vel consilium conferat ad salutem. Quanto igitur magis laudandus est ab hominibus et praemiandus a Deo, qui totam provinciam facit pace gaudere, violentias cohibet, iustitiam servat, et disponit quid sit agendum ab hominibus suis legibus et praeceptis. This will become clearer if considered in greater detail. For a private person is praised by men, and his deed reckoned for reward by God, if he helps the needy, brings peace to those in discord, rescues one oppressed by a mightier—in a word, if in any way he gives to another assistance or advice for his welfare. How much the more, then, is he to be praised by men and rewarded by God who makes a whole province rejoice in peace, who restrains violence, preserves justice, and arranges by his laws and precepts what is to be done by men? Hinc etiam magnitudo regiae virtutis apparet quod praecipue Dei similitudinem gerit, dum hoc agit in regno quod Deus in mundo: unde et in Exodo iudices multitudinis dii vocantur; imperatores etiam apud Romanos divi vocantur. Tanto autem est aliquid magis Deo acceptum, quanto magis ad eius imitationem accedit; unde et Apostolus monet: Estote imitatores Dei sicut filii charissimi. Sed si secundum Sapientis sententiam, omne animal diligit simile sibi, secundum quod causae similitudinem aliqualiter habent causata, consequens igitur est bonos reges Deo esse acceptissimos et ab eo maxime praemiandos. The greatness of kingly virtue also appears in this, that he bears a special likeness to God, since he does in his kingdom what God does in the world; wherefore in Exodus the judges of the people are called gods, and also among the Romans the emperors were called ‘divine.’ Now the more a thing approaches to the likeness of God, the more acceptable it is to him. Hence, also, the Apostle urges: Be imitators of God, as beloved children (Eph 5:1). But if, according to the saying of the wise man, every creature loves its like (Sir 13:15) inasmuch as causes bear some likeness to the caused, it follows that good kings are most pleasing to God and are to be most highly rewarded by him. Simul etiam, ut Gregorii verbis utar, quid est [potestas culminis] nisi tempestas mentis? Quieto autem mari recte navem etiam imperitus dirigit, turbato autem tempestatis fluctibus etiam peritus se nauta confundit; unde plerumque in occupatione regiminis ipse quoque boni operis usus perditur, qui in tranquillitate tenebatur. Valde enim difficile est si, ut Augustinus dicit, inter linguas sublimiter honorantium et obsequia nimis humiliter salutantium non extollantur, sed se homines esse meminerint. Et in Ecclesiastico beatus dicitur dives qui post aurum non abiit, nec speravit in pecuniae thesauris; qui potuit impune transgredi et non est transgressus, facere mala et non fecit: ex quo quasi in virtutis opere probatus, invenitur fidelis. Unde secundum Biantis proverbium principatus virum ostendit: multi enim ad principatus culmen pervenientes a virtute deficiunt, qui dum in statu essent infimo virtuosi videbantur. Ipsa igitur difficultas quae principibus imminet ad bene agendum, eos facit maiori praemio dignos, et si aliquando per infirmitatem peccaverint, apud homines excusabiliores redduntur et facilius a Deo veniam promerentur, si tamen, ut Augustinus dicit, pro suis peccatis humilitatis et miserationis et orationis sacrificium Deo suo vero immolare non negligunt. In cuius rei exemplum de Achab rege Israel, qui multum peccaverat, Dominus ad Heliam dixit Quia humiliatus est mei causa, non inducam malum in diebus euis. Likewise, if I may use the words of Gregory: What else is it for a king to be at the pinnacle of power if not to find himself in a mental storm? When the sea is calm even an inexperienced man can steer a ship straight; when the sea is troubled by stormy waves, even an experienced sailor is bewildered. Hence it frequently happens that in the business of government the practice of good works is lost which in tranquil times was maintained. For, as Augustine says, it is very difficult for rulers not to be puffed up amid flattering and honoring tongues and the obsequiousness of those who bow too humbly, but to remember that they are men. It is said also in Sirach: Blessed is the rich man who has not gone after gold, nor put his trust in money, nor in treasures, who could have transgressed with impunity and did not transgress, who could do evil and did not do it (Sir 31:8, 10). Hence, having been tried in the work of virtue, he is found faithful, and so according to the proverb of Bias: Authority shows the man. For many who seemed virtuous while they were in lowly state fall from virtue when they reach the pinnacle of power. The very difficulty, then, of acting well, which besets kings, makes them worthy of greater reward; and if through weakness they sometimes do amiss, they are rendered more excusable before men and more easily obtain forgiveness from God: provided, as Augustine says, they do not neglect to offer up to their true God the sacrifice of humility, mercy, and prayer for their sins. As an example of this, the Lord said to Elias concerning Achab, king of Israel, who had sinned a great deal: Because he has humbled himself before me, I will not bring the evil in his days (1 Kgs 21:29). Non solum autem ratione ostenditur quod regibus excellens praemium debeatur, sed etiam auctoritate divina firmatur. Dicitur enim in Zacharia quod in illa beatitudinis die qua erit Dominus protector habitantium in Ierusalem, id est in visione pacis aeternae, aliorum domus erunt sicut domus David, quia scilicet omnes reges erunt et regnabunt cum Christo sicut membra cum capite; sed domus David erit sicut domus Dei, quia sicut regendo fideliter Dei officium gessit in populo, ita in praemio Deo propinquius inhaerebit. Hoc etiam fuit apud Gentiles aliqualiter somniatum, dum civitatum rectores atque servatores in deos transformari putabant. That a very high reward is due to kings is not only demonstrated by reason but is also confirmed by divine authority. It is said in Zachariah 12:8 that, in that day of blessedness wherein God will be the protector of the inhabitants of Jerusalem (that is, in the vision of eternal peace), the houses of others will be as the house of David, because all will then be kings and reign with Christ as the members with their head. But the house of David will be as the house of God, because just as he carried out the work of God among the people by ruling faithfully, so in his reward he will adhere more closely to God. Likewise, among the Gentiles this was dimly realized, as in a dream, for they thought to transform into gods the rulers and preservers of their cities. Capitulum 10 Chapter 10 Que bona perdant tyranni que regibus exhibentur What advantages which are rendered to kings are lost by the tyrant Cum igitur regibus tam grande in caelesti beatitudine praemium proponatur si bene se in regendo habuerint, diligenti cura se ipsos observare debent ne in tyrannidem convertantur. Nihil enim eis acceptabilius esse potest quam quod, ex honore regio quo sublimantur in terris, in caelestis regni gloriam transferantur. E contra vero tyranni, quia propter quaedam terrena commoda iustitiam deserunt, tanto privantur praemio quod adipisci poterant iuste regendo. Quod autem stultum sit pro huiusmodi parvis et temporalibus bonis maxima et sempiterna perdere bona, nullus nisi stultus aut infidelis ignorat. Since such a magnificent reward in heavenly blessedness is in store for kings who have acted well in ruling, they ought to keep careful watch over themselves in order not to turn to tyranny. Nothing, indeed, can be more acceptable to them than to be transferred from the royal honor, to which they are raised on earth, into the glory of the heavenly kingdom. Tyrants, on the contrary, who desert justice for a few earthly advantages, are deprived of such a great reward which they could have obtained by ruling justly. How foolish it is to sacrifice the greatest and eternal goods for trifling, temporal goods is clear to everyone but a fool or an infidel. Addendum est autem quod etiam haec temporalia commoda, propter quae tyranni iustitiam deserunt, magis ad lucrum proveniunt regibus dum iustitiam servant. Primo namque inter mundana omnia nihil est quod amicitiae dignae praeferendum videatur. Ipsa enim est quae virtuosos in unum conciliat, virtutem conservat atque promovet. Ipsa est qua omnes indigent in quibuscumque negotiis exequendis, quae nec prosperis importune se ingerit, nec deserit in adversis. Ipsa est quae maximas delectationes affert, in tantum ut quaecumque delectabilia in taedium sine amicis vertantur; quaelibet autem aspera, facilia et prope nulla facit amor. Nec est alicuius tyranni tanta crudelitas ut amicitia non delectetur. Dionysius enim quondam Syracusanorum tyrannus cum duorum amicorum, qui Damon et Pythias dicebantur, alterum occidere vellet, is qui occidendus erat inducias impetravit ut domum profectus res suas ordinaret; alter vero amicorum obsidem se tyranno pro eius reditu dedit. Appropinquante autem praefixo die, nec illo redeunte, unusquisque fideiussorem stultitiae arguebat; at ille nihil se de amici constantia metuere praedicabat. Eadem autem hora qua fuerat praefixa, occidendus rediit. Admirans autem amborum animum, tyrannus supplicium propter fidem amicitiae remisit, insuper rogans ut eum tertium reciperent in amicitiae gradu. It is to be added further, however, that the very temporal advantages for which tyrants abandon justice work to the greater profit of kings when they observe justice. First of all, among all worldly things there is nothing which seems worthy to be preferred to friendship. Friendship unites good men and preserves and promotes virtue. Friendship is needed by all men in whatsoever occupations they engage. In prosperity it does not thrust itself unwanted upon us, nor does it desert us in adversity. It is what brings with it the greatest delight, to such an extent that all that pleases is changed to weariness when friends are absent, and all difficult things are made easy and as nothing by love. There is no tyrant so cruel that friendship does not bring him pleasure. When Dionysius, sometime tyrant of Syracuse, wanted to kill one of two friends, Damon and Pythias, the one who was to be killed asked leave to go home and set his affairs in order, and the other friend surrendered himself to the tyrant as security for his return. When the appointed day was approaching and he had not yet returned, everyone said that his hostage was a fool, but he declared he had no fear whatever regarding his friend’s loyalty. The very hour when he was to be put to death, his friend returned. Admiring the courage of both, the tyrant remitted the sentence on account of the loyalty of their friendship, and asked in addition that they should receive him as a third member in their bond of friendship. Hoc tamen amicitiae bonum quamvis desiderent tyranni, consequi non possunt. Dum enim commune bonum non quaerunt sed proprium, fit parva vel nulla communio eorum ad subditos; omnis autem amicitia super aliqua communione firmatur: eos enim qui conveniunt vel per naturae originem vel per morum similitudinem vel per cuiuscumque societatis communionem, videmus amicitia coniungi; parva igitur vel potius nulla est amicitia tyranni et subditi. Simulque dum subditi per tyrannicam iniustitiam opprimuntur et se amari non sentiunt sed contemni, nequaquam amant. Est enim maioris virtutis inimicos diligere et persequentibus benefacere quam quod a multitudine observatur; nec habent unde de subditis conquerantur si ab eis non diliguntur, quia nec ipsi se tales eis exhibent ut diligi debeant. Yet, although tyrants desire this very benefit of friendship, they cannot obtain it, for when they seek their own good instead of the common good there is little or no communion between them and their subjects. Now, all friendship is based upon something common among those who are to be friends, for we see that those are united in friendship who have in common either their natural origin, or some similarity in habits of life, or any kind of social interests. Consequently, there can be little or no friendship between tyrants and their subjects. When the latter are oppressed by tyrannical injustice and feel they are not loved but despised, they certainly do not conceive any love, for it is too great a virtue for the common man to love his enemies and to do good to his persecutors (cf. Matt 5:44). Nor have tyrants any reason to complain of their subjects if they are not loved by them, since they do not act towards them in such a way that they ought to be loved by them. At boni reges dum communi profectui studiose intendunt et eorum studio subditi plurima commoda se consequi sentiunt, diliguntur a plurimis, dum subditos se amare demonstrant; quia et hoc etiam est maioris malitiae quam quod in multitudine cadat, ut odio habeantur amici et benefactoribus rependatur malum pro bono. Ex hoc amore provenit quod bonorum regum regimen sit stabile, dum pro ipsis se subditi quibuscumque periculis exponere non recusant. Cuius exemplum in Iulio Caesare apparet, de quo Suetonius refert quod milites suos usque adeo diligebat ut, audita quorumdam caede, capillos et barbam ante non dempserit quam vindicasset; quibus rebus devotissimos sibi et fortissimos milites reddidit, ita quod plerique eorum capti concessam sibi sub ea conditione vitam, si militare adversus Caesarem vellent, recusarent. Octavianus etiam Augustus, qui modestissime imperio usus est, in tantum diligebatur a subditis, ut plerique morientes victimas quas devoverant immolari mandarent quia eum superstitem reliquissent. Non est ergo facile ut principis perturbetur dominium quem tanto consensu populus amat; propter quod Salomon dicit Rex qui iudicat in iustitia pauperes, thronus eius in aeternum firmabitur. Good kings, on the contrary, are loved by many when they show that they love their subjects and are studiously intent on the common welfare, and when their subjects can see that they derive many benefits from this zealous care. For to hate their friends and return evil for good to their benefactors—this, surely, would be too great a malice to ascribe fittingly to the generality of men. The consequence of this love is that the government of good kings is stable, because their subjects do not refuse to expose themselves to any danger whatsoever on behalf of such kings. An example of this is to be seen in Julius Caesar who, as Suetonius relates, loved his soldiers to such an extent that when he heard that some of them were slaughtered, he refused to cut either hair or beard until he had taken vengeance. In this way, he made his soldiers most loyal to himself as well as most valiant, so that many, on being taken prisoner, refused to accept their lives when offered them on the condition that they serve against Caesar. Likewise, Octavianus Augustus, who was most moderate in his use of power, was so loved by his subjects that some of them on their deathbeds provided in their wills a thank-offering to be paid by the immolation of animals, so grateful were they that the emperor’s life outlasted their own. Therefore, it is no easy task to shake the government of a prince whom the people so unanimously love. This is why Solomon says: The king that judges the poor in justice, his throne shall be established forever (Prov 29:14). Tyrannorum vero dominium diuturnum esse non potest, cum sit multitudini odiosum; non potest enim diu conservari quod votis multorum repugnat. Vix enim a quoquam praesens vita transigitur quin aliquas adversitates patiatur; adversitatis autem tempore occasio deesse non potest contra tyrannum insurgendi, et si adsit occasio, non deerit ex multis vel unus qui occasione non utatur. Insurgentem autem populus votive prosequitur, nec de facili carebit effectu quod cum favore multitudinis attentatur. Vix ergo potest contingere quod tyranni dominium protendatur in longum. The government of tyrants, on the other hand, cannot last long because it is hateful to the multitude, and what is against the wishes of the multitude cannot be long preserved. For a man can hardly pass through this present life without suffering some adversities, and in the time of his adversity occasion cannot be lacking to rise against the tyrant; and when there is an opportunity there will not be lacking at least one of the multitude to use it. Then the people will fervently favor the insurgent, and what is attempted with the sympathy of the multitude will not easily fail of its effects. It can thus scarcely come to pass that the government of a tyrant will endure for a long time. Hoc etiam manifeste patet, si quis consideret unde tyranni dominium conservatur. Non enim conservatur amore, cum parva vel nulla sit amicitia subiectae multitudinis ad tyrannum, ut ex praehabitis patet. De subditorum autem fide tyrannis confidendum non est: non enim invenitur tanta virtus in multis, ut fidelitatis virtute comprimantur ne indebitae servitutis iugum si possunt excutiant. Fortassis autem nec fidelitati contrarium reputabitur secundum opinionem multorum, si tyrannicae nequitiae qualitercumque obvietur. Restat ergo ut solo timore tyranni regimen sustentetur, unde et timeri se a subditis tota intentione procurant. Timor autem est debile fundamentum; nam qui timore subduntur, si occurrat occasio qua possint impunitatem sperare, contra praesidentes insurgunt eo ardentius quo magis contra voluntatem ex solo timore cohibebantur, sicut si aqua per violentiam includatur, cum aditum invenerit impetuosius fluit. Sed nec ipse timor caret periculo, cum ex nimio timore plerique in desperationem inciderint; salutis autem desperatio audacter ad quaelibet attendenda praecipitat. Non potest igitur tyranni dominium esse diuturnum. This is very clear, too, if we consider the means by which a tyrannical government is upheld. It is not upheld by love, since there is little or no bond of friendship between the subject multitude and the tyrant, as is evident from what we have said. On the other hand, tyrants cannot rely on the loyalty of their subjects, for such a degree of virtue is not found among the generality of men that they should be restrained by the virtue of fidelity from throwing off the yoke of unmerited servitude, if they are able to do so. Nor would it perhaps be a violation of fidelity at all, according to the opinion of many, to frustrate the wickedness of tyrants by any means whatsoever. It remains, then, that the government of a tyrant is maintained by fear alone, and consequently they strive with all their might to be feared by their subjects. Fear, however, is a weak support. Those who are kept down by fear will rise against their rulers if the opportunity ever occurs when they can hope to do it with impunity, and they will rebel against their rulers all the more furiously the more they have been kept in subjection against their will by fear alone, just as water confined under pressure flows with greater impetus when it finds an outlet. That very fear itself is not without danger, because many become desperate from excessive fear, and despair of safety impels a man boldly to dare anything. Therefore, the government of a tyrant cannot be of long duration. Hoc etiam non minus exemplis quam rationibus apparet. Si quis enim antiquorum gesta et modernorum eventus consideret, vix inveniet tyranni alicuius dominium diuturnum fuisse. Unde Aristoteles in sua Politica multis tyrannis enumeratis, omnium monstrat dominium brevi tempore fuisse finitum; quorum tamen aliqui diutius praefuerunt, quia non multum in tyrannide excedebant sed quantum ad multa imitabantur regalem modestiam. This appears clearly from examples no less than from reason. If we scan the history of antiquity and the events of modern times, we shall scarcely find one government of a tyrant which lasted a long time. So Aristotle, in his Politics, after enumerating many tyrants, shows that all their governments were of short duration; although some of them reigned a fairly long time because they were not very tyrannical, but in many things imitated the moderation of kings. Adhuc autem, hoc magis fit manifestum ex consideratione divini iudicii. Ut enim in Iob dicitur, regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi. Nullus autem verius hypocrita dici potest quam qui regis assumit officium et exhibet se tyrannum; nam hypocrita dicitur qui alterius repraesentat personam, sicut in spectaculis fieri consuevit. Sic igitur Deus praefici permittit tyrannos ad puniendum subditorum peccata. Talis autem punitio in Scripturis ira Dei consuevit nominari; unde per Oseae Dominus dicit Dabo tibi regem in furore meo. Infelix autem rex qui populo in furore Dei conceditur: non enim eius stabile potest esse dominium, quia non obliviscetur misereri Deus, nec continebit in ira sua misericordias suas; quinimmo, ut per Ioelem dicitur, est patiens, multae misericordiae et praestabilis super malitia. Non igitur diu permittit Deus regnare tyrannos, sed post tempestatem per eos inductam populo, per eorum deiectionem tranquillitatem inducet; unde Sapiens dicit Sedes ducum superborum destruxit Dominus et sedere fecit mites pro eis. All this becomes still more evident if we consider the divine judgment, for, as we read in Job, He makes a man who is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people (Job 24:30). No one, indeed, can be more truly called a hypocrite than the man who assumes the office of king and acts like a tyrant, for a hypocrite is one who mimics the person of another, as is done on the stage. Hence God permits tyrants to get into power to punish the sins of the subjects. In Sacred Scripture it is customary to call such punishment ‘the anger of God.’ Thus in Hosea the Lord says: I will give you a king in my anger (Hos 13:11). Unhappy is a king who is given to the people in God’s wrath, for his power cannot be stable, because God does not forget to show mercy nor does he shut up his mercies in his anger (Ps 77 [76]:10). On the contrary, as we read in Joel: He is patient and rich in mercy and ready to repent of the evil (Joel 2:13). So God does not permit tyrants to reign a long time, but after the storm brought on the people through these tyrants, he restores tranquillity by casting them down. Therefore, the wise man says: The Lord has cast down the thrones of rulers, and has seated the lowly in their place (Sir 10:17). Experimento etiam apparet quod reges per iustitiam magis adipiscuntur divitias, quam per rapinam tyranni. Quia enim tyrannorum dominium subiectae multitudini displicet, opus habent tyranni multos habere satellites per quos contra subditos tuti reddantur, in quibus necesse est plura expendere quam a subditis rapiant. Regum autem dominium quia subditis placet, omnes subditos pro satellitibus ad custodiam habent, in quibus expendere opus non habent, sed interdum in necessitatibus plura regibus sponte donant quam tyranni diripere possint: et sic impletur quod Salomon dicit Alii, scilicet reges, dividunt propria benefaciendo subiectiset divitiores fiunt; alii, scilicet tyranni, rapiunt non sua et semper in egestate sunt. Similiter etiam iusto Dei contingit iudicio, ut qui divitias iniuste congregant inutiliter eas dispergant, aut etiam iuste auferantur ab eis. Ut enim Salomon dicit, avarus non implebitur pecunia, et qui amat divitias fructum non capiet ex eis; quinimmo, ut alibi dicit, conturbat domum suam qui sectatur avaritiam. Reges vero dum iustitiam quaerunt, divitiae ipsis adduntur a Deo, sicut Salomoni qui, dum sapientiam quaesivit ad faciendum iudicium, promissionem de abundantia divitiarum accepit. Experience further shows that kings acquire more wealth through justice than tyrants do through rapine. Because the government of tyrants is displeasing to the multitude subject to it, tyrants must have a great many guards to safeguard themselves against their subjects. On these it is necessary to spend more than they can rob from their subjects. On the contrary, the government of kings, since it is pleasing to their subjects, has for its protection all the subjects instead of guards. And they demand no pay but, in time of need, freely give to their kings more than the tyrants can take. Thus the words of Solomon are fulfilled: Some, namely, the kings, distribute their own goods, doing good to their subjects, and grow richer; others, namely, the tyrants, take away what is not their own and are always in want (Prov 11:24). In the same way it comes to pass, by the just judgment of God, that those who unjustly heap up riches uselessly scatter them, or are justly deprived of them. For as Solomon says: He who loves money will not be satisfied with money; nor he who loves wealth, with gain (Eccl 5:9). Rather, we read in Proverbs: He who is greedy for unjust gain makes trouble for his household (Prov 15:27). But to kings who seek justice, God gives wealth, as he did to Solomon who, when he sought wisdom to do justice, received a promise of an abundance of wealth. De fama vero superfluum videtur dicere. Quis dubitet bonos reges non solum in vita, sed magis post mortem quodammodo laudibus hominum vivere, in desiderio haberi, malorum vero nomen aut statim deficere, vel, si excellentes in malitia fuerint, cum detestatione ipsorum rememoratur. Unde Salomon dicit Memoria iusti cum laudibus, nomen autem impiorum putrescet, quia vel deficit, vel remanet cum foetore. It seems superfluous to speak about fame, for who can doubt that good kings live in a sense in the praises of men, not only in this life, but still more after their death, and that men yearn for them? But the name of wicked kings straightway vanishes, or, if they have been excessive in their wickedness, they are remembered with detestation. Thus Solomon says: The memory of the righteous is a blessing, but the name of the wicked will rot (Prov 10:7), because it either vanishes or remains with stench. Capitulum 11 Chapter 11 Quae supplicia sustinebunt tyranni What punishments are in store for a tyrant Ex his ergo manifestum est quod stabilitas potestatis, divitiae, honor et fama magis regibus quam tyrannis ad votum proveniunt, propter quae tamen indebite adipiscenda declinant in tyrannidem princeps: nullus enim a iustitia declinat nisi cupiditate alicuius commodi tractus. Privatur insuper tyrannus excellentissima beatitudine quae regibus debetur pro praemio et, quod est gravius, maximum tormentum sibi acquirit in poenis: si enim qui unum hominem spoliat vel in servitutem redigit vel occidit maximam poenam meretur, quantum quidem ad iudicium hominum mortem, quantum vero ad iudicium Dei damnationem aeternam, quanto magis putandum est tyrannum deteriora mereri supplicia, qui undique ab omnibus rapit, contra omnium communem libertatem laborat, pro libito voluntatis quoscumque interficit. Tales insuper raro poenitent, vento inflati superbiae, merito peccatorum a Deo deserti et adulationibus hominum delibuti, et rarius digne satisfacere possunt. Quando enim restituent omnia quae praeter iustitiae debitum abstulerunt, ad quae tamen restituenda nullus dubitat eos teneri? Quando recompensabunt eis quos oppresserunt et iniuste qualitercumque laeserunt? From the above arguments it is evident that stability of power, wealth, honor and fame come to fulfill the desires of kings rather than tyrants, and it is in seeking to acquire these things unduly that princes turn to tyranny. For no one falls away from justice except through a desire for some temporal advantage. The tyrant, moreover, loses the surpassing beatitude which is due as a reward to kings and, which is still more serious, brings upon himself great suffering as a punishment. For if the man who despoils a single man, or casts him into slavery, or kills him, deserves the greatest punishment (death in the judgment of men, and in the judgment of God eternal damnation), how much worse tortures must we consider a tyrant deserves, who on all sides robs everybody, works against the common liberty of all, and kills whom he will at his merest whim? Again, such men rarely repent; but puffed up by the wind of pride, deservedly abandoned by God for their sins, and besmirched by the flattery of men, they can rarely make worthy satisfaction. When will they ever restore all those things which they have received beyond their just due? Yet no one doubts that they are bound to restore those ill-gotten goods. When will they make amends to those whom they have oppressed and unjustly injured in their many ways? Adiicitur autem ad eorum impoenitentiam quod omnia sibi licita existimant quae impune sine resistentia facere potuerunt; unde non solum emendare non satagunt quae male fecerunt, sed sua consuetudine pro auctoritate utentes, peccandi audaciam transmittunt ad posteros, et sic non solum suorum facinorum apud Deum rei tenentur, sed etiam eorum quibus peccandi occasionem reliquerunt. The malice of their impenitence is increased by the fact that they consider everything licit which they can do unresisted and with impunity. Hence they not only make no effort to repair the evil they have done, but, taking their customary way of acting as their authority, they hand on their boldness in sinning to posterity. Consequently, they are held guilty before God not only for their own sins, but also for the crimes of those to whom they gave the occasion of sin.