Ad septimum dicendum, quod agere et pati non convenit entibus secundum quod sunt in consideratione sed secundum quod sunt in esse, mathematicus autem considerat res abstractas secundum considerationem tantum; et ideo illae res prout cadunt in consideratione mathematici, non convenit esse principium et finis motus, et ideo mathematicus non demonstrat per causas efficientem et finalem. Res autem quas considerat divinus sunt separatae exsistentes in rerum natura, tales quae possunt esse principium et finis motus; unde nihil prohibet quin per causas efficientem et finalem demonstret. Ad 7. Action and passion do not belong to things as they exist in thought but as they exist in reality. Now since the mathematician deals with things that are abstract only in thought, insofar as they come under his consideration they cannot be the principle or the end of motion. So the mathematician does not demonstrate by means of efficient and final causes. But the things the metaphysician deals with are separate, existing in reality, and these can be the principle and end of motion. So nothing prevents his demonstrating by means of efficient and final causes. Ad octavum dicendum, quod sicut fides, quae est quasi habitus principiorum theologiae, habet pro obiecto ipsam veritatem primam et tamen quaedam alia ad creaturas pertinentia in articulis fidei continentur in quantum contingunt aliquo modo veritatem primam, per eundem modum theologia est principaliter de Deo sicut de subiecto, de creaturis autem multa assumit ut effectus eius vel quomodolibet habentia habitudinem ad ipsum. Ad 8. Just as faith, which is in a way the habit of the principles of theology, has for its object the first truth itself, and yet the articles of faith contain certain other things relating to creatures insofar as they have some connection with the first truth, in the same way theology is primarily concerned with God as its subject, but it includes many things about creatures as his effects, or as being in some way related to him. Quaestio VI Question 6 The methods of speculative science Deinde quaeritur de modis quos scientiis speculativis attribuit. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quattuor: The next question concerns the methods ascribed by Boethius to the speculative sciences. There are four points of inquiry in this connection. primo utrum oporteat versari in naturalibus rationabiliter, in mathematicis disciplinabiliter, in divinis intellectualiter; 1. Must we proceed according to the mode of reason in natural science, according to the mode of learning in mathematics, and according to the mode of intellect in divine science? secundo utrum in divinis sit omnino imaginatio relinquenda; 2. Should we entirely abandon the imagination in divine science? tertio utrum intellectus noster possit ipsam formam divinam inspicere; 3. Can our intellect behold the divine form itself? quarto utrum hoc possit fieri per viam alicuius scientiae speculativae. 4. Can our intellect behold the divine form by means of some speculative science? Articulus I Article 1 Must we proceed according to the mode of reason in natural science, of learning in mathematics, and of intellect in theology? I I Ad primum sic proceditur: videtur quod non oporteat in naturalibus rationabiliter versari. Philosophia enim rationalis contra naturalem dividitur. Sed rationabiliter procedere videtur proprie ad rationalem pertinere. Ergo non competenter attribuitur naturali. Obj. 1. On the first point we proceed as follows: it seems that we must no proceed according to the mode of reason in natural science, for rational philosophy is contra-distinguished from natural philosophy. But it seems to belong properly to rational philosophy to proceed according to the mode of reason. So this method is not appropriately ascribed to natural philosophy. Praeterea. Philosophus frequenter in libro Physicorum distinguit processus ad aliquas conclusiones rationales et physicas; ergo non est proprium naturali scientiae rationabiliter procedere. Obj. 2. Again, in the Physics the Philosopher frequently distinguishes between the methods of arriving at rational conclusions and physical conclusions. Therefore it is not the special characteristic of natural science to proceed rationally. Praeterea. Illud quod est commune omnibus scientiis non debet uni appropriari. Sed quaelibet scientia ratiocinando procedit, discurrendo vel ex effectibus in causas, vel ex causis in effectus, vel ex aliquibus signis. Ergo non debet naturali appropriari. Obj. 3. Again, what is common to all the sciences should not be reserved to one. But every science proceeds by reasoning, advancing from effects to causes or from causes to effects or from certain signs. So this method should not be reserved to natural science. Praeterea. Ratiocinativum in VI Ethicorum contra scientificum distinguitur a Philosopho. Sed philosophia naturalis ad scientificum pertinet. Ergo non convenienter attribuitur (ei) rationabiliter procedere. Obj. 4. Again, in the Ethics the Philosopher distinguishes the reasoning part of the soul from the scientific part. But natural philosophy belongs to the scientific part. Therefore it is not appropriately said to proceed according to the mode of reason. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro De spiritu et anima quod ratio circa formas corporum versatur. Sed considerare corpora maxime pertinet ad naturalem. Ergo convenienter attribuitur ei rationabiliter procedere. On the contrary, the De spiritu et anima says that reason is concerned with the forms of bodies. Now it belongs most especially to natural philosophy to consider bodies. Therefore the rational method is appropriately attributed to it. Praeterea. In V De consolatione Boethius dicit: ratio cum quid universale respicit, nec imaginatione nec sensu utens, imaginabilia tamen et sensibilia comprehendit. Sed imaginabilia et sensibilia comprehendere ad solum naturalem pertinet. Ergo rationalis processus convenienter naturali attribuitur. Moreover, Boethius says: when reason contemplates some universal nature, using neither imagination nor sense, it nevertheless comprehends imaginable and sensible things. Now it belongs to the natural philosopher alone to comprehend what is imaginable and sensible. Therefore the rational method is suitably attributed to natural philosophy. II II Ulterius videtur quod inconvenienter dicatur mathematica disciplinabiliter procedere. Disciplina enim nihil aliud esse videtur quam acceptio scientiae. Sed in qualibet parte philosophiae accipitur scientia; quia omnes demonstrative procedunt. Ergo procedere disciplinaliter est commune omnibus partibus philosophiae, et ita non debet appropriari mathematicae. Obj. 1. In the second place, it seems inappropriate to say that mathematics proceeds according to the mode of learning, for learning seems to be nothing else than the receiving knowledge. But we receive scientific knowledge in all branches of philosophy, because all proceed by means of demonstration. So it is common to all parts of philosophy to proceed according to the mode of learning; and so this procedure should not be made exclusive to mathematics. Praeterea. Quanto aliquid certius, tanto facilius esse videtur ut de eo sit disciplina. Sed naturalia sunt certiora, ut videtur, quam mathematica; quia capiuntur sensu, a quo omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet. Ergo hic modus magis competit naturali quam mathematico. Obj. 2. Again, the more certain something is, the easier it seems to learn it. But natural things seem to be more certain than mathematics because they are apprehended by the senses, from which all our knowledge takes its origin. Therefore this method belongs to the natural philosopher rather than to the mathematician. Praeterea. Ut dicitur in V Metaphysicae, initium in scientiis est a quo fit facilior disciplina. Sed initium addiscendi accipitur a logica, quam oportet praeaddiscere mathematicae et omnibus aliis. Ergo disciplinalis modus magis convenit logicae quam aliis. Obj. 3. Again, as the Metaphysics says, in the sciences we begin at the point from which we learn more easily. But learning begins with logic, which must be mastered before mathematics and all the other sciences. Therefore it belongs to logic rather than to the other sciences to proceed according to the mode of learning. Praeterea. Modus naturalis scientiae et divinae sumitur a potentiis animae, scilicet a ratione et intellectu. Ergo similiter et modus mathematicae ab aliqua animae potentia sumi deberet, et sic non convenienter ponitur eius modus disciplinabiliter versari. Obj. 4. Again, the methods of natural and divine science are taken from powers of the soul, namely from reason and intellect. Therefore in the same way the method of mathematics ought to be taken from some power of the soul. So it is not appropriate to say that its method is to proceed according to the mode of learning. Sed contra. Disciplinaliter procedere est demonstrative procedere et per certitudinem. Sed sicut Ptolemaeus in principio Almagesti, solum mathematicum genus, si quis huic diligentiam exhibeat inquisitionis firmam stabilemque fidem intendentibus notitiam dabit, velut demonstratione per indubitabiles vias facta. Ergo disciplinaliter procedere maxime proprium est mathematici. On the contrary, to proceed according to the mode of learning is to proceed by demonstration and with certitude. But as Ptolemy says, mathematics alone, if one applies himself diligently to it, will give the inquirer after knowledge firm and unshaken certitude by demonstrations carried out with unquestionable methods. Therefore it is most characteristic of mathematics to proceed according to the mode of learning. Praeterea. Hoc patet per Philosophum, qui in pluribus locis suorum librorum scientias mathematicas disciplinas nominat. Moreover, this is evident from the Philosopher who, in several places in his works, calls the mathematical sciences disciplines. III III Ulterius videtur quod non sit conveniens modus divinae scientiae intellectualiter procedere. Intellectus enim secundum Philosophum est principiorum, scientia autem conclusionum. Sed non omnia quae in scientia divina traduntur sunt principia, sed quaedam etiam conclusiones. Ergo intellectualiter procedere non est conveniens scientiae divinae. Obj. 1. In the third place, it seems that it is not appropriate to divine science to proceed according to the mode of intellect, for according to the Philosopher, there is understanding of principles, whereas there is science of conclusions. But principles alone are not considered in divine science; some conclusions are also considered. Therefore to proceed according to the mode of intellect is not appropriate to divine science. Praeterea. In illis quae omnem intellectum excedunt intellectualiter versari non possumus. Sed divina excedunt omnem intellectum, ut Dionysius dicit I c. De divinis nominibus, et Philosophus in libro De causis. Ergo intellectualiter tractari non possunt. Obj. 2. Again, we cannot proceed intellectually with regard to those things that transcend every intellect. But divine things transcend every intellect, as Dionysius and the Philosopher say. Therefore they cannot be dealt with intellectually. Praeterea. Dionysius dicit VII c. De divinis nominibus quod angeli habent intellectualem virtutem in quantum divinam cognitionem non congregant a sensibilibus aut a rebus divisis. Sed hoc est supra animae potestatem, ut ibidem subditur. Cum ergo divina scientia de qua nunc agitur sit scientia humanae animae, videtur quod non sit proprius modus eius intellectualiter tractare. Obj. 3. Again, Dionysius says that angels have intellectual power inasmuch as they do not gather their divine knowledge from what is sensible and divided; but, as he adds, this is beyond the power of the soul. Therefore, since the divine science that is now under discussion is a science belonging to the human soul, it appears that its proper method is not to proceed intellectually. Praeterea. Theologia praecipue videtur esse de his quae fidei sunt. Sed in his quae fidei sunt intelligere est finis; unde dicitur Isa. VII, secundum aliam litteram: nisi credideritis non intelligetis. Ergo intellectualiter versari circa divina non debet poni theologiae modus sed finis. Obj. 4. Again, theology seems particularly concerned with the things of faith. But understanding (intelligere) is the goal of the things of faith. Thus it is said in lsaiah, according to another version, unless you believe, you will not understand. So we should not say that proceeding intellectually about divine things is the method of theology but the goal. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima quod intellectus est spirituum creatorum, intelligentia vero ipsius Dei. De his autem praecipue est scientia divina. Ergo intellectualiter procedere videtur esse ipsius proprium. On the contrary, the De spiritu et anima says that intellect (intellectus) has for its object created spirits, while understanding (intelligentia) has for its object God himself. Now divine science is principally concerned with them. Therefore it seems proper to it to proceed intellectually. Praeterea. Modus scientiae debet respondere materiae. Sed res divinae sunt res intelligibiles per se ipsas. Ergo modus conveniens divinae scientiae est intellectualiter procedere. Moreover, the method of a science must correspond to its subject matter. But divine things are intelligible in virtue of themselves. Therefore the method appropriate to divine science is to proceed intellectually. I I Responsio. Dicendum, ad primam quaestionem, quod processus aliquis quo proceditur in scientiis dicitur rationabilis tripliciter. To the first question I answer that a method of proceeding in the sciences is called rational in three ways. Uno modo ex parte principiorum ex quibus proceditur, ut cum aliquis procedit ad aliquid probandum ex operibus rationis, cuiusmodi sunt genus et species et oppositum, et huiusmodi intentiones quas logici considerant; et sic dicetur aliquis processus esse rationabilis quando aliquis utitur in aliqua scientia propositionibus quae traduntur in logica, prout scilicet utimur logica prout est docens in aliis scientiis. Sed hic modus procedendi non potest proprie competere alicui particulari scientiae, in quibus peccatum accidit nisi ex propriis procedatur: contingit autem hoc proprie et convenienter fieri in logica et metaphysica, eo quod utraque scientia communis est et circa idem subiectum quodammodo. In one way, because of the principles from which we begin; for instance, when we proceed to prove something beginning with mental beings, like genus, species, opposite, and concepts of this sort, which the logicians study. In this sense a method will be called rational when in a science we use the propositions taught in logic; namely, when we use logic as having a teaching function in the other sciences. But this method of proceeding cannot belong properly to any particular science: it will fall into error unless it proceeds from its own proper principles. However, logic and metaphysics may properly and suitably use this method, because both are universal sciences and in a sense treat of the same subject. Alio modo dicitur processus rationalis ex termino in quo sistitur procedendo: ultimus enim terminus ad quem rationis inquisitio perducere debet, est intellectus principiorum, in quae resolvendo iudicamus; quod quidem quando fit, non dicitur processus vel probatio rationabilis sed demonstrativa. Quandoque autem inquisitio rationis non potest usque ad praedictum terminum perduci, sed sistitur in ipsa inquisitione, quando scilicet inquirenti adhuc manet via ad utrumlibet, et hoc contingit quando per probabiles rationes proceditur, quae natae sunt facere opinionem vel fidem, non scientiam; et sic rationabilis processus dividitur contra demonstrativum. Et hoc modo rationabiliter procedi potest in qualibet scientia, ut ex probabilibus paretur via ad necessarias probationes; et hic est alius modus quo logica utimur in scientiis demonstrativis, non quidem ut est docens, sed ut est utens. Et his duobus modis denominatur processus rationalis a scientia rationali: his enim modis usitatur logica, quae rationalis scientia dicitur, in scientiis demonstrativis, ut dicit Commentator in I Physicorum. In a second way, a method is called rational because of the end that terminates the thinking process. For the ultimate end that rational inquiry ought to reach is the understanding of principles, in which we resolve our judgments. And when this takes place, it is not called a rational procedure or proof but a demonstration. Sometimes, however, rational inquiry, cannot arrive at the ultimate end, but stops in the course of the investigation itself; that is to say, when several possible solutions still remain open to the investigator. This happens when we proceed by means of probable arguments, which by their nature produce opinion or belief, but not science. In this sense, rational method is opposed to demonstrative method. We can proceed by this rational method in all the sciences, preparing the way for necessary, proofs by probable arguments. This is another use of logic in the demonstrative sciences; not indeed as having a teaching function, but as being an instrument. In these two ways, then, a method is called rational from rational science, for, as the Commentator says, in both of them logic (which is another name for rational science) is used in the demonstrative sciences.