De Unitate Intellectus On the Unicity of the Intellect contra Averroistas against the Averroists Capitulum 1 Chapter 1 Sicut omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant veritatem, ita naturale desiderium inest hominibus fugiendi errores, et eos cum facultas adfuerit confutandi. Inter alios autem errores indecentior videtur esse error quo circa intellectum erratur, per quem nati sumus devitatis erroribus cognoscere veritatem. Inolevit siquidem iam dudum circa intellectum error apud multos, ex dictis Averrois sumens originem, qui asserere nititur intellectum quem Aristoteles possibilem vocat, ipse autem inconvenienti nomine materialem, esse quamdam substantiam secundum esse a corpore separatam, nec aliquo modo uniri ei ut formam; et ulterius quod iste intellectus possibilis sit unus omnium hominum. Contra quae iam pridem plura conscripsimus; sed quia errantium impudentia non cessat veritati reniti, propositum nostrae intentionis est iterato contra eumdem errorem conscribere aliqua, quibus manifeste praedictus error confutetur. As all men naturally desire to know the truth, so there is in men, by nature, the desire to shun errors and to refute them when possessed of ability to do so. Among all errors, moreover, the one that seems to be especially unbecoming is the error about the intellect; for we have been born to know the truth by the power of this intellect through the avoidance of errors. Of late there has sprung up an erroneous doctrine about the intellect on the part of many men who take their starting point from certain works of Averroes. They assert that the intellect, which Aristotle called the possible intellect (he also inaptly called it "immaterial"), is evidently a kind of substance separate, by its very nature, from the body, yet in some way united to the body as its form; and further, that this possible intellect is one for all men. Against this doctrine we have already written much. But since the boldness of those in error has not ceased to assail the truth, it is our intention once more to direct an answer to this false teaching in order that its error may be manifestly confounded. Nec id nunc agendum est ut positionem praedictam in hoc ostendamus esse erroneam quia repugnat veritati fidei Christianae. Hoc enim satis in promptu cuique apparere potest. Subtracta enim ab hominibus diversitate intellectus, qui solus inter animae partes incorruptibilis et immortalis apparet, sequitur post mortem nihil de animabus hominum remanere nisi unicam intellectus substantiam; et sic tollitur retributio praemiorum et paenarum et diversitas eorumdem. Intendimus autem ostendere positionem praedictam non minus contra philosophiae principia esse, quam contra fidei documenta. Et quia quibusdam, ut dicunt, in hac materia verba Latinorum non sapiunt, sed Peripateticorum verba sectari se dicunt, quorum libros numquam in hac materia viderunt, nisi Aristotelis qui fuit sectae Peripateticae institutor; ostendemus primo positionem praedictam eius verbis et sententiae repugnare omnino. At this time it will not be our method to show that the aforesaid position is erroneous as being repugnant to the truth of Christian faith: this is at once sufficiently evident to anyone. For if there is no diversity of intellect among all men, and the intellect appears to be the only incorruptible and immortal part of the soul, then it follows that after death nothing of the souls of men survives except the one common intellect. Thus would be destroyed any possibility of retribution, of rewards and punishments, or any diversity in recompenses. However, we intend to show that their position is not less in conflict with the principles of philosophy than it is with the certain testimony of faith. Since for certain men concerned in this matter the words of the Latin philosophers have no savor, and since they claim to be followers of the Perpatetics (though of their books on this subject they have seen none, except those of Aristotle, who was the founder of the Peripatetic school), we shall point out that their position is altogether at variance with his words and express opinion. Accipienda est igitur prima definitio animae quam Aristoteles in secundo de anima ponit, dicens quod anima est actus primus corporis physici organici. Et ne forte aliquis diceret hanc definitionem non omni animae competere, propter hoc quod supra sub conditione dixerat: si oportet aliquid commune in omni anima dicere, quod intelligunt sic dictum quasi hoc esse non possit, accipienda sunt verba eius sequentia. Dicit enim: universaliter quidem dictum est quid sit anima; substantia enim est quae est secundum rationem; hoc autem est quod quid erat esse huius corporis, i. e. forma substantialis corporis physici organici. First of all, there must be acceptance of the definition of the soul which Aristotle proposes in II De Anima, saying: "The first act of a physical, organic body." And lest, perhaps, someone may say this definition is not altogether applicable to all souls because of what Aristotle previously had conditionally stated; namely, "that it is necessary to predicate something that is common to all souls" (which they would understand to mean that such a thing cannot be), the following words of his must be noted. He says: "We have now given an answer to the question, What is soul—an answer which applies to it in its full extent. It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence. That means that it is the essential whatness of a body" (i.e., of a naturally organized body). Et ne forte dicatur ab hac universalitate partem intellectivam excludi, hoc removetur per id quod postea dicit: quod quidem igitur non sit anima separabilis a corpore, aut partes quaedam ipsius si partibilis apta nata est, non immanifestum est; quarumdam enim partium actus est ipsarum. At vero secundum quasdam nihil prohibet, propter id quod nullius corporis sunt actus. Quod non potest intelligi nisi de his quae ad partem intellectivam pertinent, puta intellectus et voluntas. Ex quo manifeste ostenditur illius animae, quam supra universaliter definiverat Aristoteles dicens eam esse corporis actum, quasdam partes esse quae sunt quarumdam partium corporis actus, quasdam autem nullius corporis actus esse. Aliud enim est animam esse actum corporis, et aliud partem eius esse corporis actum, ut infra manifestabitur. Unde et in hoc eodem capitulo manifestat animam esse actum corporis per hoc quod aliquae partes eius sunt corporis actus, cum dicit: considerare oportet in partibus quod dictum est, scil. in toto. Lest it be thought that from this universal definition the intellectual faculty is excluded, this presumption is dispelled by what he afterward says: "The soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate certain parts of it are—for the actuality of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts. But, in truth, as regards other of its faculties, nothing prevents separation; since there are acts which belong to no body whatever." But this cannot be understood except of those acts that pertain to the intellectual faculty, namely, intellect and will. Wherefore it is clear that of the soul, which Aristotle had previously defined universally and called "the act of the body," certain faculties are the act of certain parts of the body; but other faculties are the act of no body. For it is one thing that the soul should be the act of the body, and another thing that a part of it should be the act of the body, as will be explained later. Hence also, in the same chapter, he shows clearly that the soul is the act of the body, since certain of its faculties are the act of the body, when he says: "One must consider in regard to the parts what has been said of the whole." Adhuc autem manifestius apparet ex sequentibus quod sub hac generalitate definitionis etiam intellectus includitur (per ea quae sequuntur). Nam cum satis probaverit animam esse actum corporis, quia separata anima non est vivens in actu, quia tamen aliquid potest dici actu tale ad praesentiam alicuius, non solum si sit forma sed etiam si sit motor, sicut combustibile ad praesentiam comburentis actu comburitur, et quodlibet mobile ad praesentiam moventis actu movetur; posset alicui venire in dubium utrum corpus sic vivat actu ad praesentiam animae, sicut mobile movetur actu ad praesentiam motoris, an sicut materia est in actu ad praesentiam formae; et praecipue quia Plato posuit animam non uniri corpori ut formam, sed magis ut motorem et rectorem, ut patet per Plotinum et Gregorium Nyssenum, (quos ideo induco quia non fuerunt Latini sed Graeci). Hanc igitur dubitationem insinuat philosophus cum post praemissa subiungit: amplius autem immanifestum si sit corporis actus anima sicut nauta navis. Moreover, in subsequent passages it appears even more clearly that the intellect is included under this general definition, as is shown by statements that follow. For, although he had previously given sufficient proof for the fact that the soul is the act of the body (since, if the soul is separated from it, the body no longer is in act as a living thing), he reiterates his position, because a thing may be called "actual" by the presence of a thing other than its form, if that thing were only an efficient cause; just as a combustible thing catching fire by proximity to something burning is "in act," and as a movable thing is "in act" when by the power of a mover it is set in motion. Hence doubt might arise in some one's mind as to whether the body is alive, or in act, by the effect of the soul's presence as any movable thing is moved by the power of an extrinsic agent, or whether it is in act as matter is, by its union with its form. There was a special need for Aristotle to clarify his position, since Plato had held that the soul was not united to the body as its form, but rather as a "mover" and "governor," as is evident from Plotinus and Gregory of Nyssa. I may certainly cite these men, since they were not Latins, but Greeks. The uncertainty of this problem, therefore, the Philosopher implies by what he afterward adds to earlier statements, saying: "We have no clear light on the problem whether the soul is the actuality of tis body in the same sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship." Quia igitur post praemissa adhuc hoc dubium remanebat, concludit: figuraliter quidem igitur sic determinetur et describatur de anima, quia scil. nondum ad liquidum demonstraverat veritatem. Therefore since, even after previous explanation had been given, some doubt remained, he added a supplement, saying: "Thus figuratively a definition and description of the soul is given," because no one has yet demonstrated the truth to the point of certainty. Ad hanc igitur dubitationem tollendam, consequenter procedit ad manifestandum id quod est secundum se et secundum rationem certius, per ea quae sunt minus certa secundum se sed magis certa quoad nos, i. e. per effectus animae, qui sunt actus ipsius. Unde statim distinguit opera animae, dicens quod animatum distinguitur ab inanimato in vivendo, et quod multa sunt quae pertinent ad vitam, scil. intellectus, sensus, motus et status secundum locum, et motus nutrimenti et augmenti, ita quod cuicumque inest aliquid horum, dicitur vivere. Et ostenso quomodo ista se habeant ad invicem, i. e. qualiter unum sine altero horum possit esse, concludit in hoc quod anima sit omnium praedictorum principium, et quod anima determinatur, sicut per suas partes, vegetativo, sensitivo, intellectivo, motu, et quod haec omnia contingit in uno et eodem inveniri, sicut in homine. In order, therefore, to remove this doubt, he proceeds to reveal the things that are, of themselves and according to their nature, the more certain by means of the things that are less certain in themselves, but more certain as far as we are concerned; that is, he undertakes his demonstration through considering the effects of the soul, effects that are its acts. Hence he immediately makes distinctions in the operations of the soul, saying that an animate thing is distinguished from an inanimate by the fact of living, and that there are many things that pertain to life: namely, understanding, sensation, and change, both change of place and alteration connected with nutrition and growth; so that anything in which any of these characteristics is found may be said to "live." Furthermore, having shown how these powers are related one to another—how a being possessing one without the others is said to live, and how one can exist without the other—he concludes in this manner: The soul is the source of these phenomena and is characterized by them, namely, by the powers of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking, and motivity; and all these can be united in one and the same subject, as in man. Et Plato posuit diversas esse animas in homine, secundum quas diversae operationes vitae ei conveniant. Consequenter movet dubitationem: utrum unumquodque horum sit anima per se, vel sit aliqua pars animae; et si sint partes unius animae, utrum differant solum secundum rationem, aut etiam differant loco, i. e. organo. Et subiungit quod de quibusdam non difficile hoc videtur, sed quaedam sunt quae dubitationem habent. Ostendit enim consequenter quod manifestum est de his quae pertinent ad animam vegetabilem, et de his quae pertinent ad animam sensibilem, per hoc quod plantae et animalia quaedam decisa vivunt, et in qualibet parte omnes operationes animae, quae sunt in toto, apparent. Sed de quibus dubitationem habeat, ostendit subdens quod de intellectu et perspectiva potentia nihil adhuc manifestum est. Quod non dicit volens ostendere quod intellectus non sit anima, ut Commentator perverse exponit et sectatores ipsius; manifeste enim hic respondet ad id quod supra dixerat: quaedam enim dubitationem habent. Unde intelligendum est: nihil adhuc manifestum est, an intellectus sit anima vel pars animae; et si pars animae, utrum separata loco, vel ratione tantum. Moreover, since Plato had supposed that there were diverse souls in man according as different operations of life were found in him, he had inspired doubt whether each one of these were a soul, per se, or only a part of the soul; and if they were parts or faculties of the one soul, whether they differed only according to reason, or whether they were distinct according to place, that is, in organic location. And Aristotle added: "Regarding certain of these questions, there seems to be no difficulty, but others possess uncertainty." For, he pointed out, one thing is made clear about the things that pertain to the vegetative soul and the things that pertain to the sensitive soul by this fact: that plants and certain animals from which a part has been severed continue to live, and in each part all the operations of the soul which had gone on in the whole organism appear to endure. But of those questions that are doubtful he makes note when he says: "Concerning the intellect and power of foresight, nothing is yet distinctly evident." This statement he does not make because he wishes to show that the intellect is not a faculty of the soul, as the Commentator and his followers have perversely implied. For evidently this does not follow upon what he had previously said, that "some things, indeed, are uncertain." Therefore he must be understood to have meant that it is not as yet evident whether the intellect is the soul or part of the soul; and, if a part of the soul, whether it is distinct as to place, or only according to reason. Et quamvis dicat hoc adhuc non esse manifestum, tamen quid circa hoc prima fronte appareat manifestat subdens: sed videtur genus alterum animae esse. Quod non est intelligendum, sicut Commentator et sectatores eius perverse exponunt, ideo dictum esse quia intellectus aequivoce dicatur anima, vel quod praedicta definitio sibi aptari non possit; sed qualiter sit hoc intelligendum apparet ex eo quod subditur: et hoc solum contingere separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili. In hoc ergo est alterum genus, quia intellectus videtur esse quoddam perpetuum, aliae autem partes animae corruptibiles. Et quia corruptibile et perpetuum non videntur in unam substantiam convenire posse, videtur quod hoc solum de partibus animae, scil. intellectus, contingat separari, non quidem a corpore, ut Commentator perverse exponit, sed ab aliis partibus animae, ne in unam substantiam animae conveniant. And although he says the matter is not yet clear, he subsequently adds what seems at first sight to be true: "But it seems that the soul is of another genus." Now, this ought not be interpreted as the Commentator and his school have perversely explained: namely, that he said this because the intellect is equivocally spoken of in regard to the soul, or because he could not harmonize his conclusion with the previous definition; but how it ought to be interpreted is evident from what follows: "In this respect it pertains to the intellect to be 'separate': namely, as the eternal is distinct or separate from the corruptible." In this, therefore, consists the fact that the intellect is another genus, because our intellect in this respect appears to be in a certain way eternal, but the other parts of the soul, corruptible. And because the corruptible and the eternal do not seem capable of union in the one substance, it seems that this one of the soul's faculties, namely, the intellect, should be separate, not indeed from the body (as the Commentator falsely maintained), but from the other faculties of the soul, and thus not communicate in the same way in the one substance of the soul. Et quod sic sit intelligendum patet ex eo quod subditur: reliquae autem partes animae manifestum est ex his quod non separabiles sunt, scil., substantia animae vel loco. De hoc enim supra quaesitum est, et hoc ex supradictis probatum est. Et quod non intelligatur de separabilitate a corpore, sed de separabilitate potentiarum ab invicem, patet per hoc quod subditur: ratione autem quod alterae, scil. sunt ad invicem manifestum. Sensitivo enim esse et opinativo alterum. Et sic manifeste quod hic determinatur, respondet quaestioni supra motae. Supra enim quaesitum est, utrum una pars animae ab alia separata sit ratione solum, aut etiam loco. Hic dimissa quaestione illa quantum ad intellectum, de quo nihil hic determinat, de aliis partibus animae dicit manifestum esse quod non sunt separabiles, scil. loco, sed sunt alterae ratione. That this should, in truth, be the interpretation is clear from what follows: "The other parts of the soul, it is evident, are not separable according either to substance, to reason, or as to place.'' Concerning this, inquiry had previously been made, and this, from the above cited passages, has been proved. Moreover, that the separability of the intellect should be regarded as meaning separability, not from the body, but that of the potentialities of the soul from one another, is evident from what follows: "It is certainly evident from reason that these powers are mutually distinct. Clearly, sensation is one thing, and opinion another." Hence he points out plainly by this determination his answer to the question proposed above. For the previous inquiry had been as to whether one part of the soul were distinct from the others according to reason only, or by actual location. Having dismissed this question as regards the intellect, concerning which he makes no definite answer, he says that, in regard to the other parts of the soul, it is clear that they are not separable as to location, but are distinct according to reason. Hoc ergo habito quod anima determinatur vegetativo, sensitivo, intellectivo et motu, vult ostendere consequenter quod quantum ad omnes istas partes anima unitur corpori non sicut nauta navi, sed sicut forma. Et sic certificatum erit quid sit anima in communi, quod supra figuraliter tantum dictum est. Hoc autem probat per operationes animae sic. Manifestum est enim quod illud quo primo aliquid operatur est forma operantis, sicut dicimur scire anima, et scire scientia, per prius autem scientia quam anima, quia per animam non scimus nisi in quantum habet scientiam; et similiter sanari dicimur et corpore et sanitate, sed prius sanitate. Et sic patet scientiam esse formam animae, et sanitatem corporis. In maintaining that the soul is determined by its vegetative, sensitive, intellective, and motive powers, he wishes to show that in regard to all these faculties the soul is united to the body, not accidentally as a pilot in a ship, but as form is united to matter, that is, substantially. Thus it will be made manifest what the soul is in general, this manifestation having been made only in figurative language heretofore. Moreover, he further proves what the soul is by considering its operations as follows: Evidently that by which anything is first enabled to operate is the form of that operator just as we say we know by means of the soul and by means of science; although that we know by means of science is prior [in consciousness or reflection] to the fact that we know by means of the soul, because we do not know through the soul except in so far as it possesses science. Likewise we are said to be healed in body and in health, but in health primarily. Thus also it is evident that science is a form of the soul, and health a form of the body. Ex hoc procedit sic: anima est primum quo vivimus (quod dicit propter vegetativum), quo sentimus (propter sensitivum), et movemur (propter motivum), et intelligimus (propter intellectivum); et concludit: quare ratio quaedam utique erit et species, sed non ut materia et ut subiectum. Manifeste ergo quod supra dixerat, animam esse actum corporis physici, hic concludit non solum de vegetativo, sensitivo et motivo, sed etiam de intellectivo. Fuit ergo sententia Aristotelis quod id quo intelligimus sit forma corporis physici. Sed ne aliquis dicat, quod id quo intelligimus non dicit hic intellectum possibilem, sed aliquid aliud, manifeste hoc excluditur per id quod Aristoteles in tertio de anima dicit, de intellectu possibili loquens: dico autem intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima. And in this way he proceeds. "It is the soul by or with which we live." This he says because the soul is vegetative; "and that principle by which we experience sensation," because it is sensitive; "and that by which we are moved," because it is capable of motion; "and that by which we think," because it is intellective. And he concludes: "Because it will ever be a certain nature and species, but not as matter and a subject." Evidently, therefore, as he said above, the soul is the act of the physical body, so here he concludes that it is not only the act of the vegetative, sensitive, and motive powers, but also the act of the intellect. Hence this was the opinion of Aristotle: that by which we understand is the form of the physical body. But, lest some one should think Aristotle did not say that that by which we understand is the possible intellect, but something else, then, plainly this is refuted by what he states in III De anima concerning the possible intellect. There he says: "By mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges." Sed antequam ad verba Aristotelis quae sunt in tertio de anima accedamus, adhuc amplius circa verba ipsius in secundo de anima immoremur, ut ex collatione verborum eius ad invicem appareat quae fuerit eius sententia de anima. Cum enim animam in communi definivisset, incipit distinguere potentias eius; et dicit quod potentiae animae sunt vegetativum, sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum, intellectivum. Et quod intellectivum sit intellectus, patet per id quod postea subdit, divisionem explanans: alteris autem intellectivum et intellectus, ut hominibus. Vult ergo quod intellectus sit potentia animae, quae est actus corporis. But, before we reach these words of Aristotle, which are in Book III of De anima, we should pause somewhat longer upon those remarks of his which are in Book II of De anima, so that from various statements assembled for comparison there may be clearly deduced what his opinion was about the soul. Now, after he had defined the soul in general, he began to distinguish its faculties; and he says: "The powers of the soul are vegetative, sensitive, motive, and intellective." That the intellective faculty is the intellect, he states clearly in what he adds later in explaining this division of powers: "One of them is, indeed, intellective, and is the intellect, as in men." He wishes, therefore, to make clear that the intellect is a power of the same soul which is the act of the body. Et quod huius animae potentiam dixerit intellectum, et iterum quod supra posita definitio animae sit omnibus praedictis partibus communis, patet per id quod concludit: manifestum igitur est quoniam eodem modo una utique erit ratio animae et figurae: neque enim ibi figura est praeter triangulum et quae consequenter sunt; neque hic anima praeter praedictas est. Non est ergo quaerenda alia anima praeter praedictas, quibus communis est animae definitio supra posita. Neque plus de intellectu mentionem facit Aristoteles in hoc secundo, nisi quod postmodum subdit, quod ultimum et minimum (dicit esse) ratiocinationem et intellectum, quia scil. in paucioribus est, ut per sequentia apparet. And that he had called the intellect a faculty of this soul; and, furthermore, that the definition of the soul is commonly inclusive of all its parts, is evident from his conclusion: "It is now evident that a single definition can be given of soul only in the same sense as one can be given of figure. For, as in that case there is no figure distinguishable and apart from the triangle, etc., so here there is no soul apart from the forms of soul just enumerated." Hence no other soul is to be sought for in addition to the ones already discussed, to which the definition of the soul given above is commonly applied. In the Second Book, Aristotle reveals nothing further of his theory about the intellect except that he adds, farther on, that ratiocination and understanding are the highest powers, and that they are also the least because, indeed, they are in very few creatures, as hereafter will be made clear. Sed quia magna differentia est, quantum ad modum operandi, inter intellectum et imaginationem, subdit quod de speculativo intellectu altera ratio est. Reservat enim hoc inquirendum usque ad tertium. Et ne quis dicat, sicut Averroes perverse exponit quod ideo dicit Aristoteles, quod de intellectu speculativo est alia ratio, quia intellectus neque est anima, neque pars animae; statim hoc excludit in principio tertii, ubi resumit de intellectu tractatum. Dicit enim: de parte autem animae, qua cognoscit anima et sapit. Nec debet aliquis dicere, quod hoc dicatur solum secundum quod intellectus possibilis dividitur contra agentem, sicut aliqui somniant. Hoc enim dictum est antequam Aristoteles probet esse intellectum possibilem et agentem; unde intellectum dicit hic partem in communi, secundum quod continet et agentem et possibilem, sicut supra in secundo manifeste distinxit intellectum contra alias partes animae, ut iam dictum est. But because there is a great difference in operation between the intellect and the imagination, he speaks in regard to the speculative intellect of "another nature"; yet he postpones discussion of this question to the Third Book. No one, however, should say (as Averroes falsely states) that Aristotle declares that there is "another reason" or "nature" in the speculative intellect because the intellect is not in the soul, or any part of the soul. This is immediately excluded as a possible interpretation in the beginning of the Third Book, where he resumes his discussion of the intellect; for he speaks here as follows: "Concerning that part of the soul, by which the soul possesses knowledge. and wisdom." Neither should anyone say, as some have dreamed of doing, that Aristotle says this only according as the possible intellect is distinguished from the active. For this passage occurs before Aristotle proves that there is a possible as well as an active intellect; wherefore he speaks here of the intellective part of the soul in common, according as it comprises both the active and the possible intellects (even as in, the Second Book he clearly distinguishes the intellective from the other parts or faculties of the soul, as has been said). Est autem consideranda mirabilis diligentia et ordo in processu Aristotelis. Ab his enim incipit in tertio tractare de intellectu quae in secundo reliquerat indeterminata. Duo autem supra reliquerat indeterminata circa intellectum. Moreover, the admirable precision and order of Aristotle's method of procedure must be observed. Now, in the Third Book, he begins his treatise concerning the intellect, which, in Book II, he had left undecided. There he had previously allowed two things to remain uncertain. Primo quidem, utrum intellectus ab aliis partibus animae separetur ratione solum, aut etiam loco: quod quidem indeterminatum dimisit cum dixit: de intellectu autem et perspectiva potentia nihil adhuc manifestum est. First, the question whether the intellect is distinct from the other faculties of the soul only according to reason, or whether it is also distinct as to location. This he had dismissed indefinitely when he said: "We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to think." Et hanc quaestionem primo resumit, cum dicit: sive separabili existente (scil. ab aliis animae partibus), sive non separabili secundum magnitudinem, sed secundum rationem. Pro eodem enim accipit hic separabile secundum magnitudinem, pro quo supra dixerat separabile loco. This position he at first resumes when he asks: "Whether in existence it is separable (from other parts of the soul), or is inseparable from the quantity of the body but distinct or separable according to reason." In this passage he employs the phrase, "secundum magnitudinem" to indicate what he had previously spoken of as "separabile loco." Secundo, indeterminatum reliquerat de differentia intellectus ad alias animae partes, cum postmodum dixit: de speculativo autem intellectu altera ratio est. Et hoc statim quaerit, cum dicit: considerandum quam habet differentiam. Hanc autem differentiam talem intendit assignare, quae possit stare cum utroque praemissorum, scil. sive sit separabilis anima magnitudine seu loco ab aliis partibus, sive non: quod ipse modus loquendi satis indicat. Considerandum enim dicit, quam habet intellectus differentiam ad alias animae partes, sive sit separabilis ab eis magnitudine seu loco, i. e. subiecto, sive non, sed secundum rationem tantum. Unde manifestum est quod non intendit hanc differentiam ostendere, quod sit substantia a corpore separata secundum esse (hoc enim non posset salvari cum utroque praedictorum); sed intendit assignare differentiam quantum ad modum operandi; unde subdit: et quomodo sit quidem ipsum intelligere. Sic igitur per ea quae ex verbis Aristotelis accipere possumus usque huc, manifestum est quod ipse voluit intellectum esse partem animae quae est actus corporis physici. Secondly, he had left in uncertainty the difference of the intellect as compared to the other faculties of the soul, when in conclusion he said: "In regard to the speculative intellect, however, there is another nature." This he straightway questions when he says: "What kind of difference the intellect possesses must be considered." He undertakes to assign it such a difference as could stand according to both of the premises already proposed: namely, whether the soul is separable spacially in respect to certain parts of the body, or not; and this intention he himself plainly enough indicates by his manner of speaking: "Turning now to the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks (whether this is separable from the others in definition only, or spacially as well) we have to inquire what differentiates this part and how thinking can take place." From this it is evident that he did not intend to show that the difference was one of substantial separation from the body; for this position could not be maintained in view of both the alternatives proposed, but he intended to assign to the intellect a difference in mode of operation. Hence he continues: "And according to what manner it comes to understand." Consequently, by means of those statements which we are able to gather from the words of Aristotle himself, it is evident, thus far, that he wished the intellect to be regarded as a faculty of the soul, which is the act of the physical body. Sed quia ex quibusdam verbis consequentibus, Averroistae accipere volunt intentionem Aristotelis fuisse, quod intellectus non sit anima quae est actus corporis, aut pars talis animae, ideo etiam diligentius eius verba sequentia consideranda sunt. Statim igitur post quaestionem motam de differentia intellectus et sensus, inquirit secundum quid intellectus sit similis sensui, et secundum quid ab eo differat. Duo enim supra de sensu determinaverat, scil. quod sensus est in potentia ad sensibilia, et quod sensus patitur et corrumpitur ab excellentiis sensibilium. Hoc ergo est quod quaerit Aristoteles dicens: si igitur est intelligere sicut sentire, aut pati aliquid utique erit ab intelligibili, ut scil. sic corrumpatur intellectus ab excellenti intelligibili, sicut sensus ab excellenti sensibili, aut aliquid huiusmodi alterum; i. e. aut intelligere est aliquid huiusmodi simile, scil. ei quod est sentire, alterum tamen quantum ad hoc quod non sit passibile. But since, from certain other words, Averroes has tried to make it appear that Aristotle meant that the intellect was not the soul, which is the act of the body, nor any part of such a soul, further statements must also be attentively considered. Immediately after raising the question as to the difference between the intellect and sensation, Aristotle inquires in what way the intellect is like the senses and in what way it differs from them. Now, previously he had concluded two things about sensation: namely, that a sense is in potency to sensible objects, and that a sense is impaired or even destroyed by the excellence of sensible objects. On this point, therefore, Aristotle makes inquiry, saying: "If to understand is the same as to experience sensation, or to be passive to something, then in the same way the intellect will be passively impressed by its intelligible object, and will be overpowered by the excellence of that object, just as the senses are by the too-great excellence of sensible things, and in like manner of other things." Thus the question is this: Is the act of understanding something quite similar to that of experiencing sensation, or is it, on the contrary, different in this respect, that it is not passible? Huic igitur quaestioni statim respondet et concludit, non ex praecedentibus, sed ex sequentibus, quae tamen ex praecedentibus manifestantur, quod hanc partem animae oportet esse impassibilem, ut non corrumpatur sicut sensus; (est tamen quaedam alia passio eius, secundum quod intelligere communi modo pati dicitur). In hoc ergo differt a sensu. Sed consequenter ostendit in quo cum sensu conveniat, quia scilicet oportet huiusmodi partem esse susceptivam speciei intelligibilis, et quod sit in potentia ad huiusmodi speciem, et quod non sit hoc in actu secundum suam naturam; sicut et de sensu supra dictum est, quod est in potentia ad sensibilia et non in actu. Et ex hoc concludit, quod oportet sic se habere sicut sensitivum ad sensibilia sic intellectum ad intelligibilia. To this question, he immediately answers (deriving his conclusion not from previous statements but from those which he makes subsequently, which later statements are, however, clearly evident from an analysis of the former) that this part of the soul ought to be impassible and not subject to the same alteration or corruption as the senses. Yet it has a certain passivity, but this is of another sort, according as the term, "to understand," commonly means "to be passive." In this respect, therefore, it differs from sensation. But at the same time he shows how it agrees with sensation: for, indeed, this part must be capable of impression by intelligible species and be in potency to species of this kind, and not, by its own nature, in act—even as he had previously stated that a sense is in potency to sensible objects and not, of itself, in act. From this he concludes that the intellect must be related to intelligible objects just as a sense is to sensible things. Hoc autem induxit ad excludendum opinionem Empedoclis et aliorum antiquorum, qui posuerunt quod cognoscens est de natura cogniti, utpote quod terram terra cognoscimus, aquam aqua. Aristoteles autem supra ostendit hoc non esse verum in sensu, quia sensitivum non est actu, sed potentia, ea quae sentit; et idem hic dicit de intellectu. Now, he stated this in order to reject the opinion of Empedocles and other ancient philosophers who taught that the knower is of the same nature as the thing known, so that, being composed of earth, we know earth, and being also of water, we know water. Aristotle, however, had shown previously that this is not true in regard to the senses, because a sense faculty is not in act, but only in potency to that which it experiences as a sensation; and the same, he says, obtains in regard to the intellect. Est autem differentia inter sensum et intellectum, quia sensus non est cognoscitivus omnium, sed visus colorum tantum, auditus sonorum, et sic de aliis; intellectus autem est simpliciter omnium cognoscitivus. Dicebant autem antiqui philosophi, existimantes quod cognoscens debet habere naturam cogniti, quod animam, ad hoc quod cognoscat omnia, necesse est ex principiis omnium esse commixtam. Quia vero Aristoteles iam probavit de intellectu, per similitudinem sensus, quod non est actu id quod cognoscit sed in potentia tantum, concludit e contrario, quod necesse est intellectum, quia cognoscit omnia, quod sit immixtus, i. e. non compositus ex omnibus, sicut Empedocles ponebat. There is, nevertheless, this difference between the senses and the intellect: that each sense is not capable of experiencing all sensations, but sight is in potency only to color, hearing to sound, and so of the others; whereas the intellect is, absolutely, empowered to know all things. The ancient philosophers, thinking that the knower had to possess the same nature as the object known, had said furthermore that this fact, that the soul was capable of knowing all beings, must be on account of its being composed of the principles of all things. But, because Aristotle had now proved by comparison with sensation that the intellect is not in act as regards what it comes to know, but in potency only, he concludes, on the contrary, that since the intellect knows all things, it must be without any mixture; that is, not composed of all the elements, as Empedocles had stated. Et ad hoc inducit testimonium Anaxagorae, non tamen de hoc eodem intellectu loquentis, sed de intellectu qui movet omnia. Sicut ergo Anaxagoras dixit illum intellectum esse immixtum, ut imperet movendo et segregando, hoc nos possumus dicere de intellectu humano, quod oportet eum esse immixtum ad hoc ut cognoscat omnia; et hoc probat consequenter, et habetur sic sequens littera in Graeco: intus apparens enim prohibebit extraneum et obstruet. Quod potest intelligi ex simili in visu: si enim esset aliquis color intrinsecus pupillae, ille color interior prohiberet videri extraneum colorem, et quodammodo obstrueret oculum ne alia videret. To support this theory, he also calls upon the testimony of Anaxagoras, even though he had spoken not of this same human intellect, but of that mind (Nous) which moves all things. But just as Anaxagoras had declared that that intellect, in order to govern all things by setting them in motion and keeping each in its proper course, must be simple, or unmixed, so we can say of the human intellect that it must be simple in order to know all; and this Aristotle consequently proves, and the Greek text says: "Now, that which is within, evidently hinders and prevents the extraneous from entering, as can be understood by a comparison with vision." For if there should be any color intrinsic to the pupil of the eye, that interior color would prevent the seeing of the color outside, and in some manner hinder the eye from seeing other things. Similiter, si aliqua natura rerum, quas intellectus cognoscit, puta terra aut aqua, calidum aut frigidum, aut aliquid huiusmodi, esset intrinseca intellectui, illa natura intrinseca impediret ipsum et quodammodo obstrueret, ne alia cognosceret. Likewise, if any nature of those things which the intellect knows—for example, earth or water, warmth or cold, or anything else of the sort—were intrinsic to the intellect, that intrinsic nature would be an obstacle to the intellect, and in some way prevent its knowing other things. Quia ergo omnia cognoscit, concludit quod non contingit ipsum habere aliquam naturam determinatam ex naturis sensibilibus quas cognoscit; sed hanc solam naturam habet quod sit possibilis, i. e. in potentia ad ea quae intelligit, quantum est ex sua natura; sed fit actu illa dum ea intelligit in actu, sicut sensus in actu fit sensibile in actu, ut supra in secundo dixerat. Concludit ergo quod intellectus antequam intelligat in actu nihil est actu eorum quae sunt; quod est contrarium his quae antiqui dicebant, scil. quod est actu omnia. Since, therefore, the intellect does know all things, Aristotle concluded that it could not possess any determinate nature derived from the natures of sensible things which it knew, but that its nature was constituted by this alone, that it must be possible of determination; that is, that as regards its nature it must be in potency to those things which are intelligible, but become active by understanding them in act; just as the senses are made to be in act by the sensible in act, as he had previously said in the Second Book. He concludes, therefore, that the intellect, before understanding renders it "in act," is not actively any of the things which exist—a conclusion which is contrary to what the ancients claimed: namely, that it was actually all things. Et quia fecerat mentionem de dicto Anaxagorae loquentis de intellectu qui imperat omnibus, ne crederetur de illo intellectu hoc conclusisse, utitur tali modo loquendi: vocatus itaque animae intellectus dico autem intellectum quo opinatur et intelligit anima nihil est actu et cetera. Ex quo duo apparent: Moreover, because he had mentioned the statement of Anaxagoras in which he speaks of that intellect which governs all things, Aristotle, lest anyone believe that he had drawn his conclusion about that same intellect, employs this manner of explanation: "Anaxagoras called this the soul's intellect. I speak, however, of that intellect by which the soul thinks and understands, which is actively none of those things which exist before they are understood." From this, two facts are evident. primo quidem, quod non loquitur hic de intellectu qui sit aliqua substantia separata, sed de intellectu quem supra dixit potentiam et partem animae, quo anima intelligit; First, that he certainly is not speaking here of an intellect which is some kind of separate substance, but of the intellect which, as he said above, is that power and faculty of the soul by which the soul understands. secundo, quod per supra dicta probavit, scil. quod intellectus non habet naturam in actu. Secondly, the fact that he had previously proved; namely, that the intellect has no nature which is determinate in act. Nondum autem probavit quod non sit virtus in corpore, ut Averroes dicit; sed hoc statim concludit ex praemissis; nam sequitur: unde neque misceri est rationabile ipsum corpori. Et hoc secundum probat per primum quod supra probavit, scil. quod intellectus non habet aliquam in actu de naturis rerum sensibilium. Ex quo patet quod non miscetur corpori: quia si misceretur corpori, haberet aliquam de naturis corporeis; et hoc est quod subdit: qualis enim utique aliquis fiet, aut calidus aut frigidus, si organum aliquod erit sicut sensitivo. Sensus enim proportionatur suo organo et trahitur quodammodo ad suam naturam; unde etiam secundum immutationem organi immutatur operatio sensus. Sic ergo intelligitur illud non misceri corpori, quia non habet organum sicut sensus. He has not yet proved that it is not a power existing in a body (as Averroes says), but this he immediately concludes from the foregoing, when he says: "Therefore the rational faculty has no admixture of that which is corporeal." This second statement he proves by means of the first, which he previously explained: namely, that the intellect possesses actively none of the natures of sensible things. From this it is evident that there is in it no union with anything corporeal; for if it were intermingled with some bodily substance, it would possess some kind of corporeal nature. And he adds: "For indeed, a thing would become some kind of thing, either warm or cold, if it were united to a bodily organ, Just as m the case of the sensitive faculties." Now, each sense is proportioned to its own organ and is bound, as it were, or restricted to its own nature. Hence according to the immutability of the organ, the operation of each sense is immutable. Thus, therefore, he understood that the intellect was not blended with the body; namely, that it has no organ as have the senses. Et quod intellectus animae non habet organum, manifestat per dictum quorundam qui dixerunt quod anima est locus specierum, large accipientes locum pro omni receptivo, more Platonico; nisi quod esse locum specierum non convenit toti animae, sed solum intellectivae. Sensitiva enim pars non recipit in se species, sed in organo; pars autem intellectiva non recipit eas in organo, sed in se ipsa; item non sic est locus specierum quod habeat eas in actu, sed in potentia tantum. Moreover, that the soul's intellect has no organ is clear from the statement of those who say that the soul is the locus of the intelligible species (accepting the term "locus" broadly in the sense of Plato, as meaning that which is all-receptive); unless to be the locus of the species is not proper to the whole soul, but to the intellect alone. For the sensitive part of the soul does not receive species into itself, but in an organ. The intellective faculty, however, receives them in no organ, but in itself. Moreover, the locus of the species is not such that it possesses these in act by its nature, but that it is in potency to possess them. Quia ergo iam ostendit quid conveniat intellectui ex similitudine sensus, redit ad primum quod dixerat, quod oportet partem intellectivam esse impassibilem, et sic admirabili subtilitate ex ipsa similitudine sensus, concludit dissimilitudinem. Ostendit ergo consequenter quod non similiter sit impassibilis sensus et intellectus, per hoc quod sensus corrumpitur ab excellenti sensibili, non autem intellectus ab excellenti intelligibili. Et huius causam assignat ex supra probatis, quia sensitivum non est sine corpore, sed intellectus est separatus. Since, therefore, he has shown what befits the intellect, by means of comparison with the senses, he now returns to what he had first said: that the intellective faculty must be capable of receiving species; and so, with admirable subtlety, by means of a likeness, he concludes to dissimilarity. Hence he subsequently shows that the passibility of the senses and that of the intellect are not similar by the fact that a sense faculty is disturbed by the excellence of a sensible object, but the intellect is not overpowered by the excellence of its intelligible object. The reason of this he assigns as derived from the preceding discussion: namely, that the sensitive faculty is not incorporeal, but the intellectual is, being "separate." Hoc autem ultimum verbum maxime assumunt ad sui erroris fulcimentum, volentes per hoc habere quod intellectus neque sit anima neque pars animae, sed quaedam substantia separata. Sed cito obliviscuntur eius quod paulo supra Aristoteles dixit. Sic enim hic dicitur quod sensitivum non est sine corpore et intellectus est separatus, sicut supra dixit quod intellectus fieret qualis, aut calidus aut frigidus, si aliquod organum erit ei, sicut sensitivo. Ea igitur ratione hic dicitur quod sensitivum non est sine corpore, intellectus autem est separatus, quia sensus habet organum, non autem intellectus. Manifestissime igitur apparet absque omni dubitatione ex verbis Aristotelis hanc fuisse eius sententiam de intellectu possibili, quod intellectus sit aliquid animae quae est actus corporis; ita tamen quod intellectus animae non habeat aliquod organum corporale, sicut habent ceterae potentiae animae. This last word, "separate," some have especially seized upon as a prop for their error, for they would interpret him to mean by it that the intellect is neither the soul nor a faculty of the soul, but a separate substance; but they too quickly forget what Aristotle said but a little before. Now, just as here he says that the sense faculties are not incorporeal, but the intellect is separate, so previously he had said that the intellect would be of a certain quality, either warm or cold, if it possessed any organ, as the sense faculties do. By this method of reasoning here, he is stating that the senses are not incorporeal, but the intellect is "separate," since a sense faculty has an organ, but the intellect has not. Most evidently, therefore, it appears from the words of Aristotle that, without any doubt, this was his opinion about the possible intellect: namely, that the intellect is some part of the soul, which is the act of the body; but that, nevertheless, the soul's intellect has no corporeal organ, as have the other powers of the soul.