secundo, quia se alienum innuit esse ab hac lege. Et quod postmodum dicit: haec est ratio per quam Catholici videntur habere suam positionem, ubi sententiam fidei positionem nominat. Nec minoris praesumptionis est quod postmodum asserere audet: Deum non posse facere quod sint multi intellectus, quia implicat contradictionem.
secondly, because he implies that he himself is estranged from or outside this law, and because he afterward says: "This is the reason why Catholics seem to hold this opinion." Here he calls an article of faith only an "opinion." Nor is it the less presumptuous that later he dares to assert that God could not create many intellects because this implies a contradiction.
Adhuc autem gravius est quod postmodum dicit: per rationem concludo de necessitate, quod intellectus est unus numero; firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem. Ergo sentit quod fides sit de aliquibus, quorum contraria de necessitate concludi possunt. Cum autem de necessitate concludi non possit nisi verum necessarium, cuius oppositum est falsum impossibile, sequitur secundum eius dictum quod fides sit de falso impossibili, quod etiam Deus facere non potest: quod fidelium aures ferre non possunt. Non caret etiam magna temeritate, quod de his quae ad philosophiam non pertinent, sed sunt purae fidei, disputare praesumit, sicut quod anima patiatur ab igne Inferni, et dicere sententias doctorum de hoc esse reprobandas. Pari enim ratione posset disputare de Trinitate, de incarnatione, et de aliis huiusmodi, de quibus nonnisi caecutiens loqueretur.
However, what he subsequently declares is even more reprehensible: "By reason I conclude of necessity that the intellect is numerically one; nevertheless I firmly hold to the opposite by faith." Therefore he judges that faith is concerned with doctrines the contrary of which can be concluded "of necessity." Since, however, what I conclude of necessity can be only what is necessarily true,—the opposite of which is false and impossible—it follows that faith must be demanded in what is false and impossible: a thing that not even God could do. But the ears of men who have faith cannot endure such words. In his great temerity, moreover, he has not hesitated to dispute about questions that not only do not pertain to philosophy, but that are matters of pure faith: for example, that the soul suffers from the fire of hell, and that the judgment of the doctors on this point should be put aside. With equal reason one might enter into philosophical disputation about the Trinity or the Incarnation and other like questions, concerning which none but a babbler would speak.
Haec igitur sunt quae in destructionem praedicti erroris conscripsimus, non per documenta fidei, sed per ipsorum philosophorum rationes et dicta. Si quis autem gloriabundus de falsi nominis scientia, velit contra haec quae scripsimus aliquid dicere, non loquatur in angulis nec coram pueris qui nesciunt de tam arduis iudicare; sed contra hoc scriptum rescribat, si audet; et inveniet non solum me, qui aliorum sum minimus, sed multos alios veritatis zelatores, per quos eius errori resistetur, vel ignorantiae consuletur.
These, therefore, are the assembled arguments that we have written in refutation of the aforesaid error, not arguments amassed by reference to the doctrines of faith, but collected from the reasons and words of the philosophers themselves. If any one, however, boastfully claiming a pseudo-science, wishes to say anything in contradiction to what we have written, let him not do his talking in out-of-the-way corners, or before mere boys who know not how to judge of difficult problems. But, if he dares, let him write an answer to what has been here written. He will find not me alone, who am the least, but many others who know and foster the truth, by whom his error may be refuted or his ignorance enlightened.