Primum autem horum convenit politicae vel civili tam respectu speculativarum scientiarum quam respectu practicarum, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam practicae scientiae praecipit politica et quantum ad usum eius, ut scilicet operetur vel non operetur, et quantum ad determinationem actus: praecipit enim fabro non solum quod utatur sua arte, sed etiam quod sic utatur, tales cultellos faciens; utrumque enim est ordinatum ad finem humanae vitae. Now, the first of these is applicable to politics or political science both in regard to speculative sciences and in regard to practical sciences—in different ways, however. Political science dictates to a practical science both in the matter of its activity—that is, whether or not it should operate—and in regard to the objects to which its operation is to be directed. It dictates to the smith not only that he use his skill but also that he use it in such a fashion as to make knives of a particular kind. Both are ordered to the end of human living. 27. Sed scientiae speculativae praecipit civilis solum quantum ad usum, non autem quantum ad determinationem operis; ordinat enim politica quod aliqui doceant vel addiscant geometriam, huiusmodi enim actus in quantum sunt voluntarii pertinent ad materiam moralem et sunt ordinabiles ad finem humanae vitae; non autem praecipit politicus geometrae quid de triangulo concludat, hoc enim non subiacet humanae voluntati nec est ordinabile humanae vitae, sed dependet ex ipsa rerum ratione. Et ideo dicit quod politica praeordinat quas disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus, scilicet tam practicarum quam speculativarum, et quis quam debeat addiscere et usque ad quod tempus. 27. But political science dictates to a speculative science only as to activity, and not concerning the specification of its proper activity, for, political science orders that some teach or learn geometry. For, actions of this kind, insofar as they are voluntary, belong to the matter of ethics and can be ordered to the goal of human living. But the political ruler does not dictate to geometry what conclusions it should draw about a triangle, for this is not subject to the human will, nor can it be ordered to human living, but it depends on the very nature of things. Therefore, he says that political science ordains which sciences (both practical and speculative) should be studied in a state, who should study them, and for how long. 28. Alia autem proprietas scientiae architectonicae, scilicet uti inferioribus scientiis, pertinet ad politicam solum respectu practicarum scientiarum, unde subdit quod pretiosissimas, id est nobilissimas, virtutum, id est artium operativarum, videmus esse sub politica, scilicet militarem et oeconomicam et rhetoricam, quibus omnibus utitur politica ad suum finem, scilicet ad bonum commune civitatis. 28. The other characteristic of an architectonic science, the use of subordinate sciences, belongs to political science only in reference to the practical sciences. Hence, he adds that we see the most highly esteemed (that is, the noblest) skills (that is, the operative arts) fall under political science—for example, strategy, domestic economy, and rhetoric (1094a28). Political science uses such skills for its own end—that is, for the common good of the state. 29. Deinde cum dicit: utente autem hac etc., ex praemissis duobus concludit propositum. Et dicit quod, cum politica, quae practica est, utatur reliquis practicis disciplinis, sicut secundo dictum est, et cum ipsa legemponat quid oporteat operari et a quibus abstinere, ut primo dictum est, consequens est quod finis huius tamquam architectonicae complectitur, id est sub se continet, fines aliarum scientiarum practicarum, unde concludit quod hic, scilicet finis politicae, est humanum bonum, id est optimum in rebus humanis. 29. Then, at political science in fact (1094b4), he draws a conclusion from two premises. He says that, since political science uses the other practical sciences, as already noted [28], and since it legislates what is to be done and what omitted, as previously stated [27], it follows that the end of this science as architectonic embraces (or contains under itself) the ends of other practical sciences. Hence, he concludes, the end of political science is the good of man, that is, the supreme end of human things. 30. Deinde cum dicit: si enim et idem est etc., ostendit quod politica sit principalissima ex ipsa ratione proprii finis. Manifestum est enim quod unaquaeque causa tanto potior est quanto ad plura effectus eius se extendit. Unde et bonum, quod habet rationem causae finalis, tanto potius est quanto ad plura se extendit. Et ideo, si idem est bonum uni homini et toti civitati, multo videtur maius et perfectius suscipere, id est procurare, et salvare, id est conservare, illud quod est bonum totius civitatis quam id quod est bonum unius hominis. Pertinet quidem enim ad amorem qui debet esse inter homines quod homo quaerat et conservet bonum etiam uni soli homini, sed multo melius est et divinius quod hoc exhibeatur toti genti et civitatibus. Vel aliter: amabile quidem est quod hoc exhibeatur uni soli civitati, sed multo divinius est quod hoc exhibeatur toti genti, in qua multae civitates continentur. Dicit autem hoc esse divinius eo quod magis pertinet ad Dei similitudinem, qui est universalis causa omnium bonorum. Hoc autem bonum, scilicet quod est commune uni vel civitatibus pluribus, intendit methodus quaedam, id est ars, quae vocatur civilis; unde ad ipsam maxime pertinet considerare ultimum finem humanae vitae tamquam ad principalissimam. 30. Then, at even though the good be the same (1094b7), he shows that political science is the most important science from the very nature of its special end. It is evident that, insofar as a cause is prior and more powerful, it extends to more effects. Hence, insofar as the good, which has the nature of a final cause, is more powerful, it extends to more effects. So, even though the good be the same objective for one man and for the whole state, it seems much better and more perfect to attain (that is, to procure) and preserve the good of the whole state than the good of any one man. Certainly it is a part of that love that should exist among men that a man preserve the good even of a single human being. But it is much better and more divine that this be done for a whole people and for states. It is even sometimes desirable that this be done for one state only, but it is much more divine that it be done for a whole people that includes many states. This is said to be more divine because it shows greater likeness to God who is the ultimate cause of all good. But this good common to one or to several states is the object of our inquiry, that is, of the particular skill called political science. Hence, to it, as the most important science, belongs in a most special way the consideration of the ultimate end of human life. 31. Sciendum est autem quod politicam dicit esse principalissimam non simpliciter, sed in genere activarum scientiarum, quae sunt circa res humanas, quarum ultimum finem politica considerat. Nam ultimum finem totius universi considerat scientia divina, quae est respectu omnium principalissima. Dicit autem ad politicam pertinere considerationem ultimi finis humanae vitae, de quo tamen in hoc libro determinat quia doctrina huius libri continet prima elementa scientiae politicae. 31. But we should note that he says political science is the most important not simply, but in that division of practical sciences that are concerned with human things, the ultimate end of which political science considers. The ultimate end of the whole universe is considered in theology, which is the most important without qualification. He says that it belongs to political science to treat the ultimate end of human life. This, however, he discusses here, since the matter of this book covers the fundamental notions of political science. Lectio 3 Lecture 3 Qualities of the Student and Teacher Dicetur autem utique sufficienter si secundum subiectam materiam manifestetur. Certum enim non similiter in omnibus sermonibus quaerendum, quemadmodum neque in conditis. Bona autem et iusta, de quibus civilis intendit, tantam habent differentiam et errorem ut videantur lege sola esse, natura vero non. Talem autem quendam errorem habent et bona, quia multis contingunt detrimenta ex ipsis; iam enim quidam perierunt propter divitias, alli vero propter fortitudinem. Our study will be adequately treated if it is investigated according to the nature of the subject matter. The same certitude should not be sought in all discussions, just as the same exactness should not be expected in all the productions of art. Now, good and just deeds, with which political science is concerned, are differently and mistakenly judged to such a degree that none of them seems to be good and just by nature, but merely by disposition of law. Because of bad judgment, many have been harmed even by good things: some men have lost their lives by reason of riches, others by reason of physical courage. Amabile igitur de talibus et ex talibus dicentes, grosse et figuraliter veritatem ostendere, et de his quae ut frequentius et ex talibus dicentes, talia et concludere. [32] It is desirable, therefore, when treating of these variable subjects and when arguing from them as premises, to bring out roughly the outlines of the truth, and to conclude about those things which occur in the majority of cases. [32] Eodem utique modo et recipere debitum est unumquodque dictorum. Disciplinati enim est in tantum certitudinem inquirere secundum unumquodque genus, in quantum natura rei recipit. Proximum enim videtur et mathematicum persuadentem acceptare et rhetoricum demonstrationes expetere. [36] The student ought to take whatever is taught in this same spirit, for it is proper to an educated man to look for as much certitude in each study as the nature of the subject admits. It approximates the same thing to allow a mathematician to use rhetorical arguments and to demand conclusive demonstrations from a rhetorician. [36] Unusquisque autem iudicat bene quae cognoscit et horum est bonus iudex; secundum unumquodque certe eruditus, simpliciter autem qui circa omnia eruditus est. [37] Now, every man is a good judge of the things he knows. Accordingly, then, one educated in a particular subject judges well what belongs to that subject. But the man who is well-educated in all subjects can judge well about all. [37] Idcirco politicae non est proprius auditor iuvenis; inexpertus enim est eorum qui secundum vitam sunt actuum, rationes autem ex his et de his sunt. [38] In keeping with this, a young man is not a good student of political science, for he is inexperienced in the ways of life that are the starting point and subject matter of this science. [38] Amplius autem passionum secutor existens, inaniter audiet et inutiliter, quia finis est non cognitio, sed actus. Differt autem nihil iuvenis secundum aetatem vel secundum morem iuvenilis; Furthermore, because he is strongly influenced by his emotions, he will study political science without result and uselessly, for the end of this science is not knowledge, but human action. Nor does it matter whether the student be immature in age or immature in character, non enim a tempore defectio, sed propter secundum passiones vivere et persequi singula, talibus enim inutilis cognitio fit, quemadmodum incontinentibus. [39] for the deficiency is not due to time, but to a life lived according to the passions and to the pursuit of each object of passion. Such men gain no profit from their knowledge; and the same is true of the incontinent. [39] Secundum rationem autem desideria facientibus et operantibus, multum utique utile erit de his scire. Et quidem de auditore et qualiter demonstrandum et quid proponimus, prooemialiter dicta sint tanta. [41] But it will certainly be very useful to have a knowledge of moral matters for those who desire and act according to the dictates of reason. To sum up what has been treated in the introduction: we have discussed the student, the method of demonstrating, and the purpose of our science. [41] 32. Dicetur autem utique sufficienter etc. Postquam Philosophus ostendit quid sit bonum quod principaliter intenditur in hac scientia, hic determinat modum huic scientiae convenientem; 32. Our study will be adequately treated. After the Philosopher has shown what is the good principally intended in this science, he now determines the method proper to this science. et primo ex parte doctoris; He does this first on the part of the teacher; secundo ex parte auditoris, ibi: Eodem utique modo etc. second, at the student ought to take (1094b22; [36]), on the part of the student. Circa primum ponit talem rationem. Modus manifestandi veritatem in qualibet scientia debet esse conveniens ei quod subiicitur sicut materia in illa scientia. Quod quidem manifestat ex hoc quod certitudo non potest inveniri nec est requirenda similiter in omnibus sermonibus quibus de aliqua re ratiocinamur, sicut etiam neque in conditis, id est his quae fiunt per artem, non est similis modus operandi in omnibus, sed unusquisque artifex operatur ex materia secundum modum ei convenientem aliter quidem ex cera aliter ex luto aliter ex ferro. Materia autem moralis talis est quod non est ei conveniens perfecta certitudo. Et hoc manifestat per duo genera rerum quae videntur ad materiam moralem pertinere. In regard to the first, he lays down this reason. The method of manifesting truth in any science ought to be suitable to the subject matter of that science. He shows this from the fact that certitude cannot be found, nor should it be sought, in the same degree in all discussions where we reason about anything. Likewise, the same method is not used in all productions (that is, in things made by art); but each workman works with the material in a way suited to that material—in one way with the soil, in another with clay, in still another with metal. Now, the matter of moral study is of such a nature that perfect certitude is not suitable to it. He shows this from two classes of things that seem to belong to the material with which moral study is concerned. 33. Primo namque et principaliter ad materiam moralem pertinent opera virtuosa, quae vocat hic iusta, de quibus principaliter intendit civilis scientia, circa quae non habetur certa sententia hominum, sed magna differentia est in hoc quod homines de his iudicant; et in hoc multiplex error contingit, nam quaedam sunt quae a quibusdam reputantur iusta et honesta, a quibusdam autem iniusta et inhonesta, secundum differentiam temporum et locorum et personarum; aliquid enim reputatur vitiosum uno tempore aut in una regione quod in alio tempore aut in alia regione non reputatur vitiosum; et ex ista differentia contingit quosdam opinari quod nihil esset naturaliter iustum vel honestum, sed solum secundum legispositionem; de qua quidem opinione ipse plenius aget in V huius. 33. In the matter of morals, the first and foremost place is held by virtuous works. They are called just deeds and are the chief concern of political science. Regarding them, there are no agreed opinions, but rather a decided difference is found in what men judge about them. In this matter, a variety of errors occur, for certain actions that are considered just and good by some are looked upon as unjust and bad by others, according to different times and places and persons. Now, a deed is considered vicious at one time and in one country, but at a different time and in a different country it is not considered to be so. Because of this disagreement, it happens that some are of the opinion that no action is just or good by nature, but only by disposition of law. We shall treat more fully of this opinion in the second book of this work [245–54]. 34. Secundo autem ad materiam moralem pertinent bona exteriora quibus homo utitur ad finem, et circa ista etiam bona contingit invenire praedictum errorem, quia non semper eodem modo se habent in omnibus; quidam enim per ea iuvantur, quibusdam vero ex ipsis proveniunt detrimenta; multi enim homines occasione suarum divitiarum perierunt, utpote a latronibus interfecti, quidam vero occasione suae fortitudinis corporalis, ex cuius fiducia incaute se periculis exposuerunt. Et sic manifestum est quod materia moralis est varia et deformis, non habens omnimodam certitudinem. 34. Second, external goods that are used purposively by men have a moral consideration. In regard to them, it happens that we find the mistake just mentioned inasmuch as these material goods are not always used in the same way by everyone. Some men are helped by them, while others indeed are harmed by them. Many are ruined by having riches—for instance, those who are murdered by robbers. Some, by reason of their physical courage on which they rely, have carelessly exposed themselves to dangers. Thus it is evident that moral matters are variable and divergent, not having the same certitude each time. 35. Et quia secundum artem demonstrativae scientiae oportet principia esse conformia conclusionibus, amabile est et optabile de talibus, id est tam variabilibus, tractatum facientes et ex similibus procedentes, ostendere veritatem primo quidem grosse, id est applicando universalia principia et simplicia ad singularia et composita in quibus est actus; necessarium est enim in qualibet operativa scientia ut procedatur modo compositivo, e contrario autem in scientia speculativa necesse est ut procedatur modo resolutivo, resolvendo composita in principia simplicia; 35. Because, in the art of demonstrative science, principles must conform to conclusions, it is desirable and preferable when treating of such variable things, and when proceeding from premises likewise variable, to bring out the truth first roughly by applying universal principles to singulars and by proceeding from the simple (universal) to the complex (particular) where acts are concerned. For it is necessary in every practical science to proceed in a composite (deductive) manner. On the contrary, in speculative science, it is necessary to proceed in an analytical manner by breaking down the complex into elementary principles. deinde oportet ostendere veritatem figuraliter, id est verisimiliter, et hoc est procedere ex propriis principiis huius scientiae, nam scientia moralis est de actibus voluntariis, voluntatis autem motivum est non solum bonum, sed apparens bonum; Second, we should bring out the truth in outline—that is, an approximation to the truth. This is to proceed from the proper principles of this science. Moral science treats the acts of the will, and the thing moving the will is not only the good, but even fictitious good. tertio oportet ut, cum dicturi simus de his quae ut frequentius accidunt, id est de actibus voluntariis, quos voluntas non ex necessitate producit, sed forte inclinata magis ad unum quam ad aliud, ut etiam ex talibus procedamus, ut principia sint conclusionibus conformia. Third, we must speak of events as they happen in the majority of cases, that is, of voluntary acts that proceed from the will, inclined perhaps to one alternative rather than another but never operating under compulsion. In these, too, we must proceed in such a way that principles are conformable to conclusions. 36. Deinde cum dicit: Eodem utique modo etc., ostendit quod auditorem oportet acceptare in moralibus praedictum modum determinandi. Et dicit quod debitum est quod unusquisque recipiat unumquodque <eorum> quae sibi ab alio dicuntur eodem modo, id est secundum quod convenit materiae, quia ad hominem disciplinatum, id est bene instructum, pertinet ut tantum certitudinem quaerat in unaquaque materia quantum natura rei patitur; non enim potest esse tanta certitudo in materia variabili et contingenti sicut in materia necessaria semper eodem modo se habente, et ideo auditor bene disciplinatus nec debet maiorem certitudinem requirere nec minori esse contentus quam sit conveniens rei de qua agitur. Propinquum enim peccatum esse videtur si aliquis auditor acceptet aliquem mathematicum persuasionibus rhetoricis utentem et si expetat a rhetorico demonstrationes certas quales debet proferre mathematicus; utrumque enim contingit ex hoc quod non consideratur modus materiae conveniens, nam mathematica est circa materiam in qua invenitur omnimoda certitudo, rhetorica autem negotiatur circa materiam civilem in qua multiplex variatio accidit. 36. Then, at the student ought to take (1094b22), he shows that the student must accept this limitation in moral matters. He says that it is proper that each one should take whatever is said to him by another in the same spirit, that is, as the matter warrants. The reason is that a learned (that is, well-instructed) man should look for as much certitude in any matter as the nature of the subject admits. There cannot be as much certainty in variable and contingent matters as in necessary matters, which are always the same. Therefore, the educated man ought not to look for greater or be satisfied with less certitude than is appropriate to the subject under discussion. It seems an equal fault to allow a mathematician to use rhetorical arguments as it is to demand from a rhetorician conclusive demonstrations such as a mathematician should give. But mistakes happen because the method appropriate to the matter is not considered. Mathematics is concerned with matter in which perfect certitude is found. Rhetoric, however, deals with political matter where a variety of views occurs. 37. Deinde cum dicit: unusquisque autem iudicat bene etc., ostendit qualis debeat esse auditor huius scientiae. 37. Then, at now, every man (1094b27), he shows what sort of person the student of this science ought to be. Et primo ostendit quis sit insufficiens auditor; First, he shows who is an incompetent student; secundo quis sit inutilis, ibi: amplius autem passionum etc.; second, at furthermore (1095a4; [39]), who is an unprofitable student; tertio ostendit quis sit auditor conveniens, ibi: secundum rationem autem etc. and third, at but it will certainly (1095a10; [41]), he explains the characteristics of the ideal student. Circa primum duo facit. In respect to the first, he does two things. Primo praemittit quaedam quae sunt necessaria ad propositum ostendendum. Et dicit, quod unusquisque non potest habere bonum iudicium nisi de his quae cognoscit, et sic ille qui est instructus circa unum quodlibet genus bene potest iudicare de his quae pertinent ad illud genus, sed ille qui est bene instructus circa omnia potest simpliciter bene iudicare de omnibus. First, he introduces certain things necessary to explain his proposition. He states that each man can judge well only the things he knows. Thus, a man educated in one particular subject can judge well what belongs to that subject. But the man who is well-educated in all subjects can judge well about all, without restriction to a particular subject. 38. Secundo ibi: idcirco politicae etc., concludit propositum, scilicet quod iuvenis non est conveniens auditor politicae et totius moralis scientiae, quae sub politica comprehenditur, quia, sicut dictum est, nullus potest bene iudicare nisi ea quae novit, omnis <autem> auditor oportet quod bene iudicet de his quae audit, ut scilicet bene dicta recipiat, non autem ea quae male dicuntur, ergo oportet quod nullus sit auditor conveniens nisi habeat aliquam notitiam eorum quae debet audire; sed iuvenis non habet notitiam eorum quae pertinent ad scientiam moralem, quae maxime cognoscuntur per experientiam, iuvenis autem est inexpertus operationum humanae vitae propter temporis brevitatem et tamen rationes moralis scientiae procedunt ex his quae pertinent ad actus humanae vitae et etiam sunt de his; sicut si dicatur quod liberalis minora sibi reservat et maiora aliis tribuit, hoc iuvenis propter inexperientiam forte non iudicabit esse verum, et idem est in aliis civilibus; unde manifestum est quod iuvenis non est conveniens auditor politicae. 38. Second, at in keeping with this (1095a2), he proves his statement, namely, that a young man is not a good student of political science, nor of any part of moral science comprised under political science, because as was said [37], a man can judge well only the things he knows. Now, every student should make good judgments about what he studies, so that he may accept what is true but not what is false. Therefore, no one can be a good student unless he has some knowledge of what he ought to study. But a young man does not have a knowledge of things belonging to moral science, which are known mostly by experience. A young man is inexperienced in the ways of life because of the very brevity of his life, while the principles of moral science proceed from what pertains to and also treats of the actions of human life. For instance, if it be said that the generous man keeps the cheaper things for himself and makes a present of the more expensive to others, a young man will perhaps judge this not to be true because of inexperience. It is the same with other social dealings. Hence, it is evident that a young man is not a good student of political science. 39. Deinde cum dicit: amplius autem passionum etc., ostendit quis sit inutilis auditor huius scientiae. Ubi considerandum est quod scientia moralis docet homines sequi rationem et discedere ab his in quae passiones animae inclinant, quae sunt concupiscentia, ira et similia. In quae quidem aliqui tendunt dupliciter: 39. Then, at furthermore (1095a4), he shows who is an unprofitable student of this science. Here we must consider that moral science teaches men to follow reason and to refrain from the things to which the passions incline, such as concupiscence, anger, and the like. Toward these, men are inclined in two ways. uno modo ex electione, puta cum aliquis hoc proponit ut concupiscentiae suae satisfaciat, et hos vocat sectatores passionum; In one way by choice—for instance, when a man of set purpose intends to satisfy his concupiscence. Such a one he calls a slave of his emotions. alio modo cum aliquis proponit quidem a noxiis delectationibus abstinere, vincitur tamen interdum impetu passionis ut contra suum propositum impetum passionis sequatur, et talis vocatur incontinens. In another way, when a man resolves to abstain from harmful pleasures but is sometimes overcome by the urge of passion, such that, contrary to his resolution, he follows the promptings of passion. A man of this type is said to be incontinent.