2109. dictum est enim supra in nono quod unumquodque potissime videtur esse id quod est principalius in eo, quia omnia alia sunt quasi instrumenta illius, et sic, dum homo vivit secundum operationem intellectus, vivit secundum vitam maxime sibi propriam; esset autem inconveniens si aliquis eligeret vivere non secundum vitam propriam sui ipsius, sed secundum vitam alicuius alterius, unde inconvenienter dicunt qui suadent quod homo non debeat vacare speculationi intellectus. Et cum hoc dictum sit prius in nono quod id quod est secundum intellectum est proprium homini, congruit etiam et nunc in proposito: illud enim quod est optimum secundum naturam in unoquoque est maxime proprium sibi; quod autem est optimum et proprium, consequens est quod sit delectabilissimum, quia unusquisque delectatur in bono sibi convenienti; sic igitur patet quod, si homo maxime est intellectus tamquam principalissimum in ipso, quod vita quae est secundum intellectum est delectabilissima homini et maxime sibi propria.
2109. We have stated in book 9 [1868, 1872] that each thing is thought to be especially that which constitutes its chief part, since all other parts are its tools, so to speak. And so, when man lives in accordance with the activity of the intellect, he lives in accordance with the life most proper to him; for it would be strange if a person were to choose to live not his own life, but the life of some other. Hence, they give unwise counsel who say that man should not engage in intellectual contemplation. And the statement made in book 9 [1807, 1847, 1869–72] that what accords with reason is proper to man is applicable also to our present purpose. For that which is best in each thing’s nature is most proper to it. But what is best and proper, consequently, is most delightful, because everyone delights in a good that is pleasing to him. So then, if man is especially his intellect, since this is the principal element in him, evidently life according to the intellect is most delightful and proper to him in the highest degree.
2110. Nec hoc est contra id quod supra dictum est quod non est secundum hominem, sed supra hominem; non est enim secundum hominem quantum ad naturam compositam, est autem propriissime secundum hominem quantum ad id quod est principalissimum in homine; quod quidem perfectissime invenitur in substantiis superioribus, in homine autem imperfecte et quasi participative et tamen istud parvum est maius omnibus aliis quae in homine sunt. Sic ergo patet quod iste qui vacat speculationi veritatis est maxime felix, quantum homo in hac vita felix esse potest.
2110. Nor is it contrary to our previous assertion  that this is not on the human level, but above man. Indeed, it is not on the human level considering man’s composite nature, but it is most properly human considering what is principal in man—a thing found most perfectly in superior substances but imperfectly and by participation, as it were, in man. Nevertheless, this small part is greater than all the other parts in man. Thus, it is clear that the person who gives himself to the contemplation of truth is the happiest a man can be in this life.
Happiness and the Moral Virtues
Secundo autem qui secundum aliam virtutem. 
But life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is happy only in a secondary degree. 
Secundum ipsam enim operationes humanae. Iusta enim et fortia et alia quae secundum virtutes ad invicem agimus incommutationibus et necessitatibus et actionibus omnimodis et in passionibus quod decet unicuique conservantes; haec autem esse videntur omnia humana. Quaedam autem et accidere a corpore videntur et multum coappropriari passionibus moris virtus. Coniugata est autem et prudentia moris virtuti et haec prudentiae, si quidem prudentiae quidem principia secundum morales sunt virtutes, rectum autem moralium secundum prudentiam. Concopulatae autem hae et passionibus, circa compositum utique erunt. Compositi autem virtutes humanae, et vita utique quae secundum has et felicitas. Quae autem intellectus separata. Tantum enim de ipsa dictum est, certius dicere enim maius proposito est. 
Its activities are merely human, for we perform works of justice, fortitude, and the other virtues when we observe what is due to everyone in our mutual dealings, our services and various kinds of actions and passions. And all these are human experiences. Besides, some of these matters seem to pertain to the body, and moral virtue is thought to be ascribed especially to the passions. Prudence is also connected with moral virtue, and moral virtue with prudence, since the principles of prudence are taken from the moral virtues, and the rectitude of the moral virtues from prudence. And both, being connected with the passions, will belong to the nature of the composite. Now, the virtues of the composite are human, and so then are life and happiness following these virtues. The intellect, however, is something separate. We have then sufficiently treated this point, and a fuller explanation would be more than our purpose requires. 
Videbitur autem utique et exteriori largitione in parvum vel in minus indigere morali. Necessariis quidem enim ambobus opus ex aequali sit, etsi magis laborat circa corpus politicus et quaecumque talia; parvum utique quid differet. Ad operationes autem multum differt: liberali quidem enim opus erit pecuniis ad agere liberalia et iusto utique ad redditiones. Voluntates enim immanifestae; simulant enim et non iusti iuste agere velle. Forti autem potentia, si quidem perficit aliquid eorum quae secundum virtutem. Et temperato potestate; qualiter enim manifestus erit vel iste vel aliorum aliquis? Quaeritur autem quid utrum principalius virtutis, electio vel actiones, ut in ambabus existentis. Perfectum utique manifestum quod in ambabus utique erit. Ad actiones autem multis opus est, et quanto utique maiores sunt et meliores, pluribus. Speculanti autem nullo talium ad operationem necessitas, sed ut dicere et impedimenta sunt ad speculationem. Secundum quod autem homo est et pluribus convivit eligitque secundum virtutem agere, opus habebit igitur talibus ad humaniter conversari. 
But contemplative happiness seems to need little dispensing of external goods, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue. Both indeed need the necessities of life, and in an equal degree, even if the statesman is more troubled than the philosopher about the requirements of the body and the like. On this point, they differ little, but in their activities, there is a wide difference. For, the generous man needs the means to practice liberality, and the just man to make a return of services (since mere wishes are not evident and even the unjust pretend that they want to act justly). Likewise, the brave man will need strength if he performs any act in accordance with his virtue; and the temperate man will need opportunity. Otherwise, how can he or any other virtuous person be recognized? Further, it may be asked whether choice or action is more important in virtue, which appears to involve both; surely it is evident that perfection consists in both. Now, many things are required for action, and the more so the greater and nobler the deeds are; but for the activity of the contemplative man, nothing of the kind is needed. In fact, it can be said that external goods are obstacles to contemplation. But the contemplative person, insofar as he is man and lives with others, chooses to perform virtuous acts. Hence, he will need external goods to live a human life. 
Perfecta autem felicitas quoniam speculativa quaedam est operatio, et hinc utique apparebit. Deos enim maxime suspicati sumus beatos et felices esse, actiones autem quales attribuere debitum ipsis? Utrum iustas? Vel ridiculi apparebunt commutantes et depositiones dantes et quaecumque alia talia. Sed fortes, sustinentes terribilia et periclitantes quoniam bonum? Vel liberales? Cui autem dabunt? Inconveniens autem et si erit ipsis nummisma vel aliquid tale. Si autem temperati quidem utique, erit vel onerosa laus, quoniam non habent pravas concupiscentias. Per transeuntibus autem omnia, apparebunt utique quae circa actiones parva et indigna diis. Sed tamen et vivere omnes suspicati sunt ipsos, et operari ergo: non enim oportet dormire, quemadmodum Endimiona. Viventi utique ab agere ablato, adhuc autem magis a facere, quid relinquitur praeter speculationem? Quare Dei operatio, beatitudine differens, speculativa utique. Et humanarum utique quae huic cognatissima felicissima. 
That perfect happiness is a form of contemplative activity will be clear from what follows. Now, we suppose that the gods are supremely happy and blessed. But what kind of actions should we attribute to them? Just actions? The gods will appear rather ridiculous making contracts, returning deposits and so on. Brave actions in undergoing terrors and running risks because it is good to do so? Or liberal actions? But to whom will they give? Besides, it will be strange for them to have money and the like. If they are called temperate, the praise will be distasteful, since they do not have lustful desires. In fact, a thorough review shows all the circumstances of these actions trifling and unworthy of the gods. However, we commonly think of them as living and active, for we must not suppose that they are asleep like Endymion. If, then, we take away from a living being action, and production besides, what is left except contemplation? Therefore, the activity of God, which is transcendent in happiness, is contemplative; and that most akin to it among human activities is the greatest source of happiness. 
Signum autem et non participare reliqua animalia felicitate, tali operatione privata perfecte. Diis quidem enim omnis vita beata, hominibus autem in quantum similitudo quaedam talis operationis existit, aliorum autem animalium nullum felix est, quia nequaquam communicat speculatione. In quantum utique pertendit speculatio, et felicitas, et quibus magis existit speculari, et felices esse, non secundum accidens, sed secundum speculationem; haec enim secundum se ipsam honorabilis. Quare erit utique felicitas speculatio quaedam. 
This is further indicated by the fact that the other animals do not partake of happiness, for they are completely deprived of this activity. The life of the gods is completely happy; the same is true of man’s life insofar as it contains a likeness of contemplative activity. But none of the other animals possess happiness, because they do not share in contemplation. So, then, contemplation and happiness are coextensive; and the more deeply people contemplate, the happier they are, not by accident, but by reason of contemplation, which is itself admirable. Consequently, happiness consists principally in some form of contemplation. 
2111. Secundo autem qui secundum aliam virtutem et cetera. Postquam Philosophus ostendit quod perfecta felicitas est et principalis secundum speculationem intellectus, hic inducit quamdam aliam secundariam felicitatem, quae consistit in operatione moralium virtutum.
2111. But life in accordance with the other kind. After he has shown that perfect happiness consists principally and primarily in intellectual contemplation, the Philosopher next introduces a kind of secondary happiness arising from the activity of the moral virtues.
Et primo proponit quod intendit, dicens quod, cum ille qui vacat speculationi veritatis sit felicissimus, secundario est felix ille qui vivit secundum aliam virtutem, scilicet secundum prudentiam, quae dirigit omnes morales virtutes. Sicut enim felicitas speculativa attribuitur sapientiae, quae comprehendit in se alios habitus speculativos tamquam principalior existens, ita etiam felicitas activa, quae est secundum operationes moralium virtutum, attribuitur prudentiae, quae est perfectiva omnium moralium virtutum, ut in sexto ostensum est.
First, he proposes his intention: although a man who engages in the contemplation of truth is happiest, another is happy in a secondary degree as he lives by the standard of a different virtue, prudence, which directs all the moral virtues. For just as happiness of contemplative living is attributed to wisdom, which, as the preeminent virtue, contains in itself other speculative habits, so too the happiness of active living, which is gauged by the activities of the moral virtues, is attributed to prudence perfecting all the moral virtues, as was pointed out in book 6 [1275–84].
2112. Secundo ibi: secundum ipsam enim et cetera, ostendit propositum quatuor rationibus.
2112. Then, at its activities (1178a8), he proves his proposition by four reasons.
Quarum prima est quia operationes quae sunt secundum alias virtutes activas sunt operationes humanae. Sunt enim circa res humanas.
The first reason is that activities conforming to the other active virtues are human activities, since they concern human affairs.
Primo quidem circa res exteriores, quae in usum hominis veniunt; opera enim iustitiae et fortitudinis et aliarum virtutum quae ad invicem agimus existunt in commutationibus, prout secundum iustitiam homines invicem sua bona commutant, existunt etiam in necessitatibus, prout scilicet unus homo alteri subvenit in sua necessitate, existunt etiam in quibuscumque actionibus et passionibus humanis, circa quas secundum virtutes morales conservatur id quod convenit unicuique; omnia autem praedicta videntur esse quaedam humana.
In the first place, they deal with commonplace external matters in the life of man. For, the works of justice, fortitude, and the other virtues, which we do for one another, are manifest: in our dealings, as when men mutually exchange their goods in conformity with justice; in our services, as when one man succors another in need; and in all kinds of actions and passions where the moral virtues observe what is due to everyone. And all these are human experiences.
2113. Secundo autem quaedam ad virtutes pertinentia videntur pertinere ad corpus et ad animae passiones, quibus virtus moralis secundum quamdam affinitatem appropriatur; multae enim moralium virtutum sunt circa passiones, sicut ex praedictis patet. Sic igitur virtus moralis est circa humana bona in quantum est circa bona exteriora et circa bona corporis et circa animae passiones.
2113. In the second place, some matters of the virtues seem to pertain to the body and the passions of the soul, to which moral virtue is ascribed by a kind of affinity. For, many moral virtues deal with the passions, as is apparent from previous discussions . So, then, moral virtue concerns human affairs inasmuch as it deals with external goods, bodily goods, and the passions of the soul.
2114. Morali autem virtuti coniungitur prudentia, intellectualis virtus existens, secundum quamdam affinitatem et e converso, quia principia prudentiae accipiuntur secundum virtutes morales quarum fines sunt principia prudentiae, rectitudo autem moralium virtutum accipitur secundum prudentiam, quae facit rectam electionem eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut patet ex his quae in sexto dicta sunt. Ea autem, scilicet virtus moralis et prudentia, simul copulantur cum passionibus, quia scilicet secundum utramque modificantur passiones; passiones autem sunt communes totius compositi ex anima et corpore, cum pertineant ad partem sensitivam;
2114. Prudence, considered as an intellectual virtue, is connected with moral virtue by a kind of affinity; the reverse of this is likewise true, because the principles of prudence are taken from the moral virtues, whose ends are the principles of prudence. Moreover, the rectitude of the moral virtues is taken from prudence, because prudence makes the right choice of means, as is evident from book 6 [1268–69]. Likewise, moral virtue and prudence are joined at the same time with the passions, because the passions are regulated by both. And, since the passions belong to the composite, they are common to the whole composite of soul and body.
2115. unde patet quod tam virtus moralis quam prudentia sunt circa compositum. Virtutes autem compositi proprie loquendo sunt humanae, in quantum homo est compositus ex anima et corpore, unde et vita quae secundum has, id est secundum prudentiam et virtutem moralem, est humana, quae dicitur vita activa, et per consequens felicitas quae in hac vita consistit est humana. Sed vita et felicitas speculativa quae est propria intellectus est separata et divina.
2115. It is obvious, then, that both moral virtue and prudence are concerned with the composite. Now, virtues of the composite, properly speaking, are human, inasmuch as man is composed of soul and body. Hence, life in accordance with these, with prudence and moral virtue, is also human (and is called the active life). Consequently, happiness consisting in this kind of life is human. But contemplative life and contemplative happiness, which are proper to the intellect, are separate and divine.
2116. Et tantum dicere ad praesens de ipsa sufficiat, quod autem magis per certitudinem explicetur est aliquid maius quam pertineat ad propositum; agitur enim de hoc in tertio De anima, ubi ostenditur quod intellectus est separatus. Sic igitur patet quod felicitas speculativa est potior quam activa, quanto aliquid separatum et divinum est potius quam id quod est compositum et humanum.
2116. It should suffice for the present to say this much on the matter, for a fuller explanation would be more than what belongs to our purpose. The question is treated in De anima 3, where it is shown that the intellect is separate. Therefore, it is evident that happiness of contemplative living is more excellent than happiness of active living, according as something separate and divine is more excellent than that which is composite and human.
2117. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: videbitur autem utique et cetera. Et dicit quod speculativa vita et felicitas videtur parum vel saltem minus quam moralis indigere quod homini largiantur exteriora bona. Verum est enim quod ambobus, id est tam speculativo quam morali, opus est habere necessaria vitae, puta cibum et potum et alia huiusmodi, quamvis circa corpus magis laboret activus quam speculativus, quia exteriores actiones per corpus aguntur; tamen quantum ad hoc non est magna differentia quin aequaliter necessariis uterque indigeat. Sed quantum ad operationes utriusque, magna est quantum ad hoc differentia, quia virtuosus multis indiget ad suas operationes, sicut patet quod liberali opus est pecuniis ad agendum liberaliter et similiter iustus indiget pecuniis ad hoc quod reddat illa quae debet.
2117. He continues with the second reason at but contemplative. Life and happiness based on contemplative virtue have little need—or less than those based on moral virtue—for external goods to be dispensed to man. For it is true that both the contemplative and the active forms of happiness must have the necessaries of life, like food, drink, and so on; although the statesman is more concerned about the body than is the philosopher, since external activities are performed by the body. Nevertheless, on this point, there is little difference; rather, each equally needs the necessities. But in the matter of activities, the difference between them is considerable, because the virtuous man requires much for his activities, as the generous man obviously needs the means to practice liberality, and likewise the just man needs money to pay what he owes.
2118. Et si quis dicat quod actus liberalitatis est etiam velle dare et actus iustitiae velle reddere, quod potest esse etiam sine pecuniis, considerandum est quod voluntates hominum non sunt manifestae sine operationibus exterioribus; multi enim qui non sunt iusti simulant se velle iuste agere. Sed ad hoc quod sit manifestum de aliquo an sit fortis indiget aliquo exteriori, si debet aliquod opus exterius fortitudinis perficere. Et similiter temperatus indiget potestate utendi delectabilibus ad hoc quod manifestetur temperantia; aliter enim, nisi adsit facultas operandi, non poterit esse manifestus neque iste virtuosus, scilicet temperatus vel fortis, neque aliquis alius.
2118. And, if it be argued that even the will to give is an act of liberality and that the will to repay is an act of justice—these are possible without money—we should bear in mind that man’s will is hidden without external activities. In fact, many unjust persons pretend they want to act justly. But, in order to show whether a man is brave, some external act is necessary, and so he ought to perform some work of fortitude externally. Likewise, the temperate man must have the opportunity of enjoying pleasures in order to manifest temperance. Otherwise, if there is no occasion for action, neither the virtuous person—namely, the temperate or brave—nor any other can be recognized.
2119. Et ideo potest quaeri quid sit principalius in virtute morali, utrum electio interior vel actiones exteriores, cum utrumque ad virtutem exigatur. Et quamvis electio sit principalior in virtute morali, ut supra dictum est, tamen manifestum est quod ad omnimodam perfectionem virtutis moralis requiritur non solum electio, sed etiam operatio exterior. Ad actiones autem exteriores opus est homini quod habeat multa, et tanto plura quanto actiones debent esse maiores et meliores.
2119. For this reason, it can be asked which is more important in moral virtue, internal choice or external acts, for both are requirements of virtue. And although choice is more important in moral virtue, as indicated previously [322, 1129], nevertheless, external activity is also required for the complete perfection of moral virtue. But, for external actions, a man needs many things, and the greater and nobler the deeds are, the more the needs.
2120. Sed ille qui vacat speculationi nullo talium indiget ad suam operationem, quin immo potest dici quod exteriora bona impediunt hominem a speculatione propter sollicitudinem quae ex eis ingeritur homini, distrahens animum hominis ne totaliter possit speculationi vacare. Sed si homo speculativus indigeat exterioribus rebus, hoc erit in quantum est homo indigens necessariis et in quantum convivit pluribus hominibus, quos interdum oportet iuvare, et in quantum homo contemplativus eligit vivere secundum virtutem moralem; et sic indigebit talibus ad hoc quod humaniter conversetur. Sic igitur patet quod felicitas speculativa est potior quam activa, quae est secundum virtutem moralem.
2120. On the other hand, the person engaged in contemplation needs none of these things for the exercise of his activity. Rather it can be said that external goods hinder a man from contemplation on account of the anxiety they impose on him, distracting his mind so he cannot give himself completely to contemplation. But, if the contemplative person requires external goods, this will be because a man needs the necessities of life, or because he lives with many persons, he must help at times, and to this extent, he chooses to live in accordance with moral virtue. Therefore, he will need these things to live a human life. Thus, it is evident that contemplative happiness is more excellent than active happiness, which follows moral virtue.
2121. Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: perfecta autem felicitas et cetera. Et dicit quod hoc quod felicitas perfecta consistat in quadam speculativa operatione ex hoc apparet quod diis, id est substantiis separatis, maxime videtur competere quod sint felices et beati, nec tamen possumus eis attribuere actiones moralium virtutum. Si quis enim attribueret eis iustitiae operationes, apparerent deridendi, utpote commutationes facientes vel etiam sua bona apud alios deponentes vel quaecumque alia opera iustitiae facientes. Et similiter non potest eis attribui fortitudo, ut scilicet sustineant terribilia et pericula propter bonum. Similiter etiam non competit eis liberalitas, prout est virtus humana;
2121. In presenting the third reason, at that perfect happiness (1178b7), he says that perfect happiness evidently should consist in contemplative activity, because the gods (that is, separated substances) seem supremely happy and blessed. Yet we cannot ascribe to them the acts of the moral virtues. If the activities of justice were attributed to them, they would appear ridiculous in the role of making contracts, depositing their goods with others, and so on. Nor can bravery be attributed to them in the sense that they undergo terrors and run risks for the sake of the common good; nor does liberality, as a human virtue, befit them.
2122. non enim erit assignare cui mortalium dent huiusmodi bona quae dant homines liberaliter, quia inconveniens est quod aliquis dicat eos uti ad dandum denarium vel aliquid huiusmodi. Si autem aliquis attribuat eis temperantiam, huiusmodi laus magis erit onerosa Deo quam grata; non enim est laudabile Deo quod non habeat pravas concupiscentias, quia non est natus eas habere. Sic igitur pertranseundo omnes actiones moralium virtutum, apparet quod sunt parva et indigna diis, id est substantiis superioribus.
2122. They should not be described as giving to any mortal the kind of gifts that men freely bestow, because it is unseemly to say that they make presents of money or the like. And if anyone complimented them for temperance, such praise would be more distasteful than pleasing to God. For, it is not laudable for God to be without lustful desires, since his nature does not have them. So, then, in running through all the moral virtues, it is apparent that their acts are trifling and unworthy of the gods, that is, the superior substances.
2123. Sed tamen omnes opinantur quod vivant et per consequens quod operentur; non enim convenit eis quod nihil operentur sicut dormientes, sicut dicitur de quodam philosopho qui diu vixit dormiens. Si igitur a vita divina auferamus agere moralium virtutum et prudentiae, et adhuc multo magis auferamus a divina vita facere, quod est proprium artis, nulla alia operatio relinquitur Deo praeter speculationem. Et sic patet quod operatio Dei, quae excellit in beatitudine, est speculativa et per speculationem sapientiae suae omnia fecit. Ex quo patet quod inter operationes humanas illa quae est simillima divinae speculationi est felicissima.
2123. On the other hand, though, they are thought to live and consequently to be active. We cannot suppose they do nothing but sleep, like a certain philosopher who is said to have slept all his life. If, therefore, we take away from the life of the gods the action of the moral virtues and prudence, and then further take away production—which is the property of art—there remains in God no other activity excelling in happiness except contemplation, and he exercises all his activity in the contemplation of wisdom. From this, it is clear that, of all human activities, the one most akin to divine contemplation is the greatest source of happiness.
2124. Quartam rationem ponit ibi: signum autem et cetera. Et dicit quod signum huius quod perfecta felicitas consistat in contemplatione sapientiae est quod animalia irrationabilia, quae carent felicitate, omnino sunt privata tali operatione, quia non habent intellectum, quo nos speculamur veritatem, aliquo autem modo participant operatione virtutum moralium, sicut leo actu fortitudinis et liberalitatis et ciconia actu pietatis ad parentes. Et hoc rationabiliter:
2124. He then proceeds with the fourth reason, at this is further (1178b24). An indication that perfect happiness consists in the contemplation of wisdom is that irrational animals, which do not partake of happiness, are completely deprived of this activity. The reason is that they are without intellect, by which we contemplate truth. To some extent, though, they share in the activities of the moral virtues: the lion, for instance, in the act of fortitude and liberality; the stork in the act of filial piety. And this they do in a reasonable way.
2125. diis enim, id est substantiis separatis, quia habent solam intellectualem vitam, tota eorum vita est beata, homines autem in tantum sunt beati in quantum existit in eis quaedam similitudo talis operationis, scilicet speculativae, sed nullum aliorum animalium est felix, quia in nullo communicant speculatione. Et sic patet quod quantum se extendit speculatio, tantum se extendit felicitas, et quibus magis competit speculari, magis competit esse felices, non secundum accidens, sed secundum speculationem, quae est secundum se honorabilis. Unde sequitur quod felicitas principaliter sit quaedam speculatio.
2125. The life of the gods (that is, the intellectual substances) is completely happy because they have only intellectual life, and the life of men is happy insofar as some likeness of this contemplative activity is found in them. But none of the animals possess happiness, because they do not share at all in contemplation. Consequently, it is evident that, the more extensive contemplation is, the more extensive happiness is; and people who can contemplate more deeply are happier, not from something incidental, but from the contemplation, which is in itself admirable. It follows, then, that happiness consists principally in some form of contemplation.
Happiness and External Goods
Opus erit autem et exteriori prosperitate homini enti. Non enim per se sufficiens natura ad speculari, sed oportet et corpus sanum esse et cibum et reliquum famula tum existere. 
But, being man, the happy person will also need external prosperity, for human nature is not of itself sufficient for the activity of contemplation; the body too must have health and food and other requirements. 
Non tamen existimandum multis et magnis indigere futurum felicem, si non contingit sine exterioribus bonis beatum esse. Non enim in superabundantia per se sufficiens neque iudicium neque actio. Possibile autem et non principes terrae et maris agere bona; et enim a moderatis poterit utique aliquis agere secundum virtutem. Hoc autem est videre manifeste: idiotae enim potentibus non minus videntur studiosa agere, sed, et magis. Sufficiens autem tanta existere; erit enim vita felix secundum virtutem operantis. 
Yet, even if man’s happiness is not possible without external goods, we must not think that it will require many and great possessions. For, self-sufficiency does not depend on a superabundance—neither does judgment or action—and it is possible to do good deeds without ruling land and sea; one can act virtuously with moderate means. (Experience clearly demonstrates this, for private citizens seem to be not less but more active in good works than the powerful.) It is sufficient, then, that this much is available, for the life of the man who acts virtuously will be happy. 
Et Solon autem felices forte enuntiavit bene, dicens moderate his quae extra ditatos; agentes autem optima existimabat et viventes temperate, contingit enim moderata possidentes agere quae oportet. 
Solon probably gave a good description of a happy man as one who has a moderate share of external goods, has done (in Solon’s opinion) the most virtuous actions, and has lived temperately. For a man can do what he ought with only moderate means. 
Videtur autem et Anaxagoras non divitem neque potentem existimare felicem, dicens quoniam non utique admirabitur, si inconveniens appareat multis; isti enim iudicant his quae extra, haec sentientes solum. 
Anaxagoras also seems to think that a happy man need be neither rich nor powerful; and he is not surprised that this may seem strange to the majority, since they judge by externals, the only things they know. 
Consonare itaque rationibus videntur sapientum opiniones, fidem quidem igitur et talia habent quandam, verum autem in operabilibus ex operibus et vita iudicatur, in his enim dominans. Intendere autem praedicta oportet ad opera et vitam inferentes et consonantibus quidem operibus acceptandum, dissonantibus autem sermones suspicandum. 
So the views of the philosophers seem to harmonize with our arguments, and consequently have some credibility. However, in practical matters, the truth is tested by a man’s conduct and way of living, for these are the dominant factors. We must therefore examine the preceding opinions by judging them from the facts and from the actual life. If they agree with the facts, we should accept them; if they disagree, we should consider them mere theories. 
Secundum intellectum autem operans et hunc curans, et dispositus optime et Dei amantissimus videtur esse. Si enim quaedam cura humanorum a diis fit, quemadmodum videtur, et erit utique rationabile et gaudere ipsos optimo et cognatissimo, hoc autem utique erit intellectus; et diligentes maxime hoc et honorantes beneficiare, ut de amicis ipsis curantibus, et recte et bene operantes. Quoniam autem haec omnia sapienti maxime existunt, non immanifestum. Deo amantissimus ergo. Eundem autem verisimile et felicissimum. Quare, et si sic, erit sapiens maxime felix. 
But the man who is active intellectually and cultivates his mind seems to be most worthily disposed and most beloved of the gods. Now if the gods have any care of human affairs—it is generally believed they have—it would be reasonable for them both to delight in that which is best in us and most akin to them (this, of course, is the intellect) and to confer favors on those who love and honor this most—as if the gods themselves are solicitous for their friends who act rightly and honorably. But that all these attributes belong especially to the philosopher is obvious. He is therefore most beloved by the gods, and he will, in all probability, be also most happy. If this be so, then the philosopher will be the happiest of men. 
2126. Opus erit autem et exteriori et cetera. Postquam Philosophus ostendit quae sit perfecta felicitas, hic ostendit quomodo se habeat ad exteriora.
2126. But, being man, the happy person will also need. Now that the Philosopher has shown what perfect happiness is, he here shows its relations to external things.