Videturque felicitas in vacatione esse; non vacamus enim ut vacemus et bellamus ut pacem ducamus. Practicarum quidem igitur virtutum in politicis vel bellicis operationes, quae autem circa haec actiones videntur non vacantes esse. Bellicae quidem et penitus: nullus enim eligit bellare eius quod est bellare gratia neque praeparare bellum; videtur enim utique omnino violentus occisor quis esse, si amicos oppugnatores faceret ut pugnae et occisiones fierent. Est autem et quae politici non vacans et praeter ipsum civiliter conversari acquirens potentatus et honores vel magis et felicitatem ipsi et civibus, alteram existentem a politica, quam et quaerimus manifestum ut alteram existentem. Si utique eas quidem quae secundum virtutes actiones politicae et bellicae pulcritudine et magnitudine praecellunt, hae autem non vacantes et finem aliquem appetunt et non propter se ipsas sunt eligibiles, intellectus autem operatio studio differre videtur speculativa existens et praeter ipsam nullum appetere finem habereque delectationem propriam, haec autem coauget operationem, et per se sufficiens utique et vacativum utique et illaboriosum ut humanum et quaecumque alia beato attribuuntur, secundum hanc operationem apparent entia, perfecta igitur felicitas haec utique erit hominis, accipiens longitudinem vitae perfectam; nihil enim imperfectum est eorum quae felicitatis. [2098] And happiness is thought to depend on leisure, for we are busy in order to have leisure, and we wage war in order to attain peace. Now the exercise of the practical virtues is evident in political and military affairs, but actions concerned with these seem to be without leisure. This is completely the case with warlike activity, for no one chooses to wage war or provoke it merely for the sake of fighting. Indeed, a man would be considered a murderous character if he turned his friends into enemies for the sake of causing battles and slaughter. But the activity of the statesman is also without leisure, and—apart from participation in politics—aims at positions of power and honor or even the happiness of himself and fellow citizens as something distinct from political activity (and we are investigating it as something distinct). Even if, among the activities of the moral virtues, political and military actions stand out prominent both in nobility and in greatness, they are without leisure, aiming at some other end, and are not desirable for their own sakes. On the other hand, the activity of the intellect, being contemplative, is thought to be different by reason of serious application, both in desiring no end beyond itself and in possessing a proper pleasure that increases its activity. So contemplation seems to have self-sufficiency, leisureliness, freedom from labor (as far as humanly possible), and all other activities usually assigned to the happy man. Therefore, man’s perfect happiness will consist in this activity of the intellect, if a long span of life be added (as nothing belonging to happiness should be incomplete). [2098] Tatis autem utique erit melior vita quam secundum hominem. Non enim secundum quod homo est sic vivet, sed secundum quod divinum aliquid in ipso existit. Quanto autem differt hoc a composito, tanto et operatio ab ea quae secundum aliam virtutem. Si itaque divinum intellectus ad hominem, et quae secundum hunc vita divina ad humanam vitam. [2105] Such a life is higher than the human level, and it is not lived by man according to the human mode, but according to something divine in him. And, so far as this differs from the composite, to that extent its activity differs from the activity flowing from the other kind of virtue. Therefore, if the intellect is divine in comparison with man, so is its life divine in comparison with human life. [2105] Oportet autem non secundum suadentes humana sapere hominem entem neque mortalia mortalem, sed, in quantum contingit, immortale facere et omnia facere ad vivere secundum optimum eorum quae in ipso. Si enim et mole parvum est, potentia et pretiositate multum magis omnibus superexcellit. Videbitur autem utique et unumquodque esse hoc, si quidem principale et melius; inconveniens igitur fiet utique si non sui ipsius vitam eligat, sed alicuius alterius. Quod et dictum prius, congruet et nunc: proprium enim unicuique, natura optimum et delectabilissimum est unicuique; et homini utique quae secundum intellectum vita, si quidem maxime hoc homo. Iste ergo et felicissimus. [2107] Nor ought we to follow the philosophers who advise man to study human things, and mortals to study mortality, but we ought to strive to attain immortality so far as possible and to exert all our power to live according to the best thing in us. For, though this is a small part of us, it far surpasses all else in power and value; it may seem even to be the true self of each, being the principal and better part. Consequently, it would be strange if a person were to choose to live not his own life, but the life of some other. Moreover, our previous statement is applicable here: what is proper to the nature of each thing is best and most pleasant for it. So, then, the life of the intellect is best and most pleasant for man, since the intellect more than anything else is man. This life, therefore, will be the happiest. [2107] 2098. Videturque felicitas et cetera. Positis quinque rationibus ex quibus ostendebatur quod felicitas consistit in speculatione veritatis secundum convenientiam ad ea quae supra dicta sunt, hic addit sextam quae procedit ex quadam conditione felicitatis quam supra non posuerat. Felicitas enim consistit in quadam vacatione; vacare enim dicitur aliquis quando non restat ei aliquid agendum, quod contingit cum aliquis iam ad finem pervenerit, et ideo subdit quod non vacamus ut facemus, id est laboramus operando, quod est non vacare, ut perveniamus ad quiescendum in fine, quod est vacare, et hoc ostendit per exemplum bellantium, qui ad hoc bella gerunt quod ad pacem adoptatam perveniant. 2098. And happiness is thought to depend on leisure. After Aristotle has presented five reasons to show that happiness consists in the contemplation of truth, he now adds a sixth reason not previously mentioned arising from a feature of happiness. Now, happiness involves a kind of leisure. For a person is said to have leisure when he has nothing further to do—a condition in which he finds himself on arriving at some goal. For this reason, the Philosopher adds that we are busy in order to have leisure; that is, we are active in working—this is being busy—in order to rest at the end, and this is having leisure. And he finds an example of this in soldiers who wage war to obtain a desirable peace. 2099. Est tamen considerandum quod supra Philosophus dixit quod requies sit gratia operationis; sed ibi locutus fuit de requie qua intermittitur operatio ante consecutionem finis propter impossibilitatem continue operandi, quae quidem requies ordinatur ad operationem sicut ad finem; vacatio autem est requies in fine ad quem ordinatur operatio, et sic felicitati quae est ultimus finis maxime competit vacatio. Quae quidem non invenitur in operationibus virtutum practicarum, quarum praecipue sunt illae quae consistunt in rebus politicis, utpote ordinantes bonum commune quod est divinissimum, vel in rebus bellicis, quibus ipsum bonum commune defenditur contra hostes, et tamen his operibus non competit vacatio. 2099. We should note, as the Philosopher stated before [2077], that rest should be taken for the sake of activity. But there he was speaking of rest that, before attaining the end, suspends activity because of the impossibility of uninterrupted labor—this rest being ordered to activity as an end. On the other hand, leisure is rest to which activity is ordered in the end. Thus understood, leisure is a special property of happiness, the ultimate end; it is not found in the activities of the practical virtues. Prominent among these are the virtues dealing with political affairs involving the direction of the common or most divine good and with warfare involving the defense of the common good against enerdies; nevertheless, in such activities, leisure has no part. 2100. Et primo quidem circa bellicas operationes hoc est penitus manifestum, quia nullus eligit bella gerere aut praeparare bella solum gratia bellandi, quod esset vacationem habere in rebus bellicis, quia si in bellis gerendis finem suum constitueret, sequeretur quod esset violentus et occisor, in tantum quod etiam de amicis faceret impugnatores ad hoc quod posset pugnare et occidere. 2100. In the first place, this is entirely clear in military operations, since no one chooses to wage war or to provoke it solely for the sake of fighting, which would be to have leisure for warfare. The reason is that, if someone were to make his end the waging of war, he would be a murderous character turning his friends into enemies so that he could fight and kill. 2101. Secundo etiam hoc manifestum est in actionibus politicis quod non est in eis vacatio, sed praeter ipsam conversationem civilem vult homo acquirere aliquid aliud, puta potentatus et honores; vel, quia in his non est ultimus finis ut in primo ostensum est, magis est decens quod per civilem conversationem aliquis velit acquirere felicitatem sibi ipsi et civibus, ita quod huiusmodi felicitas quam intendit aliquis acquirere per politicam vitam sit altera ab ipsa politica vita; sic enim per vitam politicam quaerimus eam quasi alteram existentem ab ipsa, haec est enim felicitas speculativa ad quam tota vita politica videtur ordinata, dum per pacem, quae per ordinationem vitae politicae statuitur et conservatur, datur hominibus facultas contemplandi veritatem. 2101. Second, it is obvious that there is no place for leisure in political activities. But a man wants something besides mere participation in politics, like positions of power and honor. And, since these objectives do not constitute the ultimate end, as was pointed out in book 1 [60–72], it is rather fitting thatm, by means of politics, a person should wish to obtain happiness for himself and everyone else. Happiness of this kind sought in political life is distinct from political life itself, and in fact we do seek it as something distinct. This is contemplative happiness, to which the whole of political life seems directed; as long as the arrangement of political life establishes and preserves peace, it gives men the opportunity of contemplating truth. 2102. Si igitur inter omnes actiones virtutum moralium excellunt politicae et bellicae tam pulchritudine, quia sunt maxime honorabiles, quam etiam magnitudine, quia sunt circa maximum bonum, quod est bonum commune, cum huiusmodi operationes non habeant in se ipsis vacationem, sed agantur propter appetitum alterius finis et non sint eligibiles propter se ipsas, non erit in operationibus virtutum moralium perfecta felicitas. 2102. Among the activities of the moral virtues, political and military actions stand out preeminent both in nobility (they are most honorable) and in greatness (they concern the greatest good, which is the common good), and these actions do not themselves possess leisure, but are directed to a further end and are not desirable for their own sakes. Hence, perfect happiness will not be found in the activities of the moral virtues. 2103. Sed operatio intellectus quae est speculativa videtur a praemissis operationibus differre secundum rationem studii, quia scilicet homo vacat huiusmodi operationi propter se ipsam, ita quod nullum alium finem praeter ipsam appetit; habet etiam huiusmodi operatio propriam delectationem ex ipsa procedentem quae auget eam; sic igitur patet quod secundum huiusmodi operationem speculativam intellectus manifeste apparent omnia existere in homine quaecumque solent attribui beato, scilicet quod sit per se sufficiens et quod vacet et quod non laboret, et hoc dico quantum possibile est homini mortalem vitam agenti, in qua vita huiusmodi non possunt perfecte existere. 2103. But the activity of the intellect, which is contemplative, seems to differ from the preceding activities by reason of serious application, since man applies himself to it for its own sake such that he seeks no further end. This activity also contains a proper pleasure proceeding from itself and augmenting it. So, then, such contemplative activity of the intellect clearly provides for man the attributes customarily assigned to the happy person: self-sufficiency, leisureliness, and freedom from labor. And I say this insofar as it is possible for man living a mortal life in which such things cannot exist perfectly. 2014. Sic igitur in contemplatione intellectus consistit perfecta felicitas hominis dummodo adsit diuturnitas vitae, quae quidem requiritur ad bene esse felicitatis secundum quod oportet nihil eorum quae pertinent ad felicitatem esse imperfectum. 2104. Therefore, man’s perfect happiness consists in contemplation of the intellect, if a long span of life be added. This indeed is necessary for the well-being of happiness, as nothing belonging to happiness should be incomplete. 2015. Deinde cum dicit: talis autem utique et cetera, ostendit qualiter huiusmodi vita contemplativa se habeat ad hominem. 2105. Then, at such a life (1177b26), he shows how this contemplative life is associated with man. Et primo ostendit propositum; First, he explains his proposition. secundo excludit errorem, ibi: oportet autem non secundum suadentes et cetera. Second, at nor ought we (1177b31; [2107]), he rejects an error. Dicit ergo primo quod talis vita quae vacat contemplationi veritatis est melior quam vita quae est secundum hominem. Cum enim homo sit compositus ex anima et corpore, habens sensitivam naturam et intellectivam, vita homini commensurata videtur consistere in hoc quod homo secundum rationem ordinet affectiones et operationes sensitivas et corporales, sed vacare soli operationi intellectus videtur esse proprium supernarum substantiarum in quibus invenitur sola natura intellectiva quam (homo) participat secundum intellectum. He says first that the kind of life that has leisure for the contemplation of truth is higher than the human level. Since man is composed of soul and body with a sensitive and intellectual nature, life commensurate to him is thought to consist in that he directs by reason his sensitive and bodily affections and activities. But to engage solely in intellectual activity seems proper to the superior substances possessing only an intellectual nature, in which they participate by their intellect. 2106. Et ideo manifestans quod dictum est subdit quod homo sic vivens, scilicet vacando contemplationi, non vivit secundum quod homo, qui est compositus ex diversis, sed secundum quod aliquid divinum in ipso existit, prout scilicet secundum intellectum divinam similitudinem participat. Et ideo quantum intellectus in sua puritate consideratus differt a composito ex anima et corpore, tantum distat operatio speculativa ab operatione quae fit secundum virtutem moralem, quae proprie est circa humana. Sicut ergo intellectus per comparationem ad hominem est quiddam divinum, ita et vita speculativa, quae est secundum intellectum, comparatur ad vitam moralem sicut divina ad humanam. 2106. For this reason, in explaining his statement, he adds that man living in this manner, occupied in contemplation, does not live as man, composed of diverse elements, but as something divine is present in him, partaking in a likeness to the divine intellect. And, on that account, as the intellect considered in its purity differs from a composite of soul and body, so the contemplative activity differs from the activity following moral virtue, which is properly concerned with human affairs. Therefore, just as the intellect compared to man is something divine, so the contemplative life, which is based upon the intellect, is compared to the life of moral virtue as divine to human life. 2107. Deinde cum dicit: oportet autem et cetera, excludit quorumdam errorem qui suadebant quod homo debeat intendere ad sapiendum humana et mortalis ad sapiendum mortalia. Et fuit hoc dictum Simonidis poetae, ut patet in principio Metaphysicae. Quod quidem Philosophus dicit esse falsum, quia homo debet tendere ad immortalitatem quantum potest et secundum totum posse suum facere ad hoc quod vivat secundum intellectum, qui est optimum eorum quae sunt in homine, qui quidem est immortalis et divinus. Quamvis enim hoc optimum sit parvum mole, quia est incorporeum et simplicissimum et per consequens caret magnitudine molis, tamen quantitate virtutis et pretiositatis multum excedit omnia quae in homine sunt; 2107. Next, at nor ought we (1177b31), he rejects the error of some philosophers who advised man that he must strive to know the things of man, and mortals the things of mortals. This was the advice of the poet Simonides, as appears in the beginning of the Metaphysics. But the Philosopher calls it false, since we must strive to attain immortality so far as possible and exert all our power to live according to reason—the best of all the elements in man, who is truly divine and immortal. For, though this best element is a small part, being incorporeal and most simple, and consequently lacking greatness, it nevertheless surpasses everything human in the extent of its power and value. 2108. virtute quidem sive potentia excedit in suis operationibus quibus superioribus coniungitur et inferioribus principatur et sic quodammodo omnia complectitur, pretiositate autem quantum ad dignitatem suae naturae, quia intellectus est immaterialis et simplex, incorruptibilis et impassibilis. Unumquodque autem, id est totus homo videtur esse hoc, scilicet intellectus, si ita est, immo quia ita est, quod intellectus (est) principalius et melius quod sit in homine; 2108. It excels in power by its activities, which are akin to superior beings and have authority over inferior beings, and so, in a way, it embraces all things. Likewise, it excels in value as regards the excellence of its nature, since the intellect is immaterial and simple, incorruptible and incapable of suffering. Now each human being, meaning the whole man, seems to be the intellect if it is true—nay, rather because it is true—that the intellect is the principal and better part of man. 2109. dictum est enim supra in nono quod unumquodque potissime videtur esse id quod est principalius in eo, quia omnia alia sunt quasi instrumenta illius, et sic, dum homo vivit secundum operationem intellectus, vivit secundum vitam maxime sibi propriam; esset autem inconveniens si aliquis eligeret vivere non secundum vitam propriam sui ipsius, sed secundum vitam alicuius alterius, unde inconvenienter dicunt qui suadent quod homo non debeat vacare speculationi intellectus. Et cum hoc dictum sit prius in nono quod id quod est secundum intellectum est proprium homini, congruit etiam et nunc in proposito: illud enim quod est optimum secundum naturam in unoquoque est maxime proprium sibi; quod autem est optimum et proprium, consequens est quod sit delectabilissimum, quia unusquisque delectatur in bono sibi convenienti; sic igitur patet quod, si homo maxime est intellectus tamquam principalissimum in ipso, quod vita quae est secundum intellectum est delectabilissima homini et maxime sibi propria. 2109. We have stated in book 9 [1868, 1872] that each thing is thought to be especially that which constitutes its chief part, since all other parts are its tools, so to speak. And so, when man lives in accordance with the activity of the intellect, he lives in accordance with the life most proper to him; for it would be strange if a person were to choose to live not his own life, but the life of some other. Hence, they give unwise counsel who say that man should not engage in intellectual contemplation. And the statement made in book 9 [1807, 1847, 1869–72] that what accords with reason is proper to man is applicable also to our present purpose. For that which is best in each thing’s nature is most proper to it. But what is best and proper, consequently, is most delightful, because everyone delights in a good that is pleasing to him. So then, if man is especially his intellect, since this is the principal element in him, evidently life according to the intellect is most delightful and proper to him in the highest degree. 2110. Nec hoc est contra id quod supra dictum est quod non est secundum hominem, sed supra hominem; non est enim secundum hominem quantum ad naturam compositam, est autem propriissime secundum hominem quantum ad id quod est principalissimum in homine; quod quidem perfectissime invenitur in substantiis superioribus, in homine autem imperfecte et quasi participative et tamen istud parvum est maius omnibus aliis quae in homine sunt. Sic ergo patet quod iste qui vacat speculationi veritatis est maxime felix, quantum homo in hac vita felix esse potest. 2110. Nor is it contrary to our previous assertion [2106] that this is not on the human level, but above man. Indeed, it is not on the human level considering man’s composite nature, but it is most properly human considering what is principal in man—a thing found most perfectly in superior substances but imperfectly and by participation, as it were, in man. Nevertheless, this small part is greater than all the other parts in man. Thus, it is clear that the person who gives himself to the contemplation of truth is the happiest a man can be in this life. Lectio 12 Lecture 12 Happiness and the Moral Virtues Secundo autem qui secundum aliam virtutem. [2111] But life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is happy only in a secondary degree. [2111] Secundum ipsam enim operationes humanae. Iusta enim et fortia et alia quae secundum virtutes ad invicem agimus incommutationibus et necessitatibus et actionibus omnimodis et in passionibus quod decet unicuique conservantes; haec autem esse videntur omnia humana. Quaedam autem et accidere a corpore videntur et multum coappropriari passionibus moris virtus. Coniugata est autem et prudentia moris virtuti et haec prudentiae, si quidem prudentiae quidem principia secundum morales sunt virtutes, rectum autem moralium secundum prudentiam. Concopulatae autem hae et passionibus, circa compositum utique erunt. Compositi autem virtutes humanae, et vita utique quae secundum has et felicitas. Quae autem intellectus separata. Tantum enim de ipsa dictum est, certius dicere enim maius proposito est. [2112] Its activities are merely human, for we perform works of justice, fortitude, and the other virtues when we observe what is due to everyone in our mutual dealings, our services and various kinds of actions and passions. And all these are human experiences. Besides, some of these matters seem to pertain to the body, and moral virtue is thought to be ascribed especially to the passions. Prudence is also connected with moral virtue, and moral virtue with prudence, since the principles of prudence are taken from the moral virtues, and the rectitude of the moral virtues from prudence. And both, being connected with the passions, will belong to the nature of the composite. Now, the virtues of the composite are human, and so then are life and happiness following these virtues. The intellect, however, is something separate. We have then sufficiently treated this point, and a fuller explanation would be more than our purpose requires. [2112] Videbitur autem utique et exteriori largitione in parvum vel in minus indigere morali. Necessariis quidem enim ambobus opus ex aequali sit, etsi magis laborat circa corpus politicus et quaecumque talia; parvum utique quid differet. Ad operationes autem multum differt: liberali quidem enim opus erit pecuniis ad agere liberalia et iusto utique ad redditiones. Voluntates enim immanifestae; simulant enim et non iusti iuste agere velle. Forti autem potentia, si quidem perficit aliquid eorum quae secundum virtutem. Et temperato potestate; qualiter enim manifestus erit vel iste vel aliorum aliquis? Quaeritur autem quid utrum principalius virtutis, electio vel actiones, ut in ambabus existentis. Perfectum utique manifestum quod in ambabus utique erit. Ad actiones autem multis opus est, et quanto utique maiores sunt et meliores, pluribus. Speculanti autem nullo talium ad operationem necessitas, sed ut dicere et impedimenta sunt ad speculationem. Secundum quod autem homo est et pluribus convivit eligitque secundum virtutem agere, opus habebit igitur talibus ad humaniter conversari. [2117] But contemplative happiness seems to need little dispensing of external goods, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue. Both indeed need the necessities of life, and in an equal degree, even if the statesman is more troubled than the philosopher about the requirements of the body and the like. On this point, they differ little, but in their activities, there is a wide difference. For, the generous man needs the means to practice liberality, and the just man to make a return of services (since mere wishes are not evident and even the unjust pretend that they want to act justly). Likewise, the brave man will need strength if he performs any act in accordance with his virtue; and the temperate man will need opportunity. Otherwise, how can he or any other virtuous person be recognized? Further, it may be asked whether choice or action is more important in virtue, which appears to involve both; surely it is evident that perfection consists in both. Now, many things are required for action, and the more so the greater and nobler the deeds are; but for the activity of the contemplative man, nothing of the kind is needed. In fact, it can be said that external goods are obstacles to contemplation. But the contemplative person, insofar as he is man and lives with others, chooses to perform virtuous acts. Hence, he will need external goods to live a human life. [2117] Perfecta autem felicitas quoniam speculativa quaedam est operatio, et hinc utique apparebit. Deos enim maxime suspicati sumus beatos et felices esse, actiones autem quales attribuere debitum ipsis? Utrum iustas? Vel ridiculi apparebunt commutantes et depositiones dantes et quaecumque alia talia. Sed fortes, sustinentes terribilia et periclitantes quoniam bonum? Vel liberales? Cui autem dabunt? Inconveniens autem et si erit ipsis nummisma vel aliquid tale. Si autem temperati quidem utique, erit vel onerosa laus, quoniam non habent pravas concupiscentias. Per transeuntibus autem omnia, apparebunt utique quae circa actiones parva et indigna diis. Sed tamen et vivere omnes suspicati sunt ipsos, et operari ergo: non enim oportet dormire, quemadmodum Endimiona. Viventi utique ab agere ablato, adhuc autem magis a facere, quid relinquitur praeter speculationem? Quare Dei operatio, beatitudine differens, speculativa utique. Et humanarum utique quae huic cognatissima felicissima. [2121] That perfect happiness is a form of contemplative activity will be clear from what follows. Now, we suppose that the gods are supremely happy and blessed. But what kind of actions should we attribute to them? Just actions? The gods will appear rather ridiculous making contracts, returning deposits and so on. Brave actions in undergoing terrors and running risks because it is good to do so? Or liberal actions? But to whom will they give? Besides, it will be strange for them to have money and the like. If they are called temperate, the praise will be distasteful, since they do not have lustful desires. In fact, a thorough review shows all the circumstances of these actions trifling and unworthy of the gods. However, we commonly think of them as living and active, for we must not suppose that they are asleep like Endymion. If, then, we take away from a living being action, and production besides, what is left except contemplation? Therefore, the activity of God, which is transcendent in happiness, is contemplative; and that most akin to it among human activities is the greatest source of happiness. [2121] Signum autem et non participare reliqua animalia felicitate, tali operatione privata perfecte. Diis quidem enim omnis vita beata, hominibus autem in quantum similitudo quaedam talis operationis existit, aliorum autem animalium nullum felix est, quia nequaquam communicat speculatione. In quantum utique pertendit speculatio, et felicitas, et quibus magis existit speculari, et felices esse, non secundum accidens, sed secundum speculationem; haec enim secundum se ipsam honorabilis. Quare erit utique felicitas speculatio quaedam. [2124] This is further indicated by the fact that the other animals do not partake of happiness, for they are completely deprived of this activity. The life of the gods is completely happy; the same is true of man’s life insofar as it contains a likeness of contemplative activity. But none of the other animals possess happiness, because they do not share in contemplation. So, then, contemplation and happiness are coextensive; and the more deeply people contemplate, the happier they are, not by accident, but by reason of contemplation, which is itself admirable. Consequently, happiness consists principally in some form of contemplation. [2124] 2111. Secundo autem qui secundum aliam virtutem et cetera. Postquam Philosophus ostendit quod perfecta felicitas est et principalis secundum speculationem intellectus, hic inducit quamdam aliam secundariam felicitatem, quae consistit in operatione moralium virtutum. 2111. But life in accordance with the other kind. After he has shown that perfect happiness consists principally and primarily in intellectual contemplation, the Philosopher next introduces a kind of secondary happiness arising from the activity of the moral virtues. Et primo proponit quod intendit, dicens quod, cum ille qui vacat speculationi veritatis sit felicissimus, secundario est felix ille qui vivit secundum aliam virtutem, scilicet secundum prudentiam, quae dirigit omnes morales virtutes. Sicut enim felicitas speculativa attribuitur sapientiae, quae comprehendit in se alios habitus speculativos tamquam principalior existens, ita etiam felicitas activa, quae est secundum operationes moralium virtutum, attribuitur prudentiae, quae est perfectiva omnium moralium virtutum, ut in sexto ostensum est. First, he proposes his intention: although a man who engages in the contemplation of truth is happiest, another is happy in a secondary degree as he lives by the standard of a different virtue, prudence, which directs all the moral virtues. For just as happiness of contemplative living is attributed to wisdom, which, as the preeminent virtue, contains in itself other speculative habits, so too the happiness of active living, which is gauged by the activities of the moral virtues, is attributed to prudence perfecting all the moral virtues, as was pointed out in book 6 [1275–84]. 2112. Secundo ibi: secundum ipsam enim et cetera, ostendit propositum quatuor rationibus. 2112. Then, at its activities (1178a8), he proves his proposition by four reasons. Quarum prima est quia operationes quae sunt secundum alias virtutes activas sunt operationes humanae. Sunt enim circa res humanas. The first reason is that activities conforming to the other active virtues are human activities, since they concern human affairs. Primo quidem circa res exteriores, quae in usum hominis veniunt; opera enim iustitiae et fortitudinis et aliarum virtutum quae ad invicem agimus existunt in commutationibus, prout secundum iustitiam homines invicem sua bona commutant, existunt etiam in necessitatibus, prout scilicet unus homo alteri subvenit in sua necessitate, existunt etiam in quibuscumque actionibus et passionibus humanis, circa quas secundum virtutes morales conservatur id quod convenit unicuique; omnia autem praedicta videntur esse quaedam humana. In the first place, they deal with commonplace external matters in the life of man. For, the works of justice, fortitude, and the other virtues, which we do for one another, are manifest: in our dealings, as when men mutually exchange their goods in conformity with justice; in our services, as when one man succors another in need; and in all kinds of actions and passions where the moral virtues observe what is due to everyone. And all these are human experiences. 2113. Secundo autem quaedam ad virtutes pertinentia videntur pertinere ad corpus et ad animae passiones, quibus virtus moralis secundum quamdam affinitatem appropriatur; multae enim moralium virtutum sunt circa passiones, sicut ex praedictis patet. Sic igitur virtus moralis est circa humana bona in quantum est circa bona exteriora et circa bona corporis et circa animae passiones. 2113. In the second place, some matters of the virtues seem to pertain to the body and the passions of the soul, to which moral virtue is ascribed by a kind of affinity. For, many moral virtues deal with the passions, as is apparent from previous discussions [367]. So, then, moral virtue concerns human affairs inasmuch as it deals with external goods, bodily goods, and the passions of the soul. 2114. Morali autem virtuti coniungitur prudentia, intellectualis virtus existens, secundum quamdam affinitatem et e converso, quia principia prudentiae accipiuntur secundum virtutes morales quarum fines sunt principia prudentiae, rectitudo autem moralium virtutum accipitur secundum prudentiam, quae facit rectam electionem eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut patet ex his quae in sexto dicta sunt. Ea autem, scilicet virtus moralis et prudentia, simul copulantur cum passionibus, quia scilicet secundum utramque modificantur passiones; passiones autem sunt communes totius compositi ex anima et corpore, cum pertineant ad partem sensitivam; 2114. Prudence, considered as an intellectual virtue, is connected with moral virtue by a kind of affinity; the reverse of this is likewise true, because the principles of prudence are taken from the moral virtues, whose ends are the principles of prudence. Moreover, the rectitude of the moral virtues is taken from prudence, because prudence makes the right choice of means, as is evident from book 6 [1268–69]. Likewise, moral virtue and prudence are joined at the same time with the passions, because the passions are regulated by both. And, since the passions belong to the composite, they are common to the whole composite of soul and body. 2115. unde patet quod tam virtus moralis quam prudentia sunt circa compositum. Virtutes autem compositi proprie loquendo sunt humanae, in quantum homo est compositus ex anima et corpore, unde et vita quae secundum has, id est secundum prudentiam et virtutem moralem, est humana, quae dicitur vita activa, et per consequens felicitas quae in hac vita consistit est humana. Sed vita et felicitas speculativa quae est propria intellectus est separata et divina. 2115. It is obvious, then, that both moral virtue and prudence are concerned with the composite. Now, virtues of the composite, properly speaking, are human, inasmuch as man is composed of soul and body. Hence, life in accordance with these, with prudence and moral virtue, is also human (and is called the active life). Consequently, happiness consisting in this kind of life is human. But contemplative life and contemplative happiness, which are proper to the intellect, are separate and divine. 2116. Et tantum dicere ad praesens de ipsa sufficiat, quod autem magis per certitudinem explicetur est aliquid maius quam pertineat ad propositum; agitur enim de hoc in tertio De anima, ubi ostenditur quod intellectus est separatus. Sic igitur patet quod felicitas speculativa est potior quam activa, quanto aliquid separatum et divinum est potius quam id quod est compositum et humanum. 2116. It should suffice for the present to say this much on the matter, for a fuller explanation would be more than what belongs to our purpose. The question is treated in De anima 3, where it is shown that the intellect is separate. Therefore, it is evident that happiness of contemplative living is more excellent than happiness of active living, according as something separate and divine is more excellent than that which is composite and human. 2117. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: videbitur autem utique et cetera. Et dicit quod speculativa vita et felicitas videtur parum vel saltem minus quam moralis indigere quod homini largiantur exteriora bona. Verum est enim quod ambobus, id est tam speculativo quam morali, opus est habere necessaria vitae, puta cibum et potum et alia huiusmodi, quamvis circa corpus magis laboret activus quam speculativus, quia exteriores actiones per corpus aguntur; tamen quantum ad hoc non est magna differentia quin aequaliter necessariis uterque indigeat. Sed quantum ad operationes utriusque, magna est quantum ad hoc differentia, quia virtuosus multis indiget ad suas operationes, sicut patet quod liberali opus est pecuniis ad agendum liberaliter et similiter iustus indiget pecuniis ad hoc quod reddat illa quae debet. 2117. He continues with the second reason at but contemplative. Life and happiness based on contemplative virtue have little need—or less than those based on moral virtue—for external goods to be dispensed to man. For it is true that both the contemplative and the active forms of happiness must have the necessaries of life, like food, drink, and so on; although the statesman is more concerned about the body than is the philosopher, since external activities are performed by the body. Nevertheless, on this point, there is little difference; rather, each equally needs the necessities. But in the matter of activities, the difference between them is considerable, because the virtuous man requires much for his activities, as the generous man obviously needs the means to practice liberality, and likewise the just man needs money to pay what he owes.