Ideo et difficile est studiosum esse. In unoquoque enim medium accipere difficile, puta circuli medium non cuiuslibet, sed scientis; sic autem et irasci quidem cuiuslibet et facile, et dare argentum et consumere, cui autem et quantum et quando et cuius gratia et qualiter, non adhuc cuiuslibet neque facile, quod est bene et rarum et laudabile et bonum. [370] It is not easy to be virtuous, because in every case it is difficult to discover the mean. Thus, not every one can locate the center of a circle—it takes a person who knows. Likewise, it is easy for anyone to become angry, or to hand out money and waste it. But not everyone (for it is not easy) can give to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right purpose, in the right manner. All this pertains to virtuous giving, which is rare, praiseworthy, and good. [370] Propter quod oportet coniectantem medium, primum quidem recedere a magis contrario, quemadmodum et Calipso monebat hoc: Extra fumum quidem et undam custodi navem. Extremorum enim hoc quidem est peccatum magis, hoc autem minus. Quia igitur medium attingere summe difficile, secundum secundam aiunt navigationem minima sumendum malorum. Hoc autem erit maxime hoc modo quo dicimus. [371] For this reason, he who aims at the mean must first avoid the extreme that is more opposed to the mean. Circe used to give this warning: keep your ship beyond spray and rolling billow. One of the extremes, indeed, is a greater sin and the other a lesser sin. Therefore, since it is exceedingly difficult to reach the mean, we must choose the lesser of the evils, as they say in navigation. This will be done best in the way we are going to point out. [371] Intendere autem oportet et ad quae et ipsi facile mobiles sumus; alii enim ad alia apti nati sumus. Hoc autem erit notum ex delectatione et tristitia facta circa nos. In contrarium autem nos ipsos attrahere oportet. Multum enim abducentes a peccato in medium veniemus. Quad tortuosa lignorum dirigentes faciunt. [374] We must take into account the things to which we are easily inclined. Some of us are more prone by nature to one thing than another. Our natural inclination will be made known from the pleasure or sorrow we experience. We must, then, draw ourselves to the opposite, for by leading ourselves far away from sin, we shall arrive at the mean. A similar thing is done by nurserymen who straighten crooked saplings. [374] In omni autem maxime observandum delectabile et delectationem. Non enim non accipientes judicamus eam. Quod igitur plebis senes patiebantur ad Helenam, hoc oportet pati et nos ad delectationem, et in omnibus illorum dicere vocem. Sic igitur abicientes ipsam minus peccabimus. Haec igitur facientes, ut in capitulo dicamus, maxime poterimus medium adipisci. [377] Everyone ought to be on guard especially against the pleasurable thing and pleasure, for we cannot judge them without being unduly influenced by them. What the elders of the people felt toward Helen we ought to feel toward pleasure, and in all that concerns pleasure, repeat their words. Rejecting pleasure in this way, we will fall into sin less frequently. Those who do as we have suggested under this heading will be quite able to acquire the mean. [377] Difficile autem forsitan hoc et maxime in singularibus. Non enim facile determinare qualiter et quibus et in qualibus et quantum tempus determinandum. Et enim nos quandoque quidem deficientes laudamus et mansuetos dicimus, quandoque autem gravantes viriles vocamus. [379] This is perhaps difficult in individual cases. It is not easy to determine in what manner we should be angry, in regard to what persons we should be angry, in what type of things we should be angry, and for how long a time we should be angry. Sometimes we praise those who are deficient in becoming angry and call them meek; sometimes we praise the irascible and call them manly. [379] Sed qui quidem parum a bene transgreditur non vituperatur neque ad maius neque ad minus, sed qui plus; iste enim non latet. [380] One who deviates a little from what is virtuous is not censured, whether it be in excess or in defect. But one who deviates much is blameworthy, for his deviation is not hidden. [380] Hic autem usque quo et in quantum vituperabilis, non facile sermone determinare, neque enim aliud aliquid sensibilium. Talia autem in singularibus et in sensu iudicium. Hoc quidem igitur tantum ostendit quoniam medius habitus in omnibus laudabilis, declinare autem oportet quandoque quidem ad superabundantiam, quandoque autem ad defectum, sic enim facile medium et quod bene adipiscemur. [381] It cannot easily be determined, in so many words, at what point and how much a person is censurable. Neither is any other thing perceived by the senses determined in this way, for these are particular things and judgment of them is in the sensitive part of the soul. This much, then, shows that the mean habit is praiseworthy in all instances. However, sometimes we must incline toward excess and sometimes toward defect. Thus, we shall easily reach the mean and what is virtuous. [381] 369. Quoniam quidem igitur etc. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtute quid sit, hic ostendit quomodo aliquis possit virtutem acquirere, quia, sicut supra dictum est, finis huius doctrinae non est cognitio veritatis, sed ut boni efficiamur. 369. A sufficient explanation has been given. After the Philosopher has treated the nature of virtue, he shows here how a person can acquire virtue. He does this because, as was indicated before [351], the purpose of this teaching is not that men may know the truth. but that they may become good. Circa hoc autem duo facit: On this point, he does two things. primo ostendit quod difficile est hominem fieri virtuosum; First, he shows that it is difficult for man to become virtuous. secundo ostendit qualiter ad hoc possit perveniri, ibi: propter quod oportet coniectantem medium etc. Second, he shows how man may attain this, at for this reason he who aims (1109a30; [371]). Circa primum duo facit. The first notion calls for a twofold procedure. Primo resumit ea quae dicta sunt. Et dicit quod sufficienter supra dictum est quod virtus moralis est medietas et qualiter sit medietas, quia scilicet non secundum rem, sed quoad nos, et quorum sit medietas, quia scilicet est medietas duarum malitiarum quarum una se habet secundum superabundantiam, alia vero secundum defectum; dictum est etiam quare virtus sit medietas, quia scilicet est coniectatrix medii, inquirendo scilicet et eligendo medium tam in passionibus quam in actionibus. First, he reviews what has been said. It has been sufficiently explained before [310, 316], he states, that moral virtue is a mean, how it is a mean (not objectively but relative to us), and between what things it is the mean—namely, between two vices, one by excess, the other by defect. It has also been explained [317–18] why virtue is a middle course, namely, because it aims at the mean; virtue searches out and chooses the mean both in the passions and in actions. 370. Secundo ibi: ideo et difficile est etc., concludit ex praeostensis quod difficile est esse studiosum, id est virtuosum. Quia in omnibus hoc videmus quod accipere medium est difficile, declinare autem a medio est facile, sicut accipere medium in circulo non est cuiuslibet, sed scientis, scilicet geometrae, declinare autem a centro quilibet potest; ita etiam irasci qualitercumque quilibet potest et de facili, et similiter dare pecuniam et consumere eam, sed quod aliquis det cui oportet dare et quantum oportet et quando oportet et cuius gratia oportet et qualiter oportet, per quod intelligitur bene dare, non est cuiuslibet nec est facile, sed propter suam difficultatem est rarum et est laudabile et virtuosum, in quantum est secundum rationem. 370. Second, at it is not easy (1109a24), he concludes from the premises that it is difficult to be studious or virtuous, because we see that, in every case, it is difficult to discover the mean, but easy to deviate from the mean. Thus, not everyone—only one who knows, like a geometrician—can find the center of a circle. On the other hand, anyone can easily deviate from the center. Likewise, anyone can hand out money and waste it. But not everyone (for it is not easy) can give to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right purpose, in the right manner—all of which belongs to virtuous giving. Indeed, because of the difficulty, it is a rare and difficult thing, but praiseworthy and virtuous precisely as conforming to reason. 371. Deinde cum dicit: propter quod oportet etc., ostendit modos quibus aliquis potest pertingere ad hoc quod fiat virtuosus. Et circa hoc duo facit: 371. Then, at for this reason (1109a30), he shows the ways in which a person may become virtuous. On this point, he does two things. primo docet qualiter aliquis possit ad medium inventum pervenire; First, he shows how a person can discover the mean. secundo agit de ipsa inventione medii, ibi: difficile autem forsitan etc. Second, he treats the discovery of the mean, at this is perhaps difficult (1109b14; [379]). Circa primum ponit tria documenta. In regard to the first, he gives three admonitions. Quorum primum sumitur ex ipsa natura rei. Et dicit quod, quia fieri virtuosum et accipere medium est difficile, propter hoc oportet eum qui coniectat medium, qui scilicet intendit ad medium pervenire, principaliter ad hoc intendere ut recedat ab extremo quod magis contrariatur virtuti. Sicut si aliquis vult pervenire ad medium fortitudinis, debet principale studium adhibere ad hoc quod recedat a timiditate, quae magis opponitur fortitudini quam audacia, ut dictum est. One of these is taken from the nature of the thing. He states that it is difficult to become virtuous and to discover the mean. Therefore, one who aims at the mean (namely, he who intends to attain the mean) must strive principally to avoid the extreme more opposed to the virtue. Thus, if someone wishes to arrive at the mean of fortitude, he ought to direct his principal efforts to avoiding cowardice, which is more opposed to fortitude than rashness is, as has been explained [365]. 372. Et ponit exemplum cuiusdam nautae vel poetae qui admonebat navigantes ut principaliter caverent maxima maris pericula quae sunt undae subvertentes navem et fumositates nebularum impedientes aspectum nautarum; et hoc est quod dicit: extra fumum et undam custodi navem, quasi dicat: ita navem custodias ut sic praetereas fumositates et undas. 372. He gives an example of a certain Circe, who used to warn sailors to beware chiefly of the greatest dangers from the sea, which are waves sinking the ship and mist obscuring the vision of the sailors—keep your ship beyond spray and rolling billow—as if to say, so guard your ship that you may escape spray and waves. 373. Et rationem praedicti documenti assignat dicens quod unum extremorum vitiorum, illud scilicet quod est magis contrarium virtuti, est maius peccatum, illud autem extremum quod est virtuti similius est minus peccatum. Et ideo, quia valde difficile est contingere medium virtutis, ideo debet homo niti ut saltem maiora pericula vitet, quae scilicet sunt magis virtuti contraria, sicut navigantes dicunt quod post primam navigationem in qua homo nihil periculi sustinet, secunda navigatio est ut homo sumat minima periculorum. Et simile accidit circa vitam humanam eo modo quo dictum est, ut scilicet homo principaliter vitet vitia quae maxime contrariantur virtuti. 373. He gives the reason for this admonition, saying that one of the extremes—that which is more opposed to the virtue—is a greater sin, but that the extreme that is less opposed to the virtue is a lesser sin. Therefore, since it is exceedingly difficult to reach the mean of virtue, a man ought to try to avoid at least the greater dangers that are more opposed to virtue. Thus, sailors say that, after the best voyage on which a man is exposed to no dangers, the next best is to choose the least of the dangers. A similar thing happens to a man’s life in the way that was explained [371], that he may chiefly avoid the vices that are opposed to virtue. 374. Secundum documentum ponit ibi: intendere autem oportet etc. Et sumitur ex parte nostra, quantum scilicet ad ea quae sunt propria unicuique. Et dicit quod oportet eum qui vult fieri virtuosus attendere quid sit illud ad quod magis appetitus eius natus est moveri; diversi enim ad diversa naturaliter magis inclinantur. Ad quid autem naturaliter unusquisque inclinetur, cognoscere potest ex delectatione et tristitia quae circa ipsum fit, quia unicuique est delectabile id quod est sibi conveniens secundum naturam, 374. He gives the second admonition at we must take into account (1109b1). It is taken from our part, as far as concerns the things proper to each of us. One who wishes to be virtuous, he says, must take into account that to which his appetite is naturally inclined. Different people are more inclined by nature to one thing than another. Each one can know what he is naturally inclined to from the pleasure and sorrow he experiences, because what is agreeable to each according to his nature is pleasurable. 375. unde si aliquis in aliqua actione vel passione multum delectetur, signum est quod naturaliter inclinetur in illud. Homines autem vehementer tendunt ad ea ad quae naturaliter inclinantur et ideo de facili circa hoc homo transcendit medium, et propter hoc oportet quod in contrarium nos attrahamus quantum possumus, quia quando damus studium ad hoc quod multum recedamus a peccato ad quod proni sumus, sic tandem vix perveniemus ad medium. Et ponit similitudinem de illis qui dirigunt ligna distorta, qui, dum volunt ea dirigere, torquent in aliam partem et sic tandem reducuntur ad medium. 375. Hence, if someone takes pleasure in a particular action or passion, this is a sign that he is naturally inclined to it. But men vehemently tend to the things to which they are naturally inclined, and so easily exceed the mean in this matter. We therefore must draw ourselves as much as possible to the opposite. The reason is that, when we make an effort to recede from sin, to which we are prone, we will finally with difficulty arrive at the mean. He makes a comparison with nurserymen who straighten crooked saplings. These men, wishing to make trees straight, force them the opposite way and so bring them to the middle. 376. Et est considerandum quod haec via acquirendi virtutes est efficacissima, ut scilicet homo nitatur ad contrarium eius ad quod inclinatur vel ex natura vel ex consuetudine; via tamen quam Stoici posuerunt est facilior, ut scilicet homo paulatim recedat ab his in quae inclinatur, ut Tullius narrat in libro De Tusculanis quaestionibus. Via etiam quam hic Aristoteles ponit competit his qui vehementer desiderant recedere a vitiis et ad virtutem pervenire; sed via Stoicorum magis competit his qui habent debilem et tepidam voluntatem. 376. Here we must consider that this way of acquiring virtues is most effective: a man should strive for the opposite of that to which he is inclined either by nature or habit. However, the way advocated by the Stoics is easier: a man should little by little withdraw from those things to which he is inclined, as Cicero relates in his work Questiones Tusculanae. The way that Aristotle lays down is suitable for those who strongly desire to withdraw from vice and to attain virtue. But the way of the Stoics is more appropriate to those who have weak and halfhearted wills. 377. Tertium modum ponit ibi: in omni autem maxime etc. Et hoc etiam documentum sumitur ex parte nostra, non quidem secundum id quod est proprium unicuique, ut dictum est de secundo documento, sed secundum id quod est commune omnibus. Omnes enim naturaliter inclinantur ad delectationes, et ideo dicit quod universaliter maxime debent tendentes in virtutem cavere sibi a delectabilibus et delectationibus. Propter hoc enim quod homo maxime inclinatur in delectationem, delectabilia apprehensa de facili movent appetitum, et ideo dicit quod non de facili possumus diiudicare delectationem, immorando scilicet circa considerationem eius, quin appetitus accipiat eam, prosiliendo scilicet in concupiscentiam eius. Et ideo illud quod seniores plebis Troianae patiebantur ad Helenam, iudicantes scilicet eam esse abiciendam, hoc oportet nos pati ad delectationem, et in omnibus respectu delectationis dicere vocem illorum, ut scilicet abiiciamus a nobis corporales delectationes. Et sic abiicientes delectationem minus peccabimus, quia concupiscentia delectationum ducit homines in plurima peccata. 377. He lays down the third admonition at everyone ought to be (1109b7). This is also understood to be on our part, not in the sense that it is proper to every individual, as has been said [374–6] of the second admonition, but precisely as it is common to all. All are naturally inclined to pleasure. Therefore, he says that everyone without exception who aims at virtue ought to be on his guard especially against pleasures. Because men are very inclined to pleasure, pleasurable objects apprehended easily move their appetite. Hence, he notes that we cannot easily judge pleasure by dwelling on its consideration without the appetite accepting it and bursting forth in desire for it. What the Trojan elders felt toward Helen when they decided that she must depart we ought to feel toward pleasure; in all that concerns pleasure we ought to echo their words in order that we may reject bodily pleasures. Rejecting pleasures in this way, we will fall into sin less frequently, since the desire of pleasure leads men to many sins. 378. Concludit ergo quod facientes ea quae in capitulo, id est summarie, dicta sunt, maxime poterunt adipisci medium virtutis. 378. He concludes, then, that those who do what has been suggested under this heading—that is, summarily—will be quite able to acquire the mean of virtue. 379. Deinde cum dicit: difficile autem forsitan etc., ostendit qualiter sit determinandum medium virtutis. Et circa hoc tria facit: 379. Then, at this is perhaps difficult (1109b14), he shows how the mean of virtue must be determined. On this point, he does three things. primo ostendit huius difficultatem; First, he indicates the difficulty of this. secundo ostendit quid sufficiat ad medii determinationem, ibi: sed qui quidem parum etc.; Second, he shows what suffices to determine the mean, at one who deviates a little (1109b18; [380]). tertio respondet tacitae quaestioni, ibi: hic autem usque quo etc. Third, he answers a latent question, at it cannot easily be determined (1109b20; [381]). Dicit ergo primo quod hoc, scilicet invenire medium, est difficile et maxime considerando singulas circumstantias in singularibus operabilium. Quia non est facile determinare qualiter aliquid sit faciendum et respectu quorum et in qualibus rebus et quantum tempus sit determinandum. Et huius difficultatis signum ostendit, quia illos qui deficiunt, puta in irascendo, quandoque laudamus et dicimus mansuetos, et quandoque laudamus illos qui magis aggravant puniendo vel resistendo, et vocamus eos viriles. He says first that it is difficult to discover the mean especially when we consider the particular circumstances in individual actions. The reason is that it is not easy to determine how a thing is to be done and in regard to what persons, and in what type of things, and how long a time one should be angry. He gives a sign of this difficulty: those who are deficient in getting angry, for instance, are sometimes praised by us and called meek, while those who are rather irascible in inflicting punishment or making resistance are sometimes praised by us and called manly. 380. Deinde cum dicit: sed qui quidem etc., ostendit quid sufficiat ad medium virtutis. Et dicit quod ille qui parum transgreditur ab eo quod bene fit secundum medium virtutis non vituperatur, neque si declinet ad maius neque si declinet ad minus, quia modicus recessus a medio virtutis latet, propter difficultatem medii, sed ille qui multum recedit vituperatur, quia non latet. 380. Then, at one who (1109b18), he indicates what suffices for the mean of virtue. He says that one who deviates a little from what is done well according to virtue is not censured, whether he inclines to excess or defect. The reason is that a slight departure from the mean of virtue is hidden on account of the difficulty with the mean. But one who deviates greatly is censured because the deviation is not hidden. 381. Deinde cum dicit: hic autem usque quo etc., respondet cuidam tacitae quaestioni. Posset enim aliquis quaerere quantus recessus a medio vituperatur et quantus non. Sed ipse respondens dicit quod non potest de facili determinari aliquo sermone usque ad quantum terminum et quantum aliquis recedens a medio vituperetur, sicut nec aliquid aliud sensibilium, quae magis sensu discernuntur quam ratione determinari possunt. Huiusmodi autem quae ad operationes virtutum pertinent in singularibus consistunt et propter hoc eorum iudicium consistit in sensu, etsi non in exteriori, saltem in interiori, per quem aliquis bene aestimat de singularibus, ad quem pertinet iudicium prudentiae, ut infra dicetur in VI. Sed hoc tantum hic sufficit ut ostendatur quod medius habitus in omnibus est laudabilis, sed quandoque oportet declinare ad superabundantiam, quandoque autem ad defectum, vel propter ipsam naturam virtutis vel propter inclinationem nostram, ut ex supra dictis patet, et per hunc modum facile adipiscemur medium secundum quod aliquid bene fit. Et in hoc terminatur secundus liber. 381. Then, at it cannot easily (1109b20), he answers a latent question. Someone could ask how much departure from the mean should be censured and how much should not. He himself answers that it cannot easily be determined, in so many words, at what point and how much a person departing from the mean should be blamed. Likewise, no other sensible thing, which is judged rather by sense than by reason, can easily be determined. Things of this kind, belonging to the operations of the virtues, are individual cases. For this reason, judgment about them exists in the sensitive part of the soul—even if not in the external, at least in the internal sense, by which a person judges well about singulars and to which belongs the judgment of prudence, as will be said in book 6 [1215, 1249]. But this much suffices here to show that the mean habit in all cases is rather praiseworthy. However, we must sometimes incline toward excess and sometimes toward defect, either on account of the nature of virtue or on account of our inclination, as is clear from what was explained above [369–78]. Thus, the mean according to which a thing is done well will be easily discovered. So ends book 2. Liber 3 Book 3 The Voluntary, Fortitude, and Temperance Lectio 1 Lecture 1