494. Tertio ibi: studiosus enim etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo quantum ad virtuosos. Et dicit quod virtuosus singula quae pertinent ad operationes humanas recte diiudicat et in singulis videtur ei esse bonum id quod vere est bonum. Et hoc ideo quia unicuique habitui videntur bona et delectabilia ea quae sunt ei propria, id est ea quae ei conveniunt; habitui autem virtutis conveniunt ea quae sunt secundum veritatem bona, quia habitus virtutis moralis definitur ex hoc quod est secundum rationem rectam; et ideo ea quae sunt secundum rationem, quae sunt simpliciter bona, videntur ei bona. Et in hoc plurimum differt studiosus ab aliis quod in singulis operabilibus videt quid vere sit bonum, quasi existens regula et mensura omnium operabilium, quia scilicet in eis iudicandum est aliquid bonum vel malum secundum quod ei videtur. 494. Third, at the virtuous person (1113a29), he explains what he said, first as it affects virtuous men. He says that the virtuous person correctly passes judgment on individual things that pertain to human activity. In each case, what is really good seems to him to be good. This happens because the things that seem naturally pleasurable to each habit are those that are proper to it, those that agree with it. Those things are agreeable to the habit of virtue that are in fact good, because the habit of moral virtue is defined by what is in accord with right reason. Thus, the things in accord with right reason—things of themselves good—seem good to it. Here the good man differs very much indeed from others, for he sees what is truly good in individual practicable matters, being as it were the norm and measure of all that is to be done, for in these cases, a thing must be judged good or bad according as it seems to him. 495. Secundo ibi: multis autem etc., manifestat quod dixerat quantum ad pravos. Et dicit quod multis, scilicet pravis, deceptio in discretione boni et mali accidit praecipue propter delectationem. Ex qua contingit quod delectabile, quod non est bonum, desiderent tamquam bonum, et aliquid tristabile ipsis, quod in se est bonum, fugiant tamquam malum, quia scilicet non sequuntur rationem, sed appetitum sensitivum. 495. Next, at many men (1113a33), he explains what he said as it affects vicious men. He says that, for many, the vicious, deception in the distinction between good and evil occurs especially because of pleasure. As a consequence of this, it happens that they desire as good the pleasurable, which is not good, and seek to avoid as evil what is for them painful but in itself good. The explanation is that they do not follow reason but the senses. Lectio 11 Lecture 11 Virtue and Vice Are Within Our Power Existente utique voluntabili quidem finis, consiliabilibus autem et eligibilibus eorum quae ad finem, quae circa haec operationes secundum electionem erunt utique et voluntariae. Virtutum autem operationes circa haec. In nobis autem et virtus. [496] Since willing regards the end, but counsel and choice the means to the end, the actions concerning these means will be in accordance with choice and voluntary. But virtuous actions deal with the means. Virtue, then, is within our power. [496] Similiter autem et malitia. In quibus enim in nobis operari, et non operari; et in quibus non, et etiam. Quare si operari bonum existens in nobis est, et non operari in nobis erit malum existens; et si non operari bonum existens in nobis, et operari malum existens in nobis. [497] For a similar reason, vice is voluntary. If it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act, and contrariwise. Therefore, if to do good is in our power, then not to do evil will also be in our power. If not to do good is in our power, then to do evil will also be in our power. [497] Si autem in nobis bona operari et mala, similiter autem et non operari, hoc autem erat bonos et malos esse, in nobis erit decentes et pravos esse. [499] If it is in our power to do and likewise not to do good or evil actions (by reason of this, men become good or evil), it will be within our power to be virtuous or vicious. [499] Dicere autem quod nullus volens malus neque nolens beatus, assimulatur hoc quidem mendaci, hoc autem veraci; beatus quidem enim nullus nolens, malitia autem voluntarium. [500] It is said that no one is voluntarily evil and that no one is unwillingly happy. The first statement is really false, and the second true. In fact, no person will be happy unwillingly. Vice, on the other hand, is a voluntary thing. [500] Vel in nunc dictis dubitandum, et hominem non dicendum principium esse neque genitorem operationum, quemadmodum et natorum? [501] Must we dispute even about what has now been said and hold that man is not the principle and begetter of his actions just as he is father of his children? [501] Si autem haec videntur et non habemus in alia principia reducere praeter ea quae in nobis, quorum et principia in nobis, et haec in nobis et voluntaria. [502] If these things (counsel, choice, and willing) seem to be principles of our actions and we cannot reduce them into principles other than those within our power, then also our actions, the principles of which are under our control, will themselves be in our power and voluntary. [502] His autem videntur testificari et propria quae a singulis. Et ab ipsis legislatoribus: puniunt enim et cruciant operantes mala, quotquot non vi aut propter ignorantiam cuius non ipsi causa, bona autem operantes honorant, velut hos quidem provocantes, hos autem prohibentes. Quamvis ad ea quae neque in nobis sunt neque voluntaria, nullus provocat operari, ut nihil ante opus existens suadere, puta non calefieri vel dolere vel esurire vel aliud quodcumque talium, nihil enim minus patiemur haec. [503] This view seems to be supported by the testimony of private individuals and of legislators themselves, for legislators punish and chastise evildoers, unless these do evil by compulsion or on account of an ignorance of which they themselves were not the cause. Likewise, legislators decree honors for those who do good, thus encouraging them, as it were, but restraining the others. No one persuades a man to do whatever things are not in his power and not voluntary, for before it takes place, it is of no use to persuade a man not to become hot, or afflicted, or hungry, or anything whatsoever of this kind. We will suffer these things nonetheless. [503] Et enim in ipso ignorare puniunt, si causa videatur esse ignorantiae. Puta ebriis duplices increpationes; principium enim in ipso, dominus enim est eius quod non inebriari, hoc autem ignorantiae causa. Et ignorantes aliquid eorum quae in legibus quae oportet scire et non difficilia sunt, puniunt. Similiter autem et in aliis quaecumque propter negligentiam ignorare videntur, ut in ipsis existente non ignorare, eius enim quod est diligentes esse domini. [505] A man who is ignorant will be punished if he is the cause of his ignorance. A drunken man, for instance, is worthy of double punishment. The beginning is within him because he has it in his power not to get drunk. And his intoxication is the cause of his ignorance. Legislators punish those who are ignorant of things stated in the law that they should have known, but not those who are ignorant of the difficult things. Likewise, in other cases, we punish people whenever it seems that their ignorance was due to negligence, because it is in their power not to be ignorant. They have it in their power to inform themselves. [505] 496. Existente utique etc. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de voluntario, electione et consilio et voluntate quae sunt principia humanorum actuum, hic applicat ea quae dicta sunt ad vitia et virtutes. 496. Since willing regards the end. After the Philosopher has treated the voluntary, choice, counsel, and willing, which are principles of human acts, he here applies what has been said to vices and virtues. Et circa hoc tria facit: Concerning this question, he does three things. primo determinat veritatem; First, he determines the truth; secundo excludit errorem, ibi: dicere autem quod nullus volens etc.; second, at it is said that no one (1113b14; [500]), he rejects an error; tertio epilogat quae dicta sunt de virtutibus, ibi: communiter quidem igitur etc. third, at we have discussed virtues (1114b26; [526]), he concludes with a summary of what has been said about virtue. Circa primum tria facit: On the first point, he does three things. primo secundum ea quae dicta sunt ostendit virtutem esse in nobis, id est in potestate nostra; First, on the basis of his previous discussion, he shows that virtue is within us, that is, in our power. secundo ostendit idem de malitia, ibi: similiter autem etc.; Second, at for a similar reason (1113b6; [497]), he shows the same about vice. tertio ostendit consequentiae rationem, ibi: si autem in nobis etc. Third, at if it is in our power (1113b11; [499]), he shows the reason for this necessary consequence. Dicit ergo primo quod, cum voluntas sit de fine, consilium autem et electio de his quae sunt ad finem, consequens est quod operationes quae sunt circa haec, scilicet circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sint secundum electionem et per consequens quod sint voluntariae, quia electio voluntarium quoddam est, ut supra dictum est. Sed operationes virtutum sunt circa praedicta. Ergo sunt voluntariae. Et per consequens oportet quod etiam ipsa virtus sit voluntaria et in nobis, id est in potestate nostra existens. He says first that, since willing regards the end, but counsel and choice the means to the end, it follows that actions concerning this (namely, the means to the end) are in accordance with choice and are consequently voluntary. The reason is that choice is a voluntary thing, as was indicated before [434–6, 457]. But virtuous actions deal with the aforementioned means and are voluntary. Consequently, virtue itself must be voluntary and within us, that is, in our power. 497. Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem etc., ostendit idem de malitia, id est de vitio virtuti opposito. Et dicit quod simili ratione etiam malitia est voluntaria et in nobis existens, quia operationes eius sunt tales. Et hoc sic probat, quia, si operari est in potestate nostra, oportet etiam quod non operari sit in potestate nostra, si enim non operari non esset in potestate nostra, impossibile esset nos non operari, ergo necesse esset nos operari et sic operari non esset ex nobis, sed ex necessitate; 497. Then, at for a similar reason (1113b6), he shows the same thing about badness, that is, about vice as opposed to virtue. He says that badness is likewise voluntary and within us because its operations are of this kind. He proves this in the following way: if the capacity to act is within us, then the capacity not to act must also be in our power. If the capacity not to act were not in our power, it would be impossible that we would not act. Therefore, it would be necessary that we act, and so the capacity to act would not come from, us but from necessity. 498. et similiter dicit quod in quibus rebus non operari est in potestate nostra, consequens est quod etiam operari sit in potestate nostra, si enim operari non esset in potestate nostra, impossibile esset nos operari, ergo necesse esset nos non operari et sic non operari non esset ex nobis, sed ex necessitate; sic ergo dicendum est quod in quibuscumque rebus affirmatio est in nobis, et negatio, et e converso. Operationes autem virtutum et vitiorum differunt secundum affirmationem et negationem, puta, si honorare parentes est bonum et actus virtutis, non honorare parentes est malum et ad vitium pertinens; et si non furari pertinet ad virtutem, furari pertinet ad vitium. Unde consequens est quod, si operatio virtutum est in nobis, ut probatum est, quod etiam operatio vitii sit in nobis. Et ita per consequens ipsum vitium erit in nobis, id est in potestate nostra. 498. Similiarly, it should be said that, whenever we have the power not to act, then we also have the power to act. For, if action were not in our power, then it would be impossible for us to act. Therefore, we would necessarily not act, and thus the inaction would not be from us, but from necessity. As a consequence, we must conclude that, wherever affirmation is within our power, negation is also (and conversely). Virtuous and vicious actions differ according to affirmation and negation. For instance, if honoring one’s parents is good and an act of virtue, then not to honor one’s parents is evil and pertains to vice. If not to steal pertains to virtue, then to steal pertains to vice. Hence, it follows that, if the operation of virtue is within us, as has been proved [496], then the operation of vice also is within us. So consequently, vice itself is within us, that is, in our power. 499. Deinde cum dicit: si autem in nobis etc., assignat rationem praedictae consequentiae, scilicet quod, si operationes sint in nobis, quod et habitus sint in nobis. Et dicit quod, si in potestate nostra est operari vel non operari bona vel mala, ut nunc ostensum est, quum per hoc quod homo operatur vel non operatur bonum vel malum, fiat bonus vel malus, ut in II ostensum est, consequens est quod in potestate nostra sit esse decentes, id est bonos, secundum habitum virtutis, et pravos, secundum habitum vitii. 499. Next, at if it is (1113b11), he assigns the reason for this necessary inference: if the operations are within us, the habits are also within us. He says that, if it is in our power to do or not to do good or evil actions, as has now been shown [497–8], while man becomes good or evil by reason of the fact that he works or does not work good or evil, as was pointed out in the second book [250–3], then it follows that it is within our power to be virtuous—that is, good in conformity with the habit of virtue, and vicious in conformity with the habit of vice. 500. Deinde cum dicit: dicere autem quod nullus etc., excludit errorem circa praedicta. 500. At it is said (1113b14), he rejects an error about the aforementioned teaching. Et primo excludit ipsum errorem; First, he removes the error itself. secundo radices eius, ibi: sed forsitan talis etc. Second, at perhaps such a person (1114a3; [507]), he removes its roots. Circa primum tria facit: On the first point, his division is threefold. primo proponit erroris exclusionem; First, he explains his rejection of the error. secundo movet super hoc dubitationem, ibi: vel in nunc dictis etc.; Second, at must we dispute even about what (1113b17; [501]), he raises a doubt over this. tertio determinat veritatem, ibi: si autem haec videntur etc. Third, at if these things (1113b19; [502]), he determines the truth. Circa primum considerandum est quod quidam dixerunt quod nullus est malus volens neque aliquis est beatus vel bonus nolens; quod ideo dicebant quia voluntas per se tendit in bonum, nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt, et per consequens voluntas per se refugit malum. Dicit ergo quod unum horum verisimiliter apparet esse mendacium, scilicet quod nullus sit malus volens, quia malitia est quiddam voluntarium; alterum autem videtur esse verum, scilicet quod nullus sit beatus vel bonus nolens. In regard to the first, we must consider that some have held that no one is voluntarily evil, nor is anyone unwillingly happy or good. They say this because the will of itself tends to good. Good is what all desire, and consequently the will of itself seeks to avoid evil. He says, therefore, that one of these statements is in all likelihood false—that no one is willingly evil—since vice is something voluntary. The other seems to be true, that no one is unwillingly good and happy. 501. Deinde cum dicit: vel in nunc dictis etc., movet dubitationem circa praedicta. Si enim verum est quod actiones virtutum et vitiorum sint voluntariae et per consequens virtus et malitia, planum est verum esse quod nunc dictum est. Sed numquid est aliquis qui credat esse dubitandum de praedictis ita quod dicat hominem non esse principium suorum operum neque genitorem per modum quo pater est principium filiorum? Quasi dicat: "Mirum est si hoc aliquis dicat." 501. Then, at must we dispute (1113b17), he raises a doubt about things said before. If it is true that virtuous and vicious actions (and consequently virtue and vice) are voluntary, obviously what has presently been said is true. But is there anyone who believes there should be a doubt about what has been said, such that he might say that a man is not the principle and begetter of his actions, just as a father is the principle of his children? He as much as says, “that anyone would say this is to be wondered at.” 502. Deinde cum dicit: si autem haec videntur etc., confirmat veritatem. 502. Next, at if these things (1113b19; [502]), he confirms the truth. Et primo per rationem; First by reason.