Liber 5 Book 5 Justice Lectio 1 Lecture 1 Justice De iustitia autem et iniustitia intendendum et circa quales sunt existentes operationes. [885] We must give our attention to justice and injustice so as to determine what is the nature of the actions done, [885] Et qualis medietas est iustitia et iustum. [886] what is the mean of justice and the just, [886] Et quorum est medium. [886] and between what extremes the just action is a mean. [886] Intentio autem nobis sit secundum eandem methodum his quae praedicta sunt. [887] It is our intention to proceed according to the same method we used with the virtues just studied. [887] Videmus utique omnes talem habitum volentes dicere iustitiam a quo operativi iustorum sunt et a quo iusta operantur et volunt iusta. Eodem autem modo et de iniustitia a quo operativi iniustorum sunt et a quo iniusta faciunt et volunt iniusta. Propter quod et nobis primum ut in tipo supponantur haec. [888] We see everyone wants to call justice that habit by which men are disposed to just works, and by which they actually perform and will just deeds. We must speak in a similar way about injustice, namely, that it is a habit by which men are disposed to unjust deeds and by which they do and will unjust actions. For that reason, we must presuppose what is said here in outline. [888] Neque enim eundem habet modum et in scientiis et potentiis et in habitibus; potentia quidem enim et scientia videtur contrariorum eadem esse, habitus autem contrarius contrariorum non. Puta a sanitate non fiunt contraria, sed sana solum; dicimus enim sane ambulare quando ambulat ut utique sanus existens. [890] Likewise, the same is not true in regard to sciences and potencies as in regard to habits, for contraries belong to the same potency and the same science, but with a habit contrary things are not referred to it. We see, for example, that things contrary to health do not proceed from health, but only things in keeping with it. Thus, we say that a man walks in a healthy way when he walks like a healthy man. [890] Multotiens quidem igitur cognoscitur contrarius habitus a contrario, multotiens autem habitus a subiectis. Si enim euechia sit manifesta, et cathechia manifesta fit, et ex bene habentibus euechia et ex hac bene habentia. Si enim est euechia densitas carnis, necessarium et cathechiam esse raritatem carnis, et bene habens factivum densitatis in carne. [892] Oftentimes, then, one contrary habit is known by another, and oftentimes by its subject. If a healthy condition is known, then an unhealthy condition also becomes known. But, from the things that make a man healthy, a healthy condition is known, and the things themselves from the condition. If firmness of flesh is a sign of good condition, then flabbiness is necessarily a sign of bad condition. Likewise, what makes a man healthy necessarily makes his flesh firm. [892] Consequitur autem ut in multum, si alterum multipliciter dicitur, et reliquum multipliciter dici, puta si iustum, et iniustum. [893] It follows in most instances that, if one of opposites is spoken of in various ways, then the other also can be, as is the case with what is just and unjust. [893] Videtur autem multipliciter dici iustitia et iniustitia, sed propter propinquam esse aequivocationem ipsorum latet. Et non quemadmodum in his quae longe manifesta magis, differentia enim multa quae secundum ideam; puta quoniam vocatur clavis aequivoce et quae sub collum animalium et qua ostia claudunt. [894] Justice and injustice can be spoken of in various ways, but the different meanings lending themselves to equivocation are not immediately apparent and are not so evident as in the things that are widely separated. In these there is a great difference in concept, for instance, the name “key” is used equivocally both for the clavicle in the shoulder of animals and for the instrument that locks doors. [894] Sumatur autem iniustus quotiens dicitur. Videtur autem illegalis iniustus esse et avarus et inaequalis. Quare manifestum quoniam et iustus erit et legalis et aequalis. Iustum quidem igitur legale et aequale, iniustum autem illegale et inaequale. [895] The unjust man should be understood in as many ways as he is designated. He is spoken of as law-breaking, as covetous, and as unfair. It is clear, then, that the just man will be taken as law-abiding and fair. Hence, what is just is according to law and fair, but what is unjust is contrary to law and unfair. [895] Quia autem avarus iniustus, circa bona erit non omnia, sed circa quaecumque bona, fortuna et infortunium; quae sunt autem simpliciter semper bona, alicui autem non semper. Homines autem haec orant et persequuntur, oportet autem non, sed orare quidem bona simpliciter et ipsis bona esse, eligere autem quae sibi ipsis bona. [897] Since the unjust man is covetous, he will be concerned not about all goods, but about whatever pertains to fortune and misfortune. Goods of this kind are always good in themselves, but not always for a particular man. They are objects of his prayers and pursuits. This ought not to be so, but a man should pray that the things that are good in themselves become good for him, and should choose such as are good for him. [897] Iniustus autem non semper plus eligit, sed et minus in simpliciter malis. Sed quoniam videtur et minus malum bonum aliqualiter esse, boni autem est avaritia, propter hoc videtur avarus esse. Est autem inaequalis; hoc enim continet et commune. [898] But the unjust man does not always choose too much—rather, sometimes too little—of the things burdensome in themselves. However, because a lesser evil apparently is in some way a good, and covetousness is concerned with a good, therefore it seems that this type of man is covetous. But he is unfair—a term that contains both and is common. [898] Et illegalis. Haec enim illegalitas aut inaequalitas continet omnem iniustitiam et commune est omnis iniustitiae. [899] Besides, the unjust man is law-breaking, but this lawlessness or inequality contains all injustice and is common in respect of all kinds of injustice. [899] 885. De iustitia autem et iniustitia etc. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus, quae sunt circa passiones, hic determinat de virtute iustitiae, quae est circa operationes. 885. We must give our attention to justice. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the moral virtues dealing with the passions, he now begins to consider the virtue of justice dealing with actions. Et dividitur in partes duas: He divides the inquiry into two parts: in prima determinat de iustitia proprie dicta; in the first, he examines justice in the proper sense; in secunda determinat de iustitia metaphorica, ibi: utrum autem contingit sibi ipsi iniustum facere etc. in the second, at whether or not it is possible (1138a4; [1091]), in the metaphorical sense. Circa primum duo facit: He discusses the first point under two headings. primo determinat de virtute iustitiae; First, he investigates the virtue of justice; secundo determinat de quadam virtute, scilicet epiichia, quae est communis iustitiae directiva, ibi: de epiikia vero etc. second, at next we will treat equity (1137a31; [1078]), a certain virtue—namely, equity—that gives direction to ordinary justice. Circa primum duo facit: He handles the initial point in a twofold manner. primo dicit de quo est intentio; First, he indicates what he intends to treat; secundo exequitur propositum, ibi: videmus utique etc. second, at we see everyone wants to call justice (1129a6; [888]), he carries out his intention. Circa primum duo facit. He considers the first under two aspects. Primo dicit de quo intendat, quia de iustitia et iniustitia. First, he shows what subject he intends to consider, namely, justice and injustice. Et proponit tria circa iustitiam consideranda in quibus differt iustitia a supra dictis virtutibus. Concerning justice, he proposes for consideration three differences existing between justice and the previously mentioned virtues. 886. Quorum primum tangit cum dicit quod intendendum est circa quales operationes sint iustitia et iniustitia. Virtutes enim et vitia de quibus supra dictum est sunt circa passiones, quia scilicet in eis principaliter consideratur qualiter homo interius afficiatur secundum passiones, sed quid exterius operetur non consideratur nisi ex consequenti, in quantum scilicet operationes exteriores ex interioribus passionibus proveniunt. Sed circa iustitiam et iniustitiam praecipue attenditur quid homo exterius operatur, qualiter autem afficiatur interius non consideratur nisi ex consequenti, prout scilicet aliquis iuvatur vel impeditur circa operationem. 886. The first difference is touched upon when he says that we must aim at such operations as are done by justice and injustice. The virtues and vices discussed before [649–884] are concerned with the passions, for there, we consider in what way a man may be internally influenced by reason of the passions; but we do not consider what is externally done except as something secondary, inasmuch as external operations originate from internal passions. However, in treating justice and injustice, we direct our principal attention to what a man does externally; how he is influenced internally we consider only as a by-product, namely, according as he is helped or hindered in the operation. Secundum autem tangit cum dicit: et qualis medietas est iustitia et iustum, quod scilicet est obiectum iustitiae. In praehabitis enim virtutibus accipitur medium rationis et non rei, sed in iustitia accipitur medium rei, ut infra dicetur. The second difference is touched upon when he says what is the mean of justice and the just action (1129a4), that is, the object of justice. In the virtues previously treated, we took the mean of reason and not of the thing. But in justice, the mean of the thing is used, as will be determined later [932–77]. Tertium autem tangit cum dicit: et quorum est medium. Quaelibet enim supra dictarum virtutum est medium duorum vitiorum, iustitia autem non est medium duarum malitiarum, ut infra patebit. The third difference is touched upon when he says and between what extremes the just action is the mean (1129a5). Each of the aforementioned virtues is a mean between two vices, but justice is not a mean between two vices, as will be clear afterwards [993–4]. 887. Secundo ibi: intentio autem etc., ostendit secundum quem modum tractanda sunt praedicta. Et dicit quod intendendum est tractare de iustitia secundum eandem artem secundum quam tractatum est de praedictis virtutibus, scilicet figuraliter et aliis huiusmodi modis. 887. Second, at it is our intention (1129a5), he shows by what method we are to examine the differences just mentioned. He says that we intend to investigate justice in the same way as we investigated the virtues just discussed, that is, according to type and so on. 888. Deinde cum dicit: videmus utique etc., incipit determinare de iustitia. 888. Next, at we see that everyone (1129a6), he begins the investigation of justice. Et primo distinguit iustitiam particularem a iustitia legali; First, he distinguishes particular from legal justice.