Manifestissimum autem hoc in diis; plurimum enim isti omnibus bonis superexcellunt. Manifestum autem et in regibus; non enim his dignificant esse amici qui multum defectiores. Neque optimis vel sapientissimis qui nullo digni. [1634] This is evident in the case of the gods, because they greatly exceed men in good things; it is clear too of kings, for people in humbler walks of life are not likely to have royal friends; it is true also of the best and wisest men with whom individuals of no distinction do not become friends. [1634] Certa quidem igitur in talibus non est definitio usquequo amid; multis enim ablatis, adhuc manet, multum autem separati, puta a Deo, non adhuc. [1635] In such matters, then, it is not possible to determine exactly at what point men can be friends, for when many qualities are absent, friendship still remains. But if the persons are far removed from one another, like men from God, the friendship ceases. [1635] Unde et dubitatur ne forte non volunt amici amicis maxima bonorum, puta deos esse? Non enim adhuc amici erunt ipsis neque utique bona, amici enim bona. [1636] From this a doubt arises: perhaps men do not wish their friends the greatest goods, such that they become gods; for, then the friends will not benefit them. [1636] Si itaque bene dictum est quoniam amicus amico vult bona illius gratia, manere utique oportet qualiscumque est ille; homini autem enti volet maxima esse bona. Forte autem non prae omnibus; sibi ipsi enim maxime unusquisque vult bona. [1637-1638] If it was correctly stated that a man wishes good things to a friend for his sake, we must suppose that the friend remains much the same person as he is. One wishes the most excellent goods to his friend as he is a man, but perhaps not all goods, for everyone wishes good to himself most of all. [1637–38] 1624. Altera autem est amicitiae species et cetera. Postquam Philosophus distinxit amicitiae species quae in aequalitate consistunt, hic distinguit species amicitiae quae est inter inaequales personas. 1624. There is another kind of friendship. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship that consist in equality, he now distinguishes the kinds of friendship that exist between unequal persons. Et circa hoc duo facit: He treats two aspects of this subject. primo determinat ea quae in communi pertinent ad talium amicitiarum distinctionem; First, he determines the things pertaining in general to the distinction of such friendships. secundo determinat de distinctione harum amicitiarum secundum speciales earum rationes, ibi: videtur autem quemadmodum et cetera. Second, at as we noted at the outset (1159b25; [1657]), he treats the distinction of these friendships according to their particular natures. Circa primum duo facit: On the first point, he does two things. primo agit de amicitiis superexcedentis ad superexcessum, sicut patris ad filium, viri ad uxorem et huiusmodi; First, he discusses the friendships of a superior to a subordinate, as father to a son, and a husband to a wife. secundo agit de amicitiis quae videntur esse inter contrarios, puta inter pauperem et divitem, et huiusmodi, ibi, ex contrariis autem et cetera. Second, at between opposites, however (1159b12; [1653]), he discusses friendships existing between opposites, like a poor man and a rich man, and so on. Circa primum tria facit: He treats the first point in a threefold manner. primo distinguit huiusmodi amicitiae genus a praecedentibus amicitiis; First, he distinguishes the classification of this friendship from the previous kinds of friendships. secundo distinguit huiusmodi amicitias ab invicem, ibi: differunt autem et cetera; Second, at these friendships, though (1158b14; [1626]), he distinguishes friendships of this type from one another. tertio ostendit quomodo huiusmodi amicitiae conservantur, ibi: eadem quidem utique et cetera. Third, at certainly the same benefits (1158b20; [1629]), he shows how these friendships are preserved. 1625. Dicit ergo primo quod, praeter praedictas amicitias quas diximus in aequalitate consistere eo quod sunt similium secundum virtutem vel utilitatem vel delectationem, est quaedam alia species amicitiae quae est secundum superabundantiam, in quantum scilicet una persona excedit aliam, sicut amicitia quae est patris ad filium et universaliter senioris ad iuniorem et viri ad uxorem et universaliter omnis eius qui habet imperium super aliquem ad eum super quem habet imperium. 1625. He says first that, besides the foregoing friendships, which we said [1562–95] consist in equality, from the fact that they belong to persons having likeness in virtue or utility or pleasure, there is another kind of friendship that consists in inequality (inasmuch as one person excels another), as the friendship of a father with a son, or more generally, of an older with a younger person, or of a husband with a wife, or for the most part of a superior with a subordinate. 1626. Deinde cum dicit: differunt autem et cetera, ostendit differentiam harum amicitiarum ad invicem. 1626. Then, at these friendships, though (1158b14), he differentiates these friendships from one another. Et primo proponit quod intendit. First, he states his proposal, saying that friendships of this type differ in kind. Et dicit quod huiusmodi amicitiae differunt specie ab invicem, et assignat duas differentias: unam quidem secundum diversas relationes superabundantiae, He assigns two differences, one according to various relations of inequality: the friendship of a father for a son is one kind, and of a ruler for his subject is another. alia est enim amicitiae species patris ad filios et alia imperantis ad subditos quibus imperat; alia vero differentia est secundum diversam relationem excedentis et excessi, non enim eadem est amicitia patris ad filium et filii ad patrem neque etiam eadem est viri ad uxorem et uxoris ad virum. Another difference is according to the contrasting relation of the superior and subordinate, for the friendship of a father toward a son is not the same as the friendship of a son toward a father, nor is the friendship of a husband toward a wife the same as the friendship of a wife toward a husband. 1627. Secundo ibi: altera enim et cetera, ostendit propositum duabus rationibus. 1627. Second, at indeed, the virtue (1158b17), he explains his proposal by two reasons. Quarum prima est quia, cum amicitia dicatur secundum habitum et secundum actum, necesse est quod cuilibet amico insit aliqua habitualis virtus ad exequendum ea quae sunt amicitiae et etiam ipsum opus amicitiae, manifestum est autem in singulis praedictorum quod non est idem opus, puta patris ad filium et viri ad uxorem aut etiam filii ad patrem, et per consequens non est eadem virtus; ergo etiam sunt diversae amicitiae. The first is that, since friendship may be predicated according to habit and act, every friend necessarily should have a habitual disposition to do the things pertaining to friendship as well as the function itself of friendship. But it is clear in the case of the persons just mentioned that the function is not the same, for example, of a father toward a son and of a husband toward a wife, or even of a son toward a father. Consequently, there is not the same virtue. Therefore, they are also different kinds of friendship. 1628. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: altera autem et cetera. Quae talis est: in praedictis amicitiis inveniuntur diversae rationes propter quas amant, alia enim ratione pater amat filium et filius patrem et vir uxorem; sed secundum diversas rationes amandi sunt diversae amationes et per consequens diversae amicitiae. 1628. He gives the second reason at different, too, are (1158b18). It is this. In these friendships, there are different motives for which people love. A father loves a son for a reason different from that for which a son loves a father or a husband loves a wife. But, according to the different reasons for loving, there are different kinds of love and so different kinds of friendship. 1629. Deinde cum dicit: eadem quidem et cetera, ostendit quomodo praedictae amicitiae conservantur. 1629. Next, at certainly the same benefits (1158b20), he shows how these friendships are preserved. Et primo ostendit quod conservantur per hoc quod invicem sibi exhibent quae oportet secundum amare et amari; First, he explains that they are preserved by the parties mutually offering what they should in regard to loving and being loved. secundo ostendit quomodo amare et amari se habeant ad amicitiam, ibi: multi autem videntur et cetera. Second, at because of a desire for honor (1159a12; [1639]), he explains how loving and being loved are related to friendship. Circa primum tria facit; He discusses the first point in a threefold manner. primo ostendit quomodo praedictae amicitiae conservantur per hoc quod sibi invicem exhibent quae oportet; First, he shows how these friendships are preserved because the parties mutually offer what is proper. secundo ostendit quod ista considerantur secundum analogiam, ibi: analogon autem et cetera; Second, at in all friendships (1158b23; [1630]), he shows that these reciprocations are considered according to proportionality. tertio ostendit quomodo hoc diversimode competat iustitiae et amicitiae, ibi: non similiter autem et cetera. Third, at equality, however (1158b29; [1631]), he explains how this applies to justice and friendship in different ways. Dicit ergo primo quod in his amicitiis non fiunt eadem ab utraque parte amicorum neque etiam oportet eadem requirere quae quis facit. Sicut filius non debet requirere a patre reverentiam quam ei exibet, sicut in praedictis amicitiis pro delectatione requirebatur delectatio et pro utilitate utilitas, sed quando filii exhibent parentibus quae oportet exhibere principiis suae generationis et parentes exhibent filiis quae oportet exhibere a se genitis, tunc talium amicitia erit permansiva et epiikes, id est virtuosa. He says first that, in these friendships, the same benefits are not bestowed by each friend, and it is unnecessary to expect in return the same benefits that one bestows. For example, a son ought not to ask of his father the reverence of that which the son shows the father, as in the previous friendships, pleasure was offered for pleasure and utility for utility. But, when children show their parents what is due those who have generated them, and when parents show their children what is due their offspring, there will exist between them a lasting and just or virtuous friendship. 1630. Deinde cum dicit: analogon autem et cetera, ostendit qualiter exhibeatur quod oportet in his amicitiis. Et dicit quod in omnibus amicitiis quae sunt secundum superabundantiam unius personae ad aliam, oportet fieri amationem secundum proportionem, ut scilicet melior plus ametur quam amet, et similis ratio est de utiliori et delectabiliori vel qualitercumque aliter excellentiori. Cum enim uterque ametur secundum dignitatem, tunc fiet quaedam aequalitas, scilicet proportionis, quae videtur ad amicitiam pertinere. 1630. Next, at in all friendships (1158b23), he shows how what is proper is offered in these friendships. He says that, in all friendships involving inequality of one person to the other, love is given proportionately, such that the superior party is loved more than he loves; the same is true concerning the person who is more useful, more pleasant, or more excellent in any way whatsoever. For, when each person is loved by reason of the worth he manifests, an equality of proportion that apparently pertains to friendship will ensue. 1631. Deinde cum dicit: non similiter autem et cetera, ostendit quomodo hoc diversimode conveniat iustitiae et amicitiae. 1631. Then, at equality, however (1158b29), he shows how this is applicable to justice and friendship in a different manner. Et primo ponit differentiam; First, he gives the difference. secundo manifestat per signum, ibi: manifestum autem et cetera; Second, at this is clearly (1158b33; [1633]), he makes it clear by an indication. tertio solvit quamdam dubitationem, ibi: et unde dubitatur et cetera. Third, at from this a doubt (1159a5; [1636]), he solves a doubt.