Lectio 2 Lecture 2 Gloria Christi Glory of Christ ^1:3 qui cum sit splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae ejus, portansque omnia verbo virtutis suae, [n. 24] purgationem peccatorum faciens, [n. 37] sedet ad dexteram majestatis in excelsis: [n. 41] ^1:3 Who, being the splendor of his glory and the figure of his substance and upholding all things by the word of his power, [n. 24] making purgation of sins, sits at the right hand of the majesty on high: [n. 41] 24. Superius ostendit Apostolus Christi excellentiam quantum ad originis proprietatem, quantum ad dominii maiestatem, et quantum ad operationis virtutem, hic autem ostendit eius excellentiam quantum ad gloriae et dignitatis sublimitatem. 24. Having shown Christ’s greatness in regard to his unique origin, the majesty of his dominion, and the power of his activity, the Apostle now shows his greatness in regard to the sublimity of his glory and dignity. Et pars ista dividitur in duas. This is divided into two parts: Primo enim ostendit Christum esse idoneum ad dignitatem istam; in the first, he shows that Christ is worthy of his dignity; secundo ponit ipsam dignitatem, ibi sedet ad dexteram. in the second, he discloses this dignity, at sits at the right hand. Idoneitatem vero ostendit ex duobus, quae reddunt aliquem idoneum ad aliquid magnum: unum est facilitas administrandi, aliud est industria et strenuitas exequendi. But he shows him worthy of this dignity for two reasons: one reason is the ease with which he acts; the other reason is his diligence and strenuosity in acting. Primo ergo ostendit eius facilitatem; First, then, he shows his facility; secundo eius strenuitatem, ibi purgationem peccatorum faciens. second, his strenuosity, at making purgation of sins. 25. Circa primum sciendum est, quod tria requiruntur, quae faciunt facilitatem ad dignitatem aliquam ministrandam. Primum quidem sapientia, ne erret gubernando. Eccle. c. X, 5: est et malum quod vidi sub sole, quasi per errorem egrediens a facie principis: positum stultum in dignitate sublimi. Prov. c. VIII, 15: per me reges regnant. Secundum est generis prosapia, ne contemnatur praecipiendo. Prov. ult.: nobilis in portis vir eius, cum sederit cum senatoribus terrae. Tertium, virtutis potentia in exequendo. Eccli. c. VII, 6: noli quaerere fieri iudex, nisi valeas virtute irrumpere iniquitates. 25. In regard to the first, it should be noted that three things are required for a high dignity to be administered with ease: the first is wisdom, to avoid mistakes in governing: there is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as it were by an error proceeding from the face of the prince: a fool set in high dignity (Eccl 10:15); through me kings reign (Prov 8:15). Second, a person must be of noble stock, lest his commands be scorned: her husband is honorable in the gates, when he sits among the senators of the land (Prov 31:33). The third requirement is power in acting: seek not to be made a judge, unless you have strength enough to extirpate iniquities (Sir 7:6). Et quantum ad ista tria Apostolus ostendit in Christo facilitatem ad dignitatem praedictam. Primo quia non solum est sapiens, sed etiam ipsa Sapientia; unde dicit cum sit splendor gloriae. Secundo quia non solum est nobilis, sed est ipsa nobilitas, quia est figura substantiae eius. Tertio quia non solum est potens, sed est ipsa potentia portans omnia verbo, et cetera. These are the three marks the Apostle uses to show that Christ is worthy of his dignity: first, because he is not only wise but is Wisdom itself; hence, he says he is the splendor of his glory; second, because he is not only noble but is nobility itself, because he is the figure of his substance; third, because he is not only powerful but is power itself: upholding all things by the word of his power. Tria autem sunt, ut supra dictum est, quae faciunt hominem idoneum ut magnam dignitatem assequatur. But these are the three things which make a person worthy to possess great dignity. 26. Primum est sapientiae claritas. Prov. c. III, 35: gloriam sapientes possidebunt. Et ideo ostendit Christi sapientiam, dicens qui cum sit splendor gloriae. 26. The first is clarity of wisdom: the wise shall possess glory (Prov 3:35). Hence, he shows Christ’s wisdom when he says, who being the splendor of his glory. Ubi est considerandum, quod, secundum Ambrosium, gloria est clara cum laude notitia, quasi quaedam manifesta notitia, quae de bonitate alicuius habetur. Sed, sicut dicitur Matth. XIX, 17: nemo bonus, nisi solus Deus, et etiam Lc. XVIII, 19, unde ipse est bonitas antonomastice et per essentiam. Alia vero bona sunt per participationem, et ita soli Deo convenit gloria antonomastice. Is. XLII, 8: gloriam meam alteri non dabo. I Tim. I, 17: regi autem saeculorum immortali, invisibili, soli Deo honor et gloria. Here it should be noted that according to Ambrose, glory is fame accompanied by praise, i.e., public knowledge of someone’s goodness. But as it says in Luke, no one is good but God alone (Luke 18:19). Hence, he is goodness par excellence and essentially, but other things are good by participation, so that God alone is good par excellence: my glory I give to no other (Isa 42:8); to the king of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God, be honor and glory for ever and ever (1 Tim 1:17). Cognitio ergo divinae bonitatis, excellenter et antonomastice dicitur gloria, id est, clara cum laude notitia bonitatis divinae. Ista aliqualiter habetur ab homine, quia nunc cognosco ex parte, I Cor. XIII, 12, sed habetur excellentius ab angelis, sed a solo Deo perfecte. Deum enim nemo vidit unquam, Io. I, 18, verum est, nec angeli comprehensive, sed ipse solus seipsum comprehendit. Ergo sola cognitio Dei de seipso perfecte dicitur gloria, quia perfectam notitiam habet et clarissimam de seipso. Therefore, knowledge of God’s goodness is called glory in a most excellent sense, i.e., clear knowledge of the divine goodness accompanied by praise. Such knowledge is possessed by men up to a certain point: I know now in part (1 Cor 13:12), but perfectly by God alone: no one has ever seen God (John 1:18). It is true that not even the angels, but God alone comprehends it. Therefore, only God’s knowledge of himself is glory in the full sense, because he has perfect and clearest knowledge of himself. Quoniam autem splendor est illud quod a fulgente primo emittitur, sapientia vero est quiddam fulgens Eccli. VIII, 1: sapientia hominis lucet in vultu eius inde est quod prima conceptio sapientiae est quasi quidam splendor. Verbum ergo Patris, quod est quidam conceptus intellectus eius, est splendor sapientiae, qua se cognoscit. But because splendor is that which is first emitted by a bright object, and his wisdom is something bright: the wisdom of a man shines in his countenance (Eccl 8:1), it follows that the first conception of wisdom is, as it were, a splendor. Therefore, the Word of the Father, which is a certain concept of his intellect, is the splendor and wisdom by which he knows himself. Et ideo Apostolus Filium vocat splendorem gloriae, id est, divinae clarae notitiae. In quo ostendit ipsum non solum sapientem, sed sapientiam genitam. Is. LXII, 1: donec egrediatur ut splendor iustus eius, et cetera. That is why the Apostle calls the Son the splendor of glory, i.e., of the clear divine knowledge. Thus, he identifies him not only as wise but as begotten wisdom: I will not rest till her just one comes forth as splendor, and her savior be lighted as a lamp (Isa 62:1). 27. Secundum quod facit hominem idoneum ad magnam dignitatem, est generis nobilitas. Et hoc ostendit esse in Christo, quia dicit, quod est figura substantiae eius. Decet enim cum sapientia esse nobilitatem in principe. Deut. I, 15: tulique de tribubus vestris sapientes et nobiles, et constitui eos principes, et cetera. 27. The second mark which makes a man worthy of great dignity is noble birth, which he shows is in Christ, because he is the very figure of his substance. For it is proper that along with wisdom there be nobility in a prince: and I took out of your tribes men over fifties and over tens, who might teach you all things (Deut 1:15). Figura hic ponitur pro charactere, vel imagine; quasi dicat: imago substantiae. Sciendum tamen, quod licet imago dicat similitudinem, non tamen quaelibet similitudo est imago. Albedo enim in pariete non est imago albedinis meae, sed imago et similitudo in specie. Here, the word figure is used to denote a mark or an image. As if to say: the image of his substance. Yet it should be noted that although an image implies a likeness, not every likeness is an image: for the whiteness on a canvas is not my whiteness; but an image is a likeness in species. Illud ergo proprie dicitur esse imago alicuius, quod habet similitudinem speciei eius, vel expressum signum speciei. Therefore, that is properly called an image of someone which bears a likeness to his species or is an expressed sign of the species. Inter accidentia vero nihil ita est expressum signum, sicut speciei est figura. Unde qui describit figuram animalis, describit imaginem eius. Filius ergo, qui est imago invisibilis Dei, Col. I, 15, proprie dicitur figura. But among the accidents none is such an expressed sign of a species as a thing’s figure. Hence, one who draws the figure of an animal draws its image. Therefore, the Son, who is the image of the invisible God (Col 1:15), is properly called the figure. 28. Sed cuius? Substantiae eius. Imago enim alicuius est multiplex. Aliquando enim est signum repraesentans speciem in nullo cum ipsa conveniens, sicut imago hominis in pariete, quae in nullo habet veram speciem hominis. Aliquando vero assimilatur ei in specie, non tantum in repraesentando, sed etiam in essendo, sicut filius est imago vera patris. Gen. V, 3: Adam genuit filium ad imaginem suam, id est, in natura speciei. 28. But the figure of what? Of his substance. For there are many images of things: sometimes it is a sign representing the species but yet not agreeing with it in any way; as the image of a man on canvas, which in no sense possesses the true species of man. Sometimes it is similar to it in species not only in representing, but even in being, as a son is the true image of his father: Adam begot a son in his own image (Gen 5:3), i.e., in the nature of his species. Et ideo addit substantiae eius, quia, secundum Augustinum, filius dicitur imago patris, quia est eiusdem naturae cum ipso. Dicit ergo, quod est figura substantiae. Therefore, the Apostle adds, of his substance, because according to Augustine a son is called the image of the father because he is of the same nature as he. He says, therefore, that he is the figure of his substance. 29. Sed quare non dicit quod est figura naturae? Quia possibile est, quod natura speciei multiplicetur ad multitudinem individuorum in compositis ex materia et forma. Unde filius Socratis non habet eamdem naturam numero cum patre suo. Substantia vero numquam multiplicatur. Non enim alia est substantia patris, alia filii. Nec enim dividitur secundum diversa individua. 29. But why does he not say that he is the figure of his nature? Because it is possible for the nature of a species to be multiplied according to the multitude of individuals composed of matter and form. Hence, the son of Socrates does not have the same numerical nature as his father. But the substance is never multiplied; for the substance of the father is not distinct from the substance of the son: for substance is not divided according to diverse individuals. Quia ergo una et eadem est numero natura in Patre et Filio Dei, ideo non dicit naturae, quae dividitur, sed substantiae indivisibilis. Io. X, 30: ego et Pater unum sumus. Et c. XIV, 10: ego in Patre, et Pater in me est. Therefore, because there is one and the same numerical nature in the Father and in the Son of God, he does not say the figure of his nature, but of his substance, which is indivisible: I and the Father are one (John 10:30); I in the Father and the Father in me (John 14:10). 30. Tertium quod facit hominem idoneum, est virtus et potestas. Unde Eccli. VII, v. 6: noli quaerere esse iudex, nisi valeas virtute irrumpere iniquitates. Et ideo ostendit virtutem, cum dicit portansque omnia verbo virtutis suae. Proprium autem principum et potentum est portare. Iob IX, 13: sub quo curvantur, qui portant orbem. Ipse ergo portat. 30. The third factor which makes a man worthy is strength and power; hence, it is said: seek not to be made a judge, unless you have strength enough to extirpate iniquities (Sir 7:6). Therefore, he shows this strength when he says, upholding all things by the word of his power. For it is proper to princes and potentates to uphold: under whom they stoop that bear up the world (Job 9:13). Therefore, he upholds. 31. Sed videndum est quid portat, et quo, vel per quid. 31. But what does he uphold, and by what agency? Quantum ad primum sciendum est, quod id, quod de se nec stare nec ambulare potest, indiget portari. Omnis autem creatura de se nec subsistere, nec operari potest. Primum patet, quia remota causa, removetur effectus, Deus autem est causa omnis substantiae, quia non minus est causa substantiae rei quantum ad fieri, quam domificator est causa fieri domus, inde, sicut ad absentiam domificatoris cessat fieri domus et ad absentiam solis cessat fieri et esse luminis in aere: ita ad subtractionem virtutis divinae cessat et esse, et fieri, et subsistere omnis creaturae. Portat ergo omnia quantum ad suum esse. In regard to the first it should be noted that anything which cannot stand by itself or walk needs to be upheld. But no creature of itself can subsist or act. The first statement is clear because once the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But God is the cause of all subsistence because he is no less the cause of a thing’s continuance in existence and of its coming into existence than a builder is the cause of a house’s coming into existence. Hence, just as the house ceases coming into existence when the builder ceases to act, and just as the air ceases to be illuminated when the sun no longer shines, so, when the divine power is removed, the being, the coming-to-be, and the substance of every creature is removed. Portat etiam omnia quantum ad operari, quia subtracta influentia eius, cessat omnis motio causarum secundarum, cum ipse sit causa prima, et causa prima plus influit, quam secunda. Iob XXXVIII, 6: super quo bases illius solidatae sunt. Sic ergo patet, quod omnia portat. Therefore, he upholds all things in their existence and in their activity: because when the divine influence is removed, all the activities of secondary causes are removed because he is the first cause; and the first cause does more than the second: upon what are its bases grounded? (Job 38:6). 32. Sed per quid portat? Verbo virtutis suae. Quia enim Apostolus loquens de creatione rerum dixit, quod Deus omnia fecit per Filium, quia scilicet dixerat, per quem fecit et saecula. Ille autem per quem aliquis operatur, non videtur virtute sua operari, sed virtute eius, qui per eum operatur; sicut balivus, per quem rex operatur, non operatur virtute propria. Ergo per hoc videtur, quod filius non operetur virtute propria. Ideo dicit Apostolus quod portat verbo virtutis suae, quia, cum idem sit causa essendi et conservandi, cum dicit quod Filius virtute sua est causa conservationis, ostendit quod etiam est causa essendi. 32. But through what agency does he support them? By the word of his power. For since the Apostle, when speaking of the creation of things, said that God made all things through the Son, by whom also he made the world (Heb 1:2); and since that through which a thing acts does not seem to act by its own power but by the power of the one through whom it acts, as the bailiff through whom the king acts by his own power; hence, the Apostle says, he upholds all things by the word of his power. For since the cause of existence and of conservation are the same, when he says that the Son is the cause of conservation, he is showing that he is also the cause of existence. 33. Sed numquid non virtute Patris? Utique, et eius virtute, quia eadem est virtus utriusque. Operatur ergo et virtute propria, et virtute Patris, quia virtutem suam habet a Patre. Nec tamen dicit Apostolus virtute sua, sed verbo virtutis suae, ad ostendendum quod sicut Pater omnia per Verbum produxit Ps. XXXII, 9: ipse dixit et facta sunt, etc., in quo ostenditur maxima virtus Patris ita Filius eodem Verbo, quod est ipse, omnia fecit. 33. But is it not also by the Father’s power? It is also by his power because the power of both is identical. He works, therefore, both by his own power and by the Father’s power, because his power comes from the Father. Yet the Apostle does not say, by his power, but by the word of his power, in order to show that just as the Father produced all things by the Word: he spoke and they were made (Ps 33:9), so the Son by the same Word that he is, made all things. Et in hoc ostendit Apostolus potentiam virtutis suae, quia eamdem habet cum Patre, quia eadem operatur et per idem, quo ille. By these words, therefore, the Apostle shows the strength of his power because he has the same power as the Father: for the power by which the Father acts is the same as the power by which the Son acts. 34. Sed tunc est dubium: quia Pater, cum dicit, producit Verbum. Ergo Filius cum dicit, produceret Verbum, et sic Verbum Patris esset Verbum Filii. Et ad hoc dicunt Graeci, quod sicut Filius est imago Patris, ita Spiritus Sanctus est imago Filii. Et sic exponit Basilius portans verbo virtutis suae, id est, Spiritu Sancto. Nam sicut Filius est Verbum Patris, ita ut dicunt Spiritus Sanctus est Verbum Filii. Et ideo per ipsum facit Filius, sicut per Filium Pater. 34. But a question arises here, because the Father, when he speaks, produces a Word; when the Word speaks, he should produce a word; and so the Word of the Father should be the word of the Son. The Greeks answer this by saying that just as the Son is the image of the Father, so the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son. This is the way Basil explains the phrase, upholding all things by the word of his power, i.e., by the Holy Spirit. For just as the Son is the Word of the Father, so the Holy Spirit, they say, is the Word of the Son; consequently, the Son acts through him just as the Father acts through the Son. Verumtamen proprie loquendo, verbum non dicitur nisi quod procedit ut conceptus ab intellectu, ad quod sequitur procedere in similitudinem speciei. Spiritus autem Sanctus, et si sit similis, non tamen habet hoc ex modo suae processionis, quia non procedit ut conceptus ab intellectu, sed ut amor a voluntate. Yet, properly speaking, an utterance is not called a word unless it proceeds as something conceived by the intellect in such a way that, as consequence, it proceeds in a likeness of species. But the Holy Spirit, even though he is like, is not like by reason of the way he proceeds because he does not proceed as a concept issuing from an intellect, but as love issuing from the will. 35. Aliter autem exponit Glossa verbo virtutis suae, id est, imperio suo. 35. The Gloss, however, explains by the word of his power differently, i.e., as his authority.