553. Sciendum vero est, quod actus fidei est credere, qui est actus intellectus determinati ad unum, ex imperio voluntatis. Unde credere est cum assensu aliquid cogitare, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Praedestinatione sanctorum. Et ideo obiectum fidei et finis voluntatis oportet sibi correspondere.
553. But it should be noted that the act of faith is to believe, because it is an act of the intellect narrowed to one thing by the command of the will. Hence, to believe is to think with assent, as Augustine says in The Predestination of the Saints (2.5). Therefore, the object of faith and of the will must coincide.
Veritas autem prima est obiectum fidei, in quo quidem consistit finis voluntatis, scilicet beatitudo, quae differenter est in via et in patria, quia in via veritas prima non est habita et per consequens nec visa, quia in his, quae sunt supra animam, idem est videre et habere, ut dicit Augustinus, LXXIII Quaest., sed tantum est sperata. Rom. VIII, quaest., sed tantum est sperata. Rom. VIII, v. 25, 24: quod enim non videmus speramus. Quod enim videt quis, quid sperat? Ergo veritas prima non visa, sed sperata est finis voluntatis in via, et per consequens obiectum fidei, quia idem est sibi pro fine et obiecto. Finis autem ultimus simpliciter ipsius fidei in patria, quem intendimus ex fide, est beatitudo, quae in aperta visione Dei consistit. Io. XVII, 3: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum, et cetera. Et XX, 29: beati qui non viderunt et crediderunt. Huiusmodi autem est spes fidelium. I Pet. I, 3: regeneravit nos in spem vivam. Finis ergo fidei in via est assecutio rei speratae, scilicet beatitudinis aeternae. Et ideo dicit sperandarum rerum.
But the object of faith is the first truth, in which the end of the will consists, namely, happiness. But it is present one way on earth and another way in heaven, because on earth the first truth is not possessed and, consequently, not seen: for in regard to things that are above the soul, to possess and to see are the same, as Augustine says in the Book of 83 Questions (35). Hence, they are only hoped for: but hope that sees is not hope. For what a man sees, why does he hope for? (Rom 8:24). Therefore, the first truth, not seen but hoped for, is the end of the will on earth and, consequently, is the object of faith, because its end and object are the same. But the ultimate end of faith in heaven, which we tend toward by faith, is happiness, which consists in the clear vision of God: this is eternal life: to know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent (John 17:3). And: blessed are they that have not seen, and have believed (John 20:29). But such is the hope of believers: he has regenerated us unto a lively hope (1 Pet 1:3). The end, therefore, of faith on earth is the attainment of the thing hoped for, namely, of eternal happiness; hence, he says, of things to be hoped for.
554. Sed quaeritur hic quare cum fides sit prior quam spes, diffinitur per ipsam: quia posterius debet diffiniri per prius, et non e converso.
554. But a question arises: since faith is prior to hope, why is it defined in terms of hope? For it is customary to define the later by the previous, and not vice versa.
Respondeo. Dicendum est, quod ex iam dictis patet solutio, quia dictum est, quod idem est obiectum et finis fidei. Cum ergo assecutio rei speratae sit finis eius, oportet quod etiam sit obiectum ipsius.
I answer that the answer should be obvious from what has been said, namely, that the object and end of faith are the same. Therefore, since the attainment of the things hoped for is its end, it must also be its object.
Dicebatur autem supra, quod omnis habitus debet diffiniri per ordinem actus ad obiectum. Verum autem et bonum etsi in se considerata convertantur quantum ad supposita, tamen inquantum differunt ratione, diverso ordine se habent ad invicem, quia et verum est quoddam bonum, et bonum est quoddam verum. Et similiter intellectus et voluntas, quae distinguuntur penes distinctionem veri et boni, habent inter se diversum ordinem. Inquantum enim intellectus apprehendit veritatem et quidquid in ipsa continetur, sic verum est quoddam bonum, et sic est bonum sub vero. Sed inquantum voluntas movet, sic verum est sub bono. In ordine ergo cognoscendi, intellectus est prior, sed in ordine movendi voluntas est prior.
For it has been stated above that a habit must be defined by the order of its act to its object. But the true and the good, even though when considered in themselves are convertible as far as their supposits are concerned, differ in conception. Hence, they are diversely related to each other, because the true is a good and a good is true. In like manner, the intellect and will, which are distinguished on the basis of the distinction between the true and the good, have a diverse relationship to each other. For inasmuch as the intellect apprehends truth and anything contained in it, the true is a good; hence, the good is under the true; but inasmuch as the will moves, the true is under the good. Therefore, in the order of knowing, the intellect is prior; but in the order of moving, the will is prior.
Quia ergo intellectus movetur ad actum fidei ex imperio voluntatis, ut dictum est, in ordine movendi voluntas est prior. Ideo non diffinitur prius per posterius, quia, ut dictum est, in diffinitione fidei oportet ponere ordinem actus ad obiectum, quod idem est quod finis. Finis autem et bonum idem sunt, ut habetur II Physicorum. In ordine autem ad bonum voluntas, cuius est spes sicut subiecti, est prior.
Therefore, because the intellect is moved to the act of faith by the command of the will, in the order of moving, the will is prior. Therefore, the prior is not being defined in terms of the later because, as has been stated, in the definition of faith, the order of the act to its object, which is the same as the end, must be mentioned. But the end and the good are the same, as it says in Physics II. But in the order to the good, the will, which is the subject of hope, is prior.
555. Quare autem non dicit diligendarum, sed sperandarum?
555. But why not say, of things to be loved, rather than of things to be hoped for?
Ratio est, quia caritas est praesentium et absentium. Quia ergo finis non habitus, est obiectum fidei, ideo dicit sperandarum rerum.
The reason is because charity is concerned with things that are present or absent. Therefore, because the unpossessed end is the object of faith, he says, of things to be hoped for.
Nec obstat, quod res speranda est obiectum spei. Quia oportet, quod fides sicut ad finem ordinetur ad obiectum illarum virtutum quibus perficitur voluntas, cum fides pertineat ad intellectum secundum quod imperatur a voluntate.
Nor does it make any difference that the thing to be hoped for is also the object of hope, because it is necessary that faith be ordained to an end, which coincides with the object of those virtues by which the will is made perfect; since faith pertains to the intellect as moved by the will.
556. Sed cum fides sit una, quia ab unitate obiecti dicitur habitus unus, quare non dicitur rei sperandae, sed rerum sperandarum?
556. But since faith is one virtue, because it is called one habit (for its object is one), why not say of the thing to be hoped for, instead of things to be hoped for?
Respondeo. Dicendum est, quod beatitudo, quae in se essentialiter est una, quia consistit in Dei visione, quae in se est una, est principium et radix ex qua multa bona derivantur, quae sub ipsa continentur: sicut dotes corporis, societas sanctorum, et multa alia. Ut ergo ostendat omnia ista pertinere ad fidem, loquitur in plurali.
I answer that happiness, which is essentially one thing in itself, because it consists in the vision of God, is the principle and root from which the many good things contained under it are derived: for example, the characteristics of the body, companionship with the saints, and many other good things. Therefore, in order to show that all these pertain to faith, he speaks in the plural.
557. Illud autem, quod dicitur, substantia, potest multipliciter exponi. Uno modo causaliter, et tunc habet duplicem sensum. Unum quod est substantia, id est, faciens in nobis substare res sperandas, quod facit duobus modis. Uno modo quasi merendo. Ex hoc enim, quod captivat et submittit intellectum suum his quae sunt fidei, meretur quod aliquando perveniat ad videndum hoc quod sperat. Visio enim est merces fidei. Alio modo quasi per suam proprietatem praesentialiter faciat, quod id quod creditur futurum in re, aliquo modo iam habeatur dummodo credat in Deum.
557. The word, substance, which appears in the definition, can be explained in a number of ways: in one way, causally, and then it has two senses: one which is substance, i.e., making the things hoped for be present in us. This it does in two ways: in one way, by meriting, as it were; for from the fact that a person makes his intellect captive and submissive to the things of faith, he deserves some day to see the things he hopes for: for vision is the reward of faith. In another way, as though by its property, bringing it about that what is believed really to lie in the future, be somehow already possessed, provided one believe in God.
Alio modo exponi potest substantia essentialiter, quasi fides sit substantia, id est, essentia rerum sperandarum. Unde in Graeco habetur hypostasis rerum sperandarum. Essentia enim beatitudinis nihil aliud est, quam visio Dei. Io. XVII, 3: haec est vita aeterna ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum, et cetera. Unde de Trinit. cap. X, dicit Augustinus: haec contemplatio promittitur nobis actionum omnium finis, et cetera. Ipsa ergo plena visio Dei est essentia beatitudinis.
In another way, we can explain the word, substance, essentially, as if faith is the substance, i.e., the essence of things to be hoped for. Hence, in Greek it is defined as ‘the hypostasis of things to be hoped for.’ For the essence of happiness is no less than the vision of God: this is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God (John 17:3). Hence, in the book, On the Trinity, Augustine says: this contemplation is promised to us; the end of all actions. Therefore, the full vision of God is the essence of happiness.
Hoc autem videmus in scientiis liberalibus, quod si quis aliquam velit addiscere, oportet eum primo accipere principia ipsius, quae oportet credere cum sibi traduntur a magistro. Oportet enim credere eum qui discit, ut habetur I Poster. Et in illis principiis quodammodo continetur tota scientia, sicut conclusiones in praemissis, et effectus in causa. Qui ergo habet principia illius scientiae, habet substantiam eius, puta geometriae. Et si geometria esset essentia beatitudinis, qui haberet principia geometriae, haberet quodammodo substantiam beatitudinis.
We also see this in the liberal sciences, which, if a person wishes to learn them, he must first accept their principles, which he must believe when they are delivered to him by the teacher. For a learner must believe, as it is stated in the first book of the Posterior Analytics. And in those principles the entire science is somehow contained, as conclusions are contained in their principles, and an effect in its cause. Therefore, one who has the principles of a science, say geometry, has its substance. And if geometry were the substance of happiness, a person who possessed the principles of geometry would, in a sense, have the substance of happiness.
Fides autem nostra est, ut credamus quod beati videbunt et fruentur Deo. Et ideo si volumus ad hoc pervenire, oportet ut credamus principia istius cognitionis. Et haec sunt articuli fidei qui continent totam summam huius scientiae, quia beatos nos facit visio Dei trini et unius. Et hic est unus articulus. Unde hoc credimus, et ideo dicit substantia rerum sperandarum. I Cor. XIII, 12: videmus nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem; quasi dicat: tunc erimus beati quando videbimus facie ad faciem illud quod nunc videmus in speculo et in aenigmate.
But our faith consists in believing that the blessed will see and enjoy God. Therefore, if we will to reach that state, it is necessary that we believe the principles of that knowledge. And these principles are the articles of faith, which contain the summary of this knowledge, because the vision of the triune God makes us happy. And this is one article; hence we believe this. Consequently, he says, the substance of things to be hoped for: we see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face (1 Cor 13:12). As if to say: we shall be happy when we see face to face that which we now see in a glass and in a dark manner.
In his ergo verbis ostenditur ordo actus fidei ad finem, quia fides ordinatur ad res sperandas quasi quoddam inchoativum, in quo totum quasi essentialiter continetur, sicut conclusiones in principiis.
In these words is shown the relationship of the act of faith to its end because faith is ordained to things to be hoped for, being, as it were, a beginning in which the whole is, as it were, virtually contained, as conclusions in principles.
558. Consequenter cum dicit argumentum non apparentium, tangit actum fidei circa propriam eius materiam.
558. Then when he says, the evidence of things that appear not, he touches the act of faith in regard to its proper matter.
Actus autem proprius fidei, etsi sit in ordine ad voluntatem, ut dictum est, tamen est in intellectu sicut in subiecto, quia obiectum eius est verum, quod proprie pertinet ad intellectum.
But the act proper to faith, even though it is in relation to the will, as has been said, is nevertheless in the intellect, as in a subject, because its object is the true, which properly pertains to the intellect.
In actibus autem intellectus differentia est. Quidam enim sunt habitus intellectus, qui important omnimodam certitudinem ad completam visionem eius quod intelligitur, sicut patet de intellectu, qui est habitus primorum principiorum, quia, qui intelligit quod omne totum est maius sua parte, videt hoc, et est certus. Hoc etiam facit habitus scientiae, et sic talis habitus intellectus et scientia, faciunt certitudinem et visionem. Quaedam vero alia sunt, quae neutrum faciunt, scilicet dubitatio et opinio.
But there is a difference among the acts of the intellect: for some are habits of the intellect which imply complete certitude and perfect understanding of that which is understood, as is clear in the habit of understanding, which is the habit of first principles, because one who understands that every whole is greater than its part sees this and is certain. But the habit of science also does this: thus the habits of understanding and of science will produce certitude and vision. But there are others which beget neither, namely, doubt and opinion.
Fides vero tenet medium inter ista, quia dictum est quod fides facit assensum in intellectu, quod potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo quia intellectus movetur ad assentiendum ex evidentia obiecti, quod est per se cognoscibile, sicut in habitu principiorum, vel cognitum per aliud quod est per se cognoscibile, sicut patet in scientia astronomiae. Alio modo assentit alicui non propter evidentiam obiecti a quo non movetur sufficienter; unde non est certus, sed vel dubitat, scilicet quando non plus habet rationem ad unam partem, quam ad aliam, vel opinatur, si habet quidem rationem ad unam partem, non omnino quietantem ipsum, sed cum formidine ad oppositum.
But faith is midway between these: because, as has been stated, faith produces assent in the intellect, which can be caused in two ways: in one way, because the intellect is moved to assent because of the evidence of the object which is per se knowable, as in the habit of principles, or known through something else that is per se knowable, as in the science of astronomy. In another way, it assents to something not because of the evidence of the object, by which it is not sufficiently moved (hence it is not certain), but it either doubts, namely, when there is no more evidence for one side than for the other; or it opines, if it does have reason for one side, but without satisfying the intellect, so that there is fear in regard to the opposite side.
Fides autem neutrum horum dicit simpliciter, quia nec cum primis est sibi evidens, nec cum duobus ultimis dubitat, sed determinatur ad alteram partem, cum quadam certitudine et firma adhaesione per quamdam electionem voluntariam.
But faith does not suggest either of these absolutely because neither is it evident to itself, as with the first, nor does it doubt, as with the last two; but it fixes on one side with certainty and firm adherence by a voluntary choice.
Hanc autem electionem facit divina auctoritas, per quam electionem determinatur intellectus, ut firmiter inhaereat his quae sunt fidei, et eis certissime assentiatur. Et ideo credere est cum assensu cognoscere. Propria ergo materia habitus fidei sunt non apparentia. Apparentia enim agnitionem habent, non autem fidem, ut dicit Gregorius.
But this choice rests on God’s authority, and by it the intellect is fixed, so that it clings firmly to the things of faith and assents to them with the greatest of certainty. Therefore, to believe is to know with assent. Therefore, the proper matter of the habit of faith are things that appear not. For appearance has knowledge, but not faith, as Gregory says.
Actus autem fidei est certa adhaesio, quam vocat Apostolus argumentum, accipiens causam pro effectu, quia argumentum facit fidem de re dubia. Est enim argumentum ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem ut dicit Boetius. Vel si sequamur etymologiam nominis qua dicitur argumentum, quasi arguens mentem, tunc accipit effectum pro causa, quia ex certitudine rei provenit, quod mens cogatur ad assentiendum. Unde argumentum dicitur non apparentium, id est, certa apprehensio eorum quae non videt.
But the act of faith is certain adherence, which the Apostle calls evidence, taking the cause for the effect, because evidence produces faith about a doubtful matter. For evidence is the reason for believing a doubted thing. Or if we follow the etymology of the word, evidence (argument), which means arguing the mind, then he is taking the effect for the cause, because the mind is compelled to assent because of the thing’s certainty. Hence, it is called the evidence of things that appear not, i.e., a sure and certain apprehension of things it does not see.
Quod si quis velit verba ista ad debitam formam reducere, posset dicere, quod fides est habitus mentis qua inchoatur vita aeterna in nobis, faciens intellectum assentire non apparentibus. Ubi enim nos argumentum habemus, habet alia littera convictio quia per auctoritatem divinam convincitur intellectus ad assentiendum his quae non videt.
Now, if someone were to reduce those words to their due form, he could say that faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life is begun in us and makes the intellect assent to things that it does not see. (Where we have, evidence, another version has, conviction, because on God’s authority the intellect is convinced about things it does not see.)
Patet ergo quod Apostolus complete diffinit fidem, licet obscure.
Therefore, it is obvious that the Apostle has defined faith completely, although obscurely.
559. Per istam enim diffinitionem distinguitur fides ab omnibus quae pertinent ad intellectum.
559. By that definition, faith is distinguished from all the other habits of the intellect.
Per hoc enim quod dicitur argumentum, distinguitur fides ab opinione, dubitatione et suspicione, quia per ista non habetur firma adhaesio intellectus ad aliquid. Per hoc autem quod dicitur non apparentium, distinguitur ab habitu principiorum et scientia. Et per hoc quod dicitur rerum sperandarum, distinguitur a fide communiter sumpta, quae non ordinatur ad beatitudinem. Nam per propriam diffinitionem unumquodque innotescit, et distinguitur a quolibet alio, sicut est hic. Unde et ad istam omnes aliae reducuntur.
By the fact that it is called evidence, faith is distinguished from opinion, doubt, and suspicion, because these three do not cause the intellect to adhere to something firmly. By the words, of things to be hoped for, it is distinguished from ordinary faith, which is not ordained to happiness. For by proper definition a thing is made known and distinguished from all else, as in this case; hence, all the others are reduced to it.
560. Sed videtur quod male dicat, non apparentium, quia, ut dicitur Io. XX, 28: Thomas vidit et credidit. Item credimus esse Deum unum, quod tamen demonstratur a philosophis.
560. But it seems incorrect to say, of things that appear not, as it says in John, that Thomas saw and believed (John 20:26). Furthermore, we believe that there is one God, a fact which is demonstrated by philosophers.
Respondeo. Dicendum est quod fides dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo proprie, et sic est non visorum et non scitorum, ut patet ex praedictis. Et propterea, quod non potest maior certitudo haberi de conclusione, quam de principio a quo elicitur, quia semper principia sunt notiora conclusionibus, ideo cum principia fidei non habeant evidentiam, nec per consequens conclusiones. Et ideo intellectus non assentitur conclusionibus tamquam scitis nec tamquam visis. Alio modo communiter, et sic excludit omnem certam cognitionem, et sic loquitur Augustinus in Quaest. Evangelii, quod fides est de quibusdam quae videntur. Apostolus autem loquitur de prima.
I answer that faith is taken in two senses: in the proper sense, it is concerned with things not seen and not known, as is clear from the above. But inasmuch as there cannot be greater certainty of a conclusion than of the principle from which it is drawn, because principles are always more certain than the conclusions, it follows that since the principles of faith are not evident, neither are its conclusions. Hence, the intellect does not assent to the conclusions as to things known or seen. But taken in a general sense, it excludes all knowledge that is certain; that is the sense in which it is taken by Augustine in the Gospel Questions, when he says that faith is concerned with things that are seen. But the Apostle is speaking in the first sense.
Et quidem de Thoma dicendum est, quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, aliud vidit, aliud credidit, quia vidit humanitatem, et credidit divinitatem.
Furthermore, it must be said of Thomas that, as Gregory says, he saw one thing and believed something else: for he saw the humanity and believed the divinity.
Ad istud de demonstratione, dicendum est quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse visum uni quod est creditum alteri, sicut patet in diversis statibus. Quod enim non est visum in via, videtur in patria. Unde quod ego credo, angelus videt. Similiter quod est visum a prophetis, ut quod Deus est unus incorporeus, hoc est credendum ab idiotis, sicut idiota credit eclipsim, quam astrologus videt. Et de talibus est fides secundum quid tantum. Quaedam autem sunt, quae simpliciter excedunt statum praesentis viae, et de talibus est fides simpliciter.
To the objection based on demonstration, the answer is that nothing prohibits one thing being seen by one person and believed by another, as is obvious in diverse states. For what is not seen on earth is seen by the angels. Therefore, what I believe, an angel sees. Similarly, what is seen by the prophets, for example, that God is one and incorporeal, must be believed by the illiterate; just as an illiterate person believes in an eclipse, which an astronomer sees. However, in such matters faith is taken in a different sense. But there are some things which absolutely transcend the state of the present life; and in regard to these there is faith in the strict sense.
Lectio 2
Lecture 2
Exempla vetera fidei
Ancient examples of faith
11:2 In hac enim testimonium consecuti sunt senes. [n. 561]
11:2 For by this the ancients obtained a testimony. [n. 561]
11:3 Fide intelligimus aptata esse saecula verbo Dei: ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. [n. 563]
11:3 By faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God: that from invisible things visible things might be made. [n. 563]
11:4 Fide plurimam hostiam Abel, quam Cain, obtulit Deo, per quam testimonium consecutus est esse justus, testimonium perhibente muneribus ejus Deo, et per illam defunctus adhuc loquitur. [n. 567]
11:4 By faith Abel offered to God a sacrifice exceeding that of Cain, by which he obtained a testimony that he was just, God giving testimony to his gifts. And by it he being dead yet speaks. [n. 567]