Super librum De causis expositio Commentary on the Book of Causes Prooemium Prologue 1. Sicut Philosophus dicit in X Ethicorum, ultima felicitas hominis consistit in optima hominis operatione quae est supremae potentiae, scilicet intellectus, respectu optimi intelligibilis. 1. As the Philosopher says in Ethics, 10, the ultimate happiness of man consists in the best operation of man, which is of the highest power, that is to say, the power of the intellect, with respect to the best intelligible. 2. Quia vero effectus per causam cognoscitur, manifestum est quod causa secundum sui naturam est magis intelligibilis quam effectus, etsi aliquando quoad nos effectus sint notiores causis propter hoc quod ex particularibus sub sensu cadentibus universalium et intelligibilium causarum cognitionem accipimus. 2. Since the effect is known through the cause, it is clear that the cause according to its own nature is more intelligible than the effect, even if at sometime with respect to us the effects be more known than the causes, because they arise out of particulars, falling under the senses, we have received cognition of universal and intelligible causes. 3. Oportet igitur quod simpliciter loquendo primae rerum causae sint secundum se maxima et optima intelligibilia, eo quod sunt maxime entia et maxime vera cum sint aliis essentiae et veritatis causa, ut patet per Philosophum in II Metaphysicae, quamvis huiusmodi primae causae sint minus et posterius notae quoad nos: 3. It is therefore proper that, simply speaking, the first causes of things be according to themselves the most intelligible and the best intelligible, because they are beings to the greatest degree and true to the greatest degree, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics, 2, although these sorts of first causes are less known, and later known, with respect to us. 4. habet enim se ad ea intellectus noster sicut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis quam propter excedentem claritatem perfecte percipere non potest. 4. Our intellect relates itself to them just like the eye of the owl with respect to the sun, which it cannot perceive perfectly on account of its exceeding clarity. 5. Oportet igitur quod ultima felicitas hominis quae in hac vita haberi potest, consistat in consideratione primarum causarum, quia illud modicum quod de eis sciri potest, est magis amabile et nobilius omnibus his quae de rebus inferioribus cognosci possunt, ut patet per Philosophum in I De partibus animalium; 5. It is proper therefore that the ultimate happiness, which can be had in this life, consist in the consideration of first causes, because that little bit which can be known about them is more worthy of love and more noble than all those which can be known about inferior things, as is clear from the Philosopher in On the Parts of Animals, 1. 6. secundum autem quod haec cognitio in nobis perficitur post hanc vitam, homo perfecte beatus constituitur secundum illud Evangelii: haec est vita aeterna ut cognoscant te Deum verum unum. 6. Since this cognition is perfected in us after this life, man can be made perfectly happy according to what the Evangelist says, this is life eternal so that they may know you, the true living God (John 17:3). 7. Et inde est quod philosophorum intentio ad hoc principaliter erat ut, per omnia quae in rebus considerabant, ad cognitionem primarum causarum pervenirent. Unde scientiam de primis causis ultimo ordinabant, cuius considerationi ultimum tempus suae vitae deputarent: 7. And from this is what the intention of the philosophers principally was in this matter that through all things which they considered in things they might arrive at cognition of the first causes. Whence they set up the study about first causes last, in the consideration of which they set aside the last time of their own life. 8. primo quidem incipientes a logica quae modum scientiarum tradit, 8. First, beginning from logic which hands down the method of the sciences. secundo procedentes ad mathematicam cuius etiam pueri possunt esse capaces, Second, proceeding to mathematics, of which even children can be capable. tertio ad naturalem philosophiam quae propter experientiam tempore indiget, Third, to natural philosophy, which needs time because it requires trial. quarto autem ad moralem philosophiam cuius iuvenis esse conveniens auditor non potest, Fourth, to moral philosophy, a suitable hearer of which cannot be a young man. ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant quae considerat primas entium causas. Finally, they stop at the divine science, which considers the first causes of beings. 9. Inveniuntur igitur quaedam de primis principiis conscripta, per diversas propositiones distincta, quasi per modum sigillatim considerantium aliquas veritates. Et in Graeco quidem invenitur sic traditus Liber Procli Platonici, continens CCXI propositiones, qui intitulatur Elementatio theologica; in Arabico vero invenitur hic liber qui apud Latinos De causis dicitur, quem constat de Arabico esse translatum et in Graeco penitus non haberi: unde videtur ab aliquo philosophorum Arabum ex praedicto libro Procli excerptus, praesertim quia omnia quae in hoc libro continentur, multo plenius et diffusius continentur in illo. 9. Therefore certain things written about first principles, distinguished into diverse propositions, have been found, as if through a mode of those considering some individual truths. And in Greek it is found thus: the Book of Proclus the Platonist Containing 211 Propositions, which is entitled, Elements of Theology. But in Arabic this book is found which is called De causis among the Latins, which is agreed to be translated from the Arabic and not to be had any more in Greek. From this it seems that it was excerpted by some one of the Arab philosophers out of the aforesaid book of Proclus, especially because everything that is contained in the latter book is contained in a much fuller and more detailed way in the former. 10. Intentio igitur huius libri qui De causis dicitur, est determinare de primis causis rerum. Et, quia nomen causae ordinem quemdam importat et in causis ordo ad invicem invenitur, praemittit, quasi quoddam principium totius sequentis operis, quamdam propositionem ad ordinem causarum pertinentem, quae talis est. 10. Therefore the intention of this book, which is called the De causis, is to make a determination about the first causes of things; and because the name of the cause imports a certain order and the order is found in causes with relation to themselves he premises as if a certain principle for the whole following work, a certain proposition pertaining to the order of causes, which is thus: Lectio 1 Proposition 1 1. Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda. 1. Every primary cause has more influence on its object than a universal second cause. 2. Cum ergo removet causa universalis secunda virtutem suam a re, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam ab ea. 2. Thus, when a universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not take its power from it. 3. Quod est, quia causa universalis prima agit in causatum causae secundae, antequam agat in ipsum causa universalis secunda, quae sequitur ipsum. 3. This is because the universal first cause acts on the object of the second cause, before the universal second cause, which follows it, acts on that same object. 4. Cum ergo agit causa secunda, quae sequitur causatum, non excusat ipsius actio a causa prima, quae est supra ipsam. 4. Thus, when the second cause, which follows, acts on an object, its action does not exclude the object from the first cause which is above it. 5. Et quando separatur causa secunda a causato, quod sequitur ipsam, non separatur ab eo prima, quae est supra ipsam, quoniam est causa ei. 5. And when the second cause is separated from the object, which follows it, the first cause is not separated from it, which is above it, because it is the cause for it. 6. Et nos quidem exemplificamus illud per esse et vivum et hominem. 6. And indeed we exemplify this through "being" and "living" and "man." 7. Quod est, quia oportet, ut sit res esse in primis, deinde vivum, postea homo. 7. This is because first of all there has to be a thing being, then living, and after that, man. 8. Vivum ergo est causa hominis propinqua et esse causa eius longinqua. 8. Thus living is the proximate cause of man; and being, his remote cause. 9. Esse ergo vehementius est causa homini quam vivum, quoniam est causa vivo, quod est causa homini. 9. Thus being is more strongly a cause for man than living, because it is the cause for living, which is the cause for man. 10. Et similiter, quando ponis rationalitatem causam homini, est esse vehementius causa homini quam rationalitas, quoniam est causa causae eius. 10. And similarly, when you posit rationality as a cause for man, being is more strongly a cause for man than rationality, because it is the cause of that cause. 11. Et illius quidem significatio est, quod, quando tu removes virtutem rationalem ab homine, non remanet homo et remanet vivum spirans sensibile. Et quando removes ab eo vivum, non remanet vivum et remanet esse, quoniam esse non removetur ab eo, sed removetur vivum; quoniam causa non removetur per remotionem causati sui, remanet ergo homo esse. Cum ergo individuum non est homo, est animal, et, si non est animal, est esse tantum. 11. And the significance of that which we are saying is that when you remove the rational power from man, man does not remain but living does remain, and so do breathing and sensible. And when you remove living from him, living does not remain but being does remain, because being is not removed from it, but living is removed; because the cause is not removed by the removal of its object, Thus man remains being. Thus when an individual thing is not man, it is an animal, and, if it is not animal it is only being. 12. Iam igitur manifestum est et planum, quod causa prima longinqua est plus comprehendens et vehementius causa rei quam causa propinqua. 12. Therefore it is now manifest and plain that the first remote cause is more comprehensive and more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause. 13. Et propter illud fit eius operatio vehementioris adhaerentiae cum re quam operatio causae propinquae. Et hoc quidem non fit secundum hoc, nisi quia res in primis non patitur nisi a virtute longinqua; deinde patitur secundo a virtute, quae est sub prima. 13. And because of this its operation is of a stronger adherence with the thing than the operation of the proximate cause. And indeed this only happens in this way because a thing is first affected only by the remote power, only then in the second place is it affected by the power which is subordinate to the first. 14. Et causa prima adiuvat secundam causam super operationem suam, quoniam omnem operationem, quam causa efficit secunda, et prima causa efficit; verumtamen efficit eam per modum alium, altiorem et sublimiorem. 14. And the first cause assists the second cause in its operation, because every operation which the second cause effects, the first cause also effects; in truth, however, it effects it in a different way, higher and more sublime. 15. Et quando removetur causa secunda a causato suo, non removetur ab eo causa prima, quoniam causa prima est maioris et vehementioris adhaerentiae cum re quam causa propinqua. 15. And when the second cause is removed from its object, the first cause is not removed from it, because the first cause is of a greater and stronger adherence with the thing than the proximate cause. 16. Et non figitur causatum causae secundae nisi per virtutem causae primae. 16. And the object is made by the second cause only by virtue of the first cause. 17. Quod est, quia causa secunda, quando facit rem, influit causa prima, quae est supra eam, super illam rem de virtute sua, quare adhaeret illud rei adhaerentia vehementi et servat eam. 17. This is because when the second cause makes a thing, the first cause which is above, flows its power over the thing, because of which it adheres to it with a strong adherence and preserves it. 18. Iam ergo manifestum est et planum, quod causa longinqua est vehementius causa rei quam causa propinqua, quae sequitur eam, et quod ipsa influit virtutem suam super eam et servat eam, et non separatur ab ea separatione suae causae propinquae, immo remanet in ea et adhaeret ei adhaerentia vehementi, secundum quod ostendimus et exposuimus. 18. Thus it is now manifest and plain that the remote cause is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause which follows it, and that it flows its power over it and preserves it, and it is not separated from it by the separation of its proximate cause, but rather remains in it and adheres to it with a strong adherence, in the way which we have demonstrated and expounded. Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super suum causatum quam causa secunda universalis. Every primary cause has more influence on its object than a universal second cause (1).