1033. Notandum autem quod Magister in Sententiis, dist. XLIII, Lib. 2, ponit distinctionem, et assignat sex species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum: desperationem, praesumptionem, impoenitentiam, obstinationem, impugnationem veritatis agnitae, et invidiam fraternae gratiae. Unde dicuntur in Spiritum Sanctum peccare, qui contra appropriata Spiritui Sancto peccant. Patri appropriatur potentia, Filio sapientia, Spiritui Sancto bonitas. Ille ergo in Patrem dicitur peccare, qui ex infirmitate peccat: ille in Filium qui ex ignorantia: ille in Spiritum Sanctum qui ex malitia. 1033. One should notice that the Teacher places a distinction in the Sentences (dist. 43, book 2), and assigns six species of sin against the Holy Spirit: despair, presumption, impenitence, obstinacy, fighting against recognized truth, and envy of a brother’s grace. Hence they are said to sin against the Holy Spirit who sin against the things appropriated to the Holy Spirit. To the Father is appropriated power, to the Son wisdom, to the Holy Spirit goodness. Therefore that man is said to sin against the Father who sins out of weakness; that man is said to sin against the Son who sins out of ignorance; that man is said to sin against the Holy Spirit who sins out of malice. Sed sciendum, quod peccare ex malitia est quando quis voluntarie peccat, quod est ex certa malitia, et hoc dupliciter: vel quia habet inclinationem ad peccatum, vel quia non habet. Quando enim aliquis homo peccata committit multa, ex hoc relinquitur in eo habitus peccandi, et sic peccat ex electione. Item aliquis peccat, quia removetur id per quod retrahebatur a peccato. Retrahitur autem a peccato per spem vitae aeternae: unde qui non sperat in vitam aeternam, peccat ex certa malitia. Ad Ephes. IV, v. 19: qui desperantes semetipsos tradiderunt impudicitiae. Unde qui peccat ex inclinatione, peccat in Spiritum Sanctum, scilicet ex hoc quod recedit ab eo quod retrahit a peccato. But one should know that to sin out of malice is when someone sins voluntarily, which is from certain malice, and this in two ways: either because he has an inclination to the sin, or because he does not have an inclination. For when a man commits many sins, there remains in him from this a habit of sinning, and thus he sins by choice. Similarly, someone may sin because that by which he was restrained from sin is removed. Now, one is withheld from sin by the hope of eternal life. Hence he who does not hope for eternal life sins out of certain malice. Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness (Eph 4:19). Hence he who sins from an inclination sins against the Holy Spirit, namely from the fact that he withdraws from that which restrains him from sin. Hoc autem fit sex modis. In Deo enim sunt misericordia et iustitia. Ex contemptu misericordiae fit desperatio; ex contemptu iustitiae praesumptio. Item ex parte aversionis, quia convertit se ad bonum fragile, sic fit obstinatio. Item ex parte aversionis, quia non proponit ad Deum reverti, fit impoenitentia. Item ex parte remedii, scilicet spei et caritatis, fit impugnatio veritatis agnitae, et invidentia fraternae dilectionis. Haec sunt peccata in Spiritum Sanctum. Now, this comes about in six ways. For in God there are mercy and justice. From contempt of mercy there comes despair; from contempt of justice, presumption. Likewise on the part of aversion, because one turns himself toward some impermanent good, and from this there comes obstinacy. Likewise on the part of aversion, because one does not intend to be turned back to God, there comes impenitence. Likewise on the part of the remedy, namely on the part of hope and love, there comes about fighting against a recognized truth and envy of a brother’s love. These are the sins against the Holy Spirit. Si ergo sit impoenitentia actualis, sic non remittitur; non quia non remittatur omnino, sed quia non facile remittitur, quia non habet aliquam rationem remittendi, sed ex sola gratia Dei, ut si aliquis habeat febrem, utpote tertianam, habet unde sanari potest; sed si habet ‘emitriteum’, non habet unde sanari possit de se, quia non sanatur nisi ex divino adiutorio. If therefore there is actual impenitence, in this way it is not forgiven; not because it is in no way forgiven, but because it is not easily forgiven, because it has no reason to be forgiven except by the sole grace of God. As when someone has a fever, such as a three day fever, he has something by which he can be healed; but if he has an ‘emitriteus’, he has nothing by which he can be healed, because he is not healed except by divine help. 1034. Sequitur aut facite arborem bonam, et fructum eius bonum, aut facite arborem malam, et fructum eius malum. Supra Dominus confutavit Pharisaeorum ritum, prout erant contra ipsius opera loquentes, ostendens gravitatem peccati, nunc contra ipsos dicentes pravam eius esse doctrinam. Et 1034. There follows either make the tree good and its fruit good: or make the tree evil, and its fruit evil. Above, the Lord refuted the ceremony of the Pharisees, according as they were speaking against his works, showing the gravity of the sin; now he speaks against those saying his teaching was corrupt. And primo ponit similitudinem; first, he sets out a likeness; secundo adaptat; second, he applies it; tertio rationem assignat. third, he gives a reason. Secunda ibi progenies viperarum etc.; tertia ibi ex abundantia cordis os loquitur. The second is at O generation of vipers; the third, at out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks. Circa primum duo facit. Concerning the first, he does two things: Primo ponit similitudinem; first, he sets out a likeness; secundo inducit probationem, ibi siquidem ex fructu arbor cognoscitur. second, he brings in a proof, at for by the fruit the tree is known. 1035. Dicit ergo aut facite arborem bonam et fructum eius bonum et cetera. Istud dupliciter exponitur. Una expositio secundum Chrysostomum et Hieronymum; alia secundum Augustinum. 1035. He says then, either make the tree good and its fruit good. This is explained in two ways: one explanation according to Chrysostom and Jerome, another according to Augustine. Secundum Ioannem Chrysostomum sic exponitur. Vult ostendere vituperationem eorum esse irrationabilem; unde comparat actus ad vitam, sicut fructus ad arborem. Si aliquis videt fructum bonum, iudicat arborem esse bonam; similiter, e converso, si malum. Isti videbant actus Christi, puta expellere daemones, et hoc erat bonum; ideo valde irrationabile est quod dicitis. Et optime procedit ab effectu in causam, ut dicit Apostolus ad Rom. I, 20: invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur et cetera. Unde vult dicere: aut vos, scilicet Pharisaei, facite, idest concedatis, quia si fructus bonus est, quod arbor bona est: aut facite, idest dicite quod fructus malus est, et ita arbor mala. Et hoc non potestis dicere. According to John Chrysostom, it is explained in this way. He wishes to show that their fault-finding is irrational, so he matches action to life, as fruit to a tree. If someone sees good fruit, he judges that the tree is good; similarly, the other way around if the fruit is bad. These men saw Christ’s action, namely expelling demons, and this was good. Therefore what you say is very irrational. And he proceeds from effect to cause in the best way, as the Apostle says, for the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom 1:20). Hence he wishes to say: either you, namely the Pharisees, make, i.e., concede, that if the fruit is good, the tree is good; or make, i.e., say, that the fruit is evil and so the tree evil. And this you cannot say. Augustinus autem refert ad intentionem. Isti dicebant, quod in Beelzebub daemonia eiiciebat. Vult ergo ostendere ex qua radice hoc processerit, quia ex malitia cordis: ideo dicit aut facite. Hic ponuntur duo, unum meritorium, ut fiat, facite etc., et date operam et studium ut sitis arbor bona, quod non potest homo sine praeparatione. Unde facite ut sitis arbor bona, et tunc erit fructus bonus, et verba bona. Quod autem sequitur, est ut caveant, scilicet aut facite arborem malam, et fructum eius malum: aut studebitis malitiae, et sic eritis arbor mala, et fructus malus; Ier. II, 21: ego plantavi te vineam meam electam, quomodo conversa es mihi in pravum, vinea aliena? But Augustine refers it to the intention. They said that he cast out demons in Beelzebub. Therefore, he wishes to show from what root this would have proceeded, that it would have proceeded from malice of heart. So he says: either make. Here two things are set down. One meritorious, that one make the tree good, and work and study that you may be a good tree, which a man cannot do without preparation. Hence strive that you may be a good tree, and then there will be good fruit, and good words. And what follows is said that they may beware, namely or make the tree evil, and its fruit evil: or you will be eager for evil, and thus you will be an evil tree, and the fruit evil. Yet I planted you a chosen vineyard, all true seed: how then are you turned unto me into that which is good for nothing, O strange vineyard? (Jer 2:21). 1036. Secundum autem utramque lecturam convenit probatio quae sequitur siquidem ex fructu arbor cognoscitur etc., quia per fructum bonum bona, per fructum malum mala. 1036. But according to either reading, the proof which follows fits in: for by the fruit the tree is known, because by good fruit a good tree is known, by evil fruit an evil tree. 1037. Progenies viperarum et cetera. Et hoc diversimode subditur praemissis secundum diversas expositiones. 1037. O generation of vipers. And this is connected to what came before in different ways, according to the different explanations. Secundum Augustinum est quaedam applicatio ad propositum sic. Dictum est aut facite et cetera. Et vos facitis malum. Vos estis arbor mala, et quia arbor mala, mala facitis, quia non potestis bona loqui. According to Augustine, there is a certain application to the thing intended in this way. It was said, either make the tree good . . . or make the tree evil. And you make it evil. You are the evil tree, and because you are an evil tree, you do evil, because you cannot speak good. Secundum expositionem aliorum ostendit ex quo procedat haec malitia, et vocat Pharisaeos progenies viperarum, quia qui a pueritia malitiam habent, firmius tenent; ideo malitia viperae dicitur malitia eorum; Prov. cap. XXII, 6: adolescens iuxta viam suam, cum senuerit, non recedet ab ea. Ideo pluries qui parentes habent malos, promptiores sunt ad malum; Ier. XIV, 20: cognovimus iniquitates patrum nostrorum. Unde bonum est, quod homo a consuetudine subdat se bono operi. Item natura serpentum est, quod cum lingua venenum eiiciunt, sic mali faciunt; Iob XX, 16: occidit eum lingua viperae. Et in Ps. CXXXIX, 4: acuerunt linguas suas sicut serpentes. According to the others’ explanation, he shows what this malice proceeds from, and calls the Pharisees a generation of vipers, because those who have malice from boyhood hold it more firmly. For this reason their malice is called the malice of a viper; a young man according to his way, even when he is old he will not depart from it (Prov 22:6). For this reason oftentimes those who have evil parents are more prompt to do evil; we acknowledge, O Lord, our wickedness, the iniquities of our fathers (Jer 14:20). Hence, it is good that a man should apply himself to good works out of custom. Likewise, it is the nature of serpents that they spit out venom with the tongue; thus do evil men. The viper’s tongue will kill him (Job 20:16). And, they have sharpened their tongues like a serpent: the venom of asps is under their lips (Ps 139:4). Ideo dicit quomodo potestis bona loqui? Non dicit bona facere, sed loqui, quia filii estis viperae, quae nocet lingua; ideo cum sitis imitatores patrum sceleris, quomodo potestis bona loqui? Quasi dicat, non potestis. So he says, how can you speak good things? He does not say do good things, but speak, because you are the sons of vipers, which harm with the tongue. So since you are imitators of your father’s wicked deeds, how can you speak good things? As though to say, you cannot. 1038. Et assignat rationem: et 1038. And he gives the reason. And primo in generali; first, in general; secundo in speciali, ibi bonus homo de bono thesauro profert bona et cetera. second, in particular, at a good man out of a good treasure. 1039. Dicit ergo: ita non potestis loqui. Unde? Quia mali estis. Quare? Quia ex abundantia cordis os loquitur, quia vox est signum intellectus. 1039. He says then: you cannot speak good things. For what reason? Because you are evil. Why? For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks, because the voice is a sign of the intellect. Dicit ex abundantia cordis, quia, secundum Chrysostomum, cum aliquis ex malitia loquitur, signum est quod maior malitia sit in corde, quia de hoc quod intus retinet, nullum timet. Dum ergo aliquid ex malitia profert, signum est quod magis sit intus, quod proferre non audet. Ideo dicit ex abundantia cordis os loquitur. Et ex abundantia malitiae interius os loquitur, et hoc est in bono, et in malo. Unde Ier. XX, 9: factus est sermo Domini in me quasi ignis et cetera. Item in malo similiter, quia aliqui ex malitia concipiunt aliquid quod non possunt retinere; Iob XXXII, 18: coarctat me spiritus uteri mei et cetera. He says, out of the abundance of the heart, because, according to Chrysostom, when someone speaks out of malice, it is a sign that there is a greater malice in the heart, because he has nothing to fear from what he keeps within. Therefore, when something is brought forth out of malice, it is a sign that there is more inside, which he does not dare bring forth. This is why he says, out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks. And out of an abundance of malice, the interior mouth speaks, and this is in the good and in the evil. Hence, the word of the Lord came in my heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones (Jer 20:9). And similarly in the evil, because some conceive something out of malice which they cannot keep within; for I am full of matter to speak of, and the spirit of my bowels constrains me (Job 32:18). 1040. Bonus homo de bono thesauro profert bona. Quod dixerat ex abundantia cordis os loquitur, exponit in particulari. Verbum quod egreditur de cogitatione, est sicut donum quod egreditur de thesauro. Unde si cogitatio est bona, verbum est bonum, et e contrario. Bonus thesaurus est scientia veritatis et timor Domini; Is. XXXIII, v. 6: divitiae salutis sapientia et scientia, timor Domini ipse thesaurus est. Item malus thesaurus est mala cogitatio; et de hoc non procedit nisi malum; Prov. X, 2: nil proderunt thesauri impietatis. 1040. A good man out of a good treasure brings forth good things. He explains in the particular what he had said, out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks. A word which is brought forth from thought is like a gift which is brought forth from a treasure. Hence if the thought is good, the word is good, and vice versa. The good treasure is the knowledge of truth and the fear of the Lord; riches of salvation, wisdom and knowledge: the fear of the Lord is his treasure (Isa 33:6). Likewise the evil treasure is an evil thought, and nothing comes from this but evil; treasures of wickedness will profit nothing (Prov 10:2). Videte: quod de verbis ibi dicitur, istud etiam intelligitur de operibus. Sicut enim cogitatio est radix sermonis, ita intentio operationis; ideo si intentio est bona, opus est bonum. Unde ibi Glossa, tantum facis quantum intendis. See: what is said there about words is also understood with regard to works. For just as thought is the root of words, so intention is the root of works. Therefore, if the intention is good, the work is good. Hence the Gloss there: as much as you intend, that much you do. 1041. In bono videtur habere instantiam. Ponatur quod aliquis velit furari ut det eleemosynam, actus est malus et intentio bona: ergo et cetera. 1041. In the good there seems to be an objection. Let it be supposed that someone wills to steal in order to give alms: the act is evil and the intention good. Therefore. Dico. Intentio et voluntas quandoque distinguuntur, quando scilicet in uno et eodem aliud est voluntas et intentio. Voluntas est de obiecto volito, intentio de fine: voluntas est sicut si volo ire ad fenestram ut videam transeuntes, haec est intentio, quasi extra tentio: unde oportet quod voluntas et intentio unum sint. Unde possumus large considerare intentionem, et voluntatem, et sic in isto. Si voluntas est mala, actus est malus. Tamen si excludatur, et sumatur proprie, non est verum. I say: intention and will are sometimes distinguished, namely when the will and the intention are different in one and the same. The will is of the object willed, the intention is of the end. The will is as when I go to the window to see those passing by, this is intention, as it were beyond the holding. Hence it is necessary that the will and the intention be the same. Hence we can consider intention and will broadly, and so it is in this case. If the will is evil, the act is evil. Yet if the wide sense is excluded, and it is taken properly, it is not true. 1042. Sed, posito quod intentio et actus voluntatis unum sint, quid inde? 1042. But, if it is set down that the intention and the act of the will are one, what then? Est dicendum, quod principalitas meriti consistit circa caritatem, ex consequenti circa meritum aliarum virtutum. Meritum enim respicit praemium essentiale, penes quod consideratur caritas. Sic unumquodque opus, quod in maiori fit caritate, magis habet de merito. Sola caritas habet Deum pro obiecto et fine. Unde meritum caritatis respondet praemio substantiali, meritum aliarum virtutum praemio accidentali. Quia igitur caritas informat intentionem, quanto aliquis ex maiori caritate aliquid intendit, tantum facit; sed quantum ad praemium accidentale non. One should say that the principle of merit consists in charity, and by consequence in the merit of the other virtues. For merit regards the essential reward, according as charity is considered. Thus whatever work is done in greater charity has more merit. Only charity has God for its object and end. Hence the merit of charity corresponds to the substantial reward, and the merit of the other virtues to the accidental rewards. Since therefore charity shapes the intention, as much as someone intends something from a greater charity, that much he does; but not as regards the accidental reward. 1043. Dico autem vobis et cetera. Dominus istos reprehendit propter gravitatem peccati, et propter malitiam eorum; nunc propter futurum iudicium, quod fide tenemus: dicitur enim Iob XIX, 29: fugite a facie gladii, quoniam ultor iniquitatum gladius est: et scitote esse iudicium; Eccle. XII, 14: cuncta quae fiunt, adducet Dominus in iudicium pro omni errato, sive bonum sive malum sit. Item II ad Cor. V, 10: omnes enim nos oportet manifestari ante tribunal Christi, ut referat unusquisque propria corporis, prout gessit, sive bonum sive malum. Unde ibi erit examinatio, quia reddet unusquisque rationem de factis suis. Ideo addit etiam de verbis, dicens dico autem vobis, quoniam omne verbum otiosum quod locuti fuerint homines, reddent rationem de eo in die iudicii. Et hoc dicitur Sap. I, 8: qui loquitur iniqua, non poterit latere. Et subditur, quod sermo obscurus in vacuum non ibit. 1043. But I say unto you. The Lord reproached them because of the gravity of their sin, and because of their malice; now, because of the future judgment, which we hold by faith. For it is said, flee then from the face of the sword, for the sword is the revenger of iniquities: and know you that there is judgment (Job 19:29). And all things that are done, God will bring into judgment for every error, whether it be good or evil (Eccl 12:14). Likewise, for we must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that everyone may receive the proper things of the body, according as he has done, whether it be good or evil (2 Cor 5:10). Hence there will be an examination there, for each one will give a reason for his deeds. For this reason, he also adds something about words, saying, but I say unto you, that every idle word that men will speak, they will render an account for it in the day of judgment. And this is said, he who speaks unjust things cannot be hid (Wis 1:8). And it is added further down that an obscure speech will not go for naught (Wis 1:11). 1044. Sed quid est quod dicit de verbo otioso? Verbum otiosum dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo omne verbum malum dicitur otiosum; quia illud dicitur otiosum quod non consequitur finem, sicut si aliquis quaerit hominem, et non invenit, dicitur otiose quaesiisse. Verbum autem datur ad instructionem. Quando ergo proficit, non est otiosum: ad Ephes. IV, 29: omnis sermo malus ex ore vestro non procedat; sed si quis bonum ad aedificationem fidei, ut det gratiam audientibus et cetera. Et secundum Chrysostomum, respicit ad propositum, quia dixerant quod in Beelzebub et cetera. Istud verbum erat perniciosum, ideo etiam otiosum, secundum Hieronymum. Differt quidem perniciosum, et otiosum, quia perniciosum est quod nocumentum infert, otiosum vero quod non affert utilitatem. Gregorius dicit, quod otiosum dicitur, quod caret pia utilitate, vel necessitate. Unde quodlibet verbum quod profertur leviter, dicitur otiosum, nisi habeat piam utilitatem, vel piam necessitatem. 1044. But what is it that he says about an idle word? An idle word is said two ways. In one way, every evil word is called idle, because that is called idle which does not obtain its end, as when someone seeks a man and does not find him, he is said to have sought him idly. But a word is given for instruction. Therefore when it profits the hearer, it is not idle; let no evil speech proceed from your mouth; but that which is good, to the edification of faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers (Eph 4:29). And according to Chrysostom, he looks to the matter at hand, for they had said that by Beelzebub. That word was most pernicious, and therefore also idle. According to Jerome, the pernicious and the idle differ, for the pernicious is that which brings harm, but the idle is that which bears no usefulness. Gregory says that what lacks a pious usefulness or necessity is called idle. Hence any word which is brought forth lightly is called idle, unless it has a pious usefulness, or a pious necessity. Sed constat quod isti dixerant verbum perniciosum: quare ergo non facit mentionem nisi de otioso? Quia vult arguere a minori: quia si de otioso oportet reddere rationem, multo magis de pernicioso. But it is known that these men had spoken a pernicious word: why then does he only mention the idle word? Because he wishes to argue from the lesser, for if a reason must be given for an idle word, much more for a pernicious one. 1045. Deinde ostendit rationem ex verbis enim tuis iustificaberis et cetera. In iudicio mundi aliquando innocentes puniuntur, et mali liberantur, quia iudicium fit secundum dicta testium; in iudicio Dei ex homine ipso seipsum accusante, scilicet ex sui confessione. Unde ut non credas, quod iudiceris per ea quae alii dicent de te, sed per ea quae tu dices de te, ideo dicit ex verbis enim tuis iustificaberis, et ex verbis tuis condemnaberis. Sicut Lc. XIX, 22: ex ore tuo te iudico, serve nequam. 1045. Then he shows the reason: for by your words you will be justified. In the judgment of the world, the innocent are sometimes punished, and the evil set free, because judgment is made according to spoken testimony; in God’s judgment, judgment is made by the man himself accusing himself, namely by his own confession. Hence that you may not believe that you will be judged by the things which others say about you, but by the things which you say about yourself, for this reason he says, for by your words you will be justified, and by your words you will be condemned. As in, out of your own mouth I judge you, you wicked servant (Luke 19:22). Lectio 3 Lecture 3