Et quare non respondet Dominus de timore, sicut de dilectione? Dicendum quod quidam timent Deum, qui timent pati ab eo, ut qui timent poenam Gehennae, vel qui timent amittere aliquid quod habent a Deo; et hic est timor servilis, quia illud diligit in quo timet puniri. Alius est, qui ipsum Deum timet propter se, qui timet eum offendere; et talis timor est ex amore, et ex hoc timet, quod amat; ergo principium est amor; I Io. c. IV, 16: Deus caritas est, et qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Et ideo dicit ‘diliges Dominum’; non timeas, quia Deus diligendus est sicut primum diligibile, quia ipse finis primus est, sed quaecumque alia diliguntur propter finem. Qui ergo diligit Deum ut finem, diligit in toto corde; Ioel II, 12: convertimini ad me in toto corde vestro. Et quantumcumque nitamini, non poteritis eum comprehendere, quia Deus maior est toto corde. And why does the Lord not respond about fear, as about love? It should be said that some fear God who fear to be hurt by him, as those who fear the punishment of Gehenna, or those who fear to lose something they have from God; and this is servile fear, because he loves that in which he fears being punished. There is another who fears God himself on account of himself, who fears to offend him; and such fear is from love, and he fears because he loves. Therefore the principle is love; God is charity: and he who abides in charity, abides in God, and God in him (1 John 4:16). And for this reason he says, ‘you shall love the Lord’, not you shall fear, because God is to be loved as the first lovable thing, since he himself is the first end, while any other things are loved for the sake of the end. Therefore he who loves God as the end, loves with his whole heart; be converted to me with all your heart (Joel 2:12). And however much you struggle, you will not be able to completely grasp him, because God is greater than the whole heart. 1814. Sed quid est quod dicit ‘ex toto corde tuo, et ex tota anima tua, et in tota mente tua’? Chrysostomus exponit sic: quia in dilectione sunt duo: unum quod est principium; secundum quod est dilectionis effectus et sequela dilectionis. Principium dilectionis est duplex. Dilectio enim potest fieri ex passione, et ex iudicio rationis: ex passione, cum nescit homo vivere sine eo quod diligit; ex ratione, secundum quod diligit ut ratio dictat. Dicit ergo quod ille ex toto corde diligit, qui diligit carnaliter; ille ex anima, qui ex iudicio rationis. Et nos Deum utroque modo debemus diligere: carnaliter, ut cor carnaliter afficiatur circa Deum; unde in Ps. LXXXIII, 3: cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum. Tertium est sequela dilectionis, quia illud quod diligo, libenter video, libenter de eo cogito, libenter facio quod ei placet; Io. XIV, 23: qui diligit me, sermones meos servabit; et totum refero in ipsum; Ps. LXXXIII, 2: quam dilecta tabernacula tua, Domine virtutum. Concupiscit et deficit anima mea in atria Domini. Et possumus addere illud quod Marcus addit, et in omni fortitudine tua, quia qui Deum diligit, totum se transfert in illum, et fortitudinem expendit in ipsum. 1814. But why does he say, ‘with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind’? Chrysostom explains it this way: there are two things in love, one which is the beginning, and a second which is an effect of love and a consequence of love. There are two principles of love. For love can arise from passion, and from the judgment of reason: from passion, when a man does not know how to live without that which he loves; from reason, inasmuch as he loves as reason dictates. He says therefore that he who loves bodily loves with the whole heart; he who loves out of the judgment of reason loves with the soul. And we should love God both ways: bodily, as the heart is moved bodily concerning God; hence, my heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God (Ps 83:3). Third, there is a consequence of love, because that which I love, I freely behold, I freely think on it, I freely do what pleases it; if any one love me, he will keep my word (John 14:23); and I refer the whole to it; how lovely are your tabernacles, O Lord of hosts! My soul longs and faints for the courts of the Lord (Ps 83:2–3). And we can add what Mark adds, and with the whole strength (Mark 12:33), because he who loves God, transfers his whole self into him, and expends his strength on him. Augustinus sic distinguit inter cor et animam et mentem, secundum tria quae procedunt ex ipsis. De corde exeunt cogitationes, ut habetur supra XV, 19, ex anima vita procedit, ex mente scientia et intelligentia. Unde quod dicit ‘ex toto corde’, intelligendum est ut omnes cogitationes in ipsum referamus; quod ‘ex tota anima’, quod tota vita; quod ‘ex tota mente’, ut tota scientia referatur in eum, idest ut scientiam captives in obsequium eius; II Cor. X, 5: in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi. Augustine distinguishes between the heart and the soul and the mind according to the three things which come from them. From the heart come thoughts, as is said above (Matt 15:19); from the soul comes life; from the mind, knowledge and intelligence. Hence when he says, ‘with your whole heart’, it should be understood that we should refer all our thoughts to him; when he says, ‘with your whole soul’, that we should refer our whole life to him; when he says, ‘with your whole mind’, that the whole of knowledge should be referred to him, i.e., that you should lay hold of knowledge in his service. Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ (2 Cor 10:5). Magistralis quaedam Glossa exponit quod anima est imago Dei secundum suas potentias, secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, ita quod illud quod dicitur ‘ex corde’, ad intelligentiam referatur; quod dicitur ‘ex anima’, ad voluntatem; quod ‘ex mente’, ad memoriam, ita ut perfecte Deo vivatur. A certain magisterial Gloss explains that the soul is the image of God according to its powers, according to memory, understanding, and will, so that when it says, ‘with your whole heart’, it is referred to the understanding; when it says, ‘with your whole soul’, to the will; when ‘with your whole mind’, to the memory, such that one lives perfectly for God. Origenes sic exponit: ‘diliges Deum ex tota anima’, ita ut sis paratus animam tuam ponere pro eo si necesse est; Io. XIII, 37: animam meam ponam pro te. Origen explains it this way: ‘you shall love the Lord your God . . . with your whole soul’ such that you are prepared to lay down your soul for him if it is necessary; I will lay down my life for you (John 13:37). Sed differentia est inter mentem et cor. ‘Mens’ enim dicitur a ‘metiendo’; ‘cor’ sumitur pro simplicitate intellectus; ‘mens’ vero quoad prolationem, quia per sermonem metitur intellectus, sive cogitatio: unde vult dicere quod in locutionibus et in meditationibus Deum totaliter diligamus. But there is a difference between the mind and the heart. For ‘mind’ is derived from ‘measuring’; ‘heart’ is used for simplicity of understanding, but ‘mind’ with regard to enlargement, because understanding or thought is measured by words. Hence he wished to say that we should love God entirely in speech and in meditation. 1815. Hic posito, subdit hoc est primum et maximum mandatum. Maximum capacitate: istud enim est, in quo omnia continentur, quia in isto dilectio proximi continetur, secundum quod I Io. IV, 21 dicitur: qui diligit Deum, diligit et fratrem suum; et ideo maximum. Item primum origine, maximum dignitate et capacitate. Non primum in Scriptura, quia in Scriptura primum mandatum fuit, Dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est, Deut. VI, 4. Et quare? Quia omnis inclinatio appetitivae virtutis est in amore: ideo habemus mandatum quod colamus Deum in dilectione; ad Rom. XIII, 10: plenitudo legis dilectio est; ad Eph. III, 17: in caritate radicati et fundati. 1815. This being set out, he adds, this is the greatest and the first commandment. The greatest in comprehension: for this is the one in which all are contained, because the love of neighbor is contained in this, according as is said in John, he who loves God, loves also his brother (1 John 4:21); and so it is the greatest. Likewise it is the first in origin, the greatest in dignity and comprehension. Not the first in Scripture, because in Scripture the first commandment was, the Lord our God is one Lord (Deut 6:4). And why? Because every inclination of the appetitive power is in love, so we have a commandment that we should worship God in love; love therefore is the fulfilling of the law (Rom 13:10); rooted and founded in charity (Eph 3:17). 1816. Secundo, ponit secundum mandatum secundum autem simile huic est: ‘diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum.’ Voluit significare quod in mandatis est ordo. Et quae est causa? Constat quod mandata sunt de actibus virtutum; virtutes autem habent ordinem, quia una dependet ab alia, et sicut virtutes, sic et mandata. 1816. Second, he sets out the second commandment: and the second is similar to this: ‘you shall love your neighbor as yourself.’ He wished to indicate that there is an order in the commandments. And what is the reason? It is agreed that the commandments are about acts of virtue; but the virtues have an order, since one depends on another, and as are the virtues, so also are the commandments. 1817. Sed quare dicit quod est simile primo? Quia quando diligitur homo, cum homo sit ad similitudinem Dei, diligitur Deus in illo; ideo simile est primo mandato, quod est de dilectione Dei. 1817. But why does he say that it is like the first? Because when a man is loved, since man is made to the likeness of God, God is loved in him; for this reason it is like the first commandment, which is about the love of God. 1818. Sed quid intelligit nomine ‘proximi’, cum dicit ‘diliges proximum’? Istud satis signatur in parabola Lc. X, 36, ubi quaeritur, quis tibi videtur, quod fuerit eius proximus? Et respondetur, qui fecit misericordiam in eum. Unde qui debet facere misericordiam nobis, vel nos ipsi, sub nomine ‘proximi’ continetur. Sed non est aliqua rationalis creatura, cui non debeamus misereri, et e converso: et ideo sub nomine ‘proximi’ continetur homo et angelus. 1818. But what does he understand by the name ‘neighbor’, when he says, ‘you shall love your neighbor’? This is sufficiently indicated in the parable, where it is asked, which of these three, in your opinion, was neighbor to him? (Luke 10:36). And it is responded, he who showed mercy to him. Hence the one who should show mercy to us, or we to him, is contained under the name ‘neighbor.’ But there is no rational creature to whom we should not show mercy, and vice versa; and therefore under the name ‘neighbor’ are contained man and angel. 1819. Et quod dicit ‘sicut teipsum’, non intelligitur quantum teipsum, quia hoc esset contra ordinem caritatis; sed ‘sicut teipsum’, idest eo fine quo teipsum, vel eo modo quo teipsum. Eo fine, quia te non debes diligere propter te, sed propter Deum, sic etiam proximum. Apostolus I Cor. X, 31: omnia in gloriam Dei facite. Item in eo quod teipsum diligis, diligis te in eo in quo vis tibi bonum, et tale bonum, quod sit secundum te et legem Dei, et hoc est bonum iustitiae. Sic etiam et proximo debes optare bonam iustitiam; unde debes eum diligere, vel quia iustus est, vel quia iustus fit. Item debes eum diligere eo modo quo teipsum, quia cum dico diligo istum, dico volo bonum ei. Unde actus dilectionis cadit super duo: vel super ipsum qui bonus est, vel super ipsum bonum, quod volo sibi; unde diligo istum, quia volo ipsum esse bonum mihi. Unde aliquis diligit bona temporalia, quia scit ea bona esse sibi; aliqui vero diligunt aliquid, quia bonum est in se: sic debes diligere teipsum, et etiam proximum. 1819. And when he says, ‘as yourself’, it should not be understood to mean as much as yourself, for this would be against the order of charity, but ‘as yourself’, i.e., for the same end as yourself, or in the same way as yourself. For the same end, because you should not love yourself for your own sake, but for God’s sake; so also your neighbor. The Apostle: do all to the glory of God (1 Cor 10:31). Likewise by the fact that you love yourself, you love yourself in that in which you will good to yourself, and such a good as is in accord with you and with the law of God, and this is the good of righteousness. So also you should choose the good of righteousness for your neighbor; hence you should love him either because he is righteous, or that he may be righteous. Likewise you should love him in the same way as yourself, because when I say, I love this man, I say I will good to him. Hence the act of love falls upon two things: either on the one who is good, or on that good which I will to myself; hence I love this man, because I will him to be good for me. So some love temporal goods because they know that those goods are for them; but some love a thing because it is good in itself. And you should love yourself in this way, and also your neighbor. 1820. Consequenter assignat rationem quare ista duo sint maxima mandata in his duobus mandatis universa lex pendet, et prophetae. Tota doctrina legis et prophetarum dependet ab his. Finis in appetibilibus se habet ut principium in speculativis: procedit enim scientia a principiis ad conclusiones, et sic tota scientia ex principiis iudicatur, sicut et in omnibus operabilibus totum dependet a fine. Quia ergo dilectio est finis; I ad Tim. c. I, 5: finis praecepti est caritas; ideo ab istis dependent omnia alia, et haec est expositio Augustini. 1820. Next he gives the reason why these two are the greatest commandments: on these two commandments depends the whole law and the prophets. The teaching of the law and the prophets depends on these. The end in appetible things stand as do the principles in speculative matters: for science proceeds from principles to conclusions, and in this way the whole science is judged from the principles, just as in all doable things the whole thing depends on the end. Since therefore love is of the end: now the end of the commandment is charity (1 Tim 1:5), therefore on these depend all the others, and this is Augustine’s explanation. Origenes sic exponit: in his, idest in observantia istorum, dependet intellectus legis et prophetarum, quia qui haec observat, meretur intelligentiam legis et prophetarum; Eccli. II, 10: qui timetis Dominum, diligite illum, et illuminabuntur corda vestra. Ps. CXVIII, 104: a mandatis tuis intellexi, propterea odivi omnem viam iniquitatis. Origen explains it this way: on these, i.e., on the observance of these, depends the understanding of the law and the prophets, because the one who observes these merits understanding of the law and the prophets; you who fear the Lord, love him, and your hearts will be enlightened (Sir 2:10). By your commandments I have had understanding: therefore have I hated every way of iniquity (Ps 118:104). 1821. Congregatis autem Pharisaeis interrogavit eos Iesus. Postquam responderat eis, ipse voluit obiicere: et facit duo. 1821. And while the Pharisees were gathered together, Jesus asked them. After he had responded to them, he wished to pose an objection himself: and he does two things: Primo ponitur interrogatio; first, the questioning is set down; secundo eius effectus, ibi nemo poterat ei respondere verbum. second, its effect, at and no man was able to answer him a word. Circa primum Concerning the first, primo proponit interrogationem; first, he sets forth the question; secundo responsionem; second, the response; tertio obiicit contra. third, he objects against the contrary. 1822. Dicit ergo congregatis autem Pharisaeis, interrogavit eos Iesus. Congregati autem erant ad tentandum; unde ponit interrogationem quid vobis videtur de Christo, cuius filius est? Haec quaestio difficillima erat et congrua. 1822. It says therefore, and while the Pharisees were gathered together, Jesus asked them. They were gathered together to test him; hence he poses the question: what do you think of the Christ? Whose son is he? This question was most difficult, and fitting. Difficillima, quia habetur Is. LIII, 8: generationem eius quis enarrabit? Most difficult, because it says, who will declare his generation? (Isa 53:8). Erat etiam congrua, quia habebant opinionem, quod esset purus homo, et non credebant ipsum esse Deum, quia sic non tentarent eum, quia scriptum est Deut. VI, 16: non tentabis Dominum Deum tuum. Ideo ut ostendat se Deum dicit quid vobis videtur de Christo? It was also fitting, because they had the opinion that he was a mere man, and they did not believe that he was God, for then they would not have tested him, since it is written, you shall not tempt the Lord your God (Deut 6:16). So to show that he was God he says, what do you think of the Christ? 1823. Sequitur responsio dicunt ei: David. Christi enim erat duplex generatio: una secundum carnem, alia secundum divinitatem, secundum quam est Filius Dei Patris, de qua dicitur Ps. II, 7: Dominus dixit ad me: Filius meus es tu et cetera. Ideo ipsi respondent de generatione secundum carnem, cum dicunt David. Ier. XXIII, 5: suscitabo David germen iustum. Et ad Rom. I, 3: qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem. Et isti insufficienter responderunt, quia insufficienter cognoscebant eum. 1823. There follows the response: they say to him: David’s. For Christ had two generations: one according to the flesh, and another according to the divinity, according to which he is the Son of God the Father, about which the Psalm says, the Lord has said to me: you are my Son (Ps 2:7). So these men respond concerning the generation according to the flesh, when they say, David’s. I will raise up to David a just branch (Jer 23:5). And, who was made to him of the seed of David, according to the flesh (Rom 1:3). And they responded insufficiently, because they knew him insufficiently. 1824. Tunc obiicit ut eis det intelligere aliam generationem quomodo ergo David in spiritu vocat eum Dominum, dicens: ‘dixit Dominus Domino meo: sede a dextris meis’? Ps. CIX, 1. Habetur in lege quod pater maior est filio. Non ergo filius dominus est patris. Ergo vel Christus non est Filius David, vel in eo est aliquid maius David, cum vocet eum Dominum. Sed forte dicerent quod David fuit deceptus: quod removet, quia in spiritu hoc dicit, unde Spiritu Sancto Dei locuti sunt homines, II Petri I, 21. 1824. Then he objects, that he may give them to understand the other generation: how then does David in spirit call him Lord, saying: ‘the Lord said to my Lord, sit on my right hand, until I make your enemies your footstool’? (Ps 109:1). It says in the law that father is greater than son. Therefore a son is not the lord of his father. Therefore either Christ is not the son of David, or in him is something greater than David, since he calls him Lord. But perhaps they would say that David was deceived; which possibility he removes, because he says this, in spirit, hence, the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit (2 Pet 1:21). 1825. Possumus autem tria videre in auctoritate ista Psalmi. Primo praeeminentiam ad sanctos, aequalitatem ad Patrem, et dominium super rebelles. 1825. And we can see three things in this quotation from the Psalm: preeminence over the saints, equality with the Father, and lordship over rebels. Praeeminentiam ad sanctos, cum dicit ‘dixit Dominus Domino meo.’ ‘Dominus’, scilicet Pater, ‘Domino’, scilicet Filio: ipse enim Filius habet dominium super omnes sanctos: nullus enim sanctus illuminatur nisi a lumine vero: ipse autem est lumen verum; Io. I, 4: vita erat lux hominum. Si ergo ipse est, cuius participatione omnes sancti lumen recipiunt, praeeminentiam habet ad omnes sanctos in eo quod dicitur: tecum principium in die virtutis tuae, in splendoribus sanctorum etc.; unde ipse originaliter est splendor omnium sanctorum. Preeminence over the saints, when he says, ‘the Lord said to my Lord.’ ‘The Lord’, namely the Father, ‘to my Lord’, namely the Son: for the Son has dominion over all the saints. For no saint is enlightened unless by the true light; but he himself is the true light; the life was the light of men (John 1:4). If therefore he is the one participation with whom all the saints receive, he has preeminence over all the saints in what is said, with you is the principality in the day of your strength: in the brightness of the saints (Ps 109:3). Hence he himself as origin is the splendor of all the saints. 1826. Item aequalitas Patris tangitur, cum dicitur ‘sede a dextris meis’: non quod sint sedes locales, sed metaphorice, quia honorabilior locus est sedere a dextris. Dicere enim est emittere verbum. Quod ergo dixit Dominus ‘sede a dextris meis’ quid est aliud, nisi quod generando me Verbum, dedit mihi potestatem, aequalitatem et auctoritatem? Potest etiam exponi de temporalibus, idest in potioribus bonis, sed non est ad propositum. Dominus enim semper videtur a dextris, ut in Marc. ult., 5: viderunt iuvenem sedentem a dextris. Et Stephanus, Act. VII, 55, vidit Iesum sedentem a dextris virtutis Dei. 1826. Likewise equality with the Father is touched upon, when it says, ‘sit on my right hand’ not that there are physically located seats, but metaphorically, because the more honorable place is to sit at the right hand. For to speak is to send forth a word. Therefore when the Lord says, ‘sit on my right hand’, what else is it but, by generating me the Word, he gave me power, equality, and authority? It can also be explained as about temporal things, i.e., in more powerful goods, but this is irrelevant. For the Lord is always seen on the right hand, as in Mark, they saw a young man sitting on the right side (Mark 16:5). And Stephen saw Jesus sitting at the right hand of the power of God (Acts 7:55). 1827. Et quid fiet de inimicis eius? Ei omnes subiicientur; unde subdit ‘donec ponam inimicos tuos scabellum pedum tuorum.’ Isti vel sunt penitus infideles, vel hi qui noluerunt obedire et subesse; unde istos ponet ‘scabellum pedum tuorum.’ Scabellum enim est quod ponitur sub pedibus; illud autem quod est sub pedibus totaliter ei subiicitur, non autem illud quod est in manu. Quidam ponuntur scabellum ad punitionem, quidam ad salutem: ad punitionem, qui nolunt facere eius voluntatem; ad salutem, qui faciunt eius voluntatem. 1827. And what will happen to his enemies? They will all be subjected to him; hence he adds: ‘until I make your enemies your footstool.’ These are either the thoroughly unfaithful, or those who would not obey and be subject; hence he will make those ‘your footstool.’ For a footstool is what is placed under the feet; but that which is under the feet is entirely subjected to him, not however that which is in the hand. Some are made a footstool for punishment, others for salvation: for punishment, those who do not want to do his will; for salvation, those who do his will. Sed obiiciunt Ariani: ergo non est aequalis Patri. But the Arians object: therefore he is not equal to the Father. Dico quod legitur utrumque, et quod subiicitur Patri, et quod est aequalis Patri; I ad Cor. XV, 25: oportet autem illum regnare, donec ponat inimicos sub pedibus. Item Christus sibi omnia subiiciet; Phil. III, 21: reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae configuratum corpori claritatis suae. Unde illud dicit ad demonstrandum unitatem potestatis: unde omnia quae potest Pater, eadem potest et Filius. I say that both things are written, both that he is subjected to the Father and that he is equal to the Father; for he must reign, until he has put all his enemies under his feet (1 Cor 15:25). Likewise, Christ will subject all things to himself; who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of his glory (Phil 3:21). Hence he says this to show the unity of power: so everything which the Father can do, the Son can do as well. 1828. Sed quid est quod dicit ‘donec ponam inimicos tuos scabellum pedum tuorum’? Ergo videtur quod postquam supposuerit inimicos, quod ultra non sedebit a dextris. 1828. But why does he say, ‘until I make your enemies your footstool’? Therefore it seems that after he has subjected the enemies, he will no longer sit at the right hand. Dicendum quod ‘donec’ aliquando importat tempus determinatum, aliquando infinitum. Hic vero importat infinitum. One should say that ‘until’ sometimes implies a determinate time, and sometimes an infinite. But here it implies an infinite. Sed diceret aliquis: nonne multi rebellant Christo? But someone would say: do not many rebel against Christ? Ita, verum est quod multi rebellant, et ideo poterat esse dubium de tempore quando multi rebellarent: ideo voluit Christus exprimere. Yes, it is true that many rebel, and so there could be a doubt about the time when many were rebelling: it is for this reason that Christ wished to make a statement. 1829. Si ergo David vocat eum Dominum, quomodo filius eius est? Ergo Dominus est et filius, quia filius est secundum carnem, quia ab ipso traxit originem, et Dominus secundum divinitatem. 1829. If David then calls him Lord, how is he his son? Therefore the Lord is both son, because he is David’s son according to the flesh, since he took his origin from him, and Lord, according to the divinity.