2598. Et hoc necessarium fuit ponere Aristoteli ut possit salvare aeternitatem mundi. Manifestum enim erat quod a quodam certo tempore inceperant homines philosophari et artes adinvenire. Inconveniens autem videbatur, quod infinito tempore fuisset absque his humanum genus. Et ideo dicit quod philosophiae et aliae artes fuerunt multoties inventae et corruptae, et quod opiniones illorum antiquorum quasi reliquiae salvantur usque nunc. 2598. It was also necessary for Aristotle to maintain this view in order to save the eternity of the world. For it was evident that, at one time, men began to philosophize and to discover the arts, and it would seem absurd that the human race should be without these for an infinite period of time. Hence he says that philosophy and the various arts were often discovered and lost, and that the opinions of those ancient thinkers are preserved as relics up to the present day. 2599. Et ultimo concludit quod praedicta opinio, idest quae a philosophantibus habita est, post quos destructa fuit philosophia, solum sic manifesta est, scilicet per modum fabulae, ut supra dictum est. 2599. Last, he concludes that the opinion of our forefathers, that is, the one received from those who philosophized and after whom philosophy was lost, is evident to us only in this way, namely, in the form of a myth, as has been stated above (1074a38; [2597]). Lectio 11 Lecture 11 The dignity of the first intelligence Quae autem circa intellectum, habent quasdam dubitationes. Videtur quidem enim apparentium divinissimum. Quomodo veto habens talis erit, utique habet quasdam difficultates. The things that pertain to intellect involve certain difficulties, for of the things apparent to us, it seems to be the most divine, but how it is so gives rise to certain difficulties. Nam si non intelligat, sed habet se quemadmodum ut si dormiens quid utique erit insigne? Sive intelligat, huius vero aliud principale, non enim est hoc quod est sua substantia intelligentia, sed potentia, non utique erit optima substantia; per intelligere enim honorabile ei inest. For if it is not actually understanding, but is in a sense like one asleep, what dignity will it have? Or, if it is understanding but its chief good is different from itself, then, since its essence is not an act of understanding, but a potency, it will not be the best substance. For it is by reason of its act of understanding that dignity belongs to it. Amplius autem sive intellectus sit sua substantia, sive intelligentia, quid intelligit? Aut enim seipsum, aut alterum aliquid. Aut idem semper, aut aliud. Furthermore, whether its substance is its power to understand or its act of understanding, what does it understand? For it understands either itself or something else; and if something else, either the same thing always or something different. Ergo utrum differt aliquid aut nihil, intelligere bonum, aut contingens? Aut inconveniens meditari de quibusdam. Does it make any difference or not, then, whether it understands what is good or what is contingent? Or is it absurd that it should ponder about certain things? Palam ergo quod divinissimum et honorabilissimum intelligit. Et non transmutatur. In indignius enim transmutatio. Et motus quiddam iam tale. Hence, it is evident that it understands what is most divine and honorable, and that it does not change, for a change would be for the worse, and this would already be motion. Primum quidem igitur, si non est intelligentia, sed potentia, rationabile est laboriosam esse ei continuationem intelligentiae. Therefore, if the first mover is not its act of understanding but a potency, it is reasonable to first assume that the continuity of its act of understanding is laborious to it (1050b22). Deinde palam quia aliud aliquid erit dignius quam intellectus, scilicet intellectum. Etenim intelligere et intelligentia inerit indignissimum intelligenti: Second, [it is evident] that there is something else more honorable than intellect, namely, what it understands. For both the power to understand and understanding itself belong even to one who understands the basest thing. quare fugiendum hoc. Etenim non videre quidem quaedam, dignius quam videre. Non si sit optimum intelligentia. Seipsum ergo intelligit, si quidem est potentissimum. This must accordingly be avoided, for there are some things that it is better not to see than to see. But this will not be so if the act of understanding is the best of things. Therefore, if there is a most powerful intellect, it must understand itself. Et est intelligentia intelligentiae intelligentia. Videtur autem semper alius scientia, et sensus, et opinio, et meditatio. Ipsius autem in accessorio. And its act of understanding is an understanding of understanding. But science, perception, opinion, and thought always seem to be about something else and only indirectly about themselves. Amplius si aliud est intelligere et intelligi, secundum quid ei quidem ipsum bene inest? Non enim idem esse intelligentiae et intellecto. Again, if understanding is something different from being understood, from which of these does the intellect derive its goodness? For the essence of understanding and that of being understood are not the same. At in quibusdam scientia res? In factivis quidem, sine materia. Substantia enim et quod quid erat esse. In theoricis vero, ratio, res et intelligentia. But, in certain cases, is not understanding identical with the thing understood? For in the productive sciences, the object is the substance or quiddity without matter, and in the theoretical sciences, the intelligible structure is both the object and the understanding of it. Non altero igitur existente eo quod intelligitur et intellectu, quaecumque non materiam habent, idem erunt. Et intellectio eius quod intelligitur, una. Therefore, since the object of understanding does not differ from the act of understanding in the case of things that have no matter, they will be the same, and the act of understanding will be identical with the thing understood. Adhuc autem restat dubitatio, si compositum est quod intelligitur. Yet the difficulty still remains as to whether the thing that it understands is composite. Transmutabitur enim partibus totius. For if it is, the intellect will be changed in passing from one part of the whole to another. Aut indivisibile omne quod non habet materiam? Ut humanus intellectus. Now, whatever does not have matter is indivisible, like the human intellect. Aut quod quidem compositorum habet in aliquo tempore? Non enim habet ipsum bene in hoc aut in hoc, sed in toto quodam quod optimum, et ens aliquid aliud. Sic autem habet ipsa sui ipsius intelligentia toto aeterno. And the act of understanding composite things involves time. For it does not possess its goodness at this or at that moment, but attains the greatest good over a whole period of time, and this is something different from itself. And an intellect which understands itself is in this state through all eternity. 2600. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de substantia immateriali quantum ad eius perfectionem et quantum ad eius unitatem, nunc determinat quasdam dubitationes pertinentes ad actionem eius. Ostensum est enim supra, quod prima immaterialis substantia movet sicut intelligibile, et sicut bonum desiderabile. Et ideo dividitur haec pars in duas. 2600. Having settled the issue about the perfection and oneness of this immaterial substance, the Philosopher now meets certain difficulties concerning its action, for it has been shown above (1072a26–1072b3; [2519–35]) that the first immaterial substance causes motion as an intelligible object and a desirable good. This is divided into two parts. In prima determinat quaedam dubia circa primam immaterialem substantiam, quantum ad hoc quod est bonum intelligibile et intellectus. In the first (1074b15; [2600]), he settles certain difficulties about the first immaterial substance insofar as it is an intelligible good and an intellect; In secunda quantum ad hoc quod est bonum appetibile, ibi, perscrutandum est autem qualiter habet et cetera. in the second (1075a11; [2628]), insofar as it is a desirable good, at we must also inquire. Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first, he does two things. Primo assignat rationem dubitationis circa intellectum primae substantiae. First, he gives the reason for the difficulty concerning the intellect of the first substance. Secundo dubitationem movet et determinat, ibi, nam si non intelligat. Second (1074b17; [2601]), he raises and meets this difficulty, at for if it is not. Dicit ergo primo, quod ea quae pertinent ad intellectum primae substantiae immaterialis, habent quasdam dubitationes, et videntur oriri ex hoc. Ostenderat enim Philosophus quod intellectus intelligens et appetens primum movens, quod movet sicut intelligibile et desiderabile, habet aliquid se dignius, scilicet illud quod intelligitur ab eo, et desideratur. Ostenderat etiam quod ipsum primum intelligibile, est etiam intellectus. Unde posset videri quod pari ratione, haberet aliquid dignius et superius, et quod non esset supremum et optimum: quod est contra ea quae apparent de primo principio. Et ideo dicit hic, quod videtur omnibus apparens, quod principium sit dignissimum. Sed difficultates quaedam emergunt, si quis velit assignare quomodo se habeat ita quod sit dignissimum, idest optimum et perfectissimum. He accordingly first says (1074b15) that the things that pertain to the intellect of the first immaterial substance involve certain difficulties, and these seem to arise as follows. The Philosopher has shown that the intellect which understands and desires the first mover, which causes motion as an object of understanding and of desire, has something nobler than itself, namely, what is understood and desired by it. He has also shown that the first intelligible object itself is also an intellect. Hence for a like reason it could appear that the first intellect also has something nobler and higher than itself, and that it therefore is not the highest and best thing. But this is contrary to the truths that are apparent about the first principle, and so he says here that it seems evident to all that this principle is the noblest. Yet certain difficulties emerge if one wishes to explain how it is noblest, that is, best and most perfect. 2601. Deinde cum dicit nam si manifestat huiusmodi difficultates. Et circa hoc tria facit. 2601. For if it is not (1074b17). Then he clears up these difficulties, and in regard to this, he does three things. Primo movet dubitationes. First, he raises the difficulties. Secundo praemittit quaedam, quae sunt praenecessaria ad determinationem omnium quaestionum motarum, ibi, palam ergo quod divinissimum et cetera. Second (1074b25; [2606]), he prefaces his discussion with certain prerequisites for meeting all the questions raised, at hence, it is evident. Tertio solvit dubitationes, ibi, primum quidem. Third (1074b28; [2608]), he solves these difficulties, at therefore, if the first mover. Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first, he does two things. Primo movet quaestiones principaliter intentas. First (1074b17), he raises the questions in which he is chiefly interested. Secundo movet quamdam quaestionem incidentem, cuius solutio necessaria est ad praemissas quaestiones, ibi, ergo utrum differt. Second (1074b23; [2604]), he introduces an additional question whose solution is necessary for solving the questions raised, at does it make. Movet autem primo duas quaestiones. First of all, he raises two questions. Prima est, quomodo intellectus primi moventis se habeat ad suum intelligere. He first asks how the intellect of the first mover is related to its own act of understanding;