2511. Sed quia illud, quod semper eodem modo operatur, non causat nisi aliquod semper eodem modo se habens; in his autem quae generantur et corrumpuntur, apparet quod non semper se habent eodem modo, quia quandoque generantur, et quandoque corrumpuntur; si ergo debet esse generatio et corruptio in istis inferioribus, necesse est ponere aliquod agens, quod aliter se habeat in agendo: 2511. But that which always acts in the same way only causes something that is always in the same state, and obviously those things that are generated and destroyed do not remain in the same state, for at one time they are generated and at another destroyed. This being so, if generation and destruction are to occur in the realm of lower bodies, it is necessary to posit some agent that is always in different states when it acts. et hoc quidem agens dicit esse corpus quod movetur secundum circulum obliquum, qui dicitur zodiacus. Quia, cum hic circulus declinat ad utramque partem ab aequinoctiali, illud, quod movetur secundum circulum per zodiacum, oportet quod sit quandoque magis propinquum et quandoque magis remotum: et secundum hoc sua propinquitate et remotione causat contraria. Videmus enim quod ea, quae appropinquante sole ad nos, generantur, recedente sole, corrumpuntur. Sicut herbae, quae in vere nascuntur, et in autumno siccantur. Moventur enim in circulo zodiaco et sol et alii planetae. Sed et stellae fixae dicuntur moveri super polos zodiaci, et non super polos aequinoctiales, ut Ptolomaeus probat. Ex harum autem motu causatur generatio et corruptio omnium quae generantur et corrumpuntur, sed magis evidenter ex motu solis. He says that this agent is the body that is moved in the oblique circle called the zodiac. For, since this circle falls away on either side of the equinoctial circle, the body that is moved circularly through the zodiac must be at one time nearer and at another farther away, and it causes contraries by reason of its being near or far away. For we see that those things that are generated when the sun comes closer to the earth are destroyed when the sun recedes; for example, plants are born in the spring and wither away in the autumn. For both the sun and the other planets are moved in the circle of the zodiac. But the fixed stars are also said to be moved over the poles of the zodiac and not over the equinoctial poles, as Ptolemy proved. And the coming to be and ceasing to be of everything that is generated and destroyed is caused by the motion of these stars, but more evidently by the motion of the sun. 2512. Hoc ergo movens quod aliter agit, necesse est quod quodam modo agat secundum se, idest ex propria virtute, inquantum causat diversitatem generationis et corruptionis; quodam vero modo secundum aliud idest ex virtute alterius, inquantum causat perpetuam generationem et corruptionem. Aut ergo oportet quod agat secundum aliquid alterum, idest virtute alicuius alterius, aut secundum primum, idest virtute primi, quod semper similiter agit. 2512. Therefore, this mover which acts in different ways must act in one way of itself, that is, by its own power, inasmuch as it causes the diversity found in generation and destruction. And it must act in another way in virtue of something else, that is, by the power of some other agent, inasmuch as it causes eternal generation and destruction. Hence, this second agent must act either in virtue of some third agent, that is, by the power of some other agent, or of the first, that is, by the power of the first agent, which always acts in the same way. Et cum non sit aliquod alterum assignare, ex cuius virtute causet perpetuitatem, necesse est quod secundum hoc quod similiter agit, idest virtute eius, perpetuitatem generationis et corruptionis causet. Id enim, scilicet primum quod semper similiter agit, est causa ipsi, quod aliter et aliter agit: quia id quod aliter et aliter agit, perpetuo agit: id vero quod semper similiter agit, est causa perpetuitatis cuiuslibet motus: sic igitur est causa perpetuitatis eius, quod agit aliter et aliter, ut scilicet perpetuo sic agat; et illi etiam, quod ex eo causatur, scilicet generationi et corruptioni perpetuae. Ex quo patet, quod secundum agens, scilicet quod aliter et aliter agit, agit in virtute primi agentis, idest primi caeli sive primi orbis, quod semper similiter agit. And since it is not possible to assign some other agent by whose power this first agent brings about the eternal motion of things, it is therefore necessary according to this that it act in the same way; namely, that, by its power, it causes the eternal generation and destruction of things. For the first agent, which always acts in the same way, is the cause of that which acts in different ways. For that which acts in different ways acts eternally, and that which acts in the same way is the cause of the eternity of any motion. Hence it is the cause of the eternity of that which acts in different ways inasmuch as the latter acts eternally in this way; and it is also the cause of that which is produced by it, namely, eternal generation and destruction. From this it is also evident that the second agent, which acts in different ways, acts by the power of the first agent, that is, the first heaven or first orb, which always acts in the same way. 2513. Sic ergo patet, quod primum agens, quod semper similiter agit, est potius et dignius, quia ipsum est causa eius quod est semper esse similiter, idest perpetuitatis. Sed eius, quod est esse aliter et aliter, causa est alterum agens, quod aliter et aliter agit. Eius vero, quod est aliter et aliter se habere, quod est generationem et corruptionem esse perpetuam: manifestum est, quod sunt causa ambo coniunctim, scilicet et primum quod semper similiter agit, et secundum quod aliter et aliter agit. 2513. Hence it is clear that the first agent, which always acts in the same way, is more powerful and more noble, because it is the cause of that whose being is always to be the same, that is, of eternity. But the cause of that whose being is to be different is another agent, which acts in different ways. And it is evident that both of these combined—that is, both the first agent, which always acts in the same way, and the second agent, which acts in different ways—are the cause of that which both always is and is in different states, namely, the fact that generation and destruction are eternal. 2514. Ex hoc autem concludit quod si sic se habent motus caeli, quod ex eis potest causari perpetuitas generationis et corruptionis in istis inferioribus, non oportet quaerere aliqua alia principia, scilicet ideas, sicut Platonici posuerunt, vel amicitiam et litem, sicut posuit Empedocles: quia per hunc modum convenit assignare causam perpetuitatis generationis et corruptionis. 2514. Again, he concludes from this that, if the motions of the heavens are such that eternal generation and destruction in the realm of lower bodies can be caused by them, it is not necessary to look for any other principles (such as the ideas, which the Platonists posited, or love and hate, which Empedocles posited), because it is possible to account for the eternal generation and destruction of things in the above way. 2515. Et si iste modus non ponatur, sequentur inconvenientia, ad quae deducti sunt primi philosophantes, scilicet quod omnia fiant ex nocte, idest ex simplici privatione, aut quod omnia simul fuerint, vel quod aliquid fiat ex non ente. 2515. And if this way is not accepted, the untenable conclusions to which the first philosophers were led will follow—namely, that all things will come from Night, that is, from a simple privation, or that all things were together, or that something comes from non-being. 2516. Manifestum est ergo, quod praedicta positione servata, scilicet quod sit perpetua generatio et corruptio causata a motu caeli perpetuo, solventur praedicta inconvenientia; et sequetur, quod aliquid semper moveatur motu qui non cessat, qui est motus circularis. Et hoc non solum apparet ratione, sed ex ipso effectu et per sensum: unde necesse est, quod primum caelum, eo quod semper hoc motu movet, sit sempiternum. 2516. Therefore, it is evident that, if the above-mentioned position is accepted—that eternal generation and destruction are caused by the eternal motion of the heavens—the foregoing untenable conclusions are eliminated. And it will follow that something is always being moved in an unceasing motion, which is circular motion. This becomes apparent not only by reasoning but from the effect itself and by perception. Hence, since the first heaven always causes motion by means of this motion, it must be eternal. 2517. Deinde cum dicit est igitur concludit ex praedictis perpetuitatem motoris immobilis. Cum enim omne quod movetur, ab alio moveatur, ut in Physicis probatum est; si caelum est perpetuum, et motus est perpetuus, necesse est aliquod esse movens perpetuum. Sed quia in ordine mobilium et moventium inveniuntur tria, quorum ultimum est quod movetur tantum, supremum autem est movens quod non movetur, medium autem est quod movetur et movet; necesse est, quod ponatur aliquod sempiternum movens quod non movetur. Probatum est enim in octavo Physicorum, quod cum non sit abire in infinitum in moventibus et motis, oportet devenire in aliquod primum movens immobile: quia et si deveniatur in aliquod movens seipsum, iterum ex hoc oportet devenire in aliquid movens immobile, ut ibi probatum est. 2517. Therefore, there is (1072a23). From what has been said above, he next infers that there is an eternal unmoved mover. For, since everything that is being moved is being moved by something else, as has been proved in the Physics, if both the heavens and their motion are eternal, there must be an eternal mover. But since three kinds are found among movers and things moved—the lowest of which is something that is merely moved, the highest something that moves but is unmoved, and the intermediate something that both moves and is moved—we must assume that there is an eternal mover that is unmoved. For it has been proved in Physics 8 that, since there cannot be an infinite number of movers and things moved, we must come to some first unmoved mover. For even if one might come to something that moves itself, it would again be necessary to come to some unmoved mover for the above reason, as has been proved in that work. 2518. Si autem primum movens est sempiternum et non motum, oportet quod non sit ens in potentia; quia quod est ens in potentia natum est moveri; sed quod sit substantia per se existens, et quod eius substantia sit actus. Et hoc est quod supra concluserat. Sed necesse fuit movere dubitationem quae erat apud antiquos, ut ea soluta ostenderetur expressius, quo ordine necesse est pervenire ad primum ens, cuius substantia est actus. 2518. Again, if the first mover is eternal and unmoved, it must not be a potential being (because any potential being is naturally fitted to be moved), but an independent substance whose essence is act. This is the conclusion which he drew above (1071b20; [2499]). But it was necessary to raise this question, which was discussed among the ancients, so that, when it has been solved, the course to be followed in reaching a primary being whose substance is act will be made more evident. Lectio 7 Lecture 7 How the first mover causes motion Movet autem sicut appetibile et intelligibile. Haec enim sola movent non mota. Now the first mover causes motion as something intelligible and something appetible; for these alone cause motion without being moved. Horum autem prima eadem. Concupiscibile quidem enim ipsum apparens, voluntabile autem primum ipsum existens bonum. And what is first in the class of the appetible and in that of the intelligible is the same, for it is the apparent good which is the object of concupiscible appetite, and the real good which is the primary object of will. Appetimus autem quia videtur magis quam videtur, quia appetimus; quia appetitus principium est intelligentia. Intellectus autem ab intelligibili movetur. For we desire a thing because it seems good rather than consider it good because we desire it; for understanding is the principle of desire. And the intellect is moved by an intelligible object. Intelligibilis autem altera coelementatio, secundum se, et huius causa substantia prima, et huius quae simplex et secundum actum. Est autem unum et simplex non idem. Unum enim metrum significat, simplex autem qualiter habens ipsum. And one of the two columns of opposites (986a22) is the intelligible in itself, of which primary substance is first, and in substance that which is simple and exists actually. However, “one” and “simple” are not the same, for “one” signifies a measure (1016b17, 1053a14), and “simple” signifies a state. At vero et quod bonum, et quod propter ipsum eligibile in eadem coelementatione, et optimum semper, aut proportionabile, quod primum. Quod autem est quod cuius gratia in immobilibus, divisio ostendit. Est enim alicui quod cuius gratia, quorum hoc quidem est, hoc vero non est. But that which is good and that which is desirable in itself are in the same column of opposites, and that which is first in each is always best or analogous to the best. That the final cause belongs to immovable things is shown by a process of division, for the final cause of a thing is either that which exists or that which does not. Movet autem ut amatum; moto vero, alia moventur. Si quidem igitur aliquid movetur, contingit et aliter habere. And it causes motion as something loved, whereas, by that which is first moved, other things are moved. Therefore, if a thing is moved, it is possible for it to be other than it is. Quare latio, quae prima, et actus est secundum quod movetur. Ex hac autem contingit aliter habere secundum locum, et si non secundum substantiam. Hence, local motion, which is the primary kind of motion, is also the act of that which is first moved, and in this respect, the thing first moved can differ in place, though not in substance. Quoniam autem est quidem movens ipsum immobile ens, actu ens, hoc non contingit aliter se habere nullatenus. Latio enim prima mutationum; huius autem, quae circulo: hanc autem movet hoc. But, since there is something which moves yet is itself immovable and exists actually, this can in no way be other than it is. For the primary kind of change is local motion, and of local motion, the first is circular motion, and this is the motion that the first mover causes. Ex necessitate igitur est ens, et necessitas bene, et sic principium. Nam necessarium toties: hoc quidem videtur quod propter impetum: illud vero sine quo non bene: hoc autem non contingens aliter, sed simpliciter. Ex tali igitur principio dependet caelum et natura. Hence the first mover necessarily exists, and insofar as it is necessary, it is good, and thus is a principle. For “necessary” has all of these meanings: that which seems to be done by force; that without which something does not fare well; and that which cannot be other than it is, but is absolutely necessary (1015a20–1015b9). It is on such a principle, then, that the heavens and the natural world depend. 2519. Postquam Philosophus ostendit aliquam substantiam esse sempiternam, immaterialem et immobilem, cuius substantia est actus, procedit ad inquirendum conditionem ipsius substantiae. Et circa hoc tria facit. 2519. After having shown that there is an eternal, immaterial, immovable substance whose essence is act, the Philosopher now proceeds to investigate the attributes of this substance. In treating this, he does three things. Primo inquirit de perfectione huius substantiae. First (1072a26; [2519]), he considers the perfection of this substance. Secundo de unitate et pluralitate ipsius, ibi, utrum vero una ponenda. Second (1073a14; [2553]), he asks whether it is one or many, at we must not. Tertio de operatione eius, ibi, quae vero circa intellectum. Third (1074b15; [2600]), he considers its operation, at the things that pertain. Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first, he does two things. Primo ostendit perfectionem praedictae substantiae. First, he shows the perfection of this substance. Secundo ostendit eam esse incorpoream, ibi, ostensum autem est. Second (1073a5; [2548]), he proves that it is incorporeal, at and it has been shown. Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first, he does two things. Primo ostendit perfectionem dictae substantiae. First, he shows its perfection. Secundo excludit opinionem contrariam, ibi, quicumque autem putant. Second (1072b30; [2545]), he rejects a contrary opinion, at and all those. Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first he does two things. Primo ostendit secundum quem modum movens immobile moveat. First, he explains how the unmoved mover causes motion; Secundo ex hoc ostendit ea quae ad perfectionem eius pertinent, ibi, intelligibilis autem altera. second (1072a30; [2523]), he infers from this what is comprised in its perfection, at and one of the two. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum ostensum sit, quod sit primum movens non motum, necesse est quod sic moveat sicut desiderabile et intelligibile. Haec enim sola, scilicet desiderabile et intelligibile, inveniuntur movere non mota. He accordingly first says (1072a26) that, since it has been shown that the first mover is unmoved, it must cause motion in the way in which the desirable and the intelligible do. For only these—the desirable and the intelligible—are found to cause motion without being moved. 2520. Quod sic patet. Est enim duplex motus: naturalis et voluntarius, sive secundum appetitum. Movens autem motu naturali, de necessitate movetur, cum movens naturaliter sit generans et alterans. Nam etiam gravia et levia secundum locum moventur per se a generante. Generans autem et alterans immediate, oportet quod aliter et aliter se habeant. Unde etiam supra dictum est, quod id quod causat generationem et corruptionem agit aliter et aliter. In motu autem qui est secundum voluntatem et appetitum, voluntas, et appetitus se habent sicut movens motum, ut patet in tertio De anima. Unde relinquitur quod solum id quod movet sicut appetibile, sit movens non motum. 2520. He proves this as follows. Motion is twofold: natural and voluntary (or according to appetite). Now, that which causes motion by means of natural motion necessarily undergoes motion, since a natural mover is one that begets and alters things. For both heavy and light bodies are moved locally directly by their begetter. But that which begets and alters things directly must exist in different states. Hence it has also been pointed out above (1072a9; [2510]) that the cause of generation and destruction acts in different ways. Now, in the case of voluntary and appetitive motion, will and appetite have the character of moved movers, as is evident in On the Soul 3. Hence it remains that only that which causes motion as something appetible is an unmoved mover.