Lectio 1 Lecture 1 The acquisition of truth De veritate quidem theoria, id est contemplatio, sic difficilis est, sic vero facilis. Theoretical or speculative knowledge of truth is in one sense difficult, and in another easy. Signum autem, nec digne nullus adipisci ipsam posse, nec omnes fallere, sed unumquemque aliquid de natura dicere. An indication of this is found in the fact that, while no one can attain an adequate knowledge of it, all men together do not fail, because each one is able to say something true about nature. Et secundum unumquemque quidem nihil aut parum ei immittere, de omnibus autem coarticulatis fieri magnitudinem aliquam. And while each one individually contributes nothing or very little to the truth, still as a result of the combined efforts of all a great amount of truth becomes known. Quare si videtur habere, ut proverbialiter dicimus, In foribus quis delinquet? Sic quidem utique erit facilis. Therefore, if the situation in the case of truth seems to be like the one which we speak of in the proverb “Who will miss a door?,” then in this respect it will be easy to know the truth. Habere autem totum et partem non posse, difficultatem eius ostendit. But the fact that we cannot simultaneously grasp a whole and its parts shows the difficulty involved. Forsan autem et difficultate secundum duos existente modos, non in rebus, sed in nobis est eius causa. Sicut enim nycticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et animae nostrae intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima. However, since the difficulty is twofold, perhaps its cause is not in things but in us. For just as the eyes of owls are to the light of day, so is our soul’s intellective power to those things that are by nature the most evident of all. Non solum autem his habere gratiam iustum est, quorum aliquis opiniombus communicaverit; sed his qui adhuc superficialiter enuntiaverunt. Etenim conferunt aliquid. Nam habitum nostrum praeexercuerunt. Now it is only right that we should be grateful not merely to those with whose views we agree but also to those who until now have spoken in a superficial way, for they too have made some contribution because they have made use of the habit which we now exercise. Nam si Timotheus non fuisset, multam melodiam non haberemus. Si autem non Phrynis, Timotheus non fuisset. Thus if there had been no Timotheus, we would not have a great part of our music; and if there had been no Phrynis, there would have been no Timotheus. Eodem vero modo et de enuntiantibus veritatem. A quibusdam enim opiniones quasdam accepimus, sed alii, ut hi forent, causa fuerunt. The same is true of those who have made statements about the truth, for we have accepted certain opinions from some of them, and others have been the cause of them attaining their knowledge as they have been the cause of us attaining ours. 273. Postquam Philosophus reprobavit opiniones antiquorum philosophorum de primis principiis rerum, circa quae versatur principaliter philosophi primi intentio, hic accedit ad determinandum veritatem. Aliter autem se habet consideratio philosophiae primae circa veritatem, et aliarum particularium scientiarum. Nam unaquaeque particularis scientia considerat quamdam particularem veritatem circa determinatum genus entium, ut geometria circa rerum magnitudines, arithmetica circa numeros. Sed philosophia prima considerat universalem veritatem entium. Et ideo ad hunc philosophum pertinet considerare, quomodo se habeat homo ad veritatem cognoscendam. 273. Having criticized the ancient philosophers’ opinions about the first principles of things, with which first philosophy is chiefly concerned, the Philosopher now begins to establish what is true. First philosophy considers truth in a different way from the particular sciences do. Each of the particular sciences considers a particular truth out a definite genus of beings—for example, geometry deals with the continuous quantities of bodies, and arithmetic with numbers—but first philosophy considers what is universally true of things. Therefore, it pertains to this science to consider in what respects man is capable of knowing the truth. 274. Dividitur ergo ista pars in partes duas. 274. This part is divided into two sections. In prima parte determinat ea quae pertinent ad considerationem universalis veritatis. In the first (993a30; [274]), he deals with the things that belong to a universal consideration of truth. In secunda incipit inquirere veritatem de primis principiis et omnibus aliis, ad quae extenditur huius philosophiae consideratio; et hoc in tertio libro, qui incipit, necesse est nobis acquisitam scientiam et cetera. In the second (995a24; [338]) he begins to investigate what is true of first principles and of everything else with which this philosophy deals. He does this in book 3, which begins with the words with a view to the science under investigation. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes tres. The first part is again divided into three parts. In prima dicit qualiter se habet homo ad considerationem veritatis. In the first of these he explains in what respects man is capable of knowing the truth. In secunda ostendit ad quam scientiam principaliter pertineat cognitio veritatis, ibi, vocari vero philosophiam veritatis et cetera. In the second (993b19; [290]) he indicates to what science the knowledge of truth principally belongs, at it is only right to call. In tertia parte ostendit modum considerandae veritatis, ibi, contingunt autem auditiones et cetera. In the third (994b32; [331]) he explains the method by which truth is investigated, at the way in which people are affected. Circa primum tria facit. In regard to the first he does three things. Primo ostendit facilitatem existentem in cognitione veritatis. First, he shows in what respect it is easy to know the truth. Secundo ostendit causam difficultatis, ibi, forsan autem et difficultate et cetera. Second (993b7; [279]), he gives the reason for the difficulty involved, at however, since the difficulty is twofold. Tertio ostendit quomodo homines se invicem iuvant ad cognoscendum veritatem, ibi, non solum autem his dicere et cetera. Third (993b11; [287]), he shows how men assist each other to know the truth, at now it is only right. Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first he does two things. Primo proponit intentum, dicens, quod theoria, idest consideratio vel speculatio de veritate quodammodo est facilis, et quodammodo difficilis. First, he states what he intends to prove. He says that theoretical knowledge, that is, the contemplative or speculative understanding of truth, is in one sense difficult, and in another easy. 275. Secundo ibi signum autem manifestat propositum. 275. Second, at an indication of this (993a31), he explains what he intends to prove: Et primo quantum ad facilitatem. first, in what sense it is easy to know the truth; Secundo quantum ad difficultatem, ibi, habere autem totum et partem et cetera. second [278], in what sense it is difficult, at but the fact (993b6). Facilitatem autem in considerando veritatem ostendit tripliciter. He shows in what sense it is easy to know the truth by giving three indications. Primo quidem hoc signo, quod licet nullus homo veritatis perfectam cognitionem adipisci possit, tamen nullus homo est ita expers veritatis, quin aliquid de veritate cognoscat. Quod ex hoc apparet, quod unusquisque potest enuntiare de veritate et natura rerum, quod est signum considerationis interioris. The first is this: while no man can attain a complete knowledge of the truth, still no man is so completely devoid of truth that he knows nothing about it. This is shown by the fact that anyone can make a statement about the truth and the nature of things, which is a sign of interior consideration. 276. Secundum signum ponit ibi et secundum dicens quod licet id quod unus homo potest immittere vel apponere ad cognitionem veritatis suo studio et ingenio, sit aliquid parvum per comparationem ad totam considerationem veritatis, tamen illud, quod aggregatur ex omnibus coarticulatis, idest exquisitis et collectis, fit aliquid magnum, ut potest apparere in singulis artibus, quae per diversorum studia et ingenia ad mirabile incrementum pervenerunt. 276. And while each one individually (993b2). Here he gives the second indication. He says that while the amount of truth that one man can discover or contribute to the knowledge of truth by his own study and talents is small compared with a complete knowledge of truth, nevertheless what is known as a result of the combined efforts of all—that is, what is discovered and collected into one whole—becomes quite extensive. This can be seen in the case of the particular arts, which have developed in a marvelous manner as a result of the studies and talents of different men. 277. Tertio manifestat idem per quoddam exemplum vulgaris proverbii, ibi quare si concludens ex praemissis, quod ex quo unusquisque potest cognoscere de veritate, licet parum, ita se habere videtur in cognitione veritatis, sicut proverbialiter dicitur: in foribus, idest in ianuis domorum, quis delinquet? Interiora enim domus difficile est scire, et circa ea facile est hominem decipi: 277. Therefore, if the situation (993b4). Third, he shows that the same thing is true by citing a common proverb. He concludes from the foregoing that if anyone can attain some knowledge of the truth, even though it be little, the situation in the case of knowledge is like the one that we speak of in the proverb, who will miss a door? that is, the outer door of a house. For it is difficult to know what the interior of a house is like, and a man is easily deceived in such matters. sed sicut circa ipsum introitum domus qui omnibus patet et primo occurrit, nullus decipitur, ita etiam est in consideratione veritatis: nam ea, per quae intratur in cognitionem aliorum, nota sunt omnibus, et nullus circa ea decipitur: But just as no one is mistaken about the entrance of a house, which is evident to all and is the first thing that we perceive, so too this is the case with regard to the knowledge of truth, for those truths through which we enter into a knowledge of others are known to all, and no man is mistaken about them. huiusmodi autem sunt prima principia naturaliter nota, ut non esse simul affirmare et negare, et quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et similia. Those first principles which are naturally apprehended are truths of this sort—for example, it is impossible to both affirm and deny something at the same time, and every whole is greater than each of its parts, and so on. Circa conclusiones vero, ad quas per huiusmodi, quasi per ianuam, intratur, contingit multoties errare. Sic igitur cognitio veritatis est facilis inquantum scilicet ad minus istud modicum, quod est principium, per se notum, per quod intratur ad veritatem, est omnibus per se notum. On the other hand, there are many ways in which error may arise with respect to the conclusions into which we enter through such principles as through an outer door. Therefore, it is easy to know the truth if we consider that small amount of it which is comprised of self-evident principles, through which we enter into other truths, because this much is evident to all. 278. Deinde cum dicit habere autem manifestat difficultatem; dicens, quod hoc ostendit difficultatem quae est in consideratione veritatis, quia non possumus habere circa veritatem totum et partem. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod hoc dixit omnibus esse notum, per quod in alia introitur. Est autem duplex via procedendi ad cognitionem veritatis. 278. But the fact that we cannot (993b6). Here he explains in what sense it is difficult to know the truth. He says that our inability to grasp the whole truth and a part of it shows the difficulty involved in the search for truth. In support of this we must consider his statement that the truth through which we gain admission to other truths is known to all. Now there are two ways in which we attain knowledge of the truth.