758. Tertium exemplum ponit in artificialibus, quia artes etiam simili modo principia esse dicuntur artificiatorum, quia ab arte incipit motus ad artificii constructionem. Et inter has maxime dicuntur principia architectonicae, quae a principio nomen habent, idest principales artes dictae. Dicuntur enim artes architectonicae quae aliis artibus subservientibus imperant, sicut gubernator navis imperat navifactivae, et militaris equestri. 758. He gives as the third kind things made by art, for the arts too in a similar way are called principles of artificial things, because the motion necessary for producing an artifact begins from an art. And of these arts, the architectonic, which derive their name from the word principle, that is, those called principal arts, are said to be principles in the highest degree. For by “architectonic arts” we mean those which govern subordinate arts, as the art of the navigator governs the art of ship-building, and the military art governs the art of horsemanship. 759. Ad similitudinem autem ordinis, qui in motibus exterioribus consideratur, attenditur etiam quidam ordo in rerum cognitione; et praecipue secundum quod intellectus noster quamdam similitudinem motus habet, discurrens de principiis in conclusiones. Et ideo alio modo dicitur principium, unde res primo innotescit; sicut dicimus principia demonstrationum esse suppositiones, idest dignitates et petitiones. 759. Again, in likeness to the order considered in external motions, a certain order may also be observed in our apprehensions of things, and especially insofar as our act of understanding, by proceeding from principles to conclusions, bears a certain resemblance to motion. Therefore, in another way that is said to be a principle from which a thing first becomes known. For example, we say that postulates, that is, axioms and assumptions, are principles of demonstrations. 760. His etiam modis et causae dicuntur quaedam principia. Nam omnes causae sunt quaedam principia. Ex causa enim incipit motus ad esse rei, licet non eadem ratione causa dicatur et principium, ut dictum est. 760. Causes are also said to be principles in these ways, for all causes are principles. For the motion that terminates in a thing’s being begins from some cause, although it is not designated a cause and a principle from the same point of view, as was pointed out above [750]. 761. Deinde cum dicit omnium igitur reducit omnes praedictos modos ad aliquid commune; et dicit quod commune in omnibus dictis modis est, ut dicatur principium illud, quod est primum, aut in esse rei, sicut prima pars rei dicitur principium, aut in fieri rei, sicut primum movens dicitur principium, aut in rei cognitione. 761. Therefore, it is (1013a17). Then he reduces all of the abovementioned senses of principle to one that is common. He says that all of the foregoing senses have something in common inasmuch as that is said to be a principle which comes first either with reference to a thing’s being (as the first part of a thing is said to be a principle), or with reference to its coming to be (as the first mover is said to be a principle), or with reference to the knowing of it. 762. Sed quamvis omnia principia in hoc, ut dictum est, conveniant, differunt tamen, quia quaedam sunt intrinseca, quaedam extrinseca, ut ex praedictis patet. Et ideo natura potest esse principium et elementum, quae sunt intrinseca. Natura quidem, sicut illud a quo incipit motus: elementum autem sicut pars prima in generatione rei. Et mens, idest intellectus, et praevoluntas, idest propositum, dicuntur principia quasi extrinseca. 762. But while all principles agree in the respect just mentioned, they nevertheless differ, because some are intrinsic and others extrinsic, as is clear from the above. Hence nature and element, which are intrinsic, can be principles—nature as that from which motion begins, and element as the first part in a thing’s generation. And mind, or intellect, and purpose, or a man’s intention, are said to be as extrinsic principles. Et iterum quasi intrinsecum dicitur principium substantia rei, idest forma quae est principium in essendo, cum secundum eam res sit in esse. Again, a thing’s substance, that is, its form, which is its principle of being, is called an intrinsic principle, since a thing has being by its form. Et secundum etiam praedicta, finis cuius causa fit aliquid, dicitur etiam esse principium. Bonum enim, quod habet rationem finis in prosequendo, et malum in vitando, in multis sunt principia cognitionis et motus, sicut in omnibus quae aguntur propter finem. In naturalibus enim, et moralibus et artificialibus, praecipue demonstrationes ex fine sumuntur. Again, according to what has been said, that for the sake of which something comes to be is said to be one of its principles. For the good, which has the character of an end in the case of pursuing, and evil, which is an end in that of shunning, are principles of the knowledge and motion of many things—that is, all those which are done for the sake of some end. For in the realm of nature, in that of moral acts, and in that of artifacts, demonstrations make special use of the final cause. Lectio 2 Lecture 2 The definition of “cause” Causa vero dicitur uno quidem modo ex quo fit aliquid ut inexistente, ut aes statuae, et argentum phialae et horum genera. In one sense the term “cause” means that from which, as something intrinsic, a thing comes to be, as the bronze of a statue and the silver of a goblet, and the genera of these. Alio vero species et exemplum. Haec autem ratio ipsius quod quid erat esse, et huius genera, ut diapason, duo ad unum et totaliter numerus et partes quae in ratione. In another sense it means the form and pattern of a thing, that is, the intelligible expression of the quiddity and its genera (for example, the ratio of two to one and number in general are the cause of an octave chord), and the parts which are included in the intelligible expression. Amplius unde principium permutationis primum aut quietis, ut consiliator est causa et pater pueri et omnino efficiens facti, et permutans permutati. Again, that from which the first beginning of change or of rest comes is a cause: for example, an adviser is a cause, and a father is the cause of a child, and in general a maker is a cause of the thing made, and a changer a cause of the thing changed. Amplius ut finis. Hoc autem est quod est cuius causa, ut ambulandi sanitas: nam quare ambulavit, dicimus ut sanetur. Et dicentes ita, putamus reddidisse causam. Further, a thing is a cause inasmuch as it is an end, or that for the sake of which something is done; for example, health is the cause of walking. For if we are asked why someone took a walk, we answer, “in order to be healthy,” and in saying this we think we have given the cause. Et quaecumque movente alio fiunt infra finem, ut attenuatio, aut purgatio, aut pharmacia, aut organa. Haec namque omnia finis causa fiunt. Differunt autem ab invicem tamquam entia haec quidem, ut organa, illa vero, ut opera. And whatever occurs on the way to the end under the motion of something else is also a cause. For example, reducing, purging, drugs, and instruments are causes of health, for all of these exist for the sake of the end, although they differ from each other inasmuch as some are instruments and others are processes. Ergo causae fere toties dicuntur. These, then, are nearly all the ways in which causes are spoken of. Accidit autem multoties dictis causis multas eiusdem causas esse, non secundum accidens, ut statuae, effector statuae, et aes, non secundum aliud aliquid, sed inquantum statua. Verum non eodem modo; sed hoc quidem ut materia, illud vero ut unde motus. And since there are several senses in which causes are spoken of, it turns out that there are many causes of the same thing, and not in an accidental way. For example, both the maker of a statue and the bronze are causes of a statue not in any other respect but insofar as it is a statue. However, they are not causes in the same way, but the one as matter and the other as the source of motion. Et adinvicem causae sunt, ut dolor causa est sanitatis, et sanitas causa est dolendi: sed non eodem modo. Verum hoc quidem, ut finis; illud vero, ut principium motus. And there are things that are causes of each other. Pain, for example, is a cause of health, and health is a cause of pain, although not in the same way, but one as an end and the other as a source of motion. Amplius autem idem quandoque contrariorum est causa. Quod enim praesens, huius est causa, hoc absens, causamur quandoque de contrario. Ut absentia gubernatoris deperditionis navis, cuius erat praesentia causa salutis. Utraque vero, et praesentia et privatio, causae sunt quasi moventes. Further, the same thing is sometimes the cause of contraries, for that which, when present, is the cause of some particular thing, we sometimes blame for the contrary when it is absent. Thus the cause of the loss of a ship is the absence of the pilot whose presence is the cause of the ship’s safety. And both of these—the absence and the presence—are moving causes. The four causes 763. Hic Philosophus distinguit quot modis dicitur causa. Et circa hoc duo facit. 763. Here the Philosopher distinguishes the various senses in which the term “cause” is used, and in regard to this he does two things. Primo assignat species causarum. First, he enumerates the species of causes. Secundo modos causarum, ibi, modi vero causarum. Second (1013b29; [783]), he gives the modes of causes, at now the modes. Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first part, he does two things. Primo enumerat diversas species causarum. First, he enumerates the various species of causes. Secundo reducit eas ad quatuor, ibi, omnes vero causae dictae. Second (1013b16; [777]), he reduces them to four, at all the causes. Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first part he does two things. Primo enumerat diversas species causarum. First, he enumerates the different species of causes. Secundo manifestat quaedam circa species praedictas, ibi, accidit autem multoties et cetera. Second (1013b4; [773]), he clarifies certain things about the species of causes, at and since. Dicit ergo primo, quod uno modo dicitur causa id ex quo fit aliquid, et est ei inexistens, idest intus existens. Quod quidem dicitur ad differentiam privationis, et etiam contrarii. Nam ex contrario vel privatione dicitur aliquid fieri sicut ex non inexistente, ut album ex nigro vel album ex non albo. He accordingly first says that in one sense the term “cause” means that from which a thing comes to be and is something intrinsic, or something which exists within the thing. This is said to distinguish it from a privation and also from a contrary, for a thing is said to come from a privation or from a contrary as from something which is not intrinsic (for example, white is said to come from black or from not-white). Statua autem fit ex aere, et phiala ex argento, sicut ex inexistente. Nam cum statua fit, non tollitur ratio aeris, nec si fit phiala, tollitur ratio argenti. Et ideo aes statuae, et argentum phialae sunt causa per modum materiae. But a statue comes from bronze and a goblet from silver as from something which is intrinsic, for the nature of bronze is not destroyed when a statue comes into being, nor is the nature of silver destroyed when a goblet comes into being. Therefore, the bronze of a statue and the silver of a goblet are causes in the sense of matter. Et horum genera, quia cuiuscumque materia est species aliqua, materia est eius genus, sicut si materia statuae est aes, eius materia erit metallum, et mixtum, et corpus, et sic de aliis. He adds, and the genera of these, because if matter is the species of anything it is also its genus. For example, if the matter of a statue is bronze, its matter will also be metal, compound, and body. The same holds true of other things. 764. Alio autem modo dicitur causa, species et exemplum, id est exemplar; et haec est causa formalis, quae comparatur dupliciter ad rem. 764. In another sense, “cause” means the form and pattern of a thing, that is, its exemplar. This is the formal cause, which is related to a thing in two ways. Uno modo sicut forma intrinseca rei; et haec dicitur species. In one way, it stands as the intrinsic form of a thing, and in this respect it is called the formal “principle” of a thing. Alio modo sicut extrinseca a re, ad cuius tamen similitudinem res fieri dicitur; et secundum hoc, exemplar rei dicitur forma. Per quem modum ponebat Plato ideas esse formas. In another way, it stands as something which is extrinsic to a thing but is that in likeness to which it is made, and in this respect an exemplar is also called a thing’s form. It is in this sense that Plato held the ideas to be forms. Et, quia unumquodque consequitur naturam vel generis vel speciei per formam suam, natura autem generis vel speciei est id quod significat definitio, dicens quid est res, ideo forma est ratio ipsius quod quid erat esse, idest definitio per quam scitur quid est res. Moreover, because it is from its form that each thing derives its nature (whether of its genus or of its species), and the nature of its genus or of its species is what is signified by the definition (which expresses its quiddity), the form of a thing is therefore the intelligible expression of its quiddity—that is, the formula by which its quiddity is known. Quamvis enim in definitione ponantur aliquae partes materiales, tamen id quod est principale in definitione, oportet quod sit ex parte formae. Et ideo haec est ratio quare forma est causa, quia perficit rationem quidditatis rei. Et sicut id quod est genus materiae, est etiam materia, ita etiam genera formarum sunt formae rerum; sicut forma consonantiae diapason, est proportio duorum ad unum. Quando enim duo soni se habent adinvicem in dupla proportione, tunc est inter eos consonantia diapason, unde dualitas est forma eius. Nam proportio dupla ex dualitate rationem habet. Et, quia numerus est genus dualitatis, ideo ut universaliter loquamur, etiam numerus est forma diapason, ut scilicet dicamus quod diapason est secundum proportionem numeri ad numerum. For even though certain material parts are given in the definition, still it is from a thing’s form that the principal part of the definition comes. The reason why the form is a cause, then, is that it completes the intelligible expression of a thing’s quiddity. And just as the genus of a particular matter is also matter, in a similar way the genera of forms are the forms of things—for example, the form of the octave chord is the ratio of two to one. For when two notes stand to each other in the ratio of two to one, the interval between them is one octave. Hence two-ness is its form, for the ratio of two to one derives its meaning from two-ness. And because number is the genus of two-ness, we may therefore say in a general way that number is also the form of the octave, inasmuch as we may say that the octave chord involves the ratio of one number to another.