Lectio 9
Lecture 9
Division of being into accidental and essential
Ens dicitur hoc quidem secundem accidens, illud vero secundum se.
The term “being” signifies both accidental being and essential being.
Secundum accidens quidem, ut iustum musicum esse dicimus, et hominem musicum, et musicum hominem. Similiter autem dicentes ut musicum aedificare, quia accidit aedificatori musicum esse, aut musico aedificatorem. Hoc enim esse hoc significat accidere hoc huic.
Accidental being is designated when we say, for example, that the just person is musical, and that the man is musical, and that the musician is a man. And the same thing applies when we say that the musician builds, because it is accidental to a builder to be a musician, or to a musician to be a builder. For to say that this is that means that this is an accident of that.
Si autem et in dictis, quando hominem musicum dicimus, et musicum hominem, aut album musicum, aut hunc album. Hoc quidem, quia ambo eidem accidunt: illud vero, quia enti accidit hoc: aliud autem musicum hominem, quia huic musicum accidit.
And so it is in the cases given, for when we say that the man is musical, and that the musician is a man, or that what is musical is white, in the latter case we mean that both are accidents of the same thing, and in the former that the attribute is accidental to the being. But when we say that what is musical is a man, we mean that musical is an accident of this person.
Sic autem dicitur et album esse, quia cui accidit ille est. Quae quidem igitur secundum accidens esse dicuntur, sic dicuntur aut eo quod eidem enti ambo insunt, aut quia enti illud inest, aut quia ipsum est cui inest, de quo ipsum praedicatur.
And in this sense too white is said to exist, because the thing of which it is an accident exists. Therefore, those things that are said to be in an accidental sense are said to be such either because both belong to the same being, or because the attribute belongs to the being, or because the thing to which it belongs and of which it is itself predicated, itself exists.
Secundum se vero esse dicuntur, quaecumque significant figuras praedicationis. Quoties enim dicitur, toties esse significat.
On the other hand, those things are said to be essentially which signify the figures of predication, for being is signified in just as many ways as predications are made.
Quoniam ergo praedicatorum, alia quid est significant, alia quale, alia quantum, alia ad aliquid, alia facere, alia pati, alia ubi, alia quando: horum unicuique idem esse significat.
Therefore, since some of these predications signify what a thing is, others what it is like, others how much, others how related, others what it does, others what it undergoes, others where, and others when, to each of these there corresponds a mode of being which signifies the same thing.
Nihil enim refert, homo convalescens est, aut homo convalescit: vel homo vadens est aut secans, vel hominem vadere aut secare. Similiter autem et in aliis.
For there is no difference between “The man is recovering” and “The man recovers,” or between “The man is walking” or “cutting” and “The man walks” or “cuts.” And the same is true in other cases.
Amplius autem et esse significat, quia verum; non esse, quia non verum, sed falsum. Similiter in afiirmatione et negatione, ut quod est Socrates musicus, quia hoc verum: aut quod non est Socrates albus, quia verum est. Hoc autem non est, diameter incommensurabilis, quia falsum.
Again, “being” signifies that something is true, and non-being signifies that something is not true, but false. This also holds true of affirmation and negation. For example, to say that Socrates is musical means that this is true. Or to say that Socrates is not white means that this is true. But to say that the diagonal of a square is not incommensurable with a side means that this is false.
Amplius esse significat et ens, hoc quidem potestate dicibili, illud vero actu. Horum enim dictorum terminorum esse dicimus, et quod potestate est dicibile terminorum, et quod est actu.
Again, “to be,” and “being,” signifies that some of the things mentioned are potentially and others actually. For in the case of the terms mentioned we predicate being both of what is said to be potentially and of what is said to be actually.
Et scire similiter et potens uti scientia, et utens. Et quiescens et cum iam inest quies et potens quiescere.
And similarly we say both of one who is capable of using scientific knowledge and of one who is actually using it that he knows. And we say that that is at rest which is already so or capable of being so.
Similiter autem et in substantiis. Etenim Mercurium in lapide dicimus esse, et medietatem lineae et frumentum nondum perfectum. Quando vero potens et quando non, in aliis determinandum.
And this also applies in the case of substances, for we say that Mercury is in the stone, and half of the line in the line, and we call that grain which is not yet ripe. But when a thing is potential and when not must be settled elsewhere (1048b37; [1832]).
Kinds of being: three ways per accidens
885. Hic Philosophus distinguit quot modis dicitur ens. Et circa hoc tria facit.
885. Here the Philosopher gives the various senses in which the term “being” is used, and in regard to this he does three things.
Primo distinguit ens in ens per se et per accidens.
First (1017a7), he divides being into being per se and being per accidens.
Secundo distinguit modos entis per accidens, ibi, secundum accidens quidem et cetera.
Second (1017a8; [886]), he distinguishes between the types of accidental being, at accidental being.
Tertio modos entis per se, ibi, secundum se vero.
Third (1017a22; [889]), he distinguishes between the types of being per se, at on the other hand.
Dicit ergo, quod ens dicitur quoddam secundum se, et quoddam secundum accidens. Sciendum tamen est quod illa divisio entis non est eadem cum illa divisione qua dividitur ens in substantiam et accidens. Quod ex hoc patet, quia ipse postmodum, ens secundum se dividit in decem praedicamenta, quorum novem sunt de genere accidentis. Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem, sicut ipsa albedo in se considerata dicitur accidens, et homo substantia. Sed ens secundum accidens prout hic sumitur, oportet accipi per comparationem accidentis ad substantiam. Quae quidem comparatio significatur hoc verbo, est, cum dicitur, homo est albus. Unde hoc totum, homo est albus, est ens per accidens. Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens, attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens. Divisio vero entis in substantiam et accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens.
He says, then, that while things are said to be both per se and accidentally, it should be noted that this division of being is not the same as that whereby being is divided into substance and accident. This is clear from the fact that he later divides being per se into the ten predicaments, nine of which belong to the genus of accident [889]. Hence being is divided into substance and accident insofar as it is considered in an absolute sense—for example, whiteness considered in itself is called an accident, and man a substance. But accidental being, in the sense in which it is taken here, must be understood by comparing an accident with a substance; and this comparison is signified by the term “is” when (for example) it is said that the man is white. Hence this whole, “The man is white,” is an accidental being. It is clear, then, that the division of being into per se being and being per accidens is based on the fact that one thing is predicated of another either per se or accidentally. But the division of being into substance and accident is based on the fact that a thing is in its own nature either a substance or an accident.
886. Deinde cum dicit secundum accidens ostendit quot modis dicitur ens per accidens; et dicit, quod tribus:
886. Then he indicates the various senses in which a thing is said to be accidentally. He says that this occurs in three ways:
quorum unus est, quando accidens praedicatur de accidente, ut cum dicitur, iustus est musicus.
first, when an accident is predicated of an accident, as when it is said that someone just is musical;
Secundus, cum accidens praedicatur de subiecto, ut cum dicitur, homo est musicus.
second, when an accident is predicated of a subject, as when it is said that the man is musical;
Tertius, cum subiectum praedicatur de accidente, ut cum dicitur musicus est homo.
and third, when a subject is predicated of an accident, as when it is said that the musician is a man.
Et, quia superius iam manifestavit quomodo causa per accidens differt a causa per se, ideo nunc consequenter per causam per accidens manifestat ens per accidens.
And since he has shown above [787] how an accidental cause differs from a cause per se, he therefore now shows that an accidental being is a result of an accidental cause.
887. Et dicit, quod sicut assignantes causam per accidens dicimus quod musicus aedificat, eo quod musicum accidit aedificatori, vel e contra, constat enim quod hoc esse hoc, idest musicum aedificare, nihil aliud significat quam hoc accidere huic, ita est etiam in praedictis modis entis per accidens, quando dicimus hominem esse musicum, accidens praedicando de subiecto: vel musicum esse hominem, praedicando subiectum de accidente: vel album esse musicum, vel e converso, scilicet musicum esse album, praedicando accidens de accidente.
887. He says that, in giving an accidental cause, we say that the musician builds, because it is accidental to a builder to be a musician, or vice versa. For it is evident that the statement this is that, namely, “The musician is a builder,” simply means that this is an accident of that. The same is true of the foregoing senses of accidental being when we say that the man is musical by predicating an accident of a subject, or when we say that what is white is musical, or conversely that what is musical is white, by predicating an accident of an accident.
In omnibus enim his, esse, nihil aliud significat quam accidere. Hoc quidem, scilicet quando accidens de accidente praedicatur, significat quod ambo accidentia accidunt eidem subiecto: illud vero, scilicet cum accidens praedicatur de subiecto, dicitur esse, quia enti idest subiecto accidit accidens.
For in all of these cases “is” signifies merely accidental being. In the latter case, when an accident is predicated of an accident, “is” signifies that both accidents are accidental to the same subject, and in the former, when an accident is predicated of a subject, “is” signifies that the attribute is accidental to the being, that is, to the subject.
Sed musicum esse hominem dicimus, quia huic, scilicet praedicato, accidit musicum, quod ponitur in subiecto. Et est quasi similis ratio praedicandi, cum subiectum praedicatur de accidente, et accidens de accidente.
But when we say that what is musical is a man, we mean that musical is an accident of this person, that is, that musical, which holds the position of a subject, is an accident of the predicate. And the reason for making the predication is similar in a sense when a subject is predicated of an accident and when an accident is predicated of an accident.
Sicut enim subiectum praedicatur de accidente ea ratione, quia praedicatur subiectum de eo, cui accidit accidens in subiecto positum; ita accidens praedicatur de accidente, quia praedicatur de subiecto accidentis. Et propter hoc, sicut dicitur musicum est homo, similiter dicitur musicum esse album, quia scilicet illud cui accidit esse musicum, scilicet subiectum, est album.
For a subject is predicated of an accident by reason of the fact that the subject is predicated of that to which the accident, which is expressed in the subject, is accidental; and in a similar fashion an accident is predicated of an accident because it is predicated of the subject of an accident. And for this reason the attribute “musical” is predicated not only of man but also of white, because that of which the attribute musical is an accident (that is, the subject) is white.
888. Patet igitur, quod ea, quae dicuntur esse secundum accidens, dicuntur triplici ratione:
888. It, is evident, then, that those things that are said to be in an accidental sense are said to be such for three reasons.
aut eo quod ambo, scilicet subiectum et praedicatum, insunt eidem, sicut cum accidens praedicatur de accidente,
First, because both, namely, the subject and predicate, belong to the same being (as when an accident is predicated of an accident).
aut quia illud, scilicet praedicatum, ut musicum, inest enti, idest subiecto, quod dicitur esse musicum; et hoc est cum accidens praedicatur de subiecto;
Second, because the attribute, that is, the predicate (such as musical) belongs to the being, that is, to the subject which is said to be musical (and this occurs when an accident is predicated of a subject).
aut quia illud, scilicet subiectum in praedicato positum, est illud cui inest accidens, de quo accidente illud, scilicet subiectum, praedicatur. Et hoc est scilicet cum subiectum praedicatur de accidente, ut cum dicimus, musicum est homo.
Third, because the thing, the subject which is expressed in the predicate to which belongs the accident of which it (the subject) is itself predicated, itself exists. (This occurs when a subject is predicated of an accident, as when we say that what is musical is a man.)
Ten ways per se
889. Deinde cum dicit secundum se distinguit modum entis per se: et circa hoc tria facit.
889. On the other hand (1017a22). Here he distinguishes between the types of being per se, and in regard to this he does three things.
Primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum.
First, he divides the kind of being which lies outside the mind, which is complete being, by the ten predicaments.
Secundo ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod est tantum in mente, ibi, amplius autem et esse significat.
Second (1017a31; [895]), he gives another type of being, inasmuch as being exists only in the mind, at again, “being” signifies.