1170. Deinde cum dicit si igitur secundo solvit, dicens quod si non est aliqua alia substantia praeter eas quae consistunt secundum naturam, de quibus est physica, physica erit prima scientia. Sed, si est aliqua substantia immobilis, ista erit prior substantia naturali; et per consequens philosophia considerans huiusmodi substantiam, erit philosophia prima. Et quia est prima, ideo erit universalis, et erit eius speculari de ente inquantum est ens, et de eo quod quid est, et de his quae sunt entis inquantum est ens: eadem enim est scientia primi entis et entis communis, ut in principio quarti habitum est. 1170. Therefore, if (1026a27). Second, he answers this question, saying that, if there is no substance other than those which exist in the way that natural substances do, with which the philosophy of nature deals, the philosophy of nature will be the first science. But if there is some immobile substance, this will be prior to natural substance, and therefore the philosophy which considers this kind of substance will be first philosophy. And since it is first, it will be universal; and it will be its function to study being as being, both what being is and what the attributes are which belong to being as being. For the science of the primary kind of being and that of being in general are the same, as has been stated at the beginning of book 4 [533]. Lectio 2 Lecture 2 Being as the object of metaphysics Sed quoniam ens simpliciter dictum dicitur multipliciter, quorum unum quidem accidens, et aliud quasi verum et non ens quasi falsum; praeter haec autem sunt figurae categoriae, ut quid, quale, quantum, ubi, quando, et si quod aliud significat hoc modo; amplius praeter ea omnia, quod est potestate et actu. Being, in an unqualified sense, is said of many things, of which one is the accidental, and another the true (and “non-being” may signify the false). Besides these there are the categorical figures—for example, the what, of what sort, how much, where, when, and anything else which signifies in this way. Besides all of these, there is the potential and the actual. Quoniam itaque multipliciter dicitur ens, primum de eo quod secundum accidens est dicendum est, quia nulla est circa id speculatio. Signum autem. Nulla enim scientia studiosa est de eo, nec practica, nec theorica. Since being is said in many ways, then, we must speak first of the accidental, because there is no speculation about it. And this is indicated by the fact that there is no science, either practical or speculative, that investigates it. Non enim faciens domum, facit quaecumue simul accidunt domui factae. Infinita enim sunt. His enim voluptuosam, illis vero nocivam, aliis utilem, nihil enim prohibet factam, et alteram, ut est dicere, ab omnibus entibus, quorum nullius est aedificativa factiva. Eodem vero modo nec geometer speculatur sic accidentia figuris, nec si alterum est trigonum, et trigonum duos rectos habens. For one who builds a house does not simultaneously cause all traits that are accidental to the completed house, since these are infinite in number. For nothing prevents the completed house from being pleasant to some, harmful to others, useful to others, and different, as I may say, from all other things, none of which the art of building produces. And similarly neither does the geometrician speculate about things that are accidents of figures in this way, nor whether a triangle differs from a triangle having two right angles. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. Quemadmodum enim nomine solum accidens est. And this is understandable, because the accidental is in a sense being only in name. Unde Plato modo quodam non male sophistica circa non ens ordinavit. Sunt enim sophistarum rationes circa accidens, ut est dicere maxime omnium. Utrum diversum aut idem musicum et grammaticum, et musicus Coriscus et Coriscus. Et si omne quod est, et non semper, factum est. Quare si musicus ens grammaticus est factus, et grammaticus ens musicus, et quaecumque aliae rationum tales sunt. Videtur enim accidens propinquum non enti. Hence, in a way, Plato was not wrong when he said that sophistry deals with non-being. For the arguments of the sophists, as I may say, are concerned chiefly with the accidental—whether the musical and the grammatical are the same or different; whether musical Coriscus and Coriscus are the same; whether everything which is but has not always been has come to be (so that if one who is musical has become grammatical, then one who is grammatical has become musical); and all other such arguments. For the accidental seems to be close to non-being. Palam autem et ex his rationibus. Nam alio modo entium, generatio est et corruptio. Eorum vero quae sunt secundum accidens, non est. Now this is also clear from these arguments: there is generation and corruption of those things that are in another way, but not of those things that are by accident. Attamen dicendum est amplius de accidente inquantum contingit, quae eius natura, et propter quam causam est. Simul enim forsan palam erit, et quare eius non est scientia. Yet concerning the accidental, it is necessary to state further (so far as it is possible) what its nature is and by what cause it exists. Perhaps at the same time it will also become evident why there is no science of it. Quoniam igitur in entibus sunt haec quidem semper similiter se habentia et ex necessitate, non secundum vim dicta, sed secundum quod dicimus in non contingere aliter, illa vero ex necessitate quidem non sunt, nec semper, sed quasi secundum magis, hoc principium et haec causa eius est, quod est accidens esse. Therefore, since there are some beings which always are in the same way and of necessity (not necessity in the sense of compulsion, but in the sense of that which cannot be otherwise) and others which are neither of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the accidental. Quod enim nec semper, nec quasi secundum magis est, hoc dicimus esse accidens: ut sub cane si fuerit hiems et frigus, hoc accidere dicimus, sed non si aestuatio et calor; quia hoc quidem semper aut secundum magis, illud vero non. For that which is neither always nor for the most part we call the accidental. For example, if there should be wintry and cold weather during the dog days, we say that this is accidental; but not if the weather is sultry and hot, because the latter occurs either always or for the most part, whereas the former does not. Et hominem album esse accidit; nec enim semper nec secundum magis; animal vero non secundum accidens. And it is accidental for a man to be white, for this is so neither always nor for the most part, but it is not accidental for him to be an animal. Et aedificatorem sanitatem facere, accidens; quia non est natus hoc facere aedificator, sed medicus: sed accidit medicum esse aedificatorem. And it is accidental if a builder produces health, because it is not a builder but a physician who is naturally fitted to do this, but it is accidental for a builder to be a physician. Et opsopios voluptatem coniectans, faciet utique alicui salubre, sed non secundum opsopoieticam: Again, a confectioner, preparing something pleasing, may produce something health-giving, but not according to the confectioner’s art. quapropter accidens dicimus et est ut facit, simpliciter autem non. Aliorum enim aliae quandoque potentiae factivae sunt; horum vero nulla est ars, nec potentia determinata. Nam secundum accidens entium aut factorum causa est secundum accidens. Hence we say that it was accidental. And while there is a sense in which he produces it, he does not produce it in a primary and proper sense. For there are other powers which sometimes are productive of other things, but there is no art or determinate power which is productive of the accidental, for the cause of things that are or come to be by accident is also accidental. Quare quoniam quidem non omnia ex necessitate sunt et semper, aut entia, aut quae fiunt, sed plurima secundum magis, necesse est quod secundum accidens ens, ut nec semper, nec secundum magis albus musicus est. Quoniam vero fit aliquando, secundum accidens erit; si autem non, omnia erunt ex necessitate. Hence, since not all things are or come to be of necessity and always, but most things occur for the most part, the accidental must exist—for example, a white man is neither always nor for the most part musical. But since this occurs only occasionally, it must be accidental, otherwise everything would be of necessity. Quare materia erit causa contingens propter quam ut in pluribus aliter accidentis. Principium autem hoc oportet sumere, utrum nihil est nec semper, nec secundum magis? Aut hoc impossibile? Hence matter will be the contingent cause of the accidental, which happens otherwise than usually occurs. And we must take as our starting point this question: Is there nothing that is neither always nor for the most part, or is this impossible? Est igitur aliquid praeter hoc quod utrumque contingit et secundum accidens. Sed utrum hoc quod in pluribus et quod semper, nulli insunt, aut sunt quaedam sempiterna? De his quidem igitur posterius perscrutandum est. There is, then, besides these something which is contingent and accidental. But then there is the question: does that which occurs for the most part and that which occurs always, have no existence, or are there some beings which are eternal? These questions must be investigated later (1071b3). Quod autem scientia non est accidentia, palam. Scientia namque omnis, aut est eius quod semper, aut eius quod secundum magis. Etenim quomodo docebitur aut docebit alium? However, it is evident that there is no science of the accidental, for all scientific knowledge is of that which is always or for the most part; otherwise how could one be taught or teach anyone else? Oportebit enim definiri, aut per semper, aut per magis, ut quia utile melicratum febricitanti, ut secundum magis. For a thing must be defined either as being so always or for the most part—for example, honey-water is beneficial in most cases to those with a fever. Quod autem praeter hoc, non habebit dicere. Quando puta nova luna. Aut enim semper, aut in pluribus, et quod nova luna. Accidens autem est praeter hoc. But with regard to what happens in the other cases, it will be impossible to state when they occur, for example, at the new moon. For whatever happens at the new moon also happens either always or for the most part, but the accidental is contrary to this. Quid quidem igitur est accidens, et propter quam causam, et quia scientia non est eius, dictum est. We have explained, then, what the accidental is, and by what cause it exists, and that there is no science of it. This science is not about accidental being 1171. Hic ostendit de quibus entibus principaliter haec scientia tractare intendit; et circa hoc tria facit. 1171. Here Aristotle indicates with what beings this science chiefly intends to deal; and in regard to this he does three things. Primo repetit modos quibus aliquid dicitur ens. First, he recalls the ways in which things are said to be. Secundo determinat naturam entis secundum duos modos de quibus principaliter non intendit, ibi, quoniam itaque multipliciter dicitur ens. Second (1026b2; [1172]), he establishes the nature of the two kinds of being with which he is not chiefly concerned, at since being. Tertio ostendit quod de his modis entis principaliter non intendit, ibi, quoniam autem complexio. Third (1027b29; [1241]), he shows that it is not his chief aim to consider these two kinds of being, at but since combination. Dicit ergo primo, quod ens simpliciter, idest universaliter dictum, dicitur multipliciter, ut in quinto est habitum. Accordingly he says, first, that being, in an unqualified sense (that is, in a universal sense), is said of many things, as has been stated in book 5 [885]. Uno modo dicitur aliquid ens secundum accidens. In one sense, “being” means what is accidental. Alio modo dicitur ens, idem quod verum propositionis; et non ens, idem quod falsum. In another sense, it means the same thing as the truth of a proposition (and “non-being” the same as the falseness of a proposition). Tertio modo dicitur ens quod continet sub se figuras praedicamentorum, ut quid, quale, quantum et cetera. In a third sense, being is predicated of the things contained under the categorical figures—for example, the what, of what sort, how much, and so on. Quarto modo praeter praedictos omnes, quod dividitur per potentiam et actum. In a fourth sense, in addition to all of the above, being applies to what is divided by potency and act. 1172. Deinde cum dicit quoniam itaque determinat de modis entis quos praetermittere intendit. 1172. Since being (1026b2). Here he deals with the senses of being which he intends to exclude from this science. Et primo de ente per accidens. First [1172], he deals with accidental being; Secundo de ente quod est idem quod verum, ibi, quod autem ut verum et cetera. second (1027b17; [1223]), with being which is identical with the true, at again, being in the sense.