Expositio libri Perihermeneias On Interpretation Dedicatio Dedication Dilecto sibi Praeposito Lovaniensi frater Thomas de Aquino salutem et verae sapientiae incrementa. To the beloved Provost of Louvain himself, I, Brother Thomas Aquinas, wish you health and increase in true wisdom. Diligentiae tuae, qua in iuvenili aetate non vanitati sed sapientiae intendis, studio provocatus, et desiderio satisfacere cupiens, libro Aristotelis qui Perihermeneias dicitur, multis obscuritatibus involuto, inter multiplices occupationum mearum sollicitudines, expositionem adhibere curavi, hoc gerens in animo sic altiora pro posse perfectioribus exhibere ut tamen iunioribus proficiendi auxilia tradere non recusem. Suscipiat igitur studiositas tua praesentis expositionis munus exiguum, ex quo, si profeceris, provocare me poteris ad maiora. My attention has been drawn to your diligence, whereby in your youthful state you pursue not vanity but the study of wisdom. Desiring to satisfy your desire, I have taken the trouble, in the midst of many demanding tasks, to undertake an exposition on the book of Aristotle called Peri hermeneias, which contains many obscure passages. I aimed, as far as possible, to explain higher things to advanced students, without depriving the younger ones of the assistance they need to make progress. Therefore, may your studious self accept the small gift of the present exposition. If it helps you to make progress, you may stimulate me to do you greater favors. Liber 1 Book 1 Lectio 1 Lecture 1 Prooemium Introduction 16a1. Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen et quid sit verbum. Postea quid negatio et quid affirmatio, et enunciatio et oratio. 16a1. First, we must determine what a name is and what a verb is; then what negation is and affirmation, and the enunciation and speech. 1. Sicut Philosophus dicit in III De anima, duplex est operatio intellectus: There is a twofold operation of the intellect, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3.6, 430a26. una quidem quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essentiam uniuscuiusque rei in se ipsa; One is the understanding of simple objects, that is, the operation by which the intellect apprehends just the essence of a thing alone. alia est autem operatio intellectus componentis et dividentis; The other is the operation of composing and dividing. additur autem et tertia operatio ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio procedit a notis ad inquisitionem ignotorum. There is also a third operation, that of reasoning, by which reason proceeds from what is known to the investigation of things that are unknown. Harum autem operationum prima ordinatur ad secundam, quia non potest esse compositio et divisio nisi simplicium apprehensorum; secunda vero ordinatur ad tertiam, quia videlicet oportet quod ex aliquo vero cognito cui intellectus assentiat procedatur ad certitudinem accipiendam de aliquibus ignotis. The first of these operations is ordered to the second, for there cannot be composition and division unless things have already been apprehended simply. The second, in turn, is ordered to the third, for clearly we must proceed from some known truth to which the intellect assents in order to have certitude about something not yet known. 2. Cum autem logica dicatur rationalis scientia, necesse est quod eius consideratio versetur circa ea quae pertinent ad tres praedictas operationes rationis; de his igitur quae pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, id est de his quae simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in libro Praedicamentorum; de his vero quae pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet de enunciatione affirmativa et negativa, determinat Philosophus in libro Perihermeneias; de his vero quae pertinent ad tertiam operationem determinat Aristoteles in libro Priorum et in consequentibus, in quibus agitur de syllogismo simpliciter et de diversis syllogismorum et argumentationum speciebus, quibus ratio de uno procedit ad aliud; et ideo secundum praedictum ordinem trium operationum, liber Praedicamentorum ad librum Perihermeneias ordinatur, qui ordinatur ad librum Priorum et consequentes. Since logic is called rational science, it must direct its consideration to the things that belong to the three operations of reason we have mentioned. Accordingly, Aristotle treats those belonging to the first operation of the intellect, that is, those conceived by simple understanding, in the book Categories; those belonging to the second operation, that is, affirmative and negative enunciation, in the book On Interpretation; and those belonging to the third operation in the book Prior Analytics and the books following it, in which he treats the syllogism absolutely, the different kinds of syllogism, and the species of argumentation by which reason proceeds from one thing to another. And since the three operations of reason are ordered to each other, so are the books: the Categories is ordered to On Interpretation, and On Interpretation to the Prior Analytics and the books following it. 3. Dicitur ergo liber iste, qui prae manibus habetur, Perihermeneias, quasi De interpretatione. Dicitur autem interpretatio, secundum Boethium, vox significativa quae per se aliquid significat, sive sit complexa sive incomplexa; unde coniunctiones et praepositiones et alia huiusmodi non dicuntur interpretationes, quia non per se aliquid significant; similiter etiam voces significantes naturaliter, non ex proposito aut cum imaginatione aliquid significandi, sicut sunt voces brutorum animalium, interpretationes dici non possunt: qui enim interpretatur, aliquid exponere intendit; et ideo sola nomina et verba et orationes dicuntur interpretationes, de quibus in hoc libro determinat. Sed tamen nomen et verbum magis interpretationis principia esse videntur quam interpretationes: ille enim interpretari videtur qui exponit aliquid esse verum vel falsum; et ideo sola oratio enuntiativa, in qua verum vel falsum invenitur, interpretatio vocatur; ceterae vero orationes, ut optativa et imperativa, magis ordinantur ad exprimendum affectum quam ad interpretandum id quod in intellectu habetur. Intitulatur ergo liber iste De interpretatione, ac si dicetur De enuntiativa oratione, in qua verum vel falsum invenitur; non autem hic agitur de nomine et verbo nisi in quantum sunt partes enuntiationis: est enim proprium uniuscuiusque scientiae partes subiecti tradere, sicut et passiones. The one we are now examining is named Peri hermeneias, that is, On Interpretation. Interpretation, according to Boethius, is significant vocal sound—whether complex or incomplex—which signifies something by itself. Conjunctions, then, and prepositions and other words of this kind are not called interpretations since they do not signify anything by themselves. Nor can sounds signifying naturally but not from purpose or in connection with a mental image of signifying something—such as the sounds of brute animals—be called interpretations, for one who interprets intends to explain something. Therefore only names and verbs and speech are called interpretations and these Aristotle treats in this book. The name and verb, however, seem to be principles of interpretation rather than interpretations, for one who interprets seems to explain something as either true or false. Therefore, only enunciative speech in which truth or falsity is found is called interpretation. Other kinds of speech, such as optatives and imperatives, are ordered rather to expressing volition than to interpreting what is in the intellect. This book, then, is entitled On Interpretation, that is to say, On Enunciative Speech, in which truth or falsity is found. The name and verb are treated only insofar as they are parts of the enunciation; for it is proper to a science to treat the parts of its subject as well as its properties. Patet igitur ad quam partem philosophiae pertineat liber iste et quae sit necessitas istius et quem ordinem teneat inter logicae libros. It is clear, then, to which part of philosophy this book belongs, what its necessity is, and what its place is among the books on logic. 4. Praemittit autem Philosophus huic operi prooemium, in quo sigillatim exponit ea quae in hoc libro sunt tractanda. The Philosopher begins this work with an introduction, in which he points out one by one the things that are to be treated. Et, quia omnis scientia praemittit ea quae de principiis sunt, partes autem compositorum sunt eorum principia, ideo oportet intendenti tractare de enuntiatione praemittere de partibus eius; unde dicit: Primum oportet constituere, id est definire, quid sit nomen et quid sit verbum. In Graeco habetur: Primum oportet poni, et idem significatur: quia enim demonstrationes definitiones praesupponunt ex quibus concludunt, merito dicuntur positiones; et ideo hic praemittuntur solae definitiones eorum de quibus agendum est, quia ex definitionibus alia cognoscuntur. For, since every science begins with a treatment of the principles, and the principles of composite things are their parts, one who intends to treat enunciation must begin with its parts. Thus, Aristotle begins by saying: first we must determine, that is, define, what a noun is and what a verb is (16a1). In the Greek text it is: first we must posit, which signifies the same thing, for demonstrations presuppose definitions, from which they conclude, and hence definitions are rightly called “positions.” This is the reason he only points out here the definitions of the things to be treated; for from definitions other things are known. 5. Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro Praedicamentorum de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur, It might be asked why it is necessary to treat simple things again, that is, the name and the verb, for they were treated in the book Categories. ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum triplex potest esse consideratio: In answer to this, we should say that simple words can be considered in three ways: una quidem secundum quod absolute significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consideratio pertinet ad librum Praedicamentorum; first, as they signify simple intellection absolutely, which is the consideration proper to the book Categories; alio modo secundum rationem prout sunt partes enuntiationis, et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro (et ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et verbi, de quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum tempore vel sine tempore et alia huiusmodi quae pertinent ad rationem dictionum secundum quod constituunt enuntiationem); second, according to their function as parts of the enunciation, which is the way they are considered in this book. Hence, they are treated here under the formality of the name and the verb, and under this formality they signify something with time or without time and other things of the kind that belong to the formality of words as they are components of an enunciation. tertio modo considerantur secundum quod ex eis constituitur syllogisticus ordo, et sic determinatur de eis sub ratione terminorum in libro Priorum. Finally, simple words may be considered as they are components of a syllogistic ordering. They are treated then under the formality of terms, and Aristotle does this in the book Prior Analytics. 6. Potest iterum dubitari quare, praetermissis aliis orationum partibus, de solo nomine et verbo determinet? Ad quod dicendum quod, quia de simplici enuntiatione determinare intendit, sufficit ut solas illas partes orationis pertractet ex quibus ex necessitate simplex oratio constat; potest autem ex solo nomine et verbo simplex enuntiatio fieri, non autem ex aliis orationis partibus sine his; et ideo sufficiens ei fuit de his duabus determinare. It might be asked why he treats only the name and verb and omits the other parts of speech. The reason could be that Aristotle intends to establish rules about the simple enunciation and for this it is sufficient to consider only the parts of the enunciation that are necessary for simple speech. A simple enunciation can be formed from just a name and a verb, but it cannot be formed from other parts of speech without these. Therefore, it is sufficient to treat these two. Vel potest dici quod sola nomina et verba sunt principales orationis partes: sub nominibus enim comprehenduntur pronomina quae, etsi <non> naturam, personam tamen determinant, sub verbo vero participium, quod significat tempus, quamvis et cum nomine convenientiam habeat. Alia vero sunt magis colligationes partium orationis, significantes habitudinem unius ad aliam, quam orationis partes, sicut clavi et alia huiusmodi non sunt partes navis, sed partium navis coniunctiones. On the other hand, the reason could be that names and verbs are the principal parts of speech. Pronouns, which do not name a nature but determine a person—and therefore are put in place of names—are comprehended under names. The participle—although it has similarities with the name—signifies with time and is therefore comprehended under the verb. The others are things that unite the parts of speech. They signify relations of one part to another rather than parts of speech, as nails and other parts of this kind are not parts of a ship, but connect the parts of a ship. 7. His igitur praemissis quasi principiis, subiungit de hiis quae pertinent ad principalem intentionem, dicens: Postea quid negatio et quid affirmatio, quae sunt enuntiationis partes non quidem integrales sicut nomen et verbum (alioquin oporteret omnem enuntiationem ex affirmatione et negatione compositam esse), sed partes subiectivae, id est species. Quod quidem nunc supponatur, posterius autem manifestabitur. After he has proposed these parts [the name and the verb] as principles, Aristotle states what he principally intends to establish: then what negation is and affirmation (16a1). These, too, are parts of the enunciation; however, they are not integral parts, as are the name and the verb (otherwise every enunciation would have to be formed from an affirmation and negation), but subjective parts, that is, species. This is supposed here but will be proved later. 8. Sed potest dubitari, cum enuntiatio dividatur in categoricam et hypotheticam, quare de his non facit mentionem sicut de affirmatione et negatione? Et potest dici quod hypothetica enuntiatio ex pluribus categoricis componitur, unde non differunt nisi secundum differentiam unius et multi. Since enunciation is divided into categorical and hypothetical, it might be asked why he does not list these as well as affirmation and negation. In reply to this we could say that Aristotle has not added these because the hypothetical enunciation is composed of many categorical propositions, and thus categorical and hypothetical only differ according to the difference of one and many. Vel potest dici, et melius, quod hypothetica enuntiatio non continet absolutam veritatem, cuius cognitio requiritur in demonstratione, ad quam principaliter ille liber ordinatur, sed significat aliquid verum esse ex suppositione, quod non sufficit in scientiis demonstrativis, nisi confirmetur per absolutam veritatem simplicis enuntiationis; et ideo Aristoteles praetermisit tractatum de hypotheticis enuntiationibus et syllogismis. Or we could say, and this would be a better reason, that the hypothetical enunciation does not contain absolute truth, the knowledge of which is required in demonstration and to which this book is principally ordered. Rather, it signifies something as true by supposition, which does not suffice for demonstrative sciences unless it is confirmed by the absolute truth of the simple enunciation. This is the reason Aristotle does not treat either hypothetical enunciations or syllogisms. Subdit autem: et enunciatio, quae est genus negationis et affirmationis, et oratio, quae est genus enuntiationis. He adds: and the enunciation (16a1), which is the genus of negation and affirmation, and speech, which is the genus of enunciation. 9. Si quis ulterius quaerat quare non facit ulterius mentionem de voce, dicendum est quod vox est quiddam naturale, unde pertinet ad considerationem naturalis philosophiae, ut patet in II De anima et ultimo De generatione animalium; unde non est proprie orationis genus, sed assumitur ad constitutionem orationis sicut res naturales ad constitutionem artificialium. If it should be asked why, besides these, he does not mention vocal sound, it is because vocal sound is something natural and therefore belongs to the consideration of natural philosophy, as is evident in On the Soul 2.8, 420b5–421a6, and at the end of On the Generation of Animals. Also, since it is something natural, vocal sound is not properly the genus of speech, but is presupposed for the forming of speech, as natural things are presupposed for the formation of artificial things. 10. Videtur autem ordo enuntiationis esse praeposterus: nam affirmatio naturaliter prior est negatione, et his enuntiatio prior est sicut genus, et per consequens oratio enuntiatione. Sed dicendum est quod, quia a partibus inceperat enumerare, procedit a partibus ad totum; negationem autem, quae divisionem continet, eadem ratione praeponit affirmationi, quae ratio consistit in compositione, quia divisio magis accedit ad partes, compositio vero magis accedit ad totum. In this introduction, however, Aristotle seems to have inverted the order of the enunciation, for affirmation is naturally prior to negation, and enunciation is prior to these as a genus; consequently, speech is prior to enunciation. We could reply to this that he began to enumerate from the parts; consequently, he proceeds from the parts to the whole. He puts negation, which contains division, before affirmation, which consists of composition, for the same reason: division is closer to the parts, composition closer to the whole. Vel potest dici, secundum quosdam, quod praemittitur negatio quia in his quae possunt esse et non esse, prius est non esse, quod significat negatio, quam esse, quod significat affirmatio. Or we could say, as some do, that he puts negation first because in those things that can be and not be, non-being, which negation signifies, is prior to being, which affirmation signifies. Si tamen sunt species ex aequo dividentes genus, sunt simul natura; unde non refert quod eorum praeponatur. Aristotle, however, does not refer to the fact that one of them is placed before the other, for they are species equally dividing a genus and are therefore simultaneous according to nature. Lectio 2 Lecture 2 De vocum significatione The signification of vocal sound 16a3. Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae. 16a3. Now, those that are in vocal sound are signs of passions in the soul.