7. Ad manifestationem autem primae propositionis, inducit quod non sunt eadem magis nota nobis et secundum naturam; sed illa quae sunt magis nota secundum naturam, sunt minus nota secundum nos. Et quia iste est naturalis modus sive ordo addiscendi, ut veniatur a nobis notis ad ignota nobis; inde est quod oportet nos devenire ex notioribus nobis ad notiora naturae. 7. To clarify the first proposition, he makes the point that things that are better known to us and things that are better known according to nature are not the same. Rather, those things better known according to nature are less known to us. And, because the natural way or order of learning is that we should come to what is unknown to us from what is known to us, it is necessary for us to arrive at the better known by nature from the better known to us. Notandum autem est quod idem dicit nota esse naturae et nota simpliciter. Simpliciter autem notiora sunt, quae secundum se sunt notiora. Sunt autem secundum se notiora, quae plus habent de entitate: quia unumquodque cognoscibile est inquantum est ens. Magis autem entia sunt, quae sunt magis in actu: unde ista maxime sunt cognoscibilia naturae. It must be noted, however, that “what is known by nature” and “what is known simply” are the same. Those things are better known simply that are in themselves better known. But those things are better known in themselves that have more being, because each thing is knowable insofar as it is a being. However, those beings are greater that are greater in act. Thus, these are the most knowable by nature. Nobis autem e converso accidit, eo quod nos procedimus intelligendo de potentia in actum; et principium cognitionis nostrae est a sensibilibus, quae sunt materialia, et intelligibilia in potentia: unde illa sunt prius nobis nota quam substantiae separatae, quae sunt magis notae secundum naturam, ut patet in II Metaphys. For us, however, the converse is true, because we proceed in understanding from potency to act. Our knowledge begins from sensible things, which are material and intelligible in potency. Thus, these things are known by us before the separated substances, which are better known according to nature, as is clear in Metaphysics 2. Non ergo dicit notiora naturae, quasi natura cognoscat ea; sed quia sunt notiora secundum se et secundum propriam naturam. Dicit autem notiora et certiora, quia in scientiis non quaeritur qualiscumque cognitio, sed cognitionis certitudo. Therefore, he does not say knowable by nature as if nature knew these things, but because they are known better in themselves and according to their proper natures. And he says better known and more certain because, in the sciences, not just any kind of knowledge is sought, but certain knowledge. Ad intellectum autem secundae propositionis, sciendum est quod confusa hic dicuntur quae continent in se aliqua in potentia et indistincte. Et quia cognoscere aliquid indistincte, medium est inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum, ideo, dum intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum, primo occurrit sibi confusum quam distinctum; sed tunc est scientia completa in actu, quando pervenitur per resolutionem ad distinctam cognitionem principiorum et elementorum. Et haec est ratio quare confusa sunt primo nobis nota quam distincta. Next, in order to understand the second proposition, it must be known that those things are here called confused that contain in themselves something potential and indistinct. And because knowing something indistinctly is a mean between pure potency and perfect act, therefore, while our intellect proceeds from potency to act, it knows the confused before it knows the distinct. But it has complete science in act when it arrives, through resolution, at a distinct knowledge of the principles and elements. And this is the reason why the confused is known by us before the distinct. Quod autem universalia sint confusa manifestum est, quia universalia continent in se suas species in potentia, et qui scit aliquid in universali scit illud indistincte; tunc autem distinguitur eius cognitio, quando unumquodque eorum quae continentur potentia in universali, actu cognoscitur: qui enim scit animal, non scit rationale nisi in potentia. Prius autem est scire aliquid in potentia quam in actu: secundum igitur hunc ordinem addiscendi quo procedimus de potentia in actum, prius quoad nos est scire animal quam hominem. That universals are confused is clear. For universals contain in themselves their species in potency, and whoever knows something in the universal knows it indistinctly. The knowledge, however, becomes distinct when each of the things contained in potency in the universal is known in act. For he who knows “animal” does not know “rational” except in potency. But knowing something in potency is prior to knowing it in act. Therefore, according to this order of learning, in which we proceed from potency to act, we know “animal” before we know “man.” 8. Contrarium autem huic videtur esse quod dicit Philosophus in I Poster., quod singularia sunt magis nota quoad nos, universalia vero naturae sive simpliciter. 8. It would seem, however, that this is contrary to what the Philosopher says in Posterior Analytics 1.2, that singulars are better known to us, whereas universals are better known by nature or simply. Sed intelligendum est quod ibi accipit singularia ipsa individua sensibilia: quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, quia sensus cognitio, quae est singularium, praecedit cognitionem intellectus in nobis, quae est universalium. Sed quia cognitio intellectualis est perfectior, universalia autem sunt intelligibilia in actu, non autem singularia (cum sint materialia); simpliciter et secundum naturam universalia sunt notiora. But it must be understood that, there, he takes as singulars the individual sensible things themselves, which are better known to us because the knowledge of sense, which is of singulars, does precede in us the knowledge of the intellect, which is of universals. But because intellectual knowledge is more perfect, and because universals are intelligible in act—whereas singulars are not (since they are material)—universals are better known simply and according to nature. Hic autem singularia dicit non ipsa individua, sed species; quae sunt notiores secundum naturam, utpote perfectiores existentes et distinctam cognitionem habentes: genera vero sunt prius nota quoad nos, utpote habentia cognitionem in potentia et confusam. Here, however, by singulars, he means not the individuals themselves, but the species. And these are better known by nature, existing more perfectly, as it were, and being known with a distinct knowledge. But the genera are known by us first, being known, as it were, confusedly and in potency. Sciendum autem quod Commentator aliter exponit. Dicit enim quod ibi, innata autem est etc., vult ostendere Philosophus modum demonstrationis huius scientiae, It should be known, however, that the Commentator explains this passage in another way. At the natural way of doing this (184a16), he says that the Philosopher wishes to explain the method of demonstration of this science: quia scilicet demonstrat per effectus et posteriora secundum naturam: ut sic quod ibi dicitur, intelligatur de processu in demonstrando, et non in determinando. this science demonstrates through the effect and what is posterior according to nature. Hence, what is said here is to be understood of the progression in demonstration, and not of the progression in determination. Cum autem dicit, sunt autem nobis etc., intendit manifestare, secundum eum, quae sunt magis nota quoad nos et minus nota secundum naturam, scilicet composita simplicibus, intelligens composita per confusa. Then, at now, what is plain and obvious (184a21), according to the Commentator, Aristotle intends to make clear what things are better known to us and what is better known by nature, namely, what is composed of simple things—understanding confused to mean composed. Ultimo autem concludit quod procedendum est ab universalioribus ad minus universalia, quasi quoddam corollarium. Finally, then, he concludes, as if to a corollary, that we must proceed from the more universal to the less universal. Unde patet quod eius expositio non est conveniens, quia non coniungit totum ad unam intentionem; et quia hic non intendit philosophus ostendere modum demonstrationis huius scientiae, hoc enim faciet in secundo libro secundum ordinem determinandi; iterum quia confusa non debent exponi composita, sed indistincta; non enim posset concludi aliquid ex universalibus, cum genera non componantur ex speciebus. It is clear that the Commentator’s explanation is not suitable, because he does not join the whole passage to one intention. Moreover, the Philosopher does not intend to set forth the mode of demonstration of this science here, because he will do this in book 2, according to his order of treatment. Furthermore, the “confused” should not be taken to mean “composed,” but rather to mean “indistinct.” For nothing could be concluded from such universals, because genera are not composed of species. 9. Deinde cum dicit: totum enim etc., manifestat propositum per tria signa. 9. Next, at for it is a whole (184a23), he clarifies his position with three examples. Quorum primum sumitur a toto integrali sensibili: et dicit quod totum sensibile est notius secundum sensum; ergo et totum intelligibile est notius secundum intellectum. Universale autem est quoddam totum intelligibile, quia comprehendit multa ut partes, scilicet sua inferiora; ergo universale est notius secundum intellectum quoad nos. The first of these is taken from the integral sensible whole. He says that, since the sensible whole is better known to the sense, the intelligible whole is also better known to the intellect. But the universal is a sort of intelligible whole, because it comprehends many as parts—namely, its inferiors. Therefore, the universal is known better to us intellectually. Videtur autem haec probatio inefficax, quia utitur toto et parte et comprehensione aequivoce. But it would seem that this proof is not effective, because he uses whole, part, and comprehension equivocally. Dicendum est autem quod totum integrale et universale conveniunt in hoc, quod utrumque est confusum et indistinctum. Sicuti enim qui apprehendit genus, non apprehendit species distincte sed in potentia tantum, ita qui apprehendit domum, nondum distinguit partes: unde cum ratione confusionis totum sit prius cognitum quoad nos, eadem ratio est de utroque toto. Esse autem compositum non est commune utrique toti: unde manifestum est quod signanter dixit supra confusa, et non composita. However, it must be said that the integral whole and the universal agree in that each is confused and indistinct. For just as he who apprehends a genus does not apprehend the species distinctly, but in potency only, so also he who apprehends a house does not yet distinguish its parts. Hence it is that a whole is first known to us as confused. This applies to both of these wholes. However, to be composed is not common to each whole. Thus, it is clear that Aristotle significantly said confused above, and not composed. 10. Deinde cum dicit: sustinent autem etc., ponit aliud signum de toto integrali intelligibili. Definitum enim se habet ad definientia quodammodo ut totum integrale, inquantum actu sunt definientia in definito; 10. Next, at much the same thing (184a26), he gives another example taken from the integral intelligible whole. For that which is defined is related to the things defining it as a kind of integral whole, insofar as the things defining it are in act in that which is defined. sed tamen qui apprehendit nomen, ut puta hominem aut circulum, non statim distinguit principia definientia; unde nomen est sicut quoddam totum et indistinctum, sed definitio dividit in singularia, idest distincte ponit principia definiti. But he who apprehends a name—for example, man or circle—does not at once distinguish the defining principles. Thus it is that the name is, as it were, a sort of whole and is indistinct, while the definition divides into particular elements, that is, distinctly sets forth the principles of that which is defined. Videtur autem hoc esse contrarium ei quod supra dixit; nam definientia videntur esse universaliora, quae dixit prius esse nota nobis. Item si definitum esset notius nobis quam definientia, non notificaretur nobis definitum per definitionem: nihil enim notificatur nobis nisi ex magis notis nobis. This, however, seems to be contrary to what he said above. For the things that define would seem to be more universal, and these, he said, were first known by us. Furthermore, if that which is defined were better known to us than the things that define, we would not grasp that which is defined through the definition, for we grasp nothing except through that which is better known to us. Sed dicendum quod definientia secundum se sunt prius nota nobis quam definitum; sed prius est notum nobis definitum, quam quod talia sint definientia ipsius: sicut prius sunt nota nobis animal et rationale quam homo; sed prius est nobis notus homo confuse, quam quod animal et rationale sint definientia ipsius. But it must be said that the things that define are in themselves known to us before that which is defined, but we know the thing that is defined before we know that these are the things that define it. Thus we know animal and rational before we know man. But man is known confusedly before we know that animal and rational are the things that define man. 11. Deinde cum dicit: et pueri etc., ponit tertium signum sumptum ex universaliori sensibili. Sicut enim universalius intelligibile est prius notum nobis secundum intellectum, ut puta animal homine, ita communius sensibile est prius notum nobis secundum sensum, ut puta hoc animal quam hic homo. 11. Next, at similarly, a child (184b12), he gives the third example taken from the more universal sensible. For as the more universal intelligible is first known to us intellectually—for example, animal is known before man—so the more common sensible is first known to us according to sense—for example, we know this is an animal before we know this is a man. Et dico prius secundum sensum et secundum locum et secundum tempus. Secundum locum quidem, quia cum aliquis a remotis videtur, prius percipimus ipsum esse corpus quam esse animal, et hoc prius quam quod sit homo, et ultimo quod sit Socrates. Et similiter secundum tempus puer prius apprehendit hunc ut quendam hominem, quam ut hunc hominem qui est Plato, qui est pater eius: et hoc est quod dicit, pueri primum appellant omnes viros patres et feminas matres, sed posterius determinant, idest determinate cognoscunt, unumquodque. And I say “first according to sense” both with reference to place and with reference to time. This is true according to place, for when someone is seen at a distance, we perceive him to be a body before we perceive that he is an animal, and an animal before we perceive him to be a man, and finally we perceive that he is Socrates. And in the same way, with reference to time, a boy apprehends this individual as some man before he apprehends this man, Plato, who is his father. And this is what he says, children begin by calling all men “father” and all women “mother,” but later on distinguish; that is, they know each determinately. Ex quo manifeste ostenditur quod prius cognoscimus aliquid sub confusione quam distincte. From this, it is clearly shown that we know a thing confusedly before we know it distinctly. Lectio 2 Lecture 2 Antiquorum philosophorum opiniones de principiis naturae et entium. Quorumdam opiniones improbare non pertinet ad scientiam naturalem The ancient philosophers’ opinions about the principles of nature and of beings Necesse autem est aut unum esse principium aut plura. Et si unum, aut immobile, sicut dicunt Parmenides et Melissus; aut mobile, sicut physici, hi quidem aerem dicentes esse, alii vero aquam primum principium. Si autem plura, aut finita aut infinita. Et si finita, plura autem uno, aut duo aut tria aut quatuor, aut secundum alium aliquem numerum. Et si infinita, aut sic sicut dixit Democritus, genus unum, figura autem et specie differentia aut etiam contraria. The principles in question must be either one or more than one. If there is one, it must be either motionless, as Parmenides and Melissus assert, or in motion, as the physicists hold—some declaring air to be the first principle, others water. If there are more than one, then either a finite or an infinite plurality. If they are finite (but more than one), then either two or three or four or some other number. If they are infinite, then either (as Democritus) believed one in kind but differing in shape or form, or different in kind and even contrary. Similiter autem quaerunt et quae sunt quaerentes quot sunt. Ex quibus enim sunt quae sunt quaerunt primum, utrum haec unum aut plura sint: et si multa, aut finita aut infinita. Quare principium et elementum quaerunt, utrum unum aut multa. A similar inquiry is made by those who inquire into the number of existents. For they inquire whether the ultimate constituents of existing things are one or many, and if many, whether a finite or an infinite plurality. So they, too, are inquiring whether the principle or element is one or many. Id quidem igitur, si unum et immobile sit quod est, intendere, non de natura est intendere. Sicut enim geometrae non amplius ratio est ad destruentem principia, sed est aut alterius scientiae aut omnibus communis, sic neque alicui de principiis. Now, to investigate whether being is one and motionless does not belong to natural science. For just as the geometer has nothing more to say to one who denies the principles of his science—this being a question for a different science or common to all—so a man investigating principles cannot argue with one who denies their existence. Non enim amplius principium est, si unum solum est et sic unum: principium enim cuiusdam aut quorundam est. For if being is just one, and one in the way mentioned, there is no longer a principle, since a principle must be the principle of some thing or things. Simile igitur intendere est si sic unum est, et ad aliam positionem quamlibet disputare sermonis gratia dictam, ut Heracliteam; aut si aliquis dicat hominem unum quod est esse: To inquire, therefore, whether being is one in this sense would be like arguing against any other position maintained for the sake of argument, such as the Heraclitean thesis or such a thesis as that being is one man— aut solvere rationem litigiosam. Quod sane utraeque quidem habent rationes, et Melissi et Parmenidis. Etenim falsa recipiunt, et non syllogizantes sunt. Magis autem Melissi onerosa est ratio, et non habens defectum; sed uno inconvenienti dato alia contingunt: hoc autem nihil difficile. or like refuting a merely contentious argument. This applies to the arguments both of Melissus and of Parmenides: they have accepted what is false and they are not syllogizing. Or rather, the argument of Melissus is much worse and offers no difficulty at all: accept one ridiculous proposition, and the rest follow—a simple enough proceeding. Nobis autem subiiciantur quae sunt natura aut omnia aut quaedam moveri. Est autem manifestum hoc ex inductione. We physicists, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things that exist by nature are—either all or some of them—in motion. This is indeed made plain by induction. Simul autem neque solvere omnia convenit: sed aut quaecumque ex principiis aliquis demonstrans mentitur; quaecumque vero non, minime. Ut tetragonismum hunc quidem qui per decisiones, geometrici est dissolvere: illum autem qui Antiphontis, non geometrici est. Moreover, no one is bound to solve every kind of difficulty that may be raised, but only as many as are drawn falsely from the principles of the science. It is not our business to refute those that do not arise in this way; just as it is the duty of the geometer to refute the squaring of the circle by means of segments, but it is not his duty to refute Antiphon’s proof. Sed quoniam de natura quidem, non autem naturales defectus contingit dicere ipsos, fortassis bene se habet aliquantulum disputare de ipsis: habet enim philosophiam hic respectus. At the same time, the holders of the theory of which we are speaking do incidentally raise physical questions, though nature is not their subject, so it will perhaps be as well to spend a few words on them, especially as the inquiry is not without philosophical interest.