Nec etiam utitur hic figurata locutione, sed exemplari. Dictum est enim supra quod materia prima scibilis est secundum proportionem, inquantum sic se habet ad formas substantiales, sicut materiae sensibiles ad formas accidentales; et ideo ad manifestandum materiam primam, oportet uti exemplo sensibilium substantiarum. Sicut igitur usus est exemplo aeris infigurati et hominis non musici ad manifestandam materiam, ita nunc ad eius manifestationem utitur exemplo feminae virum appetentis, et turpis appetentis bonum: hoc enim accidit eis inquantum habent aliquid de ratione materiae. Nor does he use a figure of speech here; rather, he uses an example. For it was said above that prime matter is knowable by way of proportion, insofar as it is related to substantial forms as sensible matters are related to accidental forms. And thus, in order to explain prime matter, it is necessary to use an example taken from sensible substances. Therefore, just as he used the example of unshaped bronze and the example of the non-musical man to explain matter, so now to explain matter he uses the example of the appetite of the woman for the man and the example of appetite of the base for the good. For this happens to these things insofar as they have something that is of the account of matter. Sciendum tamen est quod Aristoteles hic loquitur contra Platonem, qui talibus metaphoricis locutionibus utebatur, assimilans materiam matri et feminae, et formam masculo; et ideo Aristoteles utitur contra eum metaphoris ab eo assumptis. However, it must be noted that Aristotle is here arguing against Plato, who used such metaphorical expressions, likening matter to a mother and the feminine, and form to the masculine. And so, Aristotle uses Plato’s own metaphors against him. 139. Deinde cum dicit: corrumpitur autem etc., ostendit quomodo materia corrumpatur. Et dicit quod quodammodo corrumpitur, et quodammodo non. Quia secundum quod est in ea privatio, sic corrumpitur cum cessat in ea esse privatio, ut si diceremus aes infiguratum corrumpi, quando desinit esse infiguratum: sed secundum se, inquantum est quoddam ens in potentia, est ingenita et incorruptibilis. 139. Next, at the matter comes to be (192a25), he shows how matter is corrupted. He says that in a certain respect matter is corrupted and, in a certain respect, it is not. For insofar as privation is in it, it is corrupted when the privation ceases to be in it, as if we should say that unshaped bronze is corrupted when it ceases to be unshaped. But in itself, insofar as it is a certain being in potency, it is neither generated nor corruptible. Quod sic patet. Si enim materia fiat, oportet ei aliquid subiici ex quo fiat, ut ex superioribus patet. This is clear as follows. If matter should come to be, there would have to be something that is the subject from which it comes to be, as is clear from what was said above. Sed primum quod subiicitur in generatione est materia: hoc enim dicimus materiam, primum subiectum ex quo aliquid fit per se et non secundum accidens, et inest rei iam factae (et utrumque eorum ponitur ad differentiam privationis, ex qua fit aliquid per accidens, et non inest rei factae). Sequitur ergo quod materia sit antequam fiat, quod est impossibile. But that which is the first subject in generation is matter. For we say that matter is the first subject from which a thing comes to be per se and not per accidens, and is in the thing after it has come to be. (And privation differs from matter on both of these points. For privation is that from which a thing comes to be per accidens and is not in the thing after it has come to be.) It follows, therefore, that matter would be before it would come to be, which is impossible. Et similiter omne quod corrumpitur, resolvitur in materiam primam. And, in like manner, everything that is corrupted is resolved into prime matter. Quando igitur iam est materia prima, tunc est corruptum: et sic, si materia prima corrumpatur, erit corrupta antequam corrumpatur, quod est impossibile. Therefore, at the very time that prime matter began to exist, it would be corrupted; and, thus, if prime matter is corrupted, it will have been corrupted before it is corrupted, which is impossible. Sic igitur impossibile est materiam primam generari vel corrumpi. Sed ex hoc non excluditur quin per creationem in esse procedat. Therefore, it is impossible for prime matter to be generated and corrupted. But by this we do not deny that it comes into existence through creation. 140. Deinde cum dicit: de principio autem etc., quia iam excluserat errores circa materiam et privationem, restare videbatur ut excluderet errores et dubitationes circa formam. Posuerunt enim quidam formas separatas, scilicet ideas, quas reducebant ad unam primam ideam. 140. Next, at the accurate determination (192a34), he indicates that, since the errors about matter and privation have been eliminated, then the errors and problems about form should also be eliminated. For some have posited separated forms (that is, ideas), which they reduced to one first idea. Et ideo dicit quod de principio formali, utrum sit unum vel plura, et quot et quae sint, pertinet determinare ad philosophiam primam, et usque ad illud tempus reservetur: quia forma est principium essendi, et ens inquantum huiusmodi est subiectum primae philosophiae; sed materia et privatio sunt principia entis transmutabilis, quod a philosopho naturali consideratur. Sed tamen de formis naturalibus et corruptibilibus in sequentibus huius doctrinae determinabitur. And so he says that first philosophy treats questions such as whether the formal principle is one or many, and how many there are, and what kind there are. Hence, these questions will be reserved for first philosophy. For form is a principle of existing, and being as such is the subject of first philosophy. But matter and privation are principles of mutable being, which is considered by the natural philosopher. Nevertheless, we shall treat of natural and corruptible forms in the following books on this discipline. Ultimo autem epilogat quae dicta sunt: et dicit quod sic determinatum est quod principia sunt, et quae, et quot. Sed oportet iterum aliter principium facere scientiae naturalis, inquirendo scilicet principia scientiae. Finally, he summarizes what has been said. It has been determined that there are principles, what the principles are, and how many there are. But it is necessary to make a new start in our study of natural science, inquiring into the principles of the science. Liber 2 Book 2 Beta (B) The Principles of Natural Science Lectio 1 Lecture 1 Quid sit natura: quaenam sint quae habent naturam, et sunt naturam What is nature, and what things have it? Eorum quae sunt, alia quidem sunt natura, alia vero propter alias causas. Natura quidem sunt animalia quaeque, et partes ipsorum, et plantae, et simplicia corpora, ut terra et ignis et aer et aqua: haec enim et huiusmodi esse natura dicimus. Of things that exist, some exist by nature and some from other causes. “By nature,” the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)—for we say that these and the like exist “by nature.” Omnia autem quae praedicta sunt, videntur differentia ad non natura existentia. Quae quidem enim natura sunt, omnia videntur habere in seipsis principium motus et status; haec quidem secundum locum, illa vero secundum augmentum et decrementum, quaedam autem secundum alterationem. All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things that are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). Lectulus autem et indumentum, et si aliquod huiusmodi genus est, secundum quod quidem sortitum est praedicationem unamquamque, et inquantum est ab arte, neque unum habet impetum mutationis innatum: secundum autem quod contingit ipsis lapideis aut terreis esse aut mixtis ex his, habent hoc tantum. On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, by merit of receiving these designations—that is, insofar as they are products of art—have no innate impulse to change. But, insofar as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent. Est igitur natura principium alicuius et causa movendi et quiescendi in quo est primum per se et non secundum accidens. And this seems to indicate that nature is a principle and cause of motion and rest in that in which it is primarily and per se, and not per accidens. Dico autem non secundum accidens, cum fiat utique ipse sibi aliquis causa sanitatis cum sit medicus: sed tamen non secundum quod sanatur medicinam habet, sed accidit eundem medicum esse et sanari; unde et dividuntur aliquando ab invicem. I say, “not per accidens,” because (for instance) a man who is a doctor might cure himself. Nevertheless, it is not insofar as he is a patient that he possesses the art of medicine: it merely has happened that the same man is doctor and patient—and that is why these attributes are not always found together. Similiter autem et aliorum unumquodque quae fiunt. Nullum enim ipsorum habet in seipso factionis principium: So it is with all other artificial products. None of them has in itself the source of its own production. sed alia quidem in aliis et ab exteriori, ut domus et aliorum manu incisorum unumquodque; But, while that principle is in something else external to the thing in some cases (for instance, houses and the other products of manual labor), alia autem in seipsis quidem, sed non secundum seipsa, quaecumque secundum accidens fiunt causae utique ipsis. Est igitur natura quod dictum est. in other cases—those that may cause a change in themselves accidentally—it lies in the things themselves (but not in virtue of what they are). Nature, then, is what has been stated. Naturam autem habent quaecumque huiusmodi habent principium. Et sunt haec omnia subiecta: subiectum enim quoddam, et in subiecto est natura semper. Things have a nature that have a principle of this kind. Each of them is a substance, for it is a subject, and nature always implies a subject in which it inheres. Secundum naturam autem sunt et haec et quaecumque his insunt secundum se, ut igni ferri sursum. Hoc enim natura quidem non est, neque habet naturam; sed a natura, et secundum naturam est. Quid quidem igitur natura sit, dictum est, et quid quod a natura et secundum naturam. The term “according to nature” is applied to all these things and also to the attributes that belong to them in virtue of what they are—for instance, the property of fire to be carried upward, which neither is a nature nor has a nature, but is “by nature” or “according to nature.” What nature is, then, and the meaning of the terms “by nature” and “according to nature,” has been stated. Quod autem est natura tentare demonstrare, ridiculum est. Manifestum enim est quod huiusmodi rerum sunt multa: demonstrare autem manifesta per immanifesta, non potentis iudicare est propter ipsum et non propter ipsum cognitum. Quod autem contingat hoc pati, non immanifestum est. Syllogizet enim aliquis, cum natus sit caecus, de coloribus: quare necesse est huiusmodi de nominibus habere rationem, nihil autem intelligere. That nature exists it would be absurd to try to prove; for it is obvious that there are many things of this kind, and to prove what is obvious by what is not is the mark of a man who is unable to distinguish what is self-evident from what is not. (This state of mind is clearly possible. A man blind from birth might reason about colors. Presumably, therefore, such persons must be talking about words without any thought to correspond.) 141. Postquam Philosophus in primo libro determinavit de principiis rerum naturalium, hic determinat de principiis scientiae naturalis. Ea autem quae primo oportet cognoscere in aliqua scientia, sunt subiectum ipsius, et medium per quod demonstrat. 141. After the Philosopher has treated the principles of natural things in book 1, he here treats the principles of natural science. Now, the things that we ought to know first in any science are its subject and the middle term by which it demonstrates. Unde hic secundus liber in duas partes dividitur: Hence book 2 is divided into two parts. in prima determinat de quibus sit consideratio scientiae naturalis; First, he determines what things belong to the consideration of natural science; in secunda ex quibus causis demonstrat, ibi: determinatis autem his etc. second, at now that we have established (194b16; [176]), he points out the causes from which it demonstrates. Prima dividitur in duas: The first part is divided into two parts. in prima ostendit quid sit natura; First, he shows what nature is. in secunda de quibus considerat scientia naturalis, ibi: quoniam autem determinatum est etc. Second, at we have distinguished (193b22; [157]), he determines what things natural science considers. Prima dividitur in duas: The first part is divided into two parts. in prima ostendit quid sit natura; First, he shows what nature is; in secunda quot modis dicitur, ibi: videtur autem natura, etc. second, the number of ways in which nature is used is pointed out, at some identify (193a9; [149]).