Et ideo terminus considerationis scientiae naturalis est circa formas quae quidem sunt aliquo modo separatae, sed tamen esse habent in materia. Et huiusmodi formae sunt animae rationales: quae quidem sunt separatae inquantum intellectiva virtus non est actus alicuius organi corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi; sed in materia sunt inquantum dant esse naturale tali corpori. Et quod sint in materia, per hoc probat, quod forma cuiuslibet rei generatae ex materia est forma in materia: ad hoc enim terminatur generatio, ut forma sit in materia. Sed homo generatur ex materia et ab homine, quasi ab agente proprio, et a sole tanquam ab agente universali respectu generabilium: unde sequitur quod anima, quae est forma humana, sit forma in materia. Unde usque ad animam rationalem se extendit consideratio naturalis, quae est de formis. And so, the last things considered by natural science are forms that are, indeed, in some way separated but that have existence in matter. And rational souls are forms of this sort. For such souls are indeed separated, insofar as the intellective power is not the act of a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of an eye. But they are in matter insofar as they give natural existence to such a body. That such souls are in matter he proves as follows. The form of anything generated from matter is a form that is in matter. For the generation is terminated when the form is in matter. But man is generated from matter and by man, as by a proper agent, and by the sun, as by a universal agent with respect to the generable. Hence, it follows that the soul, which is the human form, is a form in matter. Thus, the consideration of natural science about forms extends to the rational soul. Sed quomodo se habeant formae totaliter a materia separatae, et quid sint, vel etiam quomodo se habeat haec forma, idest anima rationalis, secundum quod est separabilis et sine corpore existere potens, et quid sit secundum suam essentiam separabile, hoc determinare pertinet ad philosophum primum. But how forms are totally separated from matter, and what they are, or even how this form, the rational soul, exists insofar as it is separable and capable of existence without a body, and what it is according to its separable essence, are questions that pertain to first philosophy. Lectio 5 Lecture 5 Ad physicam pertinet determinare de causis. Quae et quot species causarum Physics determines what and how many causes there are Determinatis autem his, considerandum est de causis, et quae et quot numero sunt. Quoniam enim sciendi gratia hoc negotium est; scire autem non ante opinamur unumquodque, quam utique accipimus propter quid est unumquodque, hoc autem est accipere primam causam; manifestum est quoniam et nobis hoc faciendum est et de generatione et corruptione et de omni physica mutatione; quatenus scientes eorum principia, reducere in ipsa tentemus quaesitorum unumquodque. Now that we have established these distinctions, we must proceed to consider causes, their character and number. Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the why of it (which is to grasp its primary cause). So clearly we too must do this as regards both generation and passing away and every kind of physical change, in order that, knowing their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our problems. Uno quidem modo causa dicitur, ex quo fit aliquid cum insit, sicut aes statuae et argentum phialae, et horum genera. In one sense, then, that from which something comes to be when it is in it is called “cause”—for instance, the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of these things. Alio autem modo species et exemplum. Haec autem est ratio ipsius quod quid erat esse, et huius genera; ut eius quae est diapason, duo ad unum, et omnino numerus, et partes quae in definitione. In another sense, the form or the exemplar—the statement of the essence—and its genera are called “causes” (i.e., of the octave, the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition. Amplius, unde principium mutationis primum aut quietis est; ut consilians causa, et pater filii, et omnino faciens facti et commutans commutati. Again, that from which there is a beginning of motion or rest is a cause, such as the man who gave advice, the father as cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed. Adhuc autem quemadmodum finis. Hoc autem est quod cuius causa, ut ambulandi sanitas. Again, the end or “that for the sake of which” a thing is done is a cause: health is the cause of walking about. Propter quid enim ambulat? Dicimus, ut sanetur: et dicentes sic, opinamur assignare causam. (“Why does he walk?” we say, “That he may become healthy,” and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) Et quaecumque iam movente alio intermedia sunt finis, ut sanitatis macies aut purgatio aut potiones aut organa: The same is true also of all the intermediate steps that are brought about through the action of something else as means toward the end, such as reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments as means toward health. omnia enim haec finis gratia sunt. Differunt tamen ab invicem, quod alia quidem opera, alia vero organa. Causae quidem igitur fere tot modis dicuntur. All these things are for the sake of the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities and others are instruments. This perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term “cause” is used. Contingit autem, multipliciter dictis causis, et multas eiusdem causas esse non secundum accidens: As the word has several senses, it follows that there are several causes of the same thing (not merely accidentally): ut statuifica et aes non secundum alterum aliquid, sed secundum quod est statua; sed non eodem modo, sed hoc quidem ut materia, illud autem sicut unde motus. for instance, both the art of the sculptor and the bronze are causes of the statue. These are causes of the statue qua statue, not in virtue of anything else that it may be—only not in the same way, the one being the material cause, the other the cause from which the motion comes. Sunt autem quaedam et ad invicem causae, ut laborare causa est boni habitus, et hic laborandi: sed non eodem modo, sed haec quidem sicut finis, illa sicut principium motus. Some things cause each other reciprocally, as hard work causes fitness and vice versa, but not in the same way: the one is the end, and the other is the origin of change. Amplius autem eadem contrariorum est. Quae enim praesens causa huius est, absentem causam aliquando contrarii; ut absentia gubernatoris navis submersionis, cuius erat praesentia causa salutis. Further, the same thing is the cause of contrary results. For that which brings about one result by its presence is sometimes blamed for bringing about the contrary by its absence. Thus, we ascribe the wreck of a ship to the absence of the pilot, whose presence was the cause of its safety. Omnes autem nunc dictae causae in quatuor incidunt modos manifestissimos. Elementa enim syllabarum, et terra vasorum, et ignis et huiusmodi corporum, et partes totius, et suppositiones conclusionis, sicut ex quo causae sunt. All the causes now mentioned fall into four obvious divisions. The elements are the causes of syllables, earth of vases, fire and the like of bodies, the parts of the whole, and the premises of the conclusion, all in the sense of “that from which.” Harum autem hae quidem sunt sicut subiectum, ut partes: aliae autem sunt sicut quod quid erat esse, et totum et compositio et species. Of these pairs, the one set are causes in the sense of substratum, such as the parts, and the other set in the sense of essence—the whole and the combination and the form. Semen autem et medicus et consilians et omnino faciens, omnes sunt unde principium mutationis aut status aut motus est. Aliae autem sicut finis et bonum aliorum: quae enim est cuius causa, potissima est, et finis aliorum voluit esse. But the seed and the doctor and the adviser, and generally the maker, are all sources from which the change or stationariness originates, while the others are causes in the sense of the end or the good of the rest, for “that for the sake of which” means what is best and the end of the things that lead up to it. Differt autem nihil eandem dicere bonam, vel videri bonam. Causae quidem igitur hae et tot sunt specie. (Whether we say “the good itself” or the “apparent good” makes no difference.) Such, then, is the number and nature of the kinds of cause. 176. Postquam Philosophus ostendit de quibus considerat scientia naturalis, hic incipit ostendere ex quibus causis demonstret. 176. Having shown what natural science considers, the Philosopher here begins to designate the causes from which it should demonstrate. Et dividitur in partes duas: This section is divided into two parts. in prima determinat de causis; First, he treats the causes; in secunda vero ostendit ex quibus causis naturalis demonstret, ibi: quoniam autem causae quatuor etc. second, at now the causes (198a22; [241]), he points out the causes from which natural science should demonstrate. Circa primum duo facit: Concerning the first part, he makes two points. primo ostendit necessitatem determinandi de causis; First, he shows the need for treating the causes; secundo incipit de causis determinare, ibi: uno quidem modo etc. second, at in one sense (194b23; [177]), he begins to treat the causes. Dicit ergo primo quod postquam determinatum est quid cadat sub consideratione scientiae naturalis, restat considerandum de causis, quae et quot sunt. Et hoc ideo, quia hoc negotium quo intendimus de natura tractare, non ordinatur ad operationem, sed ad scientiam: quia nos non possumus facere res naturales, sed solum de eis scientiam habere. Sed nos non opinamur nos scire unumquodque, nisi cum accipimus propter quid, quod est accipere causam: unde manifestum est quod hoc observandum est nobis circa generationem et corruptionem et omnem naturalem mutationem, ut cognoscamus causas, et reducamus unumquodque de quo quaeritur propter quid, in proximam causam. He says first (194b16) that, after it has been determined what falls under the consideration of natural science, there remains to be considered the causes—what they are and how many there are. This is so because the business of studying nature is not ordered to operation, but to science. For we are not able to make natural things, but only to have science of them. Now, we do not think that we know anything unless we grasp the why, which is to grasp the cause. Hence it is clear that we must observe generation, corruption, and every natural change in such a way that we know the causes and reduce each one about which we seek the why to its proximate cause. Hoc autem ideo dicit, quia considerare de causis inquantum huiusmodi, proprium est philosophi primi: nam causa in eo quod causa est non dependet a materia secundum esse, eo quod in his etiam quae a materia sunt separata, invenitur ratio causae. Sed a philosopho naturali assumitur consideratio de causis propter aliquam necessitatem; nec tamen assumitur ab eo considerare de causis nisi secundum quod sunt causae naturalium mutationum. He says this because the consideration of causes insofar as they are causes is proper to first philosophy. For insofar as it is a cause, a cause does not depend upon matter for its existence, because the account of cause is found also in those things that are separated from matter. But the consideration of causes is taken up by the natural philosopher because of a certain necessity. However, he considers causes only insofar as they are the causes of natural changes. 177. Deinde cum dicit: uno quidem modo etc., determinat de causis. 177. Next, at in one sense (194b23), he treats the causes. Et circa hoc tria facit: Concerning this, he makes three points. primo assignat diversas species causarum manifestas; First, he names the clearly diverse species of causes; secundo de quibusdam immanifestis causis determinat, ibi: dicitur autem fortuna etc.; second, at but chance also (195b31; [198]), he treats certain less obvious causes; tertio ostendit quod non sunt plures neque pauciores, ibi: quae autem sunt causae etc. third, at it is clear, then (198a14; [239]), he shows that the causes are neither more nor less. Prima dividitur in duas: The first part is divided into two parts. in prima determinat species causarum; First, he treats the species of causes;