Et hoc dico si id quod est praeter intentionem ut in paucioribus consequatur: quod enim vel semper vel ut frequenter coniungitur effectui, cadit sub eadem intentione. Stultum est enim dicere quod aliquis intendat aliquid, et non velit illud quod ut frequenter vel semper adiungitur. And I say that this is true if what is outside the intention follows in few cases. For what is always or frequently joined to the effect falls under the intention itself. For it is stupid to say that someone intends something but does not will that which is always or frequently joined to it. Ponit autem differentiam inter causam per se et causam per accidens: quia causa per se est finita et determinata; causa autem per accidens est infinita et indeterminata, eo quod infinita uni possunt accidere. Moreover, he points out a difference between the per se cause and the per accidens cause. The per se cause is limited and determinate, whereas the per accidens cause is unlimited and indeterminate, because an infinity of things can happen to be united. 215. Deinde cum dicit: sicut igitur dictum est etc., ostendit sub quibus membris praedictarum divisionum fortuna contineatur, et quod est a fortuna. Et dicit primo quod fortuna et casus, ut prius dictum est, sunt in iis quae fiunt propter aliquid. Differentia autem casus et fortunae posterius determinabitur. Sed nunc hoc debet fieri manifestum, quod utrumque continetur in iis quae aguntur propter finem: 215. Next, at to resume, then (196b29), he points out those members of the above divisions under which fortune is contained and what fortune is. He says first that fortune and chance, as was said above, pertain to those things that happen for the sake of something. However, the difference between fortune and chance will be determined later. But now it should be clear that each of them is contained among those things that act for the sake of an end. sicut si aliquis sciret se recepturum pecuniam in foro, ivisset ad deportandum eam; sed si non propter hoc venit, per accidens est quod adventus eius fiat reportationis gratia, idest habeat hunc effectum. Et sic patet quod fortuna est causa per accidens eorum quae sunt propter aliquid. Thus, if one knows that he will receive money in the forum, and if he goes there to take it away, but if he did not go there for this purpose, it is per accidens that his arrival should have this effect, that he got his money. And thus it is clear that fortune is a per accidens cause of things that are for the sake of something. Item manifestum est quod est causa eorum quae sunt in minori parte; quia ista reportatio pecuniae dicitur fieri a fortuna, quando reportat ad villam veniens neque ex necessitate neque frequenter. Further, it is clear that fortune is a cause of things that occur in few instances. For carrying money away is said to be by fortune when he who takes money away comes to the house neither necessarily nor frequently. Item est in iis quae fiunt a proposito: quia reportatio pecuniae quae dicitur fieri a fortuna, est finis aliquarum causarum, non secundum seipsum, sicut in iis quae fiunt a natura, Moreover, fortune pertains to those things that come to be because of what is proposed. For taking money away, which is said to be by fortune, is the end of some causes, but not in itself, as in those things that happen by nature. sed est finis eorum quae fiunt secundum propositum et ab intellectu. Sed si aliquis hoc proposito iret ut pecuniam reportaret, vel semper aut frequenter reportaret quando venit, non diceretur esse a fortuna: sicut si aliquis frequenter aut semper madefacit sibi pedes, quando vadit ad locum lutosum, et hoc licet non intendat, tamen hoc non dicitur esse a fortuna. Rather, it is the end of those things that come to be as proposed by the intellect. But, if someone acting under such a proposal should go in order to take money away, or if he always or frequently takes money away when he comes, this would not be said to be by fortune, just as, if anyone frequently or always soaks his feet when he goes to a muddy place, it would not be said that this is due to fortune, even though he did not intend it. 216. Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est ergo etc., concludit ex praemissis definitionem fortunae. Et dicit manifestum esse ex praemissis quod fortuna est causa per accidens in his quae fiunt secundum propositum propter finem in minori parte. Et ex hoc patet quod fortuna et intellectus sunt circa idem: quia his tantum convenit agere a fortuna, quae habent intellectum; propositum enim vel voluntas non est sine intellectu. Et licet ea tantum agant a fortuna, quae habent intellectum, tamen quanto aliquid magis subiacet intellectui, tanto minus subiacet fortunae. 216. Next, at it is clear (197a5), he gives a definition of fortune that is drawn from what was said above. He says that it is clear from the foregoing that fortune is a per accidens cause in those things that come to be in a few instances according to what is proposed for the sake of an end. And from this it is clear that fortune and intellect pertain to the same thing. For only those who have an intellect act by fortune, for there is no proposal or will without intellect. And, although only those who have an intellect act by fortune, still the more something is subject to the intellect, the less is it subject to fortune. Lectio 9 Lecture 9 Ratio eorum quae tum a philosophis antiquis tum ab hominibus vulgariter de fortuna dicuntur The meaning of what is said about fortune Infinitas quidem igitur causas necesse est esse, a quibus utique fiat quod est fortuna. Unde videtur fortuna infinita esse, et immanifesta homini. It is necessary, no doubt, that the causes of what comes to pass by fortune be indefinite, and that is why fortune is supposed to belong to the class of the indefinite and to be inscrutable to man. Et est ut a fortuna nihil videatur utique fieri. Omnia quidem enim haec recte dicuntur, quoniam rationabiliter. And this is also why it might be thought that, in a way, nothing occurs by fortune. For all these statements are correct, because they are well grounded. Est quidem enim ut sit a fortuna. Et secundum accidens enim fit, et est causa sicut accidens fortuna; Things do, in a way, occur by fortune, for they occur incidentally and fortune is an incidental cause. ut autem simpliciter, nullius. But, strictly, it is not the cause—without qualification—of anything; Ut domus aedificator quidem causa est, secundum accidens autem tibicen; for instance, a house builder is the cause of a house, but incidentally, a flute player may be so. et venientem referendi argentum, non huius causa venientem, infinitae sunt multitudine; And the causes of the man’s coming and getting the money (when he did not come for the sake of that) are innumerable. etenim videre aliquem volens, et persequens, et fugiens, et visurus. He may have wished to see somebody or been following somebody or avoiding somebody, or may have gone to see a spectacle. Et fortunam dicere esse aliquid extra rationem, recte est. Ratio enim aut est eorum quae semper sunt, aut eorum quae sunt frequenter: fortuna autem in his quae fiunt praeter haec. Quare quoniam infinitae quae sic causae sunt, et fortuna infinita est. Thus, to say that fortune is a thing contrary to rule is correct. For rule applies to what is always true or true for the most part, whereas fortune belongs to a third type of event. Hence, to conclude, since causes of this kind are indefinite, fortune too is indefinite. Tamen deficiet in quibusdam utique aliquis. Numquid igitur quaevis utique fiant fortunae causae: ut sanitatis aut spiritus aut aestus, sed non depilari? Sunt autem aliae aliis proximiores quae sunt secundum accidens causarum. (Yet, in some cases, one might raise the question whether any incidental fact might be the cause of the fortune occurrence, such as when the cause of health may be the fresh air or the sun’s heat, but having had one’s hair cut cannot be; for some incidental causes are more relevant to the effect than others.) Fortuna autem bona quidem dicitur cum bonum aliquid evenit: prava autem cum pravum aliquid. Fortune is called “good” when the result is good, and “evil” when it is evil. Eufortunium autem et infortunium est, cum magnitudinem habent haec. Quocirca et cum parum abest ut quis malum seu bonum capiat magnum, infortunatum vel bene fortunatum esse dicitur: quoniam sicut est dicit intellectus; quod enim parum, tanquam nihil distare videtur. The terms “good fortune” and “ill fortune” are used when either result is of considerable magnitude. Thus, one who comes within an ace of some great evil or great good is said to be fortunate or unfortunate. The mind affirms the essence of the attribute, ignoring the hair’s breadth of difference. Amplius incertum eufortunium rationabiliter est: fortuna enim incerta est. Neque enim ut semper, neque sicut frequenter possibile esse eorum quae sunt a fortuna quidquam. Further, it is with reason that good fortune is regarded as unstable; for fortune is unstable, as none of the things that result from it can be invariable or normal. Sunt quidem igitur ambo causae, quemadmodum dictum est, secundum accidens, et fortuna et casus, in contingentibus fieri neque simpliciter neque sicut frequenter, et eorum quaecumque utique fient propter aliquid. Both fortune and chance are, then, as I have said, incidental causes in the sphere of things that are capable of coming to pass neither simply nor frequently, and with reference to such of these as might come to pass for the sake of something. 217. Posita definitione fortunae, hic ex praemissa definitione assignat rationem eorum quae de fortuna dicuntur. 217. Having given the definition of fortune, he establishes from this definition the meaning of those things that are said about fortune. Et primo eorum quae dicta sunt a philosophis antiquis de fortuna; First, he considers those things that the ancient philosophers said about fortune. secundo eorum quae ab hominibus vulgariter de fortuna dicuntur, ibi: et fortunam dicere etc. Second, at thus, to say (197a18; [219]), he considers those things that the common man says about fortune. Posuit autem supra tres opiniones de fortuna et casu, quarum mediam improbavit tanquam omnino falsam; quia scilicet ponebat fortunam esse causam caeli et mundanorum omnium. He has given above three opinions concerning fortune and chance. And he disproved the second of these opinions as being altogether false, for this position held that fortune is the cause of the heavens and of all worldly things. Unde ea subtracta de medio, primo assignat quomodo veritatem habet tertia opinio, quae ponebat fortunam esse immanifestam homini; Thus, having rejected the second opinion, he here shows that the third opinion, which holds that fortune is hidden to man, is true. secundo quomodo veritatem habeat prima opinio, quae posuit nihil fieri a fortuna et a casu, ibi: et est ut a fortuna etc. Second, at and this is also why (197a10; [218]), he shows how the first opinion, which holds that nothing comes to be by fortune or chance, might be true. Quia autem superius dictum est quod causae per accidens sunt infinitae; et iterum dictum est quod fortuna est causa per accidens; concludit ex praemissis quod eius quod est a fortuna, sunt infinitae causae. Et quia infinitum, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum, inde est quod fortuna immanifesta est homini. Since it was said above that per accidens causes are infinite, and also that fortune is a per accidens cause, he concludes from this that the causes of that which is by fortune are infinite. And, since the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown, it follows that fortune is hidden to man. 218. Deinde cum dicit: et est ut a fortuna etc., ostendit quomodo prima opinio veritatem habeat: et dicit quod quodammodo est verum dicere quod a fortuna nihil fit. Haec enim omnia quae ab aliis dicta sunt de fortuna, quodammodo recte dicuntur, quia rationem aliquam habent. Cum enim fortuna sit causa per accidens, sequitur quod a fortuna sit aliquid per accidens; quod autem est per accidens, non est simpliciter; unde sequitur quod fortuna simpliciter nullius sit causa. 218. Next, at and this is also why (197a10), he shows how the first opinion might be true. He says that, in a way, it is true to say that nothing comes to be by fortune. For all of those things that others say about fortune are in a certain respect true, because they have some meaning. Since fortune is a per accidens cause, it follows that what is by fortune is something per accidens. But what is per accidens is not simply. Hence it follows that fortune is not the cause of anything simply. Et hoc quod dixerat circa utramque opinionem, manifestat per exempla: et dicit quod sicut aedificator est causa per se domus et simpliciter, tibicen autem est causa domus per accidens; similiter quod aliquis veniat ad aliquem locum non causa deportandi argentum, est causa reportationis per accidens. And he clarifies what he has said about each of these opinions through an example. He says that, as the builder is the per se cause of a house and is the cause simply, whereas the flute player is a per accidens cause of the house, in like manner, the fact that someone should come to a place with no intention of taking money away is a per accidens cause of carrying it away. Sed haec causa per accidens infinita est: quia infinitis aliis de causis potest homo ire ad locum illum; puta si vadat causa visitandi aliquem, vel causa persequendi hostem, vel causa fugiendi persequentem, vel causa videndi aliqua spectabilia. Omnia autem ista et quaecumque similia sunt causa reportationis argenti quae contingit a fortuna. But this per accidens cause is infinite, because it is possible for a man to go to that place because of an infinity of other reasons, such as if he came to visit someone, or to pursue an enemy, or to escape from a pursuer, or to see a show of some sort. Now, all these things and anything similar are causes of the taking of money that happens by chance. 219. Deinde cum dicit: et fortunam dicere etc., assignat rationem eorum quae dicuntur de fortuna vulgariter. 219. Next, at thus, to say (197a18), he explains the meaning of those things that are commonly said about fortune. Et primo assignat rationem eius quod dicitur de fortuna, esse sine ratione; First, he explains why it is said that what is by fortune is without reason; secundo eius quod dicitur, fortunam esse bonam vel malam, ibi: fortuna autem dicitur etc. second, at fortune is called (197a25; [222]), he explains why it is said that fortune is good or bad.