403. Deinde cum dicit: intelligentiae autem credere etc., solvit rationem quae sumitur ex parte intellectus et imaginationis, quam antiqui non distinguebant ab intellectu. Per hanc autem rationem supra ostendebatur quod esset spatium infinitum extra caelum, et per consequens locus et corpus. 403. Then, at to rely on mere thinking (208a14), he solves the argument based on the intellect and the imagination, which the ancients did not distinguish from the intellect. This argument above concluded that there was outside the universe an infinite space, and consequently a place and a body. Sed ipse dicit quod inconveniens est credere intelligentiae, ita scilicet quod quidquid apprehenditur intellectu vel imaginatione sit verum, ut quidam antiquorum putaverunt, quorum opinio reprobatur in IV Metaphys. Non enim sequitur, si apprehendo aliquam rem minorem vel maiorem quam sit, quod sit aliqua abundantia vel defectus in re illa, sed solum in apprehensione intellectus vel imaginationis. Potest enim aliquis intelligere quemcumque hominem esse multiplicem eius quod est, idest duplum vel triplum vel qualitercumque augmentans in infinitum: non tamen propter hoc erit aliqua huiusmodi quantitas multiplicata extra intellectum, aut extra determinatam quantitatem aut magnitudinem: sed contingit quod re sic existente, aliquis ita intelligat. But he says that to rely on mere thinking is incorrect, that is, to believe that whatever is apprehended by the imagination or intellect is true, as some of the ancients thought, whose opinion is refuted in Metaphysics 4. For if I apprehend a thing as smaller or larger than it is, it does not thereby follow that there is such an abundance or defect in the object itself, but only in the apprehension of the intellect or imagination. For one might understand some man to be a multiple of himself—that is, two or three times larger than he really is (or any other amount to infinity)—yet there will not be, because of this, a corresponding multiplication of him outside the intellect or outside a definite quantity or magnitude. But, while a thing remains what it is, one can conceive of it in such a manner. 404. Deinde cum dicit: tempus autem et motus etc., solvit rationem acceptam ex tempore et motu. Et dicit quod tempus et motus sunt infinita non in actu, quia nihil est temporis in actu nisi nunc; neque aliquid motus est in actu nisi quoddam indivisibile: sed intellectus apprehendit continuitatem temporis et motus, accipiendo ordinem prioris et posterioris: ita tamen quod id quod primo fuit acceptum de tempore vel motu, non permanet sic. Unde non oportet dicere quod totus motus infinitus sit in actu, vel totum tempus infinitum. 404. Then, at indeed, time (208a20), he solves the difficulty based on time and motion. And he says that time and motion are not infinite in act, because nothing of time is actual but the “now,” and nothing of motion is actual except a kind of indivisible. But the intellect apprehends a continuity in time and in motion by apprehending an order of “prior” and “posterior,” but in such a way that what was first taken in time or in motion does not remain in the same state. Hence, it is not necessary to say that the whole of motion is infinite, or that the whole of time is infinite. 405. Deinde cum dicit: magnitudo autem neque divisione etc., solvit rationem sumptam ex parte magnitudinis. Et dicit quod magnitudo non est infinita in actu neque per divisionem neque per augmentationem intelligibilem, sicut ex supra dictis patet. 405. Then, at magnitude is not infinite (208a21), he solves the argument based on magnitude, and he says that magnitude is not infinite in act, either as a result of division or as a result of an intelligible increase, as is evident from what was said above. Ultimo autem epilogat quod dictum est de infinito. Finally, he summarizes by saying that we have completed our study of the infinite. Liber 4 Book 4 Delta (Δ) Place, Void, and Time Lectio 1 Lecture 1 Ad philosophum naturalem pertinet determinare de loco. Rationes ad ostendendum locum esse Natural science studies place Similiter autem necesse est naturalem et de loco, sicut et de infinito, considerare si est aut non, et quomodo est, et quid est. The physicist must have a knowledge of place, too, as well as of the infinite—namely, whether there is such a thing or not, and the manner of its existence and what it is, Et ea namque quae sunt, omnes opinantur alicubi esse. Quod enim non est, nusquam est: ubi enim est tragelaphus aut sphinx? both because all suppose that things that exist are somewhere (the non-existent is nowhere—where is the goat-stag or the sphinx?) Et de motu, qui communis maxime est et magis proprius secundum locum est quem vocamus loci mutationem. and because “motion” in its most general and primary sense is change of place, which we call “locomotion.” Habet autem multas dubitationes, quid forte sit locus. Non enim idem videtur considerantibus ex omnibus quae insunt. The question as to what place is presents many difficulties. An examination of all the relevant facts seems to lead to divergent conclusions. Amplius autem neque habemus quidquam ab aliis neque praedubitatum neque bene exquisitum de hoc. Moreover, we have inherited nothing from previous thinkers, whether in the way of a statement of difficulties or of a solution. Quod quidem igitur locus sit, videtur ex transmutatione manifestum esse. Ubi namque nunc est aqua, hinc exeunte sicut ex vase, iterum aer inest: aliquando autem eundem locum hunc aliud aliquod corporum detinet. Hoc autem ab iis quae insunt et commutantur, alterum omnibus esse videtur: in quo enim aer est nunc, aqua in hoc prius erat. Quare manifestum est quod erat locus aliquid, et receptaculum alterum ab utrisque, in quod et ex quo mutatum est. The existence of place is held to be obvious from the fact of mutual replacement. Where water now is, there in turn air is present when the water has gone out as from a vessel. When, therefore, another body occupies this same place, the place is thought to be different from all the bodies that come to be in it and replace one another. What now contains air formerly contained water, such that the place or space into which and out of which they passed was clearly something different from both. Amplius autem loci mutationes physicorum corporum et simplicium, ut ignis et terrae et talium, non solum ostendunt quod aliquid est locus, sed quod et habet quandam potentiam. Fertur enim unumquodque in suum locum non prohibitum, hoc quidem sursum, illud autem deorsum. Hae autem sunt loci partes et species, sursum et deorsum, et reliquae sex distantiarum. Sunt autem huiusmodi non solum ad nos, dextrorsum, sinistrorsum, sursum et deorsum. Nobis enim non semper idem, sed secundum positionem quomodocumque vertamur fit: propter quod idem multoties dextrum et sinistrum est, et sursum et deorsum, et ante et retro. Further, the typical locomotions of the elementary natural bodies—namely, fire, earth, and the like—show not only that place is something but also that it has a certain power. Each is carried to its own place if it is not hindered, the one up, the other down. Now these are regions or kinds of place—up and down and the rest of the six directions. Nor do such distinctions (up and down, right and left, and the like) hold only in relation to us. They are not always the same in relation to us, but change with the direction in which we are turned, which is why the same thing may be both right and left, up and down, or before and behind. In natura autem determinatum est seorsum unumquodque. Non enim quodcumque contingit, sursum est, sed quo fertur ignis et leve; similiter autem et deorsum, non quodcumque contingit, sed quo habentia gravitatem et terrea: tanquam non positione solum differentia, sed potentia. Ostendunt autem et mathematica. But, in nature, each is distinct, taken apart by itself. It is not every chance direction that is “up,” but where fire and what is light are carried; similarly, too, “down” is not any chance direction, but where what has weight and what is made of earth are carried—the implication being that these places do not differ merely in relative position, but also as possessing distinct potencies. This is made plain also by the objects studied by mathematics. Cum enim non sint in loco, tamen secundum positionem ad nos habent dextra et sinistra: quare solum est intelligere ipsorum positionem, non habentia natura horum unumquodque. Though they have no real place, they nevertheless, in respect of their position relative to us, have a right and left as attributes ascribed to them only in consequence of their relative position, not having by nature these various characteristics. Amplius, vacuum affirmantes locum dicunt esse. Vacuum enim erit utique locus privatus corpore. Quod quidem igitur sit aliquid locus praeter corpora, et omne corpus sensibile in loco esse, per hoc aliquis concipiet. Again, the theory that the void exists involves the existence of place, for one would define void as place bereft of body. These considerations, then, would lead us to suppose that place is something distinct from bodies, and that every sensible body is in place. Videbitur autem utique et Hesiodus recte dicere, faciens primum chaos. Dicit igitur: omnium quidem primum chaos factum est, postea vero terra lata; tanquam indigeret primum esse receptaculum iis quae sunt: propter id quod opinati sunt, quemadmodum multi, omnia alicubi et in loco esse. Si autem huiusmodi est, mirabilis quaedam utique erit potentia loci, et prima omnium. Sine quo namque aliorum nullum est, illud autem sine aliis, necesse est primum esse: non enim perditur locus, iis quae sunt in eo corruptis. Hesiod also might be held to have given a correct account of it when he made chaos first. At least he says: “First of all things came chaos to being, then broad-breasted earth,” implying that things need to have space first, because he thought, with most people, that everything is somewhere and in place. If this is its nature, the potency of place must be a marvelous thing, and take precedence over all other things. For that without which nothing else can exist, while it can exist without the others, must needs be first; for place does not pass out of existence when the things in it are annihilated. 406. Postquam Philosophus determinavit in tertio de motu et infinito, quod competit motui intrinsece, secundum quod est de genere continuorum, nunc in quarto libro intendit determinare de iis quae adveniunt motui extrinsece. 406. After treating in book 3 of motion and the infinite, which belongs intrinsically to motion insofar as it is in the genus of continuous things, the Philosopher now intends, in book 4, to deal with the things that are extrinsically connected with motion: Et primo de iis quae adveniunt motui extrinsece quasi mensurae mobilis; first, of things that are connected with motion extrinsically as measures of mobile things; secundo de tempore, quod est mensura ipsius motus, ibi: consequens autem dictis etc. second, of time, which is the measure of motion itself, at next for discussion (217b29; [558]). Circa primum duo facit: As to the first, he does two things: primo determinat de loco; first, he studies place; secundo de vacuo, ibi: eodem autem modo accipiendum etc. second, the void, at the investigation (213a11; [494]). Circa primum duo facit: About the first, he does two things: primo ostendit quod determinandum est a naturali de loco; first, he shows that it is the business of the natural philosopher to study place; secundo prosequitur propositum, ibi: quod quidem igitur locus sit etc. second, he carries out his proposition, at the existence of place (208b1; [410]). Circa primum duo facit. As to the first, he does two things. Primo proponit quod intendit: et dicit quod sicut ad naturalem pertinet determinare de infinito, si est vel non est, et quomodo sit, et quid sit, similiter etiam et de loco. First (208a27), he proposes what he intends and says that, just as it is the business of the natural philosopher to determine about the infinite (namely, whether it exists or not, and how it exists, and what it is), so also about place. Secundo ibi: et ea namque quae sunt etc., probat quod dixerat: Second, at both because all suppose (208a29; [407]), he proves what he had said: et primo ex parte ipsius loci; first, from the viewpoint of place itself; secundo ex parte nostra, ibi: habet autem multas dubitationes etc. second, from our viewpoint, at the question (208a32; [409]). 407. Circa primum ponit duas rationes: quarum prima talis est. Ea quae sunt communia omnibus naturalibus, pertinent maxime ad considerationem naturalis; sed locus est huiusmodi: omnes enim communiter opinantur omnia ea quae sunt, in aliquo loco esse. Et ad hoc probandum utuntur sophistico argumento a positione consequentis. Argumentantur enim sic. Quod non est, nusquam est, idest in nullo loco est: non enim est dare ubi sit Tragelaphus aut sphinx, quae sunt quaedam fictitia sicut Chimaera. Argumentatur ergo quod si id quod in nullo loco est, non sit; ergo omne quod est, est in loco. 407. About the first, he gives two reasons, of which the following is the first (208a29). Whatever things are common to all natural things pertain especially to the considerations of the natural philosopher. But place is such, for all generally maintain that whatever exists is in some place. They prove it by a sophistic argument consisting of positing the consequent. They argue thus: what does not exist is nowhere, in no place, for there is no place where the goat-stag or the sphinx exist (these are certain fictions after the manner of chimeras). They therefore argue that, if what is found in no place does not exist, then whatever exists is in a place. Sed si esse in loco convenit omnibus entibus, videtur quod locus magis pertineat ad considerationem metaphysici quam physici. Et dicendum est quod hic argumentatur ab opinione ponentium omnia entia esse sensibilia, propter hoc quod imaginationem corporum transcendere non possunt: et secundum hos naturalis scientia est philosophia prima, communis omnibus entibus, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. But, if to be in place belongs to all beings, it seems that place pertains to the consideration of metaphysics rather than to that of physics. And it must be said that Aristotle here argues from the opinion of those who posit that all beings are sensible, on account of their inability to go beyond their imaginations. According to them, natural science is first philosophy, common to all beings, as is mentioned in Metaphysics 4.