Est autem aliquid speciale in hominibus. In aliis enim animalibus natura dedit sufficienter ea quae ad conservationem vitae pertinent, ut cornua ad defendendum, corium grossum et pilosum ad tegendum, ungulas vel aliquid huiusmodi ad incedendum sine laesione. Et sic cum talia animalia dicuntur armata vel vestita vel calceata, quodammodo non denominantur ab aliquo extrinseco, sed ab aliquibus suis partibus. Unde hoc refertur in his ad praedicamentum substantiae: ut puta si diceretur quod homo est manuatus vel pedatus. There is a special predicament for human beings. In other animals, nature provided the requirements for preserving life, such as horns for defense, a tough and woolly hide as a covering, and claws or the like for proceeding without harm. Hence, when animals are said to be “armed” or “covered” or “shod” by reason of this equipment, they are somehow so called not by reason of something extrinsic, but of something intrinsic, something that is part of them. Hence, such are referred to the predicament of “substance,” as the same would be if man were said to be endowed with hands or feet. Sed huiusmodi non poterant dari homini a natura, tum quia non conveniebant subtilitati complexionis eius, tum propter multiformitatem operum quae conveniunt homini inquantum habet rationem, quibus aliqua determinata instrumenta accommodari non poterant a natura: sed loco omnium inest homini ratio, qua exteriora sibi praeparat loco horum quae aliis animalibus intrinseca sunt. Unde cum homo dicitur armatus vel vestitus vel calceatus, denominatur ab aliquo extrinseco, quod non habet rationem neque causae, neque mensurae: unde est speciale praedicamentum, et dicitur habitus. But the other things could not be endowed upon man by nature, both because they would be out of keeping with the precise balance of his constitution and because reason makes man capable of an enormous number of works, for the performance of which nature could not have endowed him with specific instruments. In the place of all these instruments, man has reason, which he can use to make for himself the things that are intrinsic to other animals. So, when a man is said to be armed or clothed or shod, he is denominated thus by reason of something extrinsic to him that is neither a cause nor a measure. Hence it is located in a special predicament called “habit.” Sed attendendum est quod etiam aliis animalibus hoc praedicamentum attribuitur, non secundum quod in sua natura considerantur, sed secundum quod in hominis usum veniunt; ut si dicamus equum phaleratum vel sellatum seu armatum. But we should not fail to note that this predicament is, in certain matters, used also for other animals, not inasmuch as they are considered in their nature, but insofar as they are put at the service of man. Thus we say that a horse is caparisoned or saddled or armed. 323. Sic igitur patet quod licet motus sit unus, tamen praedicamenta quae sumuntur secundum motum, sunt duo, secundum quod a diversis rebus exterioribus fiunt praedicamentales denominationes. Nam alia res est agens, a qua sicut ab exteriori, sumitur per modum denominationis praedicamentum passionis: et alia res est patiens a qua denominatur agens. Et sic patet solutio primae dubitationis. 323. This makes it clear that, although motion is one, yet there are two predicaments that are based on motion, depending on the different external things according to which the predicamental denominations are made. For an agent is one thing from which, as from something external, the predicament of “passion” is taken; and the patient is some other thing from which something is denominated an agent. This solves the first difficulty. 324. Secunda autem dubitatio de facili solvitur. Nam ratio motus completur non solum per id quod est de motu in rerum natura, sed etiam per id quod ratio apprehendit. De motu enim in rerum natura nihil aliud est quam actus imperfectus, qui est inchoatio quaedam actus perfecti in eo quod movetur: sicut in eo quod dealbatur, iam incipit esse aliquid albedinis. Sed ad hoc quod illud imperfectum habeat rationem motus, requiritur ulterius quod intelligamus ipsum quasi medium inter duo; quorum praecedens comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, unde motus dicitur actus; consequens vero comparatur ad ipsum sicut perfectum ad imperfectum vel actus ad potentiam, propter quod dicitur actus existentis in potentia, ut supra dictum est. 324. The second doubt is easy to solve. For the account of motion depends not only on that which pertains to motion in reality but also on that which reason apprehends. In reality, motion is nothing more than an imperfect act, which is a sort of beginning of a perfect act in that which is being moved; thus, in that which is becoming white, some whiteness has begun to be. But, in order that what is imperfect have the account of motion, it is further required that we understand it as a mean between two. The one mentioned earlier is compared to motion as potency to act (hence motion is called act). The consequent one is compared to motion as the perfect to the imperfect or as act to potency; hence motion is called the act of a being that exists in potency, as we said above. Unde quodcumque imperfectum accipiatur ut non in aliud perfectum tendens, dicitur terminus motus et non erit motus secundum quem aliquid moveatur; utpote si aliquid incipiat dealbari, et statim alteratio interrumpatur. But anything imperfect, if it is not considered to be tending on to something other as perfect, is called the terminus of motion, and one will not have a motion according to which something is being moved—as, for example, if something should start to become white and then the alteration was immediately stopped. Quantum igitur ad id quod in rerum natura est de motu, motus ponitur per reductionem in illo genere quod terminat motum, sicut imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum, ut supra dictum est. Therefore, in regard to what there is of motion in external reality, motion is placed reductively in that genus that terminates the motion as the imperfect is reduced to the perfect, as stated above. Sed quantum ad id quod ratio apprehendit circa motum, scilicet esse medium quoddam inter duos terminos, sic iam implicatur ratio causae et effectus: nam reduci aliquid de potentia in actum, non est nisi ab aliqua causa agente. Et secundum hoc motus pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis: haec enim duo praedicamenta accipiuntur secundum rationem causae agentis et effectus, ut dictum est. But, in regard to what reason apprehends about motion—namely, that it is midway between two terms—here the account of cause and effect are brought in, because, for something to be reduced from potency to act, an agent cause is required. From this aspect, motion pertains to the predicaments of “action” and “passion,” for these two predicaments are based on the accounts of acting cause and of effect, as was said above. 325. Deinde cum dicit: quid quidem igitur motus etc., definit motum in particulari: et dicit quod dictum est quid sit motus et in universali et in particulari; quia ex hoc quod dictum est de definitione motus in universali, manifestum esse poterit quomodo definiatur in particulari. Si enim motus est actus mobilis secundum quod huiusmodi, sequitur quod alteratio sit actus alterabilis secundum quod huiusmodi: et sic de aliis. Et quia positum fuit in dubitatione, utrum motus sit actus moventis vel mobilis, et ostensum est quod est actus activi ut ab hoc, et passivi ut in hoc; ad tollendum omnem dubitationem aliquantulum notius dicamus quod motus est actus potentiae activi et passivi. Et sic etiam poterimus in particulari dicere quod aedificatio est actus aedificatoris et aedificabilis inquantum huiusmodi: et simile est de medicatione et aliis motibus. 325. Then, at what motion is, then (202b23), he defines motion more particularly. He says that we have pointed out what motion is both in general and in particular—because, from what was said about the definition of motion in general, it is clear how it can be defined in particular. For if motion is the act of the mobile as such, it follows that alteration is the act of the alterable as alterable, and so on for other particular kinds of motion. And, because there was a doubt whether motion is an act of the mover or of the mobile—and we showed that it is an act of the active as from it and of the passive as in it—then, to remove any further doubts, we can say somewhat more explicitly that motion is an act of the potency of that which is active and of that which is passive. In this way, we could have said that building is an act of the builder and of the buildable as such. The same is true of healing and of other motions. Lectio 6 Lecture 6 Pertinere ad physicam considerare de infinito. Antiquorum de illo sententiae The opinions of the ancients concerning the infinite Quoniam autem de natura scientia est circa magnitudines et tempus et motum, quorum unumquodque necesse est aut infinitum aut finitum esse (etsi non omne sit infinitum aut finitum, ut passio aut punctum: The science of nature is concerned with spatial magnitudes and motion and time, and each of these at least is necessarily infinite or finite, even if some things dealt with by the science are not, such as a point and a passion. talium enim fortasse nullum necesse est in altero horum esse); conveniens utique erit de natura negotiantem de infinito considerare si est aut non est, et si est, quid est. It is not necessary, perhaps, that such things should be put under either head. Hence, it is incumbent on the person who specializes in physics to discuss the infinite and to inquire whether there is such a thing or not, and if there is, what it is. Signum autem quod huius scientiae propria consideratio de ipso est: omnes enim qui videntur rationabiliter tetigisse huiusmodi philosophiam, fecerunt verbum de infinito. The appropriateness of this problem to the science is clearly indicated. All who have touched on this kind of science in a way worth considering have formulated views about the infinite, Et omnes tanquam principium quoddam ponunt eorum quae sunt. Alii quidem, quemadmodum Pythagorici et Plato, per se, non sicut accidens alicui alteri, sed sicut substantiam ipsum esse infinitum. and indeed, to a man, make it a principle of things. Some, as the Pythagoreans and Plato, make the infinite a principle in the sense of a self-subsistent substance, and not as a mere accident of some other thing. Praeter hoc quod Pythagorici quidem in sensibilibus (neque enim abstractum faciunt numerum), et esse extra caelum infinitum: Only the Pythagoreans place the infinite among the objects of sense (they do not regard number as separable from these) and assert that what is outside the heaven is infinite. Plato autem extra nullum esse corpus neque ideas, eo quod nusquam sint ipsae; tamen infinitum et in sensibilibus et in illis esse. Plato, on the other hand, holds that there is no body outside—the Forms are not outside because they are nowhere—yet that the infinite is present not only in the objects of sense but in these also. Et hi quidem infinitum esse parem: hic quidem enim comprehensus et sub impari reclusus, adhibet iis quae sunt infinitatem. Signum autem huius est quod contingit in numeris. Further, the Pythagoreans identify the infinite with the even. For this, they say, when it is cut off and shut in by the odd, provides things with the element of infinity. An indication of this is what happens with numbers. Circumpositis enim gnomonibus circa unum et extra, aliquando quidem aliam fieri speciem, aliquando autem unam. Plato autem duo infinita, magnum et parvum. By the addition of the gnomons to one and outside it, sometimes the figure that results is different, sometimes it is the same. But Plato has two infinites, the great and the small. Qui autem de natura omnes semper subiiciunt alteram quandam naturam dictorum elementorum infinito, ut aquam aut aerem aut medium horum. Finita autem facientium elementa, nullus infinita facit. The physicists, on the other hand, all of them, always regard the infinite as an attribute of a substance that is different from it and belongs to the class of the so-called elements—water or air or what is intermediate between them. Those who make them limited in number never make them infinite in amount. Quicumque autem infinita faciunt elementa, quemadmodum Anaxagoras et Democritus, ille quidem ex similibus partibus, hic autem ex omni semine figurarum per contactum continuum infinitum esse dicit. But those who make the elements infinite in number, as Anaxagoras and Democritus do, say that the infinite is continuous by contact—compounded of the homogeneous parts according to the one, and of the seed-mass of the atomic shapes according to the other. Et hic quidem quamlibet partem esse similiter mixtam toto, ex eo quod videt quodlibet ex quolibet fieri: Further, Anaxagoras held that any part is a mixture in the same way as the all, on the ground of the observed fact that anything comes out of anything. hinc etenim videtur et simul aliquando omnes res firmare esse, For it is probably for this reason that he maintains that, once upon a time, all things were together. ut haec caro et hoc os et sic quodlibet: et omnia itaque, et simul igitur. (This flesh and this bone were together, and so of any thing; therefore, all things were, and at the same time, too.) Principium enim non solum in unoquoque disgregationis, sed et omnium est. Quoniam enim quod fit, ex huiusmodi fit corpore; omnium autem est generatio, praeterquam quod non simul; For there is a beginning of separation not only for each thing, but for all. Each thing that comes to be comes from a similar body, and there is a generation of all things, though not, it is true, at the same time. et quoddam principium esse oportet generationis. Hoc autem est unum, quod ille vocat intellectum. Intellectus autem ex principio quodam operatur intelligens: quare necesse est simul aliquando omnia fuisse, et incoepisse moveri aliquando. Hence, there must also be an origin of generation. One such source there is that he calls mind, and mind begins its work of thinking from some starting point. So necessarily all things must have been together at a certain time, and must have begun to be moved at a certain time. Democritus autem nihil alterum ex altero fieri primorum dicit: sed tamen ipsum commune corpus omnium esse principium magnitudine, secundum partes et figura differens. Quod quidem igitur conveniens sit physicis haec speculatio, manifestum ex his. Democritus, for his part, asserts the contrary, namely, that no element arises from another element. Nevertheless, for him, the common body is a source of all things, differing from part to part in size and in shape. It is then clear from these considerations that the inquiry concerns the physicist. Rationabiliter autem et principium ipsum ponunt omnes. Neque enim frustra possibile est ipsum esse, neque aliam ipsi inesse potentiam nisi sicut principium: omnia enim principium sunt, aut ex principio: infiniti autem non est principium; esset enim utique finis ipsius. Nor is it without reason that they all make it a principle. We cannot say that the infinite is in vain, and the only effectiveness that we can ascribe to it is that of a principle. Everything is either a principle or derived from a principle. But there cannot be a principle of the infinite or limitless, for that would be an end of it. Amplius autem et ingenitum et incorruptibile, si est quoddam principium: quodcumque enim fit, necesse est accipere finem, et finis omnis est corruptionis. Further, as it is a beginning, it is both uncreatable and indestructible. For there must be a point at which what has come to be reaches its end, and also an end of all passing away. Quare, sicuti dicimus, non est huius principium, sed hoc aliorum videtur esse; et continere omnia et gubernare: sicut affirmant quicumque non faciunt praeter infinitum alias causas, ut intellectum aut concordiam. That is why, as we say, there is no principle of this, but it is this that is held to be the principle of other things, and to encompass all and to steer all, as those assert who do not recognize, alongside the infinite, other causes, such as mind or friendship. Et hoc esse divinum: immortale enim et incorruptibile est, sicut affirmant Anaximander et plurimi philosophorum. Further, they identify it with the divine, for it is “deathless and imperishable,” as Anaximander says, with the majority of the physicists. 326. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de motu, hic incipit determinare de infinito. 326. After settling motion, the Philosopher now begins to treat of the infinite. Et primo ostendit quod ad scientiam naturalem pertinet determinare de infinito; First, he shows that natural science should treat of the infinite; secundo incipit determinare, ibi: esse autem infinitum etc. second, he begins to treat of the infinite, at belief in the existence (203b15; [336]). Circa primum duo facit: As to the first, he does two things: primo ostendit quod ad scientiam naturalem pertinet determinare de infinito; first, he shows that it pertains to natural science to treat of the infinite;